Psychological Warfare against Nazi Germany

The Sykewar Campaign, D-Day to VE-Day

Daniel Lerner

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Daniel Lerner

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To

THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER

LOUIS LERNER

whose account of Tsarist pogroms
became my first lesson in
psychological warfare

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To the Original Edition

Three years ago I was encouraged to undertake this study by the two men who now, coincidentally, edit the series in which it appears. Dr. Harold D. Lasswell is the creditor of every American writer on propaganda, for the scientific study of communication still operates largely within the intellectual framework he began to provide two decades ago. My own debt to him is very great. Dr. Saul K. Padover was a colleague throughout the Sykewar campaign here described, and his brilliant achievements in field intelligence were a lesson to us all. Both men have been unfailing sources of aid and enlightenment.

I cannot thank here by name all my former Sykewar colleagues whose generous contributions of time and patience have gone into the study. The Foreword by General McClure and the Supplement by R. H. S. Crossman speak for themselves. I was saved from many errors by my former chief, Murray I. Gurfein, and by other critical friends who read all or parts of the manuscript: Hans Speier, W. Phillips Davison, Edward A. Shils, Henry V. Dicks, Morris Janowitz, and Joseph M. Goldsen. C. D. Jackson made available the rich experience stored both in his head and in his files, as did Martin F. Herz, Gerard Speyer, Richard F. Hanser, and Arthur T. Hadley. The excellent preliminary account of PWD operations edited by Richard Hollander, and that of P & PW by Gordon H. Cole, have been most useful. To name these men is not to implicate them by association, for each would have told this story in a different way. In naming only these few, I wish to express my gratitude to all the others.

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Since only a fool counts *all* his blessings in public, I shall say nothing here of the debt I owe my wife, Jean W. Lerner, except to acknowledge that she saw the book from pencilled notes through printed proofs.

DANIEL LERNER

The Hoover Institute
Stanford University, California
May, 1949

INTRODUCTION: PART 1

DANIEL LERNER

THE REPRINTING of this book in paperback calls for some reappraisal of the role of psychological warfare during the conclusive phase of World War II in Europe, from the Normandy landings on D-Day (June 6, 1944) to the unconditional surrender of Germany on VE-Day (May 8, 1945). The final campaign conducted by SHAEF/ETO (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force/European Theater of Operations) exhibits some special features in the annals of warfare, just as the management of its symbols under PWD/SHAEF (Psychological Warfare Division /SHAEF) exhibits some special features in the history of psychological warfare. The Sykewar campaign described in this book is first of all notable for how it defined the ancient and recurrent problems of psychological warfare to suit its own needs; from this definition, constructed in terms of high policy and war aims, followed more or less consistently the sequence of decisions regulating psychological operations throughout the campaign. These policy definitions and operational decisions constitute the unique configuration of psychological warfare against Germany from D-Day to VE-Day.

Much that happened before this campaign was crucial, as I indicate at the start by citing Churchill's major speech to Parliament on the highly sensitive subject of war aims. Much that happened after Germany surrendered merits, and has received, intensive study — notably in the Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) and other works cited in the text. Thus, the reader will find connective tissue joining the book to the prehistory and posthistory of psychological warfare against Nazi Germany. But the focus is on what happened *during* this unique campaign of psychological warfare.

It is relevant, in undertaking a reappraisal of the campaign, to illustrate what was special in the PWD/SHAEF/ETO configuration by telling a story about Churchill. He was closer

than Roosevelt to our headquarters in Paris, and he used this proximity to visit us more often. He usually had something to say about what we were doing, as he phrased it, "on the propaganda side." Indeed, on the occasion I am recalling, he stormed into SHAEF headquarters, waving one of our leaflets, with the command: "Kill this!" The leaflet was one of a series addressed to the dockworkers of Hamburg, Bremen, and other North German seaports. The full text of the leaflet is reproduced opposite page 238 of this book (Leaflet W.G. 54, "To the Workers and Port Officials of Hamburg!"). Churchill objected that we didn't need to "plead" with dockworkers to keep their docks in working order for our purposes in Germany; we had enough docks already, and we could open others as we needed them. Had we heeded Churchill, our psychological warfare campaign would have lost the power latent in this relatively minor manifest message. For while Churchill was right on the "reality" of the North Sea ports, he was quite wrong on the "psychology" of this leaflet. Its latent message went far beyond the issue of dockage to tell readers such things as: we are winning and our final victory will come soon; you can do nothing to change this but may make life easier for you and yours, after our victory, by doing as we tell you; thus your own future, under our dispensation, depends on what you do now.

This leaflet, and dozens like it addressed to towns and cities *before* strategic bombing, was primarily designed to reduce resistance and habituate German civilians to obeying allied instructions. It was on this ground that PWD defended the leaflet series against Churchill's airy dismissal and won its case at the highest decision-making level of SHAEF. Whatever the future need for dockage might be, there was a clear and present Allied interest in persuading German civilians to cease resistance and obey our orders.

The devious reasoning illustrated by this incident reminds us that in some respects psychological warfare is only a recent name for an ancient activity. Some of its operational modes are "no newer than the rumors whispered about Hannibal and the methods used by George Washington among the Hessians." * The handling of besieged cities is a case in point. The book traces (pp. 272–281) the siege tactics used in World War II —

* General Robert A. McClure, Foreword to the original edition of this book.

notably the prolonged siege of Aachen, the ancient *Kaiserstadt* on Germany's westernmost border and the first city to be occupied by Allied troops — from Joshua at the walls of Jericho through the Trojan Horse used in ancient Attica, the psychic ritual of *evocatio* practiced by the Romans (a ritual dating back to the Hittites), and the countersubversive modes advocated by Machiavelli to the "terror-bombing" (for psychic more than physical effect) of the Spanish Civil War dramatized by Archibald MacLeish in *Fall of the City*.

The historical lineage of psychological warfare is a fruitful study, for in showing how recurrent problems of psychology under wartime conditions have been solved in the diverse situations of the past, it brings the varieties of human experience to bear on the problems of the present. Yet each situation incorporates enough features of its own to make a special configuration; we take it as an axiom that in some respect every human experience is like all others, like some others, and like no others. If we focus here upon the distinctive aspects of psychological warfare in World War II, it is to provide a historical record of this particular configuration as it dealt with the ancient and recurrent problems of wartime propaganda. More generally conceived, our concern is with the problems of propaganda under conditions of war and crisis, since these appear increasingly to be the chronic state of the world we live in.*

From this perspective, the World War II experience has much to teach us. Subsequent propaganda campaigns carried out under conditions of war and crisis — by the British in Malaya, by the Dutch in Indonesia, by the French in Algeria, by the Americans in Korea and Vietnam — have been executed and interpreted within severe, perhaps excessive, constraints of localism. The localized character of psychological warfare in these situations was determined largely by the high policy directives that have conditioned world politics during the postwar years, that is, the psychological code of the Cold War.

That the Cold War code constrained and localized the execution of psychological warfare operations in embattled areas is fitting and proper, since wartime propaganda must be the controlled instrument of high policy. That is certainly a major

* In order to document these conditions from a wider variety of perspectives, I edited *Propaganda in War and Crisis* (New York: George W. Stewart, 1951) as a companion volume to the original edition of this book.

lesson to be drawn from the experience of World War II, as described in the first chapter of this book. But the analysis, interpretation, and evaluation of such operations after the event need not — indeed, should not — be so constrained and controlled by policy directives. The endless task of postmortems is to prevent premortems. The aim of the study of psychological warfare as a policy science is to interpret past experience so as to improve future performance. Scholarship serves policy not by obeying it — that is the job of operations — but by improving it. The second chapter of this book, and in particular the section dealing with "Problems of Unconditional Surrender," attempts to do just that by subjecting high policy to critical analysis.

It is worth dwelling a moment on the issue of unconditional surrender. The conclusion I reached after three years of postwar study was based on evidence that I, as the Intelligence officer in charge of the PWD weekly digest, evaluated continuously during the war and that, as European representative of the Library of Congress, I reviewed closely after the war. My conclusion ran counter to the prevailing wartime opinion of my Sykewar colleagues, particularly those on the "output" side of PWD/SHAEF, and to the postwar judgment pronounced by no less a person than Allen W. Dulles. Their conclusion was that unconditional surrender made Germany's surrender harder to obtain. That this policy imposed difficulties upon psychological warfare operations was obvious. Propaganda is always easier when we can promise you "something" rather than "nothing." Unconditional surrender, on the contrary, said: "Yield to *us* without regard to any terms *you* may want." But the purpose of high policy in World War II was not to make life easier for propagandists. It was rather to shape psychological warfare to help win the war on terms acceptable to the victors. This, I believe, it did.

The lesson we have not adequately put into practice is the adaptation of critical postmortems to subsequent propaganda operations. Scholarly judgments of past policy and practice are objectively adaptable to new conditions because they have documentary support. Since the closely reasoned and well-supported postmortems on World War II were not adapted in this way, the Cold War code — the major psychological operation that has shaped the world arena over the past two decades — has not been articulated sufficiently in operational terms or evaluated in

policy terms. As a result, we have no solid basis for reaching a judgment of whether, for instance, Khrushchev won a victory at Suez by missile rattling or whether Kennedy won a victory at Cuba by his firm rejection of missile rattling. (The fine analysis of "nuclear blackmail" by Hans Speier has not been followed by adequate empirical studies of particular cases.) Nor can we say, with the confidence that can only be based on sound scholarship and critical evaluation, whether the United States lost or gained, in psychological terms, by its restraint during the Hungarian uprising of 1956, or how Soviet restraint during the successive Congo crises was perceived by the rest of the world.

While psychological warfare as a branch of military action has operated only in localized situations since the end of World War II, not enough study has been given to the interaction of these operations and United States high policy, which made placing limitations on them meaningful, and indeed — in the light of the controversy between President Truman and General MacArthur over Korea — indispensable. The policy of containment adopted by the postwar United States as the world's leading status quo power required that all areas of conflict (especially with the U.S.S.R.) be limited as rapidly and localized as completely as possible. Even the substantial, and understandable, pressure of the United States military on behalf of the tactical doctrine of "hot pursuit" has been subject to the high policy commitment to containment. This policy has shaped both the military and the propaganda postures of the United States, in Korea as well as in Vietnam.

The importance to propagandists of a continuing evaluation of such a policy in operation is obvious. However, little guidance can be gleaned from published studies of American propaganda in war and crisis over the past two decades. We lack comprehensive studies of the psychological component underlying American policy toward Eastern Europe, from the Truman Doctrine guaranteeing protection to Greece and Turkey to the display of American restraint, after years of broadcasting by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation (later Radio Liberty), when anti-Soviet activities erupted in Hungary and East Germany a decade later. Also wanting are critical evaluations of American high policy in the Middle East, from the Eisenhower Doctrine guaranteeing Lebanon and Jordan to the more recent reticence of Washington when faced with military

initiatives in the area by the U.S.S.R. and Egypt. Especially lacking are documented and reasoned studies of the inherent psychology of American high policy toward the great "rest of the world" — studies that clarify the Kennedy Doctrine of the *Allianza* in terms of American coexistence with military regimes in Latin America or the coexistence of war to the death in Vietnam with holier-than-thou propriety in neighboring countries of Asia.

I am not bushwacking the American administrations that have been faced with the severe and largely novel problems of the postwar decades. I am rather addressing to those scholars capable of policy science thinking and research a counsel of concern for the interaction of policy and propaganda. Under the rule of containment, psychological operations usually are more important than — indeed are a major alternative to — military operations. A few (all too few) studies are available to illustratrate the kinds of scholarship we need. Hans Speier, at a particularly dangerous period, published a set of studies that shaped American policy thinking about Soviet nuclear blackmail as a new psychological technique for intensifying international crises and thereby influencing their resolution. W. P. Davison, in a notable case study of the Berlin airlift, arrayed and evaluated the full set of factors involved in this major psychopolitical operation of the Cold War. Lessons from the great power arena as applied to the vast terrain of the emerging nations — for example, via Soviet doctrine on "the socialist commonwealth" and Maoist teaching on "wars of national liberation" — are sorely needed.

Such scholars as Speier and Davison learned to fit localized and limited situations into the larger global context through their participation in the psychological warfare campaign against Germany described in this book and through studying the campaign extensively for years after it was over. For in its very particularities that campaign remains the most important experience available to us of the conditions under which contemporary psychological warfare is waged. The experience is only as valuable, however, as its recorders and interpreters make it for the generations that follow.

This lesson is still vivid to my generation. Once engaged in World War II, we looked for guidance to prior experience that had been recorded. codified. evaluated. We found little ready at

hand. World War I clearly was an important experience in psychological warfare for its participants, as revealed in thousands of pages of documents and memoirs, but these pages contained little that could serve as guidance for those of us involved in World War II. Instead, our guidance came from a brilliant codification and evaluation of these records published a full ten years later: Harold D. Lasswell's classic study *Propaganda Technique in World War I.**

What has happened to psychological warfare since World War II is summarized in Part 2 of this Introduction by William E. Griffith. During his eight years (1951–1958) as political advisor to Radio Free Europe, Griffith was obliged to relearn and reapply principles and practices that had been learned "the hard way" during World War II. His intimate knowledge of the Sino-Soviet conflict has taught us valuable lessons about the interaction of policy and propaganda in the current world arena. His is the voice of experience; I hope it will be heeded.

* Reprinted as a companion volume to this book in the M.I.T. Press series Studies in Comparative Politics.

INTRODUCTION: PART 2

William E. Griffith

Rereading Daniel Lerner's standard work on psychological warfare in World War II gave me above all a sense of *déjà vu*. As one who was actively engaged in psychological warfare operations directed toward Eastern Europe in the 1950s, I realized again how long it took us to learn the lessons that he (and R. H. S. Crossman) had set forth in this pioneering work.

Not that one should be surprised by this: as Goethe put it, *Nur der seine Freiheit verdient, der sie täglich erobern muss.* Yet how long it took post–World War II psychological warfare operations to grasp what Professor Lerner states as the obvious: "Credibility is a condition of persuasion." How long it took to understand that one cannot conduct professional psychological warfare operations with "gifted amateurs," but only with trained professionals. How slow many were to accept the qualifications Professor Lerner specified for a trained propagandist. And how often, particularly under the malign influence of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy, were the logical conclusions of the "strategy of truth" not drawn.

For the conduct of psychological warfare against the communist countries in the post–World War II period, then, Professor Lerner's conclusions as to strategy, tactics, and above all personnel remain correct. Indeed, far from being invalidated, they have become even more compelling in the postwar period because of the major differences between the problems of psychological warfare since 1945 as compared with wartime.

The main, overshadowing difference between the post-1945 period and World Wars I and II has been, quite simply, that with the exception of Korea and Vietnam, fighting has not been going on. World War I and World War II were above all *world* wars. It was clear that they had to, and would, come to an end. Therefore, psychological warfare was directed toward victory — and indeed, as Professor Lerner states, on the Allied side in

World War II as in World War I, toward total victory and unconditional surrender. In both cases, war for the Allies was not a continuation of politics by other means, but (it was hoped) a one-time spasm, in which the overwhelming objective was simply to win. What came after would take care of itself. (I believe that this was an oversimplified war aim, but nevertheless it was the aim for which the Western allies fought.)

The Cold War, like death and taxes, is always with us. This was perhaps the greatest qualitative change for the West in the post-1945 period: that the postwar world was one of neither peace nor war. For pre-1945 America this state of things was initially unbelievable, and indeed it took quite a long time for most Americans to accept it. The concept of cold war, however, was nothing new to the Soviets or to other communists (or, for that matter, fascists): it was for Lenin and Stalin the *normal* state of relations between capitalist and socialist states, as it had been for Philip II or John Knox in the religious wars of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Moreover, even that apostle of détente Nikita Khrushchev defined peaceful coexistence as "the intensification of the class struggle by all means other than interstate war."

Yet behind this aspect of the Cold War was another, which Winston Churchill first saw: the existence of atomic weapons created not only the nightmare but also the security of the postwar world. Had they not existed, it is difficult to imagine that the United States and the Soviet Union would have avoided a major conflict in the past two decades. Because they existed, boundaries have been frozen, and war, nuclear or otherwise, has become much less likely. Psychological warfare, therefore, has evolved as the main substitute for military conflict.

This was only slowly realized after 1945. The adjustment of U.S. and Soviet policy, and even more of psychological warfare policy, limped behind realities. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution marked a great caesura in propaganda from the West. Thereafter it was clear even for the psychological warriors that only gradual, in-system change, in East or West, was tolerable, given the overhanging mushroom cloud.

This realization was all the easier for Western psychological warriors to accept because, in addition to the nuclear deterrent, they had one other great advantage as compared to World War I or World War II: nationalism, with the exception of the Great

Russians, was on their side, while German, Italian, and Japanese nationalism had been against them. Ours is an age of nationalism, and as Professor Lerner points out, psychological warfare can intensify but not create realities. Moreover, as the fifties and sixties advanced and the economic recovery of Western Europe proceeded, one of Lerner's concluding prophecies came true: the West exercised an increasing economic attraction on the East, which Western psychological warfare needed merely to project in order to be effective.

These, then, were in general the advantages of Western psychological warfare in the post-1945 period. What were its main problems? Not so much different as more complex than those of Allied psychological warfare in World War II. Wartime Nazi Germany was a very difficult target for psychological warfare *inter alia* because of the intelligence and analysis problems that it posed. Postwar Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were, in my opinion, even more difficult targets in this respect. The range of available expertise on this region in the United States was, until recently, quite limited. The wartime reservoir of trained psychological warfare personnel was largely dissipated through demobilization, and the Cold War has never, even during Korea and Vietnam, mobilized talents on a comparable scale. Neither the urge to offer support, nor the prestige, nor other tangible rewards created anything like the equivalent of the wartime U.S. psychological cadres. Moreover, the problem of linguistic, area, and analytical skills for the Soviet Union and the East European countries, to say nothing of Korea, China, and Vietnam, presented far greater difficulties than was the case during World War II. Finally, communist ideological discourse presented problems in the decipherment and analysis of esoteric communications which were met only with the development of a new conceptual and methodological framework.

Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of American psychological warfare operations in the postwar period was what Professor Lerner points to as its necessary prerequisite: an informational and analytical base. Only in the middle and late 1960s did such American psychological warfare operations as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty finally acquire fully competent American personnel with linguistic and political training. A resource not available during World War II was especially helpful in this regard: regular personal contact between travelers from the tar-

get countries and personnel involved in psychological warfare operations — perhaps the major single key to a realistic view of the audience and the political situation with which propagandists must deal.

That the Cold War has not become hot is not the only thing that distinguishes it from World War II. The second and by now increasingly important difference is the rise of pluralism within the communist world. It is clear that after 1948 Yugoslavia could not at one and the same time be given U.S. economic and then military aid and yet be the target of anticommunist U.S. psychological warfare. Not surprisingly, therefore, the originally planned Radio Free Europe Yugoslav desk never became operational. U.S. broadcasting to Rumania since the mid-1960s has also naturally become more equivocal: less anticommunist ideologically, more concerned with gradualist liberalization and with strengthening anti-Soviet sentiment in the population — in short, implicitly sharing certain aims with Bucharest's propaganda.

These are only two examples of what has been since the mid-1950s the main policy dilemma for American psychological warfare operations toward communist countries. This dilemma may be, admittedly in an oversimplified manner, summed up as the contradiction between liberation and peaceful engagement.* Should the goal of American policy, and therefore of American psychological warfare, be the liberation of Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union, that is, the rapid if not revolutionary overthrow of their communist party-state regimes and their replacement by parliamentary democracies; or should the United States abandon this otherwise desirable objective as beyond the realm of the possible and replace it by the more modest one of "peaceful engagement?" The latter would mean the encouragement of gradualist, in-system changes toward more autonomy from the Soviet hegemonic power (in the case of Eastern Europe and — a more disputed point — the Soviet minority nationalities) and more internal liberalization.

The American rhetoric of liberation was a combination of anticommunist ideology and competition for the U.S. ethnic vote. It was buried in Budapest in 1956. But even before that, some psychological warfare policy makers had been developing

* Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 39 (July 1961): 642–654.

a policy of peaceful engagement, out of their own realization of the impracticability of a policy of liberation. Since then, this policy has been retained and intensified, at least on the propaganda level, but for a series of reasons it has hardly been implemented politically. The policy of peaceful engagement, of trying to exercise influence toward in-system changes, inevitably required that psychological warfare concentrate on elites rather than masses, since the elites, especially in Eastern Europe, were more inclined toward collaboration than the anticommunist masses. It therefore required greater credibility — that is, greater apparent objectivity.

Furthermore, by the end of the 1960s another problem was looming large for U.S. psychological warfare: the state of American society. Whether or not American society is in crisis may be debated, but it seems fairly clear that this is how most of the rest of the world sees it. This problem has been particularly difficult for American psychological warfare operations because of their inhibitions, whether official or unofficial, as a result of Washington's sensitivities on the subject. If Professor Lerner is right, and I believe he is, in declaring that credibility is the precondition of persuasion, then American propagandists would be shortsighted indeed if they attempted to project an optimistic image of America by glossing over the reality. (Of course, this statement must be qualified by pointing out that the difference between what the truth is and what it is seen to be varies with the audience: for example, the images of America that would be credible in France and in South Korea would certainly be different.)

My own inclination is that of Noel Newsome, a major figure in British wartime psychological warfare: "Bad news comes first in the bulletin." If America pulls out of whatever domestic crisis it is now in, a ruthlessly objective U.S. propaganda presentation of it will pay off in the end, just as the BBC's rapid and complete announcement of British defeats did in wartime; and if America does *not* pull out of it, propaganda can in the long run do nothing to conceal this, except at the cost of discrediting itself.

There is one other topic in Professor Lerner's book that stimulated me to postwar comparisons: the propaganda of "the other side." Wartime German propaganda was relatively ineffective once Germany had begun to lose the war. For Western,

as for communist or other anti-Western propaganda, the demands of the postwar situation have been different. Perhaps the greatest difference has been owing to the emergence of pluralism within the communist world beginning with the Soviet-Yugoslav split in 1948 and intensifying as a result of the Sino-Soviet split in 1959 and thereafter. These developments have produced intracommunist propaganda of an increasingly multifarious nature, first Soviet-Yugoslav, then Sino-Soviet, and by now many other varieties as well, more or less explicit in nature: Soviet-Cuban, Sino-Cuban, Soviet-Czechoslovak until August 1968, and so on. A common Marxist-Leninist ideology delayed the advent of this overt propaganda but made it more violent once it broke out. Its development has been perhaps the major indicator available to Western analysts of esoteric communications of the course of relations among communist powers.* It has also provided Western propaganda media with an invaluable source of "cross-reporting": the projection to all communist states of disagreements among some of them, with the purpose of eroding the credibility of Communist propaganda media.

The challenge to American psychological warfare personnel, then, is more complex and long-term than it was in World War II. Moreover, the present inward-turning mood of America makes U.S. propaganda operations abroad more difficult, and the acquisition and retention of able personnel much harder. Yet the Cold War continues. Those who must deal with it now and in the future can learn much from this book.

* William E. Griffith, "Esoteric Communications: Explication de texte," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (January 1970): 47–54.

Psychological Warfare against Nazi Germany

Chapter 1

POLICY AND PROPAGANDA IN WORLD WAR II

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE is one of the magic phrases in current parlance. A study of its use in World War II is beset by temptations to dramatize, for the subject suggests moods appropriate to Greek tragedy. D-Day marks the start, and VE-Day the finish, of the final act in an epic conflict. The place is the European continent, and most of the action occurs in the northwest area which lies between the Normandy beaches and the River Elbe. The time is the dreadful winter between June 1944 and May 1945, warm spring months whose loveliness hints of classical irony. Great moral principles are contending, embodied in rival nations, each with its own *dei ex machina.* The protagonists, as ever, are those skilled in pleading righteous causes, while vast armies play chorus to their symbols and a watchful world sits in audience. The plot concerns power, and the issue is—victory.

On a nearer approach such an Aristotelian schema, appropriate to Greek amphitheaters, seems too patently contrived for our purposes. Ours is not the unique history of a Great Man destroyed through some tragic flaw in his own character but, instead, a recurrent episode of modern society in which many ordinary men are destroyed through flaws but dimly perceived by either the players or the spectators. The tragic issue is not wholly clear, but plainly it antedates our beginning, and our ending does not coincide with its final resolution. Tragedy has been redefined in our time, and the man who seeks stark and simple explanations for contemporary crises is using his leisure poorly. The "century of the common man" demands analysis in terms more complex than the tragic flaw of character in some Great Man. Witness the evident inadequacy of views which purport to explain World War II in terms of Roosevelt's ambitions or Hitler's neuroses.

This study reports on Allied psychological warfare against

Germany in terms derived from contemporary social science, rather than from classical tragedy. The discussion proceeds outside the realm of magic by defining terms in references which are empirical and explicit. Propaganda is conceived as an instrument of policy in the competition for political power, and psychological warfare is the form propaganda takes when this competition becomes violent. The relevance of such a conception, which avoids identifying present ignorance with eternal mysteries, is clear from a brief consideration of its main terms.

1. *Policy and the Propaganda Process*

Politics is the control, distribution, and use of power over human activities in society. Politics becomes "international" when the competition for power is carried on mainly through the agency of governments representing nations; it becomes "global" when the scale of competition is so broadened that nations throughout the world are involved.

War, the "continuation of politics by other means," in Clausewitz's phrase, naturally figures prominently among the events in the political continuum. As the stakes of politics increase, so do those of war. In an age of polite diplomacy, wars were "limited"; as international politics became global, war became "total." Briefly, then, war is politics conducted mainly by coercion, rather than by negotiation.

Policy is a convenient term to characterize the top decisions—in any body politic. In the competitive arena of global politics, the policy process disposes of four main instruments to implement its decisions: diplomacy, propaganda, sanctions, and war.[1] These can be arranged schematically in terms of their appropriate vehicles and techniques:

Mechanism	*Vehicle*	*Technique*
diplomacy	contracts	negotiation
propaganda	symbols	persuasion
sanctions	supplies	deprivation
war	violence	coercion

Propaganda is thus conceived as a mechanism of policy, and may be assessed in terms of expediency. From this perspective,

[1] Notes are printed at the end of each chapter. Publication details of titles cited in passing can be found in the Bibliography.

the only significant questions relate to effectiveness. The policies may be judged "good" or "bad"; the instrument may be employed with or without skill.[2] There are four obvious possibilities:

(1) Acceptable policy effectively propagandized
(2) Acceptable policy ineffectively propagandized
(3) Unacceptable policy effectively propagandized
(4) Unacceptable policy ineffectively propagandized

Propaganda is a more complex matter when one views it in the perspective of democratic policy. In a society that aspires toward the realization of human dignity in theory and fact, the aim is the optimum shaping and sharing of values. Besides democracy, fraternity, and security, there is, for instance, the goal of public enlightenment. For the sake of enlightenment, we support public schools and defend the freedom of the press. Unless opinion is informed, as well as expressed, majority rule can neither survive nor contribute to the dignity of men.[3]

What is the relation between propaganda and enlightenment? Between propaganda and the other values of a free society? We now speak of considerations other than technique, which, as we said above, is a question of skill. Freedom of persuasion is compatible with human dignity; and the persuasion of the public on controversial issues is another name for propaganda. Such persuasion *can* proceed by means of rational exposition and clarification of complex issues. It was with these techniques in mind that Whitehead wrote:

> In so far as the area of reasonable persuasion widens, an environment has been provided within which the higher mental activities and the subtler feelings can find their use and enjoyment. But with the growth of intellect the range of necessity diminishes. Some command over nature has been attained. Thus a widespread reliance on persuasion produces its reward in the shape of an upward evolution. At least, it produces conditions favourable to such an upward trend.[4]

Since propaganda may *not* proceed by rational exposition and clarification, the policy that prescribes nonrational methods of persuasion can be subversive of the goals of a free man's commonwealth. Propaganda can be used under circumstances in which barriers are constructed against the flow of communica-

tion from opposing sources. In wartime, this is the typical policy of democracies, as of despotisms. Democratic governments do not, even in principle, allow full access to enemy propaganda on the part of their nationals. Despotisms simply perform the censorship functions more effectively in practice.

In many ways, the most troublesome question connected with democracy's use of propaganda is the proper scope of the government's control of home opinion. It is generally recognized that government-made opinion is likely to serve the party in office. At the same time, it is admitted that the winning of the war calls for some latitude to public officials. These problems are acute in wartime, but they are invariably present in policy at all times. In the words of Quincy Wright:

> Policy is the adaptation of means to accepted ends or values. It assumes values, finds them in predominant opinions, or makes them through influencing opinion and seeks to achieve them. The discovery and influencing of opinion is of its essence.[5]

We raise these issues in this place as a reminder of the vast labyrinth of problems connected with the use of propaganda by a democratic commonwealth. It is not the purpose of this report on our Sykewar against Germany to deal at great length with these profound questions. Our scope is narrower and more technical. But the technical operations always occur in a context of policy that calls for the weighing of all value alternatives at all times.[6]

We are chiefly concerned with the efficient use of the propaganda mechanism. As with all mechanisms, efficient use requires certain skills. The skills appropriate to propaganda are those which can manipulate a unilateral flow of symbols in such a way as to modify the behavior of a designated audience in ways favorable to the purposes which the propagandist serves. Propagandists, in short, are highly-skilled technicians. It is important to understand the general contours of the historical process by which these technicians came to occupy a position of such prominence as they now hold in world politics. No adequate history of this development has yet been written, and therefore an oversimplified delineation of its main line will have to serve the present purpose.[7]

The rise of the propaganda function was closely linked with

the development of democratic mass societies, which invariably entailed an increasing recognition of public opinion as a political force. As the opinions of the man-in-the-street came to figure more weightily in the shaping and sharing of power, efforts to control and manipulate these opinions (i.e., propaganda) multiplied. Special skills appropriate to the manipulation of mass opinion were adapted to the needs of politicians, and a new profession trained in those skills (i.e., the propagandist) was seated at the councils of those who hold or seek power.

The main task of the propagandist was to present any given policy as persuasively as possible to the audience for which it was intended. In performing this task, it was essential that the propagandist be thoroughly familiar with his audience, in order to foresee its probable reaction to any given policy. This factor became increasingly important to the conduct of international relations in the ever-shrinking modern world. As any nation sought power in new areas of the world, it became suddenly sensitive to the identifications, expectations, and demands of people in those areas. The propagandist, as expert counsel on these sentiments to the policymaker, developed a stronger position as arbiter of policies which would satisfy them. Through the side door of his intelligence function, then, the propagandist gradually became an important policy-adviser as well as policy-server.

Today, whether he be adviser to the foreign minister (as in the United States) or himself a minister to the chief executive (as in most other countries), the propagandist is usually found nearby wherever policy is made. Mass politics makes it impossible for citizens and leaders to maintain face-to-face communication. Instead, intercourse between them is channeled mainly through the "mass media" of print, radio, and film. Characteristically unilateral, indirect, and symbolic, such intercourse places a premium upon the skills of specialists. Great advantage goes particularly to the propaganda specialist, whose distinctive skill is the adaptation of mass communication to policy uses.

For a nearer look at the service it renders to policy, the propaganda function may be conceived as the emission of a unilateral flow of symbols selected to persuade a given audience toward a given end. Such a definition conforms to the approach developed in recent years by students of mass communication, who analyze specific propaganda situations by asking: *Who says what to*

whom, how, why, and with what effects? This is an admirably tidy formula which enables us to distinguish the following variables in any flow of symbols: source, channel, content, audience, technique, purpose, result.[8]

Psychological warfare is here conceived as a special version of the propaganda process, the case of propaganda operative within the context of war instead of peace. Among the major changes involved in the transition from peace to war are these: The competition for larger shares of world power is publicly declared to be insoluble by nonviolent modes of intercourse, and the techniques of coercion are invoked as final arbiter of competing claims. Such a drastic shift of contexts involves special adaptations of the nonviolent instruments used for peacetime competition. This is indicated by the new names which are given to familiar mechanisms: *sanctions* becomes economic warfare, *diplomacy* becomes political warfare, *propaganda* becomes psychological warfare.[9]

In these circumstances, psychological warfare serves the same function relative to war as does propaganda relative to the context of nonviolent competition (i.e., peace). It adapts the techniques of symbol-selection to the conditions that its audience is an "enemy," that its purpose must always include "victory," and that the stakes of success in this context are higher than usual (failures in war include death as a consequence, whereas failures with nonviolent techniques usually entail only loss of power and other lesser deprivations). These adaptations are illuminating and important, but they indicate that the variations between propaganda and psychological warfare are mainly technical, whereas the function of both, relative to the total flow of events in the political process (which includes both war and peace), remains constant.

2. *Psychological Warfare in Total War*

This brings us to the question: How does psychological warfare, thus conceived, serve war policy? Specific answers to this question always are formed with reference to the military character of a specific war, the nature of its policy objectives (i.e., war aims), and the international political situation in which the war occurs. It makes great difference to the range of psychological warfare activity, for example, whether a war is "limited" or

"total" in character. The character of a war, in turn, is determined by the nature of its policy objectives, which derive from the political situation that led to war. Dr. Hans Speier has formulated this view in terms which bear directly on the matter at hand:

> A triumph of diplomacy over war is possible when there is a balance of power in international politics—when wars are waged to gain a relative advantage within the balance, rather than for the sake of upsetting it. In such circumstances the status of the enemy as an enemy is a temporary one, and war aims are means of persuading him to resume his role as a partner or associate in a balanced system of power.[10]

In the forms of warfare designated as "limited," psychological warfare was tied closely to diplomatic maneuver. Where war aims were means of persuading an avowedly temporary enemy "to resume his role as a partner or associate," negotiation was the dominant mechanism. The political situation called for bargaining, and combat was a way of pounding the diplomatic table for emphasis. The populations of the rival powers remained largely uninvolved, and the symbols of mass ideologies were largely uninvoked. The flow of propaganda was directed mainly by one set of rulers to the other, as an informal way of making plain or persuasive the conditions of peace. At some point, acceptance of enemy terms became more attractive than continuance of combat, and the negotiators thereupon took over the formal arrangements for peace. The kind of warfare we now designate as "total" is quite another matter. Here diplomatic negotiation is subordinated to trial by combat, and psychological attack is integrated with the instruments of violence. Whole populations are ranged as antagonists, and a vast array of symbols is brought forth from the armory of mass ideologies. The flow of propaganda is aimed at the "nation in arms."

Total war is not an invention of the twentieth century, if the phrase is employed to mean a maximum use of all available instruments of violence. Thus conceived, total wars have been fought whenever the policies they implemented were grandiose in design, relative to the current political situation. The wars of Genghis Khan were total in this sense, and so were the Crusades. However, the twentieth century has given total war a meaning more appropriate to an epoch of industrialized mass societies

organized as competing nations. Today total war involves "industrial mobilization"—which means the maximum utilization of every able hand, male and female, which can operate a gun, scythe, or lathe. Such mobilization increases the power, but it also increases the vulnerability, of the nation at war. As the area of dependence on popular participation broadens, so does the area of vulnerability to enemy attack. A nation which has mobilized all its population and resources for total war ("war of survival" President Roosevelt called it) is committed and exposed on every side. The stakes are greater, and so are the dangers.

In such a context, psychological warfare takes a new turn. It no longer aims mainly, if at all, at the rival rulers. Its target includes "the man behind the man behind the gun," i.e., the whole productive force of the enemy. For if the worker, farmer, and clerk can be persuaded to abandon their allotted tasks in the mobilization plan, the "man behind the gun" can not long continue to function. General Eisenhower has characterized this modern aspect of total war as "the acute dependence of all elements of military life upon the industrial capacity of the nation." [11]

To this broad vulnerable flank, on which the enemy is exposed to strategic bombing with symbols as well as with explosives, psychological warfare turns its attention. The home government responds with campaigns to maintain "home-front morale." The concept of the "nation in arms" becomes less a metaphor, and more a description. Psychological warfare, in these circumstances, does not function merely as a form of correspondence between rulers and of attack upon their armed forces at the front, but takes on the character of a struggle for the attention, beliefs, and loyalties of whole populations. In this sense, psychological warfare is the invention, and the destiny, of the twentieth century. Dr. Speier writes:

> The distinctly new feature of modern war propaganda is its extension to noncombatants. Propaganda at home to bolster up the martial spirit, or at least the will to resistance, among the millions of workers and farmers, men and women and children, is a phenomenon unknown to earlier centuries of modern history. . . . Thus under the conditions created by these three factors—the development of technology, mass participation in war, and nationalism—the morale of the nation itself becomes of decisive *military* importance. A major war assumes the char-

acter of siege warfare on a huge scale, with economic and symbol war supplementing the strictly military effort.[12]

The character of psychological warfare as a policy instrument thus derives, in any epoch, from the social structure of the nation whose policies it serves. Any nation sufficiently industrialized to fight a twentieth-century style total war will do so, and will require an appropriate mode of psychological warfare. How well such symbol warfare can be conducted will depend upon other factors in the society. The condition of its communication industries will affect the number and kinds of channels available for symbol warfare. This factor, plus the condition of its educational system, will help determine the distribution of appropriate skills and talents among its population, i.e., the number and quality of symbol specialists it is likely to have available for the manipulation of its communication media. The structure of values, goals, aspirations in the society will condition the war policies which psychological warfare is designed to serve.

In reading this study, which describes a psychological warfare operation in detail, with only occasional regard for the social context, it will be useful to recall that psychological warfare is conceived as a wartime policy function characteristic of the nation it serves.

3. *The Case of Sykewar, World War II* *

The policy posture of the Western Allies in World War II was global and defensive. It was ideologically defensive in the sense that its objectives did not include the military conquest of new territories for its ideas, but rather the defense of its own territories against ideas whose initiative was sponsored by a rival power-center. It was global in the sense that reactions to any given policy had to be calculated and foreseen in terms of a coalition whose interests encompassed the world. These aspects of the policy posture determined the limits and direction of Allied psychological warfare in World War II. Their influence upon the Sykewar campaign against Germany is discussed in the next chapter, but some indication here of the overall policy-

* Sykewar upper-case is used throughout as an abbreviation for the Psychological Warfare Division under SHAEF, whose propaganda campaign against Germany is the subject of this book; sykewar lower-case is used to include other propaganda organizations cooperating against Germany (e.g., OSS, OWI, BBC) and to designate psychological warfare in general.

propaganda situation in which Sykewar functioned may be useful.

The total flow of propaganda emanating from joint Allied sources during World War II began long before D-Day (officially in December 1941, and actually at least by the summer of 1941).[13] This flow was directed toward a variety of audiences around the world, which may be classified as: Home, Allied, Neutral, Enemy. The typology of propaganda audiences is an interesting and important subject which need not detain us here longer than is required to illustrate the fact that audience ("to whom?") is one of the controlling variables in the propaganda process. That is, "what" is said in propagandic communication—even "who" says it and "how"—is limited by policies ("why") chosen with respect to a specific audience to be persuaded ("to whom"). To illustrate grossly: The broad policy which propaganda serves in any war is "victory," but the manner in which propagandists proceed varies greatly according to whether the audience is home, allied, neutral, or enemy.

Audience-classification must, of course, be much further refined in practice. Among the home audiences in World War II, different appeals and techniques (and even propagandists) were used to win the support of workers, financiers, or intellectuals. Among Allied audiences, unity with such members of the coalition as Britain and China was sought on (and in) different terms. Wide differences, too, appeared in the approaches to friendly neutrals like Switzerland and hostile neutrals like Spain. Propaganda to enemy audiences did not attack the Japanese as it did the Italians, nor the Germans as it did either of the others. Audience, clearly, exerted a controlling influence upon sykewar.

These bare indications of the time-space dimensions through which Allied propaganda flowed during World War II provide some perspective for this study, which slices off a small segment involving only the operations against one enemy, in one area, during one period.[14] An historical justification for this procedure is that the campaign against Germany in northwestern Europe from D-Day (6 June 1944) to VE-Day (8 May 1945) is generally regarded as a decisive phase of the war. The methodological justification, in the light of our general analysis of the propaganda process, is also important. The flow of propaganda in this campaign was continuously produced by the same organization, under the same directive, against the same target—and

consequently this year of propaganda history presents us with an almost unique situation for study. By defining our limits so closely, we are able to retain the unity of the campaign which began on the Normandy beaches and ended in Berlin, and thus approximate the desirable conditions of a case study. The organization of the book conforms to the analysis of propaganda process which has been outlined.

The basic policy which defined the direction and scope of psychological warfare throughout this campaign was Unconditional Surrender, and we turn first to a consideration of this context for the Sykewar "why?" The organization of propagandists which presented this policy from shortly before D-Day to shortly after VE-Day was PWD/SHAEF (Psychological Warfare Division/Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force), and it is this organization which provides the answers to our question "who?" The Sykewar audience was Germany, and we proceed with a study of this particular "to whom?" The other variables—"what?" and "how?"—are examined in turn. The study concludes with a discussion of the difficult problems posed by the question "with what effects?" There, after a brief look at the present and future, in the light of this experience in the past, the story is brought to a close.

Chapter 1. Notes

1. These definitions derive from theoretical grounds stated by A. N. Whitehead. They are developed most fully in *Process and Reality* and synopsized most concisely in two sentences from *Science and the Modern World* (New York, 1925), p. 106: "Nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the process." An application of this conception to politics-as-process has been made by Harold D. Lasswell. See especially *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York, 1935) and *The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach* (London, 1948).

2. This conception was long ago made familiar to serious students of propaganda, particularly by German writers, who were unusually preoccupied with problems of political propaganda in the period after World War I. A whole series of competent studies taking this view were written by non-Nazi Germans between the dates of the following two titles: Edgar Stern-Rubarth, *Die Propaganda als politisches Instrument* (Berlin, 1921) and Willi Münzenberg, *Propaganda als Waffe* (Basel, 1937). The latter work is of particular interest here, owing to the connection between its author and R. H. S. Crossman, a leading British propagandist during World War II. See the autobiographical sketch by Mr. Crossman in Chapter 4, below.

3. For a fuller treatment, see H. D. Lasswell, *Democracy Through Public Opinion* (Menasha, Wis., 1941).

4. A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York, 1933), pp. 87, 88.

5. Quincy Wright, "The Social Sciences and Policy Formation," in *Approaches to World Peace,* L. Bryson, L. M. Finkelstein, R. M. MacIver (eds.), (New York, 1944), p. 86.

6. "Policy-making depends on the assessing of alternatives with a view to translating one of them into action." R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York, 1948), p. 9.

7. Useful historical materials are collected in the works of Wilhelm Bauer: *Die öffentliche Meinung und ihre geschichtlichen Grundlagen* (Tübingen, 1914) and *Die öffentliche Meinung in der Weltgeschichte* (Potsdam, 1929). The later work is particularly valuable for its wealth of illustrations.

8. "As developed in the past few years, the scientific study of communication centers around the four successive phases of any act of communication: In what channels do communications take place? Who communicates? What is communicated? Who is affected by the communication, and how?" B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, and R. D. Casey, *Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion. A Comprehensive Reference Guide* (Princeton, 1946), p. 3. Cf. P. F. Lazarsfeld: "Control, content, audience, and effect analysis can be considered as answers to the four-pronged question: Who is saying what, to whom, and with what effect in the mass media?" "Audience Research in the Movie Field," *The Annals* (Nov. 1947), p. 160.

9. P. M. A. Linebarger suggests that psychological warfare be "simply regarded as application of propaganda to the purposes of war." *Psychological Warfare* (Washington, 1948), p. 40. Wallace Carroll writes: "In the decade before the outbreak of the Second World War, many of the future belligerents were mastering new ways of using this instrument of national policy. Long before Hitler and the Nazis came to power in Germany, they planned their Propaganda Ministry, and when the political war . . . matured into armed conflict, their propagandists became the fourth arm of the fighting services." *Persuade or Perish* (Boston, 1948), pp. 3-4.

10. Hans Speier, "War Aims in Political Warfare," *Social Research* (May 1945), Vol. XII, p. 160.

11. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York, 1948), p. 19.

12. Hans Speier, "Morale and Propaganda," in *War In Our Time* (New York, 1939), pp. 300, 302, Hans Speier and Alfred Kähler (eds.).

13. Robert Bruce Lockhart reports that in the summer of 1941 Robert Sherwood, "in the guise of an information officer," went to England "to provide for Anglo-American cooperation in political and psychological warfare in the event of the United States' participation in the war." *Comes the Reckoning* (London, 1947), p. 132.

14. A bold, and partly successful, attempt to epitomize psychological warfare on the basis of a synoptic report of propaganda against "the enemy" on all fronts, throughout World War II, is *Psychological Warfare* (Washington, 1948), P. M. A. Linebarger. An extremely useful survey with more modest aims is *Overseas Information Service of the U. S. Government* (Washington, 1948), C. A. H. Thomson.

Chapter 2

MAKING SYKEWAR POLICY

1. *Policy Complications of Coalition Warfare*

THE WAGING of war, throughout history, has been complicated by coalitions. Nations, joined to win a war, bring to this limited common purpose an unlimited variety of recollections from the past and expectations for the future. From this variety derives a vast range of possible complications in the making of policy decisions. Each party to the coalition values its own wants and interests, and policymakers must be wary of the pride and prejudice of all.

On the military side, such complications usually involve technical, administrative, or organizational matters. These can be solved on the policy level, if not completely eliminated on the operational level, by such a device as was adopted in World War II: unified command under a supreme commander. Such devices are possible because military science has evolved, characteristically, a highly simplified solution for policy problems—i.e., the "chain of command." For the military man, policy is a relatively simple matter which comes to him as a "mission" contained in orders from his superior officer at "next higher headquarters." This system of policy transmission, which operates in all modern armies, may explain why soldiers of all nations have some equivalent for the familiar phrase: "Ours not to reason why, ours but to do or die."

Such a device would scarcely solve the political complications of coalition warfare. Whereas the military leader, including the supreme commander, can always turn to a superior for orders, the political leader has no superior. The consensus of public opinion is the only "next higher headquarters" to which a chief executive can submit his policies for approval. Social consensus has none of the clear-cut authority of a military order, for its source is a large, heterogeneous, anonymous, and dispersed collection of individuals. The political leader who, with Quincy

Wright, conceives policy as "the adaptation of means to accepted ends or values" confronts the difficult task of deciding which ends or values are "accepted." [1]

Such being the case, we perceive immediately the difficulties of making policy for a wartime coalition. If policy must be formulated with reference to predominant public opinion, then clearly the larger and more varied the publics, the more difficult will it be to formulate policies, for the more numerous and diverse will be their opinions. In peacetime, a chief executive speaks as the head of a government based on a "nation"—i.e., a population more or less homogeneous through tradition. Consider, however, the complexities Roosevelt or Churchill faced in finding a consensus among the variegated wartime coalition of World War II.[2]

First came the home publics. Roosevelt, in particular, had to lead a nation which, until the very day of Pearl Harbor, contained highly vocal groups that opposed war for a variety of reasons.[3] Next came the major fighting Allies, chiefly the United States, Britain, Soviet Russia, and China—a coalition of four more variant power groups would be hard to invent.[4] Next came the minor fighting Allies. Next came the occupied countries, with governments-in-exile at London, and with a variety of collaborationist and resistance groups at home.[5] Next came the neutrals, mainly out to play both ends against the middle and get what they could for themselves.[6] Hovering constantly in the background was the enemy, with his allies and satellites.

Coalitions are, by their nature, a temporary form of association based upon an agreement to submerge differences over what one is *for,* in order to combat what all are *against.*[7] The attempt to provide detailed positive policies for such a coalition as was assembled under the name United Nations was extremely difficult. Mr. Churchill faced this situation squarely when he told the House of Commons:

> I see that in some quarters I am expected today to lay out, quite plainly and decisively, the future plan of world organization, and also to set the Atlantic Charter in its exact and true relation to subsequent declarations and current events. It is easier to ask such questions than to answer them. We are working with thirty-three United Nations and, in particular, with two great Allies who, in some forms of power, far excel the British Empire. It would be a great mistake for me, as head of the

> British Government, or, I may add, for this House, to take it upon ourselves to lay down the law to all those different countries, including the two great Powers with which we have to work, if the world is to be brought back into a good condition.[8]

Churchill's remarks indicate that the global spread of the Allied coalition was at least partly responsible for the defensive posture of its policies. The less clearly Allied statesmen committed themselves to aggressive and specific policies, the less risk they ran of alienating one or another member of their coalition.

In some measure, too, the social situation among the Western countries was responsible for the defensive character of Allied war policies. These were the "satisfied" countries—in the sense that their conception of the war was not integrated with any program of foreign aggrandizement or domestic reform. The ideological apparatus they brought to World War II was traditional and familiar, and there was no widespread desire to make basic innovations which would fire the imagination of peoples all over the world. Particularly in such imperial powers as Britain, France, and the Low Countries, with large colonial interests to defend, was there a notable lack of ideological aggressiveness in the formulation of official war policies.[9]

Another important factor inhibiting any tendencies to ideological aggressiveness among the policymakers of World War II, particularly in the United States, was their recollection of the fate met by the politician-propagandists of World War I. The unparalleled propaganda success of the war and peace aims of the earlier war, known collectively as "Wilsonism," bequeathed a difficult legacy to successors. Their extreme propaganda success during the war had led to an equally extreme reversal during the period of postwar disenchantment. The notion of "war propaganda" became a main target for postwar debunkers, a specific symbol for ideas which had failed, and thus a kind of comprehensive public scapegoat for postwar ills. There seems little reason to doubt that Mr. Wilson's history exercised profoundly inhibiting effects upon Mr. Roosevelt's imagination. Robert Sherwood writes that:

> As Roosevelt sat at the end of the long table in the Cabinet Room working on that [Arsenal of Democracy] speech and other speeches during the war years, he would look up at the portrait of Woodrow Wilson, over the mantelpiece. The tragedy of Wilson was always somewhere within the rim of his con-

> sciousness. Roosevelt could never forget Wilson's mistakes . . . and there was no motivating force in all of Roosevelt's wartime political policy stronger than the determination to prevent repetition of the same mistakes.[10]

These three factors—the size and diversity of the coalition, the social structure of the chief Allies, and the propaganda legacy of World War I—together account in great measure for the uninspired ideology under whose authority Sykewar was obliged to conduct its symbol warfare during World War II.

2. *Function of War Aims*

War aims are a basic form of policy assertion in wartime. They declare the objectives for which a war is being fought, and thus they are extremely important to all interested parties—home, allied, neutral, enemy. This complicates the framing of war aims in an age of high-speed and global mass communications, when any public declaration of policy is soon made accessible to all. It is not feasible to vary the policy to suit the audience. Instead, all policy statements must reckon with all audiences. Statements primarily intended for the enemy leadership must take account of the allied and neutral leadership. Statements to the home audience must calculate the effects on the enemy audience. As a result, war aims must be prepared carefully and scrutinized closely.

The policy aims of any war must include, as a bare minimum, defeat of the enemy and restoration of the peace. The Allied coalition clearly numbered victory among its aims, and nowhere more forcefully than in the early declarations of Mr. Churchill. In the famous "blood, sweat, and tears" speech on 13 May 1940, his first address as Prime Minister, he told a shaken House of Commons:

> You ask, what is our policy? I will say it is to wage war, by sea, land and air. . . . That is our policy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs.[11]

Victory, however urgent its claims when a nation faces defeat and destruction, does not suffice when the balance tips in a favorable direction. Once victory seems probable or certain, its adequacy as a war policy is replaced by public agitation for clarification as to what lies "beyond victory." In the era of total

war, when the enthusiasm (or at least the support) of mass opinion must be rallied, statesmen must be prepared to answer the public's persistent demand to know "what we are fighting for." A cause is required—something stirring, with wide appeal, bringing the angels onto one's side. Mr. Joe Louis, heavyweight boxing champion of the world, responded to this need by a public declaration during World War II that "God is on our side." However, this view received no confirmation from official sources.

Instead, Anglo-American policymakers proposed the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. The aims outlined were equally "safe and sound." They contained nothing that could arouse strong opposition among either the home publics or the Allied publics within the coalition. By the same token, they contained nothing to arouse great popular enthusiasm. Dr. Jerome S. Bruner has summarized the findings of wartime opinion surveys, which indicated a pervasive apathy toward Allied war and peace aims among the American public, in the following terms:

> Our attitude toward the great "peace documents" of the war is symptomatic . . . none has been *the* simple guarantee of security. Take, for example, the case of the Atlantic Charter. With the rest of the free world, America was thrilled by the epochal meeting at sea. It had élan. It captured our fancy. . . . Five months later, polls discovered that less than a quarter of the American public claimed they had ever heard of the Atlantic Charter. Tragically, only one in three of the enlightened few could name even one provision. The same goes for the Four Freedoms—a simple credo in twelve words . . . it has not become a symbolic rallying cry for the future. . . . [Its symbols] do not have the freshness to kindle anew the convictions which by now are deep in our unconscious.[12]

A coalition so defensively positioned that its home propaganda struck no sparks would seem to be at a disadvantage in framing inspired policies for psychological warfare against its enemies. Sykewar was, in fact, prohibited from using the Atlantic Charter in propaganda to the Axis populations. Instead, the policy of Unconditional Surrender became *the* basic directive for Sykewar against Germany. Its wisdom has been the subject of heated controversy from the moment it was proclaimed by President Roosevelt at Casablanca. Since Unconditional Surrender set the boundaries and defined the limits of the Sykewar

operation, some attention must be given here to the propaganda consequences of this policy.

3. *Problems of Unconditional Surrender*

It is important to notice that a chief argument against Unconditional Surrender, used even by critics not personally concerned with propaganda, is that it needlessly weakened our psychological warfare against the enemy. Such a view can make sense only if based on the judgment, one of the four judgments available on the score-card proposed in Chapter 1, that Unconditional Surrender was an "unacceptable policy ineffectively propagandized."

Concerning the merits of Unconditional Surrender as a policy decision, we are short on relevant facts but long on speculative guesses. To judge the policy merits of Unconditional Surrender we must know the objectives it was designed to attain. The writers of memoirs—Hull, Stimson, Sherwood, Eisenhower—thus far have deliberately skirted these delicate issues or avoided them altogether. A number of guesses have been made, among which may be mentioned the estimates that Unconditional Surrender was designed to:

(1) Stimulate the American public from its lethargic reception of the Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms to a recognition that this was an all-or-none "War of Survival."

(2) Encourage the occupied peoples to believe that their liberation from the Nazis could not be made the subject of discussions and conditions, but depended wholly upon a complete Allied victory which their cooperation would hasten.

(3) Reassure all members of the Allied coalition that there could be no question of division and separate peace among its components.

(4) Provide an effective reply to the Soviet demand for a "second front," which was echoed throughout the Allied world, and thus reduce the possibility that the Soviet Union might make peace in Europe, "where very many Russians but no American or British soldiers were dying at the time." [13]

(5) Persuade the German people that surrender was the only available alternative to the continued misery of war.

To these explanations of Unconditional Surrender, all of which are plausible and compatible, may be added two other

comments. First, Allied leaders may have believed no other outcome than Unconditional Surrender was feasible for a global and total war such as World War II. Sherwood tells us that the following statement by the President was "Roosevelt's profound belief . . . an essential essence in the formulation of his wartime policies":

> A nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender. . . . Such a dictated peace would be no peace at all. It would only be another armistice leading to the most gigantic armament race and the most devastating trade wars in history. . . .[14]

The second comment on Unconditional Surrender is related to our earlier discussion of the defensive ideological posture in which the United States found itself during World War II. In the absence of inspiring affirmative policies, which would involve American policymakers in commitments to Allies and offers to enemies beyond their ideological and political means, Unconditional Surrender at least elevated and maximized the policy of Victory.

However one may interpret and judge Unconditional Surrender as a basic war policy, the fact remains beyond dispute that it *was* the basic policy. As such, the main question before propagandists was whether to publicize or hide it. Sherwood writes:

> There were many propaganda experts, both British and American, who . . . were not necessarily opposed to the principle of total defeat—but considered it a disastrous mistake for the President to announce it publicly. There were others who objected violently to the principle itself, and who . . . are still attributing the world's postwar troubles to the enforcement of Unconditional Surrender on Germany.[15]

Two such propagandists have written out their criticism of Unconditional Surrender in detail: Captain Ellis M. Zacharias (USN), who conducted a final radio phase of high-level sykewar against the Japanese; and Allen W. Dulles, who, as chief of an OSS outpost in Switzerland, was in touch with Allied sykewar against Germany. Their criticisms of Unconditional Surrender are identical, and consist of three central propositions which warrant careful analysis:

(1) In the first place, they argue, Unconditional Surrender

was too nebulous a proposition to put before the enemy high command. Such a formula made it impossible for them to yield. Concerning the Japanese, Zacharias has written:

> What prevented them from suing for peace . . . was their uncertainty on two scores. First, they wanted to know the meaning of unconditional surrender and the fate we planned for Japan after defeat. Second, they tried to obtain from us assurances that the Emperor could remain on the throne after surrender.[16]

The argument that Unconditional Surrender made negotiation with highly placed enemy groups impossible is a valid criticism only on the assumption that Roosevelt and Churchill actually intended to negotiate with such groups. Such an assumption is clearly unwarranted by the evidence available at present. Both leaders publicly and repeatedly disavowed any such intention. Churchill, in a full-dress defense of the policy against attack in the House of Commons as late as 18 January 1945, when negotiation with both Nazi and Anti-Nazi groups was easily available, said:

> Should we modify this declaration which was made in days of comparative weakness and lack of success, now that we have reached a period of mastery and power? I am clear that nothing should induce us to abandon the principle of unconditional surrender, or to enter into any form of negotiation with Germany or Japan, under whatever guise such suggestions may present themselves, until the act of unconditional surrender has been formally executed.[17]

This criticism seems to have been untenable unless one was prepared to negotiate with the ruling or military cliques in Japan and Germany, for practically there was no other choice. The British historian Trevor-Roper puts the situation thus:

> Conditions can only be made with power-holders, or alternative power-holders, otherwise they are not conditions but promises. . . . Of alternative power-holders, the army leaders might perhaps have been ready to bargain; but conditions which included the destruction of the German Army would have seemed no conditions to them; and anyway, even the Army failed in its politics. As for the "democratic opposition" invented by virtuous journalists, it is a creature as fabulous as the centaur and the hippogriff.[18]

(2) The second argument against Unconditional Surrender is that it lengthened the war by providing enemy propagandists with effective ammunition for bolstering the morale of their people. Dulles claims:

> Official Allied policy towards Germany was frozen into the formula unconditional surrender. Goebbels quickly twisted it into the formula "total slavery" and very largely succeeded in making the German people believe that was what unconditional surrender meant.[19]

We have seen Churchill's assertion: "It is false to suggest that it prolonged the war." But on such a question rival claims are of little help. It may be more useful to examine the basis of Dulles' argument, that the formula made possible a Nazi propaganda which worked effectively ("very largely succeeded"). Criticism here is valid only on the assumption that Nazi revision of Unconditional Surrender to mean "total slavery" *actually* strengthened German resistance (and thereby prolonged the war). This is, at best, a dubious assumption. While there can be no certainty on this point, the weight of intelligence data on the subject indicates that this Nazi propaganda theme was not effective. An enormous number of captured documents, including letters and diaries of German soldiers and civilians, give evidence that the Germans did not fear surrender to, or occupation by, the Anglo-Americans. Following are some characteristic passages, taken from the intercepted correspondence of German civilians, which indicate the tenor of German reactions throughout the period of continental Sykewar, from shortly after D-Day to shortly before VE-Day.

(a) ". . . Gerade bekomme ich eine Karte, wo sie mir sagt, dass Hans in englischer Gefangenschaft ist. Weisst Du, wie sehr ich mich darüber freue? Eigentlich ist ihr Mann mehr in Sicherheit wie sie." (PWD Doc., 7/11/44)

(b) ". . . Wir wollen doch alle hoffen und nochmals hoffen, dass Euer Herbert in die Gefangenschaft geraten ist, denn bei den Amerikanern und Engländern haben sie es nicht so schlecht. . . ." (PWD Doc., 9/12/44)

(c) "In grosser Eile möchte ich noch schnell an Dich einen Brief schreiben, denn in einigen Stunden werden die Amerikaner hier ihren glorreichen Einzug halten. Die Bevölkerung ist voller Freude, dass der ganze Kram für sie nun endlich ein

Ende hat . . . Heute Nacht sind unsere Truppen durch Nauheim gezogen, und wird also dementsprechend auch keinerlei Widerstand sein. Wir geben uns schon der Hoffnung hin, dass wir Ostern Bohnenkaffee trinken werden und womöglich auch Schokolade bekommen. Jedenfalls tun uns die Berliner wirklich schrecklich leid, denn Ihr werdet ja wohl noch viel auszuhalten haben. Hoffentlich kannst Du Dich nach wie vor von allem fern halten, und sieh nur zu, dass Du Dich vom Volkssturm retten kannst . . ." (DE 358/DIS 202, 27/3/45)

(d) ". . . Wir rechnen stündlich mit der Besetzung. Du brauchst keine Sorge um uns zu haben, uns wird nichts geschehen, denn der Amerikaner ist ja anständig und tut den Frauen nichts. Denn wir können ja nichts dazu dass dieser Krieg ist und kein Ende gemacht wird . . ." (DE 375/DIS 202, 18/4/45)[20]

These quotations are merely illustrative. Somewhat more systematic data were compiled by the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, which presented the following results of a postwar survey of German attitudes toward Unconditional Surrender:[21]

Willingness to Accept Unconditional Surrender

	Percent of people in unbombed towns	*Percent of people in bombed towns*
Willing	51	57
Unwilling	13	9
No personal admission of willingness, but thinks surrender inevitable	20	18
Indifferent, never heard or thought about unconditional surrender	16	16
Total	100	100

Perhaps the critics had not read, or found it inconvenient to use, these reports. When 54 percent of a sampled population express personal willingness to accept unconditional surrender, an additional 19 percent regard it as inevitable, and 16 percent are indifferent, while only 11 percent express unwillingness to

accept, it is difficult to see how Nazi counterpropaganda of "total slavery" based on the Unconditional Surrender theme "very largely succeeded."

The intelligence reports illustrated by the above data were supported by the evidence of military events. The Goebbels Propaganda Ministry tied its "total slavery" theme to five major action-campaigns for organizing popular German resistance:

(a) The "scorched earth" policy
(b) Final evacuation of western areas
(c) Mobilization of the Volkssturm
(d) Creation of the Bavarian "Redoubt"
(e) Sabotage of the invading armies [22]

The collapse of the first of these campaigns was so complete that the policy was withdrawn by Hitler himself. The complete failure of the others is now a part of the military record.[23] In the light of available evidence, therefore, the view that Unconditional Surrender lengthened the war by strengthening the German will-to-resist is based on assumptions which, at best, are speculative and rather dubious.

(3) The third major criticism is based on the proposition that Unconditional Surrender inhibited our psychological warfare against Germany. Dulles writes:

> We were tongue-tied by the fear that any explanation of what unconditional surrender meant might be construed by the Germans as a promise some future Hitler could say had been broken.[24]

These remarks are clearly not intended to be taken in any literal sense, for PWD/SHAEF alone supervised the dissemination of more than *three billion* leaflets between D-Day and VE-Day.[25] What Dulles apparently means is that Sykewar was prevented by Unconditional Surrender from the free selection of its own war aims—i.e., those which might have made surrender look more attractive to the Germans. This criticism seems to express a petulant naiveté which is characteristic of many professional propagandists—namely, that policy should be formed mainly with reference to the requirements of their propaganda. This puts the cart before the horse, and swings the horse by his tail. In the normal course of political activity, propaganda is the servant of policy, and not the reverse. The chances are that this is a reasonable arrangement, for the talents

and skills which make a good propagandist do not necessarily insure a high order of policy thinking. Dr. Speier states this point rather aptly:

> A policy that is focused on enduring interests, future conditions and long-range objectives may restrict the propagandist's daily operations, and when this happens the propagandist has to comply. He complies, but is sometimes dissatisfied. The sense of frustration that he feels may be caused by the prudence of the statesman, but the training that is most valuable in the work of a propagandist is no education for appreciating political prudence.[26]

A decision to subordinate the objective of shortening the war to that of obtaining more desirable conditions of peace is thus a legitimate policy decision. It is particularly difficult to attack the Unconditional Surrender policy on these grounds, when the available evidence, as indicated above, renders dubious the assumption that the demand for Unconditional Surrender actually did prolong the war. The absence of an appropriate group with which to negotiate conditions, in fact, made the whole argument in these terms seem rather pointless—unless one was prepared to negotiate with either the Nazi or the military hierarchies.

Since Unconditional Surrender actually was the basic policy from which Roosevelt and Churchill would permit no deviations, the complaint that it made life difficult for propagandists is rather irrelevant. The task of the propagandist was to find ways of living with it. It may be suggested that perhaps even its difficulties as a viable propaganda policy have been exaggerated by those who opposed it for other reasons. Mr. Crossman, the key policymaker at Sykewar, assures us: "Surprisingly enough, we found more room for maneuver than might have been expected." [27] The reader will be able to judge, from the material presented in the chapters on content and techniques, the agility with which Sykewarriors maneuvered.

The foregoing was designed to present the main objections to Unconditional Surrender which have been advanced by propagandists, together with some evidence that these objections are less damning than their makers suppose. A final account of Unconditional Surrender remains to be written. Until it is written, skepticism is justified concerning the validity and rele-

vance of complaints that it: (1) made negotiation with anti-Nazi Germans impossible; (2) prolonged the war by strengthening German resistance; and (3) hamstrung our psychological warfare against German morale. In this connection, it is interesting to note the view of Lt. Col. C. A. H. Thomson, Chief of PWD Plans and Directives Section, and probably the Sykewarrior with the longest continuous propaganda experience in World War II:

> Our fears about the negative effects of unconditional surrender were not borne out by war developments, surrender rates, or the interrogation of prisoners. The well-established ideas of British and American fairness in treating captured enemy seemed to furnish a sufficient rationalization to those Germans who wished to surrender, more than overcoming any probable fears arising from the threat of unconditional surrender.[28]

In general, many Sykewarriors who actually participated in the campaign against Germany appear to regard the policy more favorably. Some claim—and the present writer is among these—that given the nature of the Allied coalition, the defensive ideological position in which Anglo-American society found itself, and the heritage of propaganda-wariness (i.e., skepticism of promises) in the Western world, Unconditional Surrender was probably the most acceptable long-run policy that the responsible Anglo-American policymakers for the Allied coalition could devise.[29] If it did not challenge the public imagination and stimulate popular hopes for a better world, it at least provided a formula which kept the coalition intact and avoided promises which could not be fulfilled. If this seems an argument of *faute de mieux,* it is perhaps not unreasonable to suggest that the pattern of Western politics in recent decades has been, in fact, a series of compromises organized around choices of second-best and lesser-evil.

Whether or not they accepted this view, Sykewar policymakers seemed to agree at least that, since the policy of Unconditional Surrender was a "given," the best propaganda strategy was to publicize the policy rather than to conceal it; to organize propaganda output within its terms, rather than to attempt to evade its consequences. The reasoning that supported this view, which was probably the central decision that guided Sykewar operations, is usually designated by the phrase "Strategy of Truth."

4. *Strategy of Truth*

A strategy of truth, it should be noted at the outset, is not synonymous with honesty. Conversely, there is no known national propaganda apparatus which operates according to a strategy of dishonesty. The word to be emphasized, in the first instance, is not "truth" but "strategy," for truth in propaganda is a function of effectiveness. The base of operations described by the phrase is expediential, even if its rationalization to the public is usually made in terms of morality. Propagandists do not decide to tell the truth because they personally are honest, any more than they decide to tell lies because they are dishonest. Given a particular audience to be reached with a particular policy, the basis for decision is an estimate of what will work.

Such an estimate may be conditioned by the characteristics of the propagandist. Wallace Carroll, for example, describes the inclination of OWI propagandists toward a strategy of truth in these terms:

> Many of us in OWI were strongly predisposed by our previous training in favor of a program of information. Take Elmer Davis, for example. . . . Edward Klauber, Ed Barrett, Ferdinand Kuhn, and I had also been trained in the traditions of American journalism. Our inclination, too, was to put the facts of the war before the world. These facts were so overwhelmingly in favor of the Allies and they would therefore—presumably—work for an Allied victory.[30]

These men inclined toward a strategy of truth less because they were virtuous (though they were surely that) than because of their "previous training" as journalists. In any case, as propagandists they defended their inclinations in the pragmatic terms that such a strategy would "presumably work for an Allied victory." When their inclinations could not be justified in these terms—i.e., when the presentation of "straight facts" presumably would *not* help an Allied victory—the decision went the other way. On this point, Mr. Carroll testifies obliquely:

> Our real difficulties came over a choice between giving the news and withholding it, between the practices of journalism and the dictates of war, between the urge to inform and the passion to save lives, between common honesty and plain humanity.[31]

The policymakers at PWD were also coy, but somewhat more explicit, about distinguishing the Sykewar Strategy of Truth from the concept expressed by the phrase "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." In fact, there was general recognition that some truths were to be modified and other truths were to be omitted altogether. The *Standing Directive for Psychological Warfare,* which was the basic statement of policy for all Sykewar personnel, made the following discreet provision:

> It is recognized that in the execution of Psychological Warfare it is a fundamental principle not to antagonize the audience. Direct denunciation or direct offence against known susceptibilities will therefore be avoided in all Psychological Warfare against the enemy armed forces.[32]

This eliminated undue preoccupation of Sykewarriors with "the whole" truth. The *Standing Directive* also made clear that Sykewar was not confined to "nothing but" the truth, by restricting its instructions to overt propaganda. Overt, or "white," propaganda was the only form of Sykewar output which identified itself to the German audience as an Allied source. The rule of accurate reporting, or at least its negative version, which prohibited deviation from the truth in statements that could be verified by the German audience, had to be strictly observed in "white" Sykewar. No such restriction was placed upon the covert "gray" and "black" forms of Sykewar output. "Gray" propaganda, which omitted all mention of source, specialized precisely in *not* telling "the whole" truth. "Black" Sykewar, which identified itself by a false source, may be viewed as, in the last analysis, a specialty in telling "anything but" the truth.

The theory was that by leading this double life, Sykewar could carry on like a wanton woman in the covert forms, while protecting the good name of SHAEF in "white" output. Since "white" was the only form that accurately identified itself, it was felt that nothing could be "pinned on" the Allies officially as a result of covert lying. The extent to which the Allies have been "officially" protected by this stratagem is questionable, in view of the postwar disclosures about covert operations which former Sykewarriors have been permitted to publish. The actual, which is perhaps more important than official, protection of the Allied reputation for honesty by this stratagem is even more

questionable. We do not know how many Germans were actually deceived as to the source of covert Allied propaganda—though what intelligence reports we received indicate that many were not deceived. Clearly the two chief "gray" media—the newspaper *Nachrichten für die Truppe* and the radio station *Soldatensender West*—were pretty generally identified with Allied sources by members of their German audience.

Most interesting and relevant to the present discussion was the agreement among Sykewarriors in the covert forms that, for the most part, and particularly in the early stages of any covert campaign, they too were obliged to observe the rule of accurate reporting. The simple reason was that, in order ultimately to persuade their audience, they first had to make the audience believe them. This is one of the few dogmas advanced by Sykewarriors that seems likely to endure as an axiom of propaganda: Credibility is a condition of persuasion. Before you can make a man do what you say, you must make him believe what you say. A necessary condition for gaining his credence is that you do not permit him to catch you in lies. Hence the constraint upon all propagandists to accurate reporting of matters which are subject to verification by the audience. As the official historian put it:

> Such truth [in propaganda], to be sure, can, and sometimes must, be selective, for often the truth is not credible to the enemy. However, selective or not, use by overt propaganda of falsehoods *which can be proved false by the enemy* is the same as killing the goose that might eventually lay golden eggs. (italics mine) [33]

This constraint operates upon all propagandists, irrespective of the country or policy they serve. The Nazi propagandists had to observe the rule of accurate reporting, when they wanted to be believed, just as carefully as the Allies. Mr. Crossman writes:

> It is not my impression that German propaganda was guilty of many deliberate lies. . . . Most of the German lies . . . were probably sheer mistakes, just as most of the German promises . . . were due to the ineptness of politicians. Goering was not knavish but foolish when he once stated in a speech that not a bomb would fall on the Ruhr, and so was Hitler, in October 1941, when he announced the final collapse of the Bolshevists. . . . There is every likelihood that Goebbels, the arch-propagan-

> dist, was furious when such statements were made. He was far too able a man to make silly propaganda "commitments" or to perpetrate small lies deliberately. He understood that, if you want to put over a big lie, the way to do it is to be as scrupulously accurate as possible about small facts.[34]

This brings us to the nub of the problem of truth. If all propagandists are equally committed to accurate reporting of verifiable facts, how is the Allied Strategy of Truth to be distinguished from the Nazi Strategy of the Big Lie? A general answer might be framed thus: The Allies attempted to convey a true impression of their basic policy intentions; the Nazis attempted to convey a false impression of their basic policy intentions.

The Nazis, in brief, *believed* that the Germans were a master race, and *intended* that they should establish their rule over Europe and beyond. They *said,* however, that they believed in a European culture (particularly French culture when addressing the French, particularly Italian culture when addressing the Italians, whom they off-the-record referred to as "dreckige italienische Schweine," and so forth), and intended to establish a "new order" in which all Europeans could share equitably. They intended to *rule* Europe, but they pretended that they wanted only to *save* Europe from the Bolshevik menace. Thus their accuracy on details must be located within a context of overall falsehood.

The Allies, on the other hand, *believed* that Nazism was a menace to Western civilization and world peace, and *intended* to destroy it completely. They *said* the same thing in all their propaganda, no matter to whom addressed. Allied inaccuracies, and even chicaneries, on details can thus be located within a context of overall truth.

The Nazis relied on accurate reporting of details to build credibility for a propaganda campaign which was a great sham—a systematic misrepresentation of their overall policy. This is the procedure of "black" sykewar and, when elevated to the guidance of national propaganda, it becomes a Strategy of the Big Lie. Conversely, since Allied propaganda faithfully reflected the policy intentions of its political leadership, it can appropriately be designated, despite frequent inaccuracies and occasional untruths, as a Strategy of Truth.

Allied strategy was the outcome of the decision, once Uncon-

ditional Surrender was settled as basic policy, to acknowledge and publicize it rather than to conceal it. In making *this* decision, Allied policymakers showed a greater regard for ethical considerations than did their Nazi counterparts, and perhaps a greater political wisdom than did those propagandists who tried to seduce them into modifying the policy for propaganda purposes. It was Roosevelt and Churchill, in refusing to permit sykewarriors to falsify their actual intention with "softening" promises to the Germans, who were responsible for the Allied Strategy of Truth. Just as it was Hitler, in allowing his actual policies to be modified and falsified by the propagandists, who was responsible for the Nazi Strategy of the Big Lie.

A strategy of truth for the Nazis would have entailed a consistent campaign to persuade Europe to accept a hegemony organized under the superior German "race." Thus Nazi propaganda would have reflected faithfully Nazi intentions (i.e., policy decisions), even though it might not have succeeded any better than the attempt to deceive Europe into believing that Nazi hegemony was identical with European comity. It was not Nazi lying alone that lost them the war, any more than truthfulness alone would have won it. Had their power been sufficient, they might have accomplished their purpose despite the "big lie." Dictatorship, accepting the view that dissent which can not be eliminated by persuasion can always be eliminated by coercion, need not emphasize peaceful cooperation among its long-term goals.

For the democratic process, however, which bases itself on the freely-given consent of the governed, coercion must be held to a minimum, and persuasion is the key to government. On any long-term basis, credibility is a condition of persuasiveness and credence is associated with a reputation for truthfulness. Democracy, by its nature, is a long-run operation, and its distinctive function as government by consent must be affiliated with a strategy of truth. The matter is aptly summarized in a remark attributed to Abraham Lincoln, that one cannot fool all of the people all of the time. This is a view basic to democratic procedures. If the success of your government depends on fooling people (i.e., the big lie), then you must be prepared to chop off the heads of people who are not fooled. If you do not intend to govern by execution, but by consent, then you can not rely upon fooling people.

It would be misleading, as we have seen, to score the Allies 100 percent for truth and the Nazis 100 percent for falsehood. Policymaking in practice is a continuous compromise of ethics by power, of what is desirable by what is possible, and the decisive aspect of the compromise is the tendency it emphasizes. It was a matter of emphasis, in this crucial sense, that distinguished the Allied Strategy of Truth from the Nazi Strategy of the Big Lie. The sykewar campaigns conducted on both sides of the battlefront had the same general objectives:

(1) to help win the war by facilitating enemy surrender

(2) to help secure desirable conditions of peace (war aims)

We have seen that the Nazi emphasis on the first objective derived from the view that, once the war was won, desirable conditions of peace could be imposed by force and fiat. The Allied leadership, however, recognized that they would be in no position, at war's end, to impose conditions on all the world by force and fiat. They were confronted by a varied coalition whose wishes concerning the conditions of peace would have to be accommodated within a framework of discussion and consent. In such a situation, their emphasis had to be upon the second objective, that of maximizing the prospects for a desirable peace, without unduly compromising the first. The *Standing Directive* is very clear and firm on this cardinal point:

> The use of Psychological Warfare in military operations must be strictly subordinated to the long-term policy of our Governments, in the sense that nothing must be done with the object of undermining fighting morale during operations which would prejudice Government policy to Germany after the war. (Section 7)

The basic Allied policy being Unconditional Surrender, the Strategy of Truth required that no Sykewar activity should convey the impression to any German audience that other, more acceptable, terms might be arranged. Here, again, the *Standing Directive* was forceful and explicit:

> It has also been made clear by our Governments that they are determined to destroy not only the Nazi system, but the concept of the Wehrmacht, which has been both the initiator and the willing instrument of recurring German attempts to dominate other peoples. Nothing in the implementation of this directive must compromise that issue. (Section 3)

Thus the policy of Unconditional Surrender, interpreted according to the Strategy of Truth, defined the limits within which Sykewar was to operate. The propaganda policies which Sykewar developed within these limits to guide its operations merit examination here.

5. *The Sykewar Policies*

Unconditional Surrender may be considered as, in one important sense, an agreement among the Allies on a policy of no-policy-commitments-until-surrender. Such an agreement meant, as we have seen, that no propaganda designed to speed German surrender could be permitted to compromise the conditions of peace to be worked out after surrender. In terms of Sykewar operations, perhaps the most important consequence of the policy was that it sharply restricted the use Sykewar could make of the potent propaganda of promises. The *Standing Directive,* in the terms given below, prohibited Sykewarriors from venturing into this fertile and facile field, which is the constant temptation of all propagandists:

> No specific promises will be made concerning the treatment of Germany after the war, other than those expressly made by Government spokesmen. In particular there must be no suggestion that the Atlantic Charter applies to Germany by right. (Section 9)

To make quite certain that what was excluded openly would not be smuggled in by innuendo, Sykewar propagandists were forbidden to give any "suggestion or implication" from which Germans could deduce that the Allied governments might be prepared to:

> (1) recognise any claims of the German Army to be absolved from its full share of responsibility for German aggression on the grounds that its part is merely professional and non-political and that it does no more than obey orders;
>
> (2) recognise the possibility of divorcing the "fighting war" from the atrocities which the German soldier has committed or condoned, e.g., the taking and shooting of hostages and the murder of prisoners;
>
> (3) allow German militarism to survive in any form.
>
> (Section 10)

In order to insure against violation of important Allied policies, which individual Sykewarriors might justify on the ground that they had not been specified, the *Standing Directive* drew up a detailed list of points on which the Anglo-American governments were considered to have committed themselves. These points included:

(1) Demilitarisation of Germany
(2) Punishment of war criminals
(3) Liberation of territories overrun by Nazi-Germany, including Austria
(4) Occupation of Germany
(5) Destruction of Nazism and German militarism
(6) Prevention of such economic distress in Germany as will be detrimental to the rest of the world
(7) Ultimate restoration of Germany to a place "in the world family of democratic nations."

(Section 11)

The attention of all concerned was directed particularly to the fact that points 6 and 7, the only points mentioned which could serve as the basis for a propaganda of promises, were "only general commitments." Personnel were instructed that these points "may not be elaborated in Psychological Warfare unless and until specific Government statements are forthcoming." By means of these directives, Sykewar made certain that the policy of Unconditional Surrender would be used according to the tenets of the Strategy of Truth.

The *Standing Directive* next turned its attention to the construction of a positive line of policy. On the basis of available intelligence (and the inevitable sparseness of hard evidence during the pre-invasion spring of 1944 forced considerable reliance upon political intuition), an analysis was made of the propaganda lines most likely to succeed. The basic conception was organized in terms of two phases of military operations affecting German morale: *Phase A,* the period up to some indeterminate point after D-Day when the Allied forces should have "demonstrated that they can use their quantitative superiority"; *Phase B,* the period after the tide of war had turned in favor of the Allies beyond any widespread question among Germans. The propaganda plan which accompanied this conception was as follows:

In Phase A all psychological warfare against German troops must be regarded as *preparatory*. This must be a period *not* of *direct assault* or of open appeals for surrender, but of steady repetition of the facts, full recognition of which will bear sudden fruit in Phase B. (Section 16)

Leaving Sykewar instructions for Phase B until it should have developed (this development is described later in this study, in the chapter on Sykewar themes), the *Standing Directive* outlined its plan for Phase A in three stages, corresponding to stages of the military operations:

(1) *Long-term tasks:*

(a) Maintenance and increase of belief in the reliability of the Anglo-American word, and of unity between the Russians and ourselves.

(b) Creation of an atmosphere in which the German soldier gradually comes to feel that, since defeat is certain, he has fulfilled his soldierly duty and can now follow the example of the German Army in Tunisia.

(2) *Short-term tasks, pre D-Day:*

(a) Stimulation of defeatism through a sense of Anglo-American superiority in men and materials; combating the fear of Bolshevism by a cautious build-up of Anglo-American strength.

(b) Exploitation of German confidence in the good treatment of prisoners of war so as to decrease German fighting spirit and undermine German fear of defeat. Simultaneously, familiarisation of the German soldier with official Allied statements on the place of Germany in Post-War Europe.

(c) Exploitation of the Russian offensive as exemplifying the certainty of a German defeat in a two-front war.

(d) Exploitation of the German fear of sabotage and resistance by occupied peoples, including foreign workers.

(e) Exploitation of a sense of isolation through the Allied threat to German communications.

(f) Exploitation of the air offensive to stimulate distrust between the air force and the army and to undermine confidence in the possibility of successful resistance.

(3) *Short-term tasks, post D-Day.* After D-Day the following tasks should be added to those in (2) above:

(a) Stimulation of distrust of foreigners in the German Army by open incitement of these foreigners.

(b) Special attacks on the morale of troops on the flanks of the fighting. Since these troops will not be actually engaged,

they will probably form the best target for propaganda. In this campaign, emphasize the failure of the Luftwaffe and the German Navy to prevent the landings.

(Section 17)

Naturally the estimates of German, and particularly Wehrmacht, morale from which these instructions derived were altered with the course of events after D-Day, and with the improved intelligence reporting which was made possible by Sykewar location on the Continent and first-hand contact with enemy sources. This process of constantly adapting and refining Sykewar directives on the basis of military events and intelligence reports, while remaining within the framework of the basic policy of Unconditional Surrender and the basic Strategy of Truth, was the continuing function of Sykewar's policymakers from D-Day to VE-Day. The policy position of PWD was gradually adapted to enable the performance of this function.

6. *Policy Position of PWD/SHAEF*

The policy decisions made by top Allied leadership were always couched in terms of general objectives, and had to be adapted to the needs of day-to-day situations by persons in constant touch with current developments. Unconditional Surrender, for example, did not come in its pristine simplicity from President Roosevelt at Casablanca to the Sykewar policymakers in the ETO. It went along the route marked out by the Chain of Command (see Chart I, page 49) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, whence it finally emerged in the shape of a document designated officially as JCS 1067. In this and earlier forms the policy was transmitted to PWD, along with the other staff sections of SHAEF, "for study and compliance." Once it had arrived, Unconditional Surrender defined, as the *Standing Directive* put it, "not the strategy of the campaign . . . against German fighting morale, but the limits within which it must, for policy reasons, be confined" (Section 8). Sykewar thus could choose to do anything which was not incompatible with Unconditional Surrender and its supplementary high-policy directives. To repeat Mr. Crossman's phrase: "Surprisingly enough, we found more room for maneuver than might have been expected."

This policy latitude assumed by PWD was largely the result of its fortunate status as a staff agency of General Eisenhower's SHAEF, an arrangement which will be clarified in the next chapter.[35] The official historian writes:

> Although PWD/SHAEF did not by any means perform all sykewar operations in Western Europe, its directive control was sufficient to permit it to coordinate the efforts of the agencies and individuals which contributed toward the total sykewar impact, and to coordinate these efforts along the simple line of the Supreme Commander's specific expressed wishes. PWD/SHAEF was the channel that extended back to the political policymaking agencies in London and Washington, and forward to the extreme front lines where Psychological Warfare Teams were in immediate contact with the enemy.[36]

An important contribution to the winning of this broad policy position by PWD (for the woods were full of rival propaganda policymakers) was the experience of sykewar in the Mediterranean campaign. At the start, propaganda policy in North Africa came through a formal channel which had to be strictly observed. From the President/Prime Minister came the word that was elaborated by the State Department/Foreign Office into political policy. This passed to CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff), where it was translated into a military directive. Thence it went to the joint OWI-PWE policy committee, where it was translated into a propaganda directive. In this form, finally, it came to PWB (Psychological Warfare Branch), the equivalent of PWD in the Mediterranean, where it was translated into actual propaganda operations against the enemy.

Such an arrangement was tidy, but quite ineffectual, in a rapidly changing war of movement. The following passage shows how the North African experience broke this rigid pattern:

> Day by day and hour by hour there were local military and political developments of great importance which could not be known immediately to the civilian policy-making agencies in America and Britain. These developments necessarily had great bearing on PWB's propaganda policy in these rapidly changing circumstances.
>
> Thus, pressure of events placed PWB in the position of recommending policy to London and Washington and these recommendations usually were included in the next Joint

Directive. Meanwhile PWB was permitted, because of its knowledgeable position, to follow its own suggestions without awaiting formal approval from London and Washington.

This gradual arrival at flexible policy control was reflected in the policy-control aspects of PWD/SHAEF.[37]

The result was that PWD increasingly wrote its own directives, on matters ranging from the "local developments" mentioned above to political affairs on high levels. The reach of PWD's policy control is illustrated in its *Standing Directive,* whose first instruction to Sykewarriors is that all other directives, including those of PWE/OWI, are to be regarded "unless expressly stated . . . as supplementary to and not as cancelling the present Standing Directive, which has the approval of PWE/OWI" (Section 1). Starting from this high point, Sykewar policy control of propaganda on the continent of Europe, extended in subsequent directives and a regular "Weekly Guidance," became fairly complete.

Before we turn to examine the formal organizational structure through which this control was exercised, a word may be said about the limitations under which Sykewar policy was made. PWD suffered from the same human limitations of character and intelligence as all policymaking agencies. Its top personnel were neither perfectly good nor infinitely wise, but among their considerable merits in this connection was a degree of modesty and awareness of self-limitations which is perhaps not usual among highly placed men. Like all other policymakers, too, they were subject to all manner of irrelevant pressures and considerations—the top-flight V.I.P., in from Washington or Whitehall, who insisted that his newly invented "stunt" be put on the air or into leaflets immediately, although (as Mr. Crossman points out in his vivid recollection of two such instances) it was likely that the working propagandists had long since discussed and discarded this newborn brain-child. The demands of military protocol, overlapping jurisdictions, personality clashes, personnel shortages, and other dispensable consumers of time and energy daily bedeviled the policymakers.

Constantly present was the serious difficulty of inadequate information. Although the Intelligence performance of Sykewar was excellent, yet, by the nature of the war situation, the available information was rarely adequate and policy had to be based partly on intuition and guesswork. Each of these aspects

of the matter is discussed in detail in the chapters which follow, but it is well to emphasize in advance that an account written five years after D-Day may now convey to the reader a sense of orderliness which was not always apparent to the participants, or may now impute to the writer a superior wisdom which he did not demonstrate during the actual course of events. The point to be remembered has been stated tidily by Dr. Alexander H. Leighton:

> Policy making in practice is largely a matter of improvisation, of doing the best you can with what you have and, as in other aspects of life, this is seldom ideal.[38]

Chapter 2. Notes

1. On these points, see the illuminating discussion by Louis Wirth, "Consensus and Mass Communication," *American Sociological Review* (Feb. 1948), Vol. XIII, no. 1.

2. On "multiple publics," see H. L. Childs, *An Introduction to Public Opinion* (New York, 1940), pp. 41-42. On the World War II coalition, see Max Werner, *The Great Offensive* (New York, 1942), Chap. XIV. Also U.S. State Department, *Cooperative War Effort* (Washington, 1942).

3. See Walter Johnson, *The Battle Against Isolation* (Chicago, 1944).

4. The special difficulties of "coalition" with the Soviet Union are recounted by the wartime chief of the U. S. Military Mission in Moscow: J. R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance* (New York, 1947). Owen Lattimore, *America and Asia* (Claremont, 1943), discusses the Chinese and other Asiatic partners in the coalition. Churchill's remark, "The greatest cross I have to bear is the Cross of Lorraine," expresses an attitude toward the Fighting French ally. U. S. State Department points of view on the latter are found in W. L. Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble* (New York, 1947).

5. H. L. Scanlon, *European Governments in Exile,* rev. ed. (Carnegie Endowment, Washington, 1943).

6. Switzerland and Turkey were the most successful in this respect. See Edgar Bonjour, *Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralität* (Zurich, 1946).

7. A particularly useful literature on the nature of international coalitions in our time is that which grew up around the prewar issues of the Spanish Civil War, popular front, and collective security. See especially the analyses by the Trotskyist theoreticians of the Fourth International.

8. British Information Service, *A Selection From Speeches Made By Winston Churchill. . . .* (New York, 1943), unpaged.

9. For the texts of war aims statements, see: Geneva Research Center, *Official Statements of War and Peace Aims* (Geneva, 1940), and United Nations Information Office, *War and Peace Aims* (New York, 1943). Also P. E. Corbett, *Post-War Worlds* (I.P.R., New York, 1942). An extremely interesting document on German war and peace aims is the last full-dress tract on the subject addressed to the armed forces: Personalamt des Heeres,

Wofür kämpfen wir? (Berlin, 1944). This document is in The Hoover Library.

Henry Wallace, the one important Anglo-American spokesman who tried to adapt Wilsonism to World War II conditions, was promptly "debunked." To his slogan, "The Century of the Common Man," Mrs. Luce and the Luce press replied with a campaign *against* "Globaloney." (However, the Luces tactfully reserved their campaign *for* "The American Century" until after the war, since apparently even they felt it might be difficult to enlist the enthusiasm of some thirty assorted nations in behalf of this particular war aim.) It should be noted that Roosevelt never committed himself publicly to the sweeping slogans of Wallace. Roosevelt's attempt at an overall slogan, "the war of survival," must be recorded as a dismal failure. Churchill never went further than, in a broadcast to the French on 21 October 1940: "Long live also the forward march of the common people in all the lands towards their just and true inheritance, and towards the broader and fuller age."

10. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York, 1948), p. 227. Further cases in which Sherwood perceives the ghost of Wilson at Roosevelt's side can be traced through the index of his book.

11. Winston Churchill, *Blood, Sweat, and Tears* (New York, 1941), p. 276.

12. J. S. Bruner, *Mandate From The People* (New York, 1944), pp. 28-29.

13. Hans Speier, "War Aims in Political Warfare," *Social Research* (May 1945), Vol. XII, p. 173. Although published before the war ended, this paper is still the most cogent analysis of Allied war aims in World War II. See also the statement of C. A. H. Thomson:

> When it was announced, the main policy goal of unconditional surrender was to affirm Allied faith in ultimate victory. Other policy goals had more to do with propaganda to Russia, to the occupied areas, and to the world's masses, than with propaganda to Germany. The objective in the former areas was to convince the Russians of our determination to stick with them till military victory over the common enemy, and to convince the peoples of the world of our role as liberator. To Germany, the purpose was negative: to prevent future German propaganda from claiming with reason that surrender in this war was bought with any such device as the Fourteen Points. Roosevelt's policy was stubbornly based on his conviction that our war and diplomatic policy must give no color to any future German propaganda of a deal; this overrode any advantages which might come from telling Germans exactly what we planned to do to them. Despite the strong pleas of high Allied military and political leaders, Roosevelt never shifted this policy in any important respect.

Overseas Information Service of the U. S. Government, p. 115.

14. Sherwood, *op. cit.,* p. 226.

15. *Ibid,* p. 695.

16. E. M. Zacharias, "Eighteen Words That Bagged Japan," *Saturday Evening Post* 218: 20 (17 November 1945), p. 17. The same view is stated by A. W. Dulles, *Germany's Underground* (New York, 1946), p. 132.

17. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations of Churchill are taken from the volumes of his speeches edited by Charles M. Eade, published by

Little, Brown & Co. The dates given are those under which they appear in these volumes. On the point above, compare Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 696.

18. H. R. Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler* (New York, 1947), p. 238. Hans Speier, writing before the surrender took place, sharpened the point thus, *loc. cit.*, p. 178:

> In brief, it appears that "softer war aims" might have shortened this war if a more compromising policy had been adopted either towards the leaders of the National Socialist Party or toward the leaders of German militarism. It is difficult to conceive that anything but compelling military reasons, which do not exist, could speak for such a policy.

19. Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 133. Cf. Zacharias, *loc. cit.*, p. 17.

20. All the foregoing passages are cited from documents in The Hoover Library, and can be traced through the reference numbers given in parentheses.

21. U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale* (Washington, 1947), Vol. I, p. 16.

22. Files of German documents and Allied reports have been collected on each of these subjects in The Hoover Library.

23. See General Dwight D. Eisenhower's *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force* (Washington, 1945), which credits none of these Nazi campaigns with any effect upon strengthening German resistance. A Canadian intelligence officer's systematic account of Germany's defeat similarly gives no consideration to any of these as a factor in supporting Germany at any point, viz., Major Milton Shulman, *Defeat in the West* (New York, 1948).

24. Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 133. Cf. Zacharias, *loc. cit.*, p. 17.

25. *History: PWD*, p. 47. This volume, hereafter cited as *History: PWD* for convenience, was issued by PWD under the title *The Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF. An Account of its Operations in the Western European Campaign, 1944-1945*. This extremely useful volume was edited by Mr. Richard Hollander, the PWD historian, who explicitly requests that it be considered "as a preparatory outline, rather than as a final critique."

26. Hans Speier, *loc. cit.*, p. 158.

27. Letter to this writer, deposited in The Hoover Library. See also the postwar recollections of the British and American sykewarriors, Robert Bruce Lockhart and Wallace Carroll, cited in notes 13 and 9, respectively, Chapter 1.

28. Letter to this writer, deposited in The Hoover Library. See also C. A. H. Thomson, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-111. See also the view of Wallace Carroll, whose long recollection and analysis of Unconditional Surrender concludes: "No, the policy of unconditional surrender did not prolong the war against Germany." *Op. cit.*, pp. 306-337.

29. In their summary of "Trends in 20th Century Propaganda," Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites assign considerable importance to increasing popular skepticism: "Our thesis is that the differences between the propaganda styles during both World Wars are largely due to the rising tendencies toward *distrust* and *privatization*—tendencies that we believe to have

existed in the Western democracies, as well as in Germany." See *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences* (New York, 1947), Vol. I, p. 398, Geza Roheim (ed).

30. Carroll, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

31. *Ibid*, p. 237.

32. *The Standing Directive for Psychological Warfare Against Members of the German Armed Forces* (June 1944), section 4. This was the basic statement of Sykewar policy, and is reproduced in full as an appendix to this study. (Appendix B, page 403.) All quotations from this document will be followed by reference to the sections in which they appear.

33. *History: PWD*, p. 23. See the excellent discussion of issues which lie buried in this view, by Hans Speier, "The Future of Psychological Warfare," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1948), p. 5.

34. See Section 3 of Mr. Crossman's concluding chapter in this book. His speculation about Goebbels' reactions to the stupidities of Nazi politicians is amply sustained by Semmler's account and Goebbels' own diaries. See Rudolf Semmler, *Goebbels: The Man Next To Hitler* (London, 1947) and *The Goebbels Diaries* (New York, 1948), Louis P. Lochner (ed).

35. General Eisenhower was given great discretionary power on many policy matters. Harry C. Butcher writes that, at their first meeting in Berlin, "Zhukov was amazed that General Ike could modify the quadripartite agreement in the name of Britain and America without consulting the home governments. Zhukov seemed greatly impressed by the latitude of judgment allowed the Supreme Commander." *My Three Years With Eisenhower* (New York, 1946), p. 858.

36. *History: PWD*, p. 20.

37. *Ibid*, p. 27. Relevant, too, is Butcher's note on the situation in North Africa before propaganda control in the field was broadened:

> It would seem the Prime Minister is anxious to keep within his and the President's hands such public announcements to the enemy. This is understandable, but his complaint indicates a better understanding is needed so that the general in the field may use this new implement without having to wait for specific approval from the home offices of each manifesto. This waiting process takes about three days, during which the President and the Prime Minister exchange views and attempt to reach an understanding. In the meantime, the psychological moment for an effective statement to the enemy may have passed. It is as if we had to wait for specific approval of the Prime Minister and the President for opening on the enemy with our heavy guns, only these guns happen to be aimed at the mind rather than at the body.

H. C. Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

38. A. H. Leighton, *Human Relations In A Changing World* (New York, 1949), p. 147. This extremely useful account of the work done by the Foreign Morale Analysis Division should be consulted by all interested in the lessons learned during the course of propaganda and morale work during World War II. On the points discussed above, see especially Leighton's Chapter 9, on "The Policy Maker."

Chapter 3

ORGANIZATION FOR SYKEWAR

AN ORGANIZATION is an aggregation of individuals homogeneous with respect to at least one function: the application of a common purpose to a given situation.[1] The particular form any organization takes is important mainly as it increases or reduces the effectiveness with which that function is performed. It is difficult to evaluate the organization of Sykewar, because it operated as part of a much larger formation, i.e., SHAEF. Many decisive features of Sykewar organization were thus the inevitable heritage of its formal status as a military headquarters. Once located in the "chain of command" at SHAEF, Sykewar's range of choice among organizational forms and administrative procedures was limited.

The distinctive characteristic of SHAEF was its unified control over the largest and most heterogeneous armed force ever assembled under a single commander in modern military history.[2] General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF), considers the organization of these armies as "one of the two miracles" that won the war in Europe, the first being the transformation of American weakness into "unparalleled might in battle" in the course of three years:

> The other was the development, over the same period, of near perfection in allied conduct of war operations. History testifies to the ineptitude of coalitions in waging war. Allied failures have been so numerous and their inexcusable blunders so common that professional soldiers had long discounted the possibility of effective allied action unless available resources were so great as to assure victory by inundation. Even Napoleon's reputation as a brilliant military leader suffered when students in staff colleges came to realize that he always fought against coalitions—and therefore against divided counsels and diverse political, economic, and military interests.[3]

The present account attempts to set the organization of Sykewar within the context of this massive coalition organized as SHAEF. We notice particularly the manner in which the "divided counsels and diverse political, economic, and military interests" which General Eisenhower mentions were organized for psychological warfare. We then locate Sykewar in this vast structure and describe its internal organization. Since we began by defining the essential function of any organization as "the application of a common purpose to a given situation," it is appropriate to examine briefly the Sykewar "mission."

1. *The Sykewar Mission*

The overall mission assigned to SHAEF was "the destruction of Germany's armed forces." [4] What this meant precisely is not clear, for military language is invariably tautological, and so its directives are full of jokers. It appears that when the enemy judges himself incapable of successfully mounting an offensive or maintaining a defensive, and therefore surrenders, he is considered to be "destroyed." [5] In this sense, and only in this sense, were the armed forces of Germany destroyed. However, the formula was generally taken to be the equivalent of Unconditional Surrender, in military terminology.[6]

Accordingly, Sykewar phrased its mission as: "to destroy the fighting morale of our enemy, both at home and on the front." [7] If the mission of SHAEF was the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, it was clearly appropriate that the mission of SHAEF's Psychological Warfare Division should be the destruction of his fighting morale. But here, too, there is some difficulty in stating precisely what was intended, for neither the concept of "fighting morale" nor the notion of its "destruction" was officially clarified in detail.

To find a consensus of qualified opinion on the Sykewar mission, this writer mailed to fifty former Sykewarriors who had occupied important posts the following question: "How would you describe the mission of Sykewar in Europe during World War II?" [8] Usable replies came from twenty-nine respondents, and were tabulated as follows:

THE SYKEWAR MISSION

(1) To *weaken* enemy will-to-resist	13
(2) To *undermine* enemy will-to-resist	6
(3) To *destroy* enemy will-to-resist	4
(4) To destroy enemy *will-to-win*	1
(5) To induce surrenders	8
(6) To shorten duration of the war	6
(7) To encourage resistance in enemy-occupied areas	6
(8) To lay foundations of a "good peace"	3
(9) To undermine prestige of Nazi government	2
(10) To present clearly Allied aims and ideals	2
(11) To make enemy easier to handle after surrender	2
(12) To support the military mission	2
(13) To control populations of enemy-occupied areas	1
Total Mentions	56

All but 5 of the respondents defined the primary mission of Sykewar in terms of the first 4 categories above. (Several then went on to define special and supplementary missions, which explains why there were 56 responses tabulated for only 29 respondents.) The words "morale" and "will-to-resist" were used almost interchangeably, and both have been combined here under the latter, which was used more often. Five respondents did not use either of these terms, and one used only the phrase "will-to-win." The other 23 respondents agreed that the Sykewar mission was an operation against German morale, but disagreed rather sharply about the precise character of this operation. Only 4 respondents offered the official phrase "to destroy." Six others substituted the less extravagant phrase "to undermine," and the largest number (13) used only the most diffuse and noncommittal phrase "to weaken."

This lack of agreement among Sykewarriors on the exact character of their organizational mission can be attributed, in large measure, to the fact that Sykewar never explicitly formulated a coherent theory of morale and propaganda for the guidance of its personnel. It is doubtful whether this lack seriously affected Sykewar policy, which was made by a few men who reached agreements on their "common purpose" through discussion of specific issues. It is less doubtful that the orientation

of Sykewar personnel by means of an explicitly formulated theory would have contributed to the efficient functioning of the organization as a unit.[9] In its absence, Sykewarriors operated with a largely undefined concept of morale, which may be represented by some such speculative reconstruction as the following.[10]

The enemy's will to resist (i.e., his morale) is a state of mind. It derives from a complex of beliefs, among which the following are important:

(1) Resistance pays dividends (a stake in the war).
(2) Continued resistance will pay even higher dividends (a stake in victory).
(3) Resistance and its dividends are signs of virtue (justice of the cause).

Each of these beliefs is an estimate, and the product of three such estimates in judicious mixture is a sense of community in resisting the enemy throughout the nation, a state of mind designated as "high morale." It shows itself in "the capacity of a group of people to pull together consistently and persistently in pursuit of a common purpose"—e.g., winning a war.[11] This state of mind among the enemy, Sykewar seeks to destroy; and, to do so, it must undermine the beliefs upon which high morale rests. Beliefs can be undermined, it would seem reasonable to suppose, by causing doubt among the believers.

The three beliefs mentioned above show an increasing degree of abstraction, i.e., of remoteness from observable events. Belief in the justice of the national cause, for example, does not correlate with any one observable event. It derives rather from a number of prior commitments of the "will-to-believe," cemented together by confidence in victory: We are surely in the right because we are obviously going to win (could wickedness triumph?). Dr. Lasswell has stated the connection thus:

> The illusion of victory must be nourished because of the close connection between the strong and the good. . . . If we win, God is on our side. If we lose, God may have been on the other side.[12]

Confidence in victory thus integrates a series of optimistic beliefs which, in turn, depend very largely upon a favorable present situation. Untrained observers—and most of the world's population, the sykewar targets, are untrained observers—usu-

ally believe that they will win in the end on the basis that they are winning now. The belief that they are winning now thus depends largely upon the "observable facts" which are brought to their attention at any given period. To cause doubt among the believers, therefore, their attention must be diverted to less encouraging facts.

Here, finally, would seem to be a point of entry through which the whole structure of high morale may be toppled. The Sykewar objective thus became, in the first instance, the enemy's focus of attention. Once this was gained, the trick was to present him with adverse sets of "facts" (the nonobservable integrated with the observable) which he would believe, and which therefore would cause him to doubt his prior beliefs in victory. Once the enemy begins to doubt that he is winning now, before long he will doubt victory in the end. With confidence in final victory and the increased dividends therefrom destroyed, there is little reason to want to continue fighting. The will to resist dissolves into a desire for "peace soon," and finally crumbles into a demand for "peace now."

On such an analysis, Sykewar success depended upon the possession of adverse "observable facts" which the enemy would believe. For ammunition of this kind Sykewar depended largely upon the military, economic, and political forces alongside of which it operated. Sykewar did not "create" its own victories and enemy defeats, but simply arranged to present actual victories and defeats in a manner calculated to persuade the enemy that he was not winning now, thereby undermining his confidence that he would win in the end. Dr. Speier has written:

> Propagandists cannot change the simple meaning of immediate facts but they can try to manipulate the interpretation of remote facts, and this they do chiefly by manipulating the symbolic relevance of concrete experiences.[13]

Thus, great aid and comfort were provided to Sykewarriors when their armies actually won a battle or their air forces destroyed a factory; when their political warriors actually alienated an ally or a prominent source of political comfort from the enemy; when their economic warriors actually cut off a supply of good things to which the enemy had become accustomed. In fact, one of the doctrines with which some Syke-

warriors emerged from the war was that sykewar can not be effective without military successes:

> Psychological warfare must be tied closely to military events, and without the impressiveness of military successes it cannot itself be successful.[14]

It seems open to question whether this particular doctrine will survive as a useful axiom of propaganda, even in the tautologous form quoted above. There is little question, however, that it was taken as axiomatic by Sykewarriors during World War II. There was probably no alternative for a propaganda agency assigned the mission "to destroy the fighting morale of our enemy, both at home and on the front," and organized to perform this function as a staff section of a massive military formation whose mission was "the destruction of Germany's armed forces." The foregoing analysis of the Sykewar mission may be further clarified by a description of the organization designed to carry out this "common purpose."

2. *Multiple Sykewar Agencies*

The "common purpose" of destroying German morale was regarded as their prerogative by a number of propaganda agencies. The organization which ultimately assumed primary responsibility for sykewar against Germany during the campaign in northwestern Europe was PWD/SHAEF.[15] At no time, however, was PWD the sole operating agency, nor was it ever wholly free from jurisdictional overlapping with other agencies. By directive, Sykewar became the sole *military* agency for verbal propaganda to the enemy in Europe.[16] The terms of the directive limited the scope of Sykewar authority and left several important phases of propaganda outside its jurisdiction. These phases were in the hands of the "civilian agencies," organized along approximately parallel national lines by the British and Americans. Chart I, page 49, presents a schematic arrangement of the various propaganda organizations functioning in the ETO (European Theater of Operations).

The military chain of command, descending from the respective heads of state through the CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff) and the commander of the joint headquarters at SHAEF to PWD, was the only device which successfully tied British and

American policies together for purposes of propaganda. Other efforts were made to coordinate policies and operation of the various agencies, notably the LPCC (London Propaganda Coordinating Committee), but these achieved no conspicuous success.[17] Outside of the military, each nation maintained a large and independent propaganda structure, which spoke exclusively in terms of national policy. Parallel to each other, these national propaganda structures could, and often did, operate without regard to each other or to the joint operations at SHAEF.

The effect of three such independent propaganda structures was a complex system of red tape designed to achieve coordination. Each failure of the tape to hold resulted either in a lack of complementary activity or, in some cases, outright conflict among the multiple agencies. The potential range of such conflict is clear from the functions of the British agencies, of which the American creations were a fairly close copy.[18]

PWE (Political Warfare Executive) was the highest policy authority on all matters of British propaganda. It was Britain's only temporary war agency in this field, and its stability came from its being based on the permanent agencies. PWE was in effect a small policy committee, designed chiefly to coordinate the enemy propaganda activities of the three big permanent agencies—Political Intelligence Department, British Broadcasting Corporation, Ministry of Information. To assure the authority of PWE, it was composed of representatives of the three permanent agencies, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart was placed at its head, and it was given an impeccable status in the war government.[19] (The United States had no effective equivalent for PWE, a fact of considerable importance for the control of American propaganda.)

Of the three permanent agencies, PID (Political Intelligence Department) was clearly regarded as central by British sykewarriors. Supposedly secret, but actually quite well known to all students of international affairs as the peacetime Research Department, PID became the wartime central intelligence agency of the British Foreign Office. It was very likely the best-informed agency in the world, during World War II, on matters of international interest, and it was a genuine power in the formation of British policy in these matters.[20]

BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) is the "public corporation" which operates the huge British radio system.[21] Of its

CHART I | PROPAGANDA AGENCIES IN THE ETO



NOTE: *LPCC (London Propaganda Coordinating Committee) is shown in dotted lines because it did not actually function in the chain of command. It was formed in November 1943 as an attempt to coordinate policy and operations among the various agencies identified in this chart. It lacked authority to enforce its decisions (i.e., a place in the chain of command) and exerted little influence upon Sykewar during the period from D-Day to VE-Day.*

three main Services—Home, Empire, and European—only the latter concerns us here. The wartime broadcasts of the European Service achieved sustained propaganda successes probably unequalled in the history of broadcasting.[22] In addition, BBC's enormous Monitoring Service produced a first-rate item of sykewar intelligence—a daily printed record, in two large volumes, of everything important that had been heard on world transmitters the preceding day.[23]

MOI (Ministry of Information) was the only agency represented directly in the Cabinet by a minister (Mr. Brendan Bracken, during the final phase of war), although PID exercised possibly a more potent influence in the Cabinet on matters of international politics, through its position as the Foreign Minister's eyes and ears. MOI was concerned mainly with domestic audiences, but it contributed to sykewar output the product of its splendid staffs on films, press, publications (posters, pamphlets, magazines, books), and intelligence. Through its Minister and its position in the PWE agency, MOI had a voice in the framing of propaganda policy to the enemy.

Throughout the war, these agencies were largely occupied with propaganda to the European enemy (the proper function of sykewar). In fact, so expensive did the BBC's European Service become that immediately after VE-Day the Corporation took steps to reduce its operations or suspend them altogether.[24]

In review, then, PWE formulated policy, PID gathered intelligence, BBC broadcast, MOI contributed to all media. All this was directed toward the same end as Sykewar operations ("destruction of the enemy's will-to-resist"), but in terms of British policy and with complete independence of the American agencies and the joint headquarters at SHAEF.

The American side erected a propaganda structure parallel to the British, which operated with equal independence of the British or the joint Sykewar agency at SHAEF. Parallel to Britain's PID was the American OSS (Office of Strategic Services), charged with the gathering, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence data.[25] Unlike PID, however, OSS had no official access to the Cabinet through the Secretary of State. More often, OSS and the State Department were at odds over questions of jurisdiction, situation estimates, and similar matters which the British system integrated under one permanent agency. It seems likely that OSS retained its position throughout the war only

because its charter made its director responsible directly to the President and Joint Chiefs of Staff, its activities were classified "secret," and its budget was not subject to Congressional review.

Parallel to the British MOI was the American OWI (Office of War Information). Unlike its British "opposite number," however, OWI was not a permanent agency headed by a member of the Cabinet in good standing. OWI was headed, instead, by a newspaperman, and had no official standing save that of an executive agency.[26] It lived a rather furtive life, caught in the American system of checks and balances, with an ample delegation of responsibility from the executive (to whom alone it reported), but in continual fear for its power to discharge that responsibility. The threat to kill OWI by means of the attack budgetary remained a Congressional weapon throughout the war.[27]

There was no exact parallel to the BBC on the American side, chiefly because the Federal Government neither owns nor operates its own radio networks in the continental United States. In the ETO, a formal equivalent was set up under the name ABSIE (American Broadcasting Station in Europe), operated by the Overseas Division of the OWI, in contrast with the BBC which is a self-operating corporation. A more important contrast is that the BBC became, by common consent of all qualified observers, the most effective single propaganda instrument in the ETO. ABSIE, operating largely with facilities leased from the British over channels allocated by the British, was comparatively little known among the Germans. (This situation changed later in the war, when Sykewar took over Radio Luxembourg.)

This comparison between BBC and ABSIE serves, in slighter degree, for British and American propaganda to Europe as a whole. The British agencies operated from their home base, with a staff of personnel trained in European propaganda, a superlative intelligence machinery, and an assured status in the higher levels of the British government. The American agencies, whose lack of each of these was signalized in the absence of an effective equivalent for the British PWE, were simply no match for them—until PWD became "operational."

3. *Place of PWD/SHAEF*

It is important to remember this context in examining the position of Sykewar. The multiplicity of Anglo-American propaganda agencies conditioned Sykewar operations at nearly every point, and the superiority of the British agencies was largely responsible for the virtual "Americanization" of SHAEF's PWD.

Two points need to be made here. First, the civilian agencies in both countries were in direct touch with the heads of state through their agency chiefs. Bruce Lockhart and Brendan Bracken could confer directly with Churchill; Elmer Davis and General Donovan directly with Roosevelt. Although Lockhart was much closer to the makers of British foreign policy than Davis was to their American counterparts, nevertheless all of them had direct access to the highest levels of political decision. This was denied to Sykewar, which, as indicated in Chart I, had to follow the military chain of command through a minimum of three levels before its views could be laid before the respective chief executives.

On the other hand, Sykewar's limitation through military command was also its strength. As the only propaganda agency with military status, PWD reported directly to the Chief of Staff at SHAEF. This meant that its chief, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, was the only official adviser on propaganda matters to General Eisenhower. So, though General McClure could formally talk only to General Eisenhower (not to General Marshall or to Roosevelt or Churchill), in the ETO this was enough. General Eisenhower commanded the continent of Europe, and the military agency under him commanded all the continental radio transmitters, printing establishments, and paper supplies. General McClure was thus able to make his views count in Allied propaganda councils by the control he exerted over continental channels, supplies, and personnel.

Within SHAEF, confusion derived less from the multiplicity of Anglo-American civilian agencies (which on the continent were, in principle, subsumed under General McClure) than from overlapping jurisdiction among the various staff sections. The general scheme can be seen from Chart II, page 53, on which are shown in solid squares the staff sections whose jurisdictions frequently overlapped, and occasionally conflicted with, those of PWD. A few examples of characteristic overlapping

CHART II | STAFF SECTIONS OF SHAEF



NOTE: *Solid squares indicate those staff sections whose functions frequently overlapped with those of PWD.*

will illustrate the problems of intra-SHAEF jurisdiction, particularly with regard to Sykewar operations.[28]

To begin with, intelligence of the enemy was essential for Sykewar purposes: How strong was his will to resist? Where could it be attacked? These, and similar questions, were also the province of G-2, which collected intelligence on all matters bearing upon the enemy situation, including "morale intelligence." Next, having formed an estimate of morale among the enemy soldiers, Sykewar undertook to form propaganda policy on how to attack it. But all matters of operations against the enemy came within the province of G-3, which, ordinarily, either approved or conducted *nonverbal* operations against the enemy's morale. Policies formed on the basis of intelligence about German civilian morale were an intimate concern of SHAEF's Political Advisers, charged with supervision of political warfare, and of G-5, charged with preparing the military occupation of Germany. Along with its attempts to get certain news items into Germany, Sykewar was concerned to keep certain other news out. The activities of PRD (Public Relations Division) thus became a subject of considerable importance to Sykewar. Since PRD releases for Allied publication were a source of information carefully studied by the Germans, a minor slip at PRD could easily betray information which PWD had studiously withheld from the enemy.[29] Similarly, any Sykewar message to the Germans, if revealed to Allied audiences out of context, could, as Mr. Crossman makes clear in his concluding essay to this book, cause a furor at home.

These jurisdictional overlappings, inside and outside of SHAEF, imposed liaison and coordination tasks of great complexity upon PWD. It will suffice here to notice the restrained comment in the official history: "It is obvious that this dual nature of PWD implied an unusual intricacy of relationships." [30] Despite this "unusual intricacy," and largely owing to General McClure's rare ability to cope with it, PWD's function as the responsible coordinator of sykewar against Germany remained constant throughout the period of continental warfare.

4. *Internal Organization of Sykewar*

Sykewar was a military formation in name only. Aside from General McClure himself, its key personnel were mainly ci-

CHART III | SYKEWAR CHAIN OF COMMAND



ORGANIZATIONAL NOTE: *At Army Group level, Sykewar was combined with Public Relations to form a special staff section as "P & PW" (Publicity and Psychological Warfare). Nominally, at 12 AG, Col. Clifford R. Powell was Sykewar "deputy" for the "P & PW Officer," Col. Fitzgerald.*

At Army level, Sykewar was integrated into the General Staff section G-2 as "PWB" (Psychological Warfare Branch).

Names above boxes are those of unit commanders; those within or below boxes are Sykewar officers. .

vilians or soldiers with uniforms tailored for the occasion. Although the military performance of Sykewar personnel is memorable chiefly for amusing incident, and much of its fruitful work was accomplished outside of traditional military ways, nevertheless Sykewar was compelled by its status to conform to military patterns of organization. The whole Sykewar apparatus, accordingly, was made to descend from the parent body at SHAEF (PWD under General McClure) through the regular army "chain of command," with a Sykewar unit functioning on the special staff of the unit commander at each level, as shown in Chart III, page 55.

This Chart, although schematically correct, gives a somewhat exaggerated picture of the extent of PWD's actual domain. The First French Army was hastily organized, and ill equipped to conduct extensive sykewar operations. Its area was manned largely by borrowed American personnel using American equipment, and its production was mainly repetition on a smaller scale of 12th AG operations. The Canadian and British armies assembled under 21st AG reflected faithfully, in the field of sykewar, the attitude of their headquarters as a whole toward SHAEF. They sent the higher headquarters little information, asked it for little advice, and acted on its orders more or less as they pleased. Their Sykewar chief, Brigadier Neville, like his commander Marshal Montgomery, tended to "run his own show." [31] This left PWD, nominally in charge of all Allied forces in the field, with only the four American armies actually functioning under its control. Since these armies were best prepared with personnel, equipment, and enthusiasm (if not experience), Sykewar on the European continent became mainly an American operation.[32]

Along with its organizational chain of command, Sykewar took on a functional pattern of internal organization, illustrated most clearly at the SHAEF level, but repeated with local variations on the lower levels. The component sections of PWD/SHAEF were based on the four major functions to be performed:

(1) *Intelligence*—the acquisition and evaluation of information concerning enemy opinions, attitudes, and situations affecting morale.

(2) *Liaison*—the coordination of Sykewar intelligence and

plans with the other civilian and military agencies of overlapping jurisdiction and interests.

(3) *Policy and planning*—the formulation of Sykewar policies and the translation of these general policies into specific plans of operation.

(4) *Operations*—the actual execution of plans via the available "white" media—radio, mobile broadcasters, leaflets, newspapers—with a subsection on "special operations" exclusively concerned with the possible "gray" and "black" uses of media and gadgets.[33] Chart IV, page 59, shows the organization of these functions within the "sections" of PWD.

5. *Significance of Sykewar Organization*

The influence of organization and administration upon the functioning of a propaganda agency requires careful study, for there is considerable disagreement among qualified Sykewarriors. Mr. Crossman, for example, claims that the multiplicity and confusion of Anglo-American propaganda agencies was not wholly without advantage. The following passage, from his concluding essay, is of great importance and will bear repeating here:

> It was one of the accidental advantages of our complex and unwieldy psychological warfare machine that in this controversy no one had the final word. The BBC, for instance, always remained independent of the PID of the Foreign Office. OSS was at loggerheads with OWI. The SHAEF staff, who ran Radio Luxembourg in almost open rivalry with the BBC, exploited to the full the delicate balance of power between 12th Army Group, in whose area they operated, SHAEF in Paris and the far away policy-makers of Washington and London. The leaflet teams, forward with combat troops, were each responsible to an Army Hq, itself responsible to an Army Group, which in turn was bound by a SHAEF directive derived from an OWI-PID overall directive, ground out at the highest policy level and in the most generalised terms. At each level a considerable degree of independence was retained, which permitted friction, harassing at the time, but fruitful in its effect on the output. Our propaganda was constantly in danger of disintegrating into a chaos of conflicting specialised appeals for special purposes—sometimes indeed it did so—but this danger was far preferable to the dreary uniformity and lifelessness which the

> Russians so successfully imposed on their propaganda machine. Theoretically, this lack of system and individualism was utterly intolerable; apart from its other defects, it caused a most wasteful overstaffing at all levels. But the product, in the peculiar conditions of Anglo-American team work, was remarkably successful. Our psychological warfare was credible because it was *not* uniform. If the State Department and the Foreign Office had had their way, they would have caused us to be dismissed, by friend and foe alike, as blatant propagandists, and so destroyed our reputation for truthfulness and objectivity.

One question that arises is whether even the diversity that Mr. Crossman postulates as desirable could not have been attained *more effectively* through centralized planning rather than as the haphazard outcome of disparate efforts.

Another question raised by Mr. Crossman's analysis is whether the same desiderata could not have been achieved *more cheaply* through centralized organization of the propaganda services. For the United States, in World War II, apparently the rule was "money no object." This may not always be so. Further, more than the waste of money was involved. More important, perhaps, was the great waste of talent. The skills of the propagandist on a professional level are rare, even in the vast pool of trained manpower upon which the United States can draw. Mr. C. D. Jackson, one of the top personalities in Sykewar throughout World War II, has written that "the United States did not have *any* born psychological warriors, say of the Crossman caliber." If there were no "born" ones, some at least might have developed by practising their skills. However, Mr. Jackson goes on to indicate that the organizational complexities described in this chapter prevented many of the promising talents from getting an opportunity to develop:

> If [two names omitted] had been operating in the field instead of in Washington and New York, they might have developed into skillful propagandists but they were too busy protecting OWI from the various Washington onslaughts that never seemed to end. Besides, they suffered from such inferiority complex vis-a-vis the British that they were constantly overcompensating, so that directives, when they occasionally arrived on time to be of use, were mostly semantic double talk.[34]

One is hard put to explain this failure of Americans, normally adept at complex problems of organization and ad-

CHART IV | INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF PWD/SHAEF



NOTE: *A fuller organization chart, giving the detailed breakdown of the Executive and Administrative branch, is reproduced in* HISTORY: PWD, *p. 243.*
The original deputies, representing the various agencies, were: C. D. Jackson (OWI), R. H. S. Crossman (PID), Dennis Routh (MOI), Fred Oechsner (OSS), and Colonel Harold D. Kehm. Colonel Ralph Harari (British) also figured prominently among the policymakers during the early period. Only Jackson and Crossman remained at Sykewar throughout the campaign from D-Day to VE-Day.

ministration, to devise a more efficient overall coordination of psychological warfare at the highest level. The answer is to be found, probably, in the lack of interest in sykewar displayed by most top American officials responsible for the policies and conduct of the war. That sykewar did not figure as an important element in their calculations, from President Roosevelt down, is beyond dispute. Every competent observer has indorsed this point, and General McClure has underscored it in his introduction to this book.

The conclusion reached by Wallace Carroll, after an interview with President Roosevelt, is illustrative:

> It was a curious fact—and I had confirmation of it later—that the President, who established the OWI, never knew what it was doing and sometimes, apparently, confused it with the Office of Censorship. He had been opposed to the creation of a propaganda service and had established OWI with considerable reluctance, under pressure from his advisers, whose primary aim was to provide an adequate flow of information to the American public. Once the organization was established, he did not want to be bothered about it. In his own right Roosevelt was a great propagandist . . . but he did not understand the systematic use of propaganda in total war.[35]

Mr. Carroll goes on to add that "Cordell Hull knew even less than the President about OWI and cared about as much."

What are we to conclude from this failure of our highest officers to "understand" or even "care about" an instrument of warfare as important as the propagandists claim it to be? We are compelled to assume from other evidence that Roosevelt and Hull were men of good sense and good intentions toward the nation they led, and therefore that they would have both understood and cared about any matter that they believed to be of great consequence to the conduct of the war. It is perhaps permissible to suggest that sykewar was in fact *not,* despite the natural inclination of sykewarriors to emphasize its importance, of great consequence to the American conduct of World War II. In explanation, it is possible to adduce two related hypotheses: (1) the aims of the war were such that American policymakers *felt no need* of the instruments of persuasion to supplement the instruments of coercion in achieving these aims; (2) the political character of Allied strategy was such that the

propaganda function *could not be used* to great advantage in the service of high policy.

These, however, are speculations, not conclusions, which must await further clarification of the issues and events of World War II. Whatever the explanation, it seems clear that the organization of sykewar in World War II was no model of efficiency. Inside the SHAEF formation, the difficulties were those which might have been expected, perhaps even less than might reasonably have been expected, in such a massive organization so speedily assembled. General McClure writes in his Foreword:

> An understanding of the proper source of Government policy, its actual communication to the field by a reliable, rapid channel, a feeling of belonging to a properly organized team owing allegiance to the commander under whom serving, and not to several independent Government agencies, would have solved most of the major Psychological Warfare difficulties in SHAEF.

Outside SHAEF, and the rigorous channels provided by its "chain of command," the organization of propaganda-connected activities was diffuse and often confused. To the end of the war, for example, there were civilian propagandists who felt that cooperation with PWD was a form of "selling out to the military," and there were military personnel who felt that civilians should either be drafted or be sent home. These were extreme expressions of milder attitudes more generally distributed. But they indicate that the basic question of military control, which is ideally an "all-or-none" type of control, was settled only piecemeal and at considerable cost to efficiency for the total effort. For example, these "organizational fights and prejudices" apparently were responsible for killing the pre-invasion plan for a G-6 at SHAEF—i.e., a full-fledged general staff section which would have integrated the direction of sykewar, censorship, and public relations into one organization under a single head.[36] General McClure, and members of his staff, believed that such an organization, which was used in North Africa, would have improved the execution of all three functions. Some civilians disagreed. In either case, this was not an issue to be settled in terms of the organizational and personal sentiments of propagandists. It is important to note, however, as will be seen in the

next chapter, that nobody was very much interested except the propagandists themselves.

Chapter 3. Notes

1. Chester I. Barnard, in *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, 1948), p. 195, includes an organization's purpose within its "environment." I have no particular quarrel with this view, even though my respect for this book may not be apparent from my treatment of ideas borrowed from it.

2. The superlative degree of this assertion is based upon statistical computations of "men under arms," gathered by George K. Schueller at The Hoover Institute in connection with its research project called RADIR (Revolution and the Development of International Relations).

3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe,* p. 4.

4. See paragraph 2 of the "Directive to SCAEF," reprinted in Eisenhower's *Report by the Supreme Commander. . . .* (Washington, 1945), p. vi.

5. Cf. Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, *The Conduct of War* (London, 1917), pp. 5-8.

6. It is not evident that Professor W. L. Langer's view clarifies this situation, but since he has studied American war policy in detail it should be noted: "As a matter of cold fact, even the so-called 'unconditional surrenders' were based upon conditions, the only real difference being that those powers more or less agreed in advance to accept the conditions laid down by the victor." *Our Vichy Gamble,* p. 34. The general dictum of Karl von Clausewitz may be appropriate here: "The compulsion which we must use toward our enemy will be regulated by the magnitude of our own and his political demands." *On War* (New York, 1943), p. 574.

7. *History: PWD,* p. 21.

8. This was part of a seven-point questionnaire which is reproduced, together with a description of procedures and analysis of results, in the section of Chapter XI entitled "Sykewar Effectiveness: Some Expert Opinions."

9. The nearest approach to such a theory was that formulated by Lt. Col. Henry V. Dicks (British psychiatrist) in his *Psychological Foundations of the Wehrmacht* and other basic studies which he used to instruct and train pre-invasion Intelligence personnel, apparently with considerable success (see Chapter VI). Lt. Col. C. A. H. Thomson makes the following observation:

> No doctrine of the operational use of propaganda had been developed before the war; it was hammered out only as a result of war experience, and as it demonstrated its qualities in such militarily comprehensible ways as increasing the rate of surrender or reducing the effectiveness of enemy resistance under certain conditions. . . . The result of this lack of doctrinal preparation meant that the organization of psychological warfare showed wide variation among military staffs--sometimes it was a part of intelligence, sometimes a part of operations, sometimes a separate section

reporting to the commander or his deputy through another section, or sometimes directly.

Op. cit., p. 114 (note 8).

10. Compare this brief resumé with the exactly formulated analysis of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division, as stated by A. H. Leighton in *Human Relations In A Changing World,* Chapters II and III.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 78. Dr. Leighton's words state clearly a formula which, in these general terms, Sykewar left unsaid but upon which it usually acted.

12. H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (London, 1927), Chapter 5.

13. *War In Our Time,* p. 310, Hans Speier and Alfred Kähler (eds).

14. *History: PWD,* p. 23.

15. "Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, was the first agency, military or civilian, to coordinate successfully in Western Europe the efforts of the numerous military and civilian agencies which had waged Anglo-American psychological warfare since the beginning of the war." *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

16. Cf. Appendix, "The Sykewar Charter." Emphasis here is on the word "military." As we shall see, PWD's status as the exclusive propaganda spokesman for General Eisenhower and SHAEF was, in terms of organization, its source of strength vis-a-vis the "civilian agencies." It was, at the same time, an important source of weaknesses. The word "verbal" poses an unfortunate dichotomy with "non-verbal," and indicates that Sykewar was not conceived, in Linebarger's felicitous phrase, as "warfare psychologically waged." The dichotomy, however, represents the actual divisions made during the campaign, as is shown in the pages which follow.

17. Wallace Carroll, who participated in the London Propaganda Coordinating Committee, has written:

> The meetings of this Committee . . . added little to the effectiveness of Allied propaganda and served mainly to bring out the vagueness of American foreign policy, its subservience to short-range military objectives, and the contrast between the smooth-working machinery behind the British representatives and the creaking administrative machine on which the American side was dependent.

Persuade or Perish, p. 181.

18. See W. H. Hale, "Big Noise in Little Luxembourg," *Harper's,* No. 1151 (April 1946), pp. 377-384. This article reveals two important factors which colored Anglo-American propaganda relations: (1) British assumption of superiority in all propaganda matters; (2) American resentment of this assumption. It is revealing that Mr. Hale, who, more than many Americans, sincerely supported close Anglo-American cooperation during the war, throughout this article refers to the BBC propagandists ironically as "our betters."

19. The exact nature of PWE was very "hush-hush" during the early years of the war. Mr. Bracken told inquiring MP's: "The affairs of the department are wrapped in impenetrable mystery, and their cars are camouflaged." In October 1941, Mr. Churchill gave the House of Commons the following report:

> [The Foreign Secretary, Minister of Information, and Minister of Economic Warfare] have recommended, and I have approved their recommendation, that a small special executive for the conduct of Political Warfare should be established, in lieu of the various agencies concerned at present, to conduct such propaganda in all its forms. This executive has already begun its work, but it would be contrary to the national interest to make any public statement regarding its personnel or the nature of its activities. . . . The executive will be responsible to the three Ministers sitting together; but if those Ministers . . . do not agree, the matter would come to me as Minister of Defence, and afterwards to the Cabinet.

Cited in *Voices in the Darkness* (London, 1943), pp. 97-99, E. T. Lean. See also the memoir of Bruce Lockhart, *Comes the Reckoning,* especially pp. 125-130, which indicate that, to its director, PWE's status seemed somewhat less than "impeccable."

20. Ralph Ingersoll, *Top Secret* (New York, 1946), gives an exaggerated but lively account of the political capital which the British made of their splendid intelligence apparatus.

21. There is a fairly extensive literature by and about the BBC. A very useful brief account of its history, organization, and operations is the government paper on *Broadcasting Policy* (H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1946). See also the series of *BBC Handbooks,* issued annually.

22. For the data on which this assertion is based, see the chapters on Media and Effectiveness. See also the tribute of S. K. Padover, *Experiment in Germany* (New York, 1946), p. 307.

23. A broken file of this *Daily Digest of Foreign Broadcasts* is in The Hoover Library. A similar daily digest of the world press, with emphasis on Germany and Austria, was prepared by PID under the title *News Digest.* These two documents are among the most useful source materials produced by official agencies for research in World War II. (The corresponding documents produced by the Federal Communications Commission were not used at Sykewar, owing to the difficulty of transporting them daily from Washington to Europe.) An excellent study based largely on these materials is: Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, *German Radio Propaganda* (New York, 1943).

24. Many important considerations which led Parliament to retain the European Service after the war are not revealed in the *Hansard* for this period. These were summarized for the writer by former Sykewar colleagues, who, as members of BBC, PID, or the House of Commons, participated in the discussion. Quite clearly, the decision was designed to retain the strong hold of British broadcasting on the European audience which BBC had built up during the war: "There are clear indications that other Powers intend to continue to use the broadcasting medium to put their point of view before the European audience, and we cannot afford to let the British viewpoint go by default." *Broadcasting Policy,* p. 17.

25. In addition, the MO (Morale Operations) branch of OSS was charged with certain propaganda functions, particularly in "black" output. This phase is discussed in the chapter on Sykewar Techniques.

26. *Executive Order 9182* (13 June 1942), which created the OWI, includes a fairly detailed directive concerning its organization and function.

The full text of this, the order creating OSS, and other relevant documents are reprinted in *Wartime Censorship of Press and Radio* (New York, 1942), R. E. Summers.

27. Elmer Davis: "Life . . . is simpler in Washington, at least for us, now that members of Congress are mostly fighting each other and take no more than occasional side swipes at OWI. However, enough unexpected crises pop up every day to keep the liver well shaken up and functioning." Quoted in H. C. Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 670.

An entertaining account of how American rivalry looked to a highly placed Briton is Bruce Lockhart's recollection, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-2: "In making their propaganda arrangements the Americans had repeated and, indeed, aggravated our mistakes, for two separate organizations, the OWI and the OSS, were competing with zeal and with ill-concealed hostility for the doubtful privilege of competing with us. . . . The delicacy of our own position was accentuated by the fact that the OWI was staffed mainly by New Dealers, while the OSS was a stronghold of Republicans." (In this connection it is interesting to recall that the head of OSS, General William Donovan, was an important New York Republican, while the head of OWI Overseas Branch, Robert Sherwood, was a well-known New Dealer.)

28. For elaboration of the overall chain-of-command situation in the ETO, see the directive and chart reprinted in General Eisenhower's *Report by the Supreme Commander . . .*, pp. vi-vii.

29. Conversely, PRD worried about PWD as well. PRD (Public Relations Division) was charged with disseminating the views of the Supreme Commander to his home audience. These views might not always coincide with the views of the Supreme Commander as disseminated by PWD to enemy or Allied audiences. One curious effect of such a situation during World War I was recorded by a ranking British officer in his war diary: "As a matter of fact, half the trouble [with our propaganda] now probably is that the War Office do not want things to look too rosy; it may queer their pitch in their attempts to get what the army needs." John Charteris, *At GHQ* (London, 1931), p. 167.

30. *History: PWD,* p. 13.

31. Ralph Ingersoll, *op. cit.,* gives an account of the dissension between Montgomery's 21st AG and Eisenhower's SHAEF. Since he writes as a heated partisan, Ingersoll's interpretations are suspect, particularly his contention that Montgomery's intransigeance was the expression of a deliberate British policy. It seems more reasonable to assume that Montgomery was expressing mainly the arrogance which is conspicuous in the personality of many field commanders, and that Eisenhower was in a bad position to make Montgomery behave (as he could do in the case of Patton). This view is supported in the exchange of letters between them, quoted in H. C. Butcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 717-720. It is doubtful that Montgomery expressed British policy, because British policy is famous for keeping its eye on the "main chance." The British had little to gain, and much to lose, from 21st AG's cold shoulder to SHAEF. In the field of sykewar, for example, the British—with their superior experience and organization —might have assimilated the Americans if 21st AG had cooperated. Instead, they froze them out. In consequence, the Americans, spurred by the mave-

rick 12th AG under Colonel Clifford R. Powell, got together and organized the large and active Sykewar, which dominated the Continent.

The Eisenhower-Montgomery relationship can be studied further in: H. C. Butcher, *op. cit.,* passim; J. B. Phillips, "Controversy of the Anglo-American Command," *Newsweek* 27: 46 (29 April 1946); D. Malone, "You Yanks Never Gave Monty His Due," *Saturday Evening Post* 219: 12-13 (21 September 1946); A. Moorehead, "Montgomery's Quarrel with Eisenhower," *Collier's* 118: 12-13 (5 October 1946); C. H. Taylor, "Errors of Ralph Ingersoll," *Atlantic Monthly* 178: 118 (21 October 1946).

32. The "Americanization" of Sykewar on the Continent, the historical basis for which is merely indicated in note 31, is a revealing chapter of coalition warfare in the European campaign. The *History: Publicity and Psychological Warfare 12th Army Group* (no date or place of publication given) discreetly omits all discussion of the leading role played in this process by "Bradley's men" of the 12th AG, and a detailed account must await the writing of memoirs. But some notion may be gathered from a comparison of P & PW's limited directive with the enormous and varied functions it actually assumed during the campaign, as recorded in the above volume (hereafter cited as "History: P & PW").

On this point, too, should be noted the opinion of Bruce Lockhart, *op. cit.,* p. 236: "His [apparently R. H. S. Crossman's] knowledge and technical skill appealed strongly to the Americans and, although we were heavily outnumbered, our influence was paramount."

33. Cf. *History: PWD,* pp. 13-16. PWD/SHAEF was nominally charged with two main functions in addition to psychological warfare against the enemy: (1) "consolidation propaganda" in liberated friendly countries; (2) control of the "information services" in occupied Germany. Actually, the first was handled by a subsidiary organization known as AIS (Allied Information Service), later USIS, and staffed mainly by OWI personnel under C. D. Jackson. The second did not become important until after the surrender, when PWD was converted into ICD (Information Control Division). Since neither of these exerted any important influence upon PWD's main function of sykewar against the enemy, they are not treated in this study.

34. Letter from C. D. Jackson to this writer, deposited in The Hoover Library.

35. Wallace Carroll, *op. cit.,* p. 7. Similar testimony concerning Churchill is offered by a Briton formerly in Sykewar: "Winston wasn't interested and didn't believe in propaganda, except as far as his own speeches were concerned." (Letter to the writer, deposited in The Hoover Library.) Bruce Lockhart corroborates this point, *op. cit.,* p. 127: "Much of our teething trouble would have been modified if only the Prime Minister had been interested in political warfare. Unfortunately for us, this great man, himself our greatest war propagandist, attached at best a secondary importance to all forms of propaganda."

36. C. A. H. Thomson, *op. cit.,* p. 102. This authoritative book makes sense of the deranged alphabet used to designate war propaganda agencies, clarifies the confused organizational development, and analyzes the perspective of Washington and London regarding the sykewar operation.

Chapter 4

SYKEWAR PERSONNEL AND PERSONALITIES

1. *Persistent Personnel Problems*

THE PROPAGANDISTS who took Sykewar so earnestly were—to use the term of collective self-description which, through habitual usage, nearly became official—"characters." The word "character" in this context contains something of the flavor of the Elizabethan "original" and the French *numéro,* i.e., the eccentric, more or less conscious of his eccentricities and ready to exploit them. The term is interesting here because in the ETO its use was reserved mainly for intellectuals—and particularly for intellectuals assigned to such "screwball" outfits as PWD, OWI, and OSS.[1]

Used in this sense, the term is not unfamiliar in the United States—and perhaps reflects the suspicion, common among Americans, of sustained intellectual preoccupation. Its consistent use by Sykewarriors to describe themselves indicates their self-conscious *malaise* in the military environment which engulfed them. Their difficulties came not from technical aspects of strategy, tactics, or logistics, for many Sykewarriors knew more about these matters than most ordinary soldiers in the AEF. Their difficulties stemmed largely from the deprivations inflicted upon them by the symbol of the uniform.

PWD, it has already been noted, was a military formation in name only. Under General McClure, in fact, nearly every key post, outside of the Intelligence and Liaison sections, was occupied by a civilian. The relations of these aggressively imaginative and administratively irresponsible symbol-manipulators, representing the war's disorganized "characters," with the more cautious troop-manipulators who ruled the general staff sections provide both comic relief and illuminating footnotes to the history of the war. It is likely that nothing less than General McClure's gifts of intellect and character could have kept the

rate of explosions so low. His recollections should, if made public, be a first-rate contribution to social analysts on a little-known subject.

The civilian character of PWD created a whole series of persistent personnel problems. One issue was the psychic gap created by the uniform, which symbolizes the rigorous ritual of interpersonal relations called "military courtesy" that governs its wearers. Surrounded by a world in which people saluted, stood at attention, and said "sir!" in prescribed patterns, civilians were not permitted to share the magic comforts of these rites of salutation, deportment, and communication. The simpler, though no less rigorous, formula of "military privilege" excluded them from such institutions as Red Cross Clubs. The high-status civilians at PWD were little affected by such deprivations, but their effects upon the morale of many Army civilians of lesser status were serious enough to force a relaxation in due course. Civilians, who had "assimilated ranks" and wore officer-style uniforms, were even permitted to wear an equivalent of the "regimental badge" (Sykewar's badge was a golden spear against an oval-shaped black background) and to use some Officers' Clubs. However, the military never provided adequate compensations for some of the disadvantages, at least to Sykewar civilians, of exclusion from the normal social life of the AEF. For example, most of them never established systematic contact with that magnificent source of morale intelligence, the off-duty gossip of ordinary soldiers (known alternately as "the GI underground" or "the latrin-o-gram circuit").

The converse of the deprivations imposed upon the "characters" by military tradition was their effect upon the military formation in which they were organized. They were largely exempt from the petty but continuous annoyances imposed by military status, and the breezy civilian atmosphere they created (particularly the female secretaries and lesser employes) made PWD a graveyard of military discipline. For example, most Sykewar personnel, irrespective of rank, were on a first-name basis—whereas in "regular" military headquarters for a junior officer (not to mention an enlisted man!) to call his colonel by given name was almost unheard of.[2] Occasionally, too, it happened that an officer had to work "under" his junior, or even under an enlisted man—in "regular" headquarters an impossible situation. This occasioned some bitterness among military per-

sonnel—who received much less pay than civilians doing comparable work—and was subversive of traditional military esprit.

Dissension between soldiers and civilians on the higher levels of administration and policy derived from the divergent attitudes toward organization encouraged by their training and experience. Army officers are taught to value precise planning, even at the cost of organizational rigidity. A vast enterprise like an army must place a high premium upon exact specifications of T/O (Table of Organization) and T/BE (Table of Basic Equipment) planned long in advance of actual use. Civilians, on the other hand, and particularly those from the "free professions" represented so abundantly at PWD, tend to regard all formal organization as regimentation and all systematic administration as red tape. General McClure has pointed out, for example, that the basic administrative planning for Sykewar on the Continent, from typewriters and jeeps down to leaflet writers, was completed seven months before D-Day. Naturally, it was difficult for civilians accustomed to the ready hire-and-fire procedures of civil life to regard such plans as binding. Their normal inclination, when faced with a shortage in civilian life, would be, to quote General McClure, to say: "Buy another car! Hire another writer! I don't care if it costs another thousand dollars!" At PWD, dollars were irrelevant, because the available supply of personnel and equipment was not for sale. The inclination of the civilian in such cases, therefore, was to ignore the T/O and T/BE, to circumvent the "chain of command," and to go after what he thought he needed.

Small wonder, then, that some high Army officers regarded some Sykewar civilians as a lunatic fringe. C. D. Jackson, who knows as much about this aspect of Sykewar as any civilian, recollects PWB experiences in North Africa with "Chief of Staff Bedell Smith, who despised civilians in the Army, who thought we were all nuts, but who had repeatedly been irritated, if not infuriated, by extravagances, lack of security and disregard for channels on the part of many members of the original group." Mr. Jackson concludes from these experiences that it is essential to arrange relations between the Army and Sykewar "so that if there is a next time we don't have to go through the agonizing routine of explaining to every officer in the Army what we are supposed to do. I think we probably spent more of our time

maneuvering so that we were in a position to do our job than we spent on doing the job itself." [3]

By the time PWD opened its "shop" under SHAEF much progress had been made, owing largely to the successes achieved by sykewar in North Africa, to the broad outlook of General Eisenhower and some members of his immediate staff, and to the intelligence and courage of General McClure, who retained the respect of his professional colleagues while putting up a persistent fight for his "characters." In some measure, too, the successes of Sykewar civilians with Allied generals were due to the high status of the former in the socio-economic hierarchies at home (which even generals in wartime must recognize) and the remarkable skills in persuasion which the "characters" demonstrated on numerous occasions.[4]

Such pull-and-tug was not without certain advantages to the actual operations of PWD. It made for that flexibility of organizational control and administrative procedures which is valuable for an operation dependent upon the maximum coordination of skills, rather than upon the strict subordination of ranks. Whether advantages outweighed disadvantages in PWD is a difficult question. The problem of "characters" persisted throughout World War II, and is likely to recur so long as armies organize people trained to operate symbols within frameworks designed for people trained to operate triggers and filing cabinets. The testimony is overwhelming that propagandists are "temperamental" and "individualistic" and "prima donnas." [5] To function efficiently within a large organization, they must be properly "handled," and such handling requires, as a minimum, administrators who like intellectuals, know their ways, and understand the subtleties of freedom within organization. It requires, too, administrators with a "policy conception of propaganda" and a functional view of administration. In plain words, they should know what the organization's purpose is, and how to get it done most efficiently. Given an adequate administrative framework, sykewarriors might cease to be "characters," even in a military formation. Nor can the possibility be rejected that all propaganda except operations against enemy troop morale might best be performed completely outside of military jurisdiction.

A second persistent personnel problem during World War II was the lack of adequately trained symbol-manipulators. The

analogy between symbols and triggers breaks down as soon as one pushes it beyond the first degree of comparison. Symbols are far more complicated mechanisms than triggers, and the skills required to operate them are more difficult to acquire. The following sections of this chapter outline some of the skills required for propaganda work, and the kinds of background most likely to produce these skills. They indicate clearly that the training of a propagandist involves the work of a lifetime and the making of a career. Propagandists in our day tend to be professionals. Even the gifted amateur who succeeds in this work with less practice than the professional shows a similar pattern of learning, experience, and interests.

There was a shortage of trained propagandists in the American Army for two important reasons. First, the propaganda profession in America had grown up within the framework of business, not of world politics. The public relations, advertising, and salesmanship industries absorb men with the kinds of *talents* required for commercial propaganda at home, but do not provide them with the *skills* required to produce political propaganda abroad. The man who is a wizard at selling patent medicines to Americans is likely to be a flop at selling surrender to Germans, and partly because he conceives sykewar as a "selling" job.[6] Many Americans who could do the former never had occasion to learn the latter. Second, the precipitous entry of the United States into total war, and the consequent rapidity with which matters had to be organized, allowed little opportunity to train men in the skills appropriate to sykewar, most of which are normally acquired by sustained work over a long period. Here, as elsewhere, improvisation was the normal procedure.

Without such a reservoir of skilled personnel, Sykewar was forced to rely largely upon gifted amateurs, and some amateurs not so gifted. Some efforts at training propagandists, particularly for morale intelligence on the "lower echelons," were made. Such efforts undoubtedly improved the performance of many individual Sykewarriors, but they could do comparatively little toward alleviating the continuous shortage of adequately trained personnel.

This shortage was largely responsible for a third persistent personnel problem—the use of German refugees in Sykewar. During the early part of the war there developed among Allied propagandists a prevailing sentiment against the use of refugees

as Sykewar personnel in direct contact with the enemy (e.g., as radio speakers). The core of this view has been stated by William Harlan Hale, a keen observer with no discernible tendencies to xenophobia, who filled important posts at Sykewar. Hale writes:

> As both ineffectual and mischievous I look on the use of German refugees on Allied broadcasting stations in positions where they were able to use "brotherly" or otherwise tenderhearted appeals to the German public, often with the implication that the German people as a whole were innocent, while their leaders alone were guilty. (This practice was largely overcome early in the war by BBC, but lingered on until 1943 in the "Voice of America.") [7]

An important consequence of this view was that in all of PWD not a single German refugee held a responsible position (i.e., one in which he habitually made his own decisions). This eliminated the problem of refugees on the highest level, but did not solve the problem of personnel shortages—particularly at the lower echelons, where most of the daily Sykewar operations were actually performed. It was in the jobs which required specific skills (including, as a minimum, thorough knowledge of the German language) that Sykewar had to call upon German refugees. In consequence, throughout the lower echelons the great majority of leaflet writers, radio speakers, POW (Prisoner of War) interrogators, and document analysts were former Germans or Austrians. Much criticism has been directed against these persons, and some portion of this criticism may have been just. However, their enormous contribution to Sykewar has not been given adequate attention and credit. In fact, most of the criticism was quite irrelevant in the prevailing circumstances. In view of America's incapacity to produce an adequate number of natives possessed of the essential skills, the Sykewar tasks simply could not have been accomplished without the use of refugees. Colonel Gurfein writes: "Without them there could have been no PWD intelligence and perhaps no PWD." [8]

2. *Composition of PWD*

Some light is thrown on the skill problems of Sykewar by a casual review of PWD personnel. Considerably more illumina-

tion would come from a thorough and systematic study of all Sykewar personnel, from PWD down to the smallest field units. The data for such a study are not now available, and the following survey is confined mainly to the high-level personnel of PWD. The procedure is to group key persons by functions and to check their possession of certain selected skills. Persons who performed several functions are grouped separately with respect to each function. Omitted in this discussion is the liaison function, which is mainly important as a supplement to the policy and intelligence functions. Liaison in an army often requires only a certain amount of undifferentiated cunning, plus smartly worn uniforms, handsome features, and some ability to read military maps. Sykewar liaison required more special skills of the sort discussed below.

Of primary importance to PWD were those persons who contributed significantly to the framing of important Sykewar decisions on a continuing day-to-day basis throughout the campaign. In this group are considered the following persons:

General Robert A. McClure	Chief of Division
Richard H. S. Crossman	Deputy Chief
Charles D. Jackson	Deputy Chief
Lt. Col. Charles A. H. Thomson	Chief, Plans Section
Lt. Col. Murray I. Gurfein	Chief, Intelligence Section
William S. Paley	Chief, Radio Section
Lt. Col. John S. Minary	Executive Aide

The chart below indicates the distribution among these seven men of certain skills and experience regarded as appropriate to their function. The classification represents this writer's judgment, based on personal acquaintance and, in most cases, on autobiographical sketches supplied by the persons named. This group of seven men is considered as a unit in the following chart, which shows how the relevant qualifications were distributed among the seven.

The experience and skills listed below are not offered as the necessary or sufficient qualifications for the effective performance of all high-level functions in Sykewar. Many important tasks of organization, administration, and liaison were performed without them. For the execution of the Sykewar policy function proper, with respect to the German target, possession of some

	Yes	*No*	*Unknown*
1. Expert ability to use German language	1	6	–
2. Adequate ability to use German language	2	5	–
3. Expert knowledge of modern German history	1	6	–
4. Adequate knowledge of modern German history	3	3	1
5. Expert knowledge of recent German politics	1	6	–
6. Adequate knowledge of recent German politics	5	1	1
7. Expert knowledge of recent European politics	2	5	–
8. Adequate knowledge of recent European politics	5	1	1
9. Prior professional travel in Europe	2	4	1
10. Prior pleasure travel in Europe	4	2	1
11. Prior systematic study of propaganda (pre-1941)	2	5	–
12. Prior extended experience in political propaganda (pre-1942)	2	5	–
13. Prior limited experience in political propaganda (e.g., North Africa)	7	–	–

of these qualifications in some degree was indispensable. Experience prior to D-Day, as indicated by item 13 in the chart, above, provided an important common background for the persons named. The distribution among them of other items of experience provided the "cluster of skills" which must be present among the policymaking team. This point is emphasized in a letter to this writer from Colonel C. A. H. Thomson, Chief of PWD's Plans Section, whose connection with the policy levels of American propaganda extended from the beginning to the end of the war:

> Even at the top, what is needed is a spectrum of skills, any one of which may be found in combination with others in particular personalities, but most or all of which must be represented at the top level of Sykewar if it is to function with minimal tolerance as to smoothness and effectiveness. . . . Also there must be at the top sufficient information about operating skills so that policy and leadership do not go by default in favor of the lines picked out by operating decisions made with immediate, short-run goals in mind. I do not speak of the obvious elements: language, social structure, communications analysis, etc.

Several of the persons named, responding to a direct query from this writer, have specifically stated that inadequate knowledge of German language, land, history, society, and politics constituted a *felt lack* in their daily tasks at Sykewar. It is inter-

esting to note that the three persons who later in the campaign were added to the PWD staff as Policy Advisers—William Harlan Hale, Duncan Wilson, and Douglas Schneider—possessed expert skills in all or most of these qualifications. So did several outstandingly successful Sykewarriors who worked on the field echelons: Lt. Col. Louis Huot of Third Army, Lt. Col. Shepard Stone of First Army (G-2), Major Fernand Auberjonois, and others.

The second major function of Sykewar was Operations, i.e., the actual production of leaflet, newspaper, and radio texts. At PWD itself, where little operational work was actually done except in the form of leaflets, R. H. S. Crossman, the Deputy Chief of Operations, had already demonstrated outstanding mastery of both the broadcast and the printed media. On the level of "strategic" output, conspicuous success in manipulating *printed* symbols was demonstrated by Majors Martin F. Herz (PWD) and Hans Habe (P & PW 12th AG). Most successful in manipulating *spoken* symbols on this level were Lindley M. Fraser (BBC) and William Harlan Hale (Radio Luxembourg).

All these men had acquired part of their education in Germany or Austria, or had taught in universities in those countries. They were expert in the German language, had known the German land and people continuously over a long period, were deeply interested and well informed about recent German history and politics (as well as European history and politics), and had worked at prewar jobs which required the manipulation of symbols. Fraser, a former professor of political economy at Aberdeen and Oxford, had written an outstandingly lucid and systematic analysis of the symbols used in economic sciences. He had, in addition, taught prewar summer courses at the University of Heidelberg. Hale, gifted with a splendid command of spoken German, had made a reputation as novelist, editor, and political analyst in the United States, prior to the war. Habe, born in Hungary, had survived the rough school of Viennese and European journalism to become a successful Hollywood scenarist and novelist. (An autobiographical sketch of Herz is given in Section 3, p. 81.)

The same considerations applied to Operations personnel on the lower echelons, where—to name only a few conspicuously successful writers and broadcasters, Hans Wallenberg, Jacob Tenenbaum, Joseph Wechsberg, Benno Frank, Gerard Speyer,

and Hans Deppisch—most of the personnel were natives of German-speaking areas of Europe who had been engaged in "intellectual" (i.e., symbol-manipulating) occupations prior to the war.

The third major function of Sykewar was Intelligence. At the PWD level, this meant the collation, objectification, and evaluation of data collected by Sykewar interrogators in the field, together with data received from other sources. Seven persons held responsible posts in the Intelligence Section throughout most of the campaign, and the following notes indicate their specific functions and some relevant factors of experience, training, and interest which they brought to their work. All these persons had varying degrees of facility in the French and German languages, training in the analysis of evidence, and keen interest in the social and political life of Europe. (Ranks given are those effective throughout most of the campaign, with final ranks shown parenthetically.)

(1) CHIEF (Murray I. Gurfein): U. S. Lieutenant Colonel; lawyer with intellectual interests; former editor of *Harvard Law Review;* author of article on "Rackets" in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences;* practiced law mainly as a public prosecutor; prewar travel in Europe and Germany.

(2) DEPUTY CHIEF (Michael Balfour): British civilian; former Oxford tutor in history and politics; taught prewar summer courses at Heidelberg; prewar travel in Europe.

(3) CHIEF EDITOR (Daniel Lerner): U. S. Lieutenant (later Captain); former university instructor in history and literature; special interest in cross-cultural history of modern ideas.

(4) MILITARY ANALYST (Eric Fontaine): British Captain (later Major); former lawyer at London bar; special interest in applying legal canons of evidence to military intelligence; prewar travel in Europe.

(5) WEHRMACHT MORALE ANALYST (Morris Janowitz): U. S. Corporal (later Lieutenant); former graduate student (now instructor) in social science; special interest in scientific study of communications and propaganda.

(6) DOCUMENTS ANALYST (Donald V. McGranahan): U. S. Captain (later Major); former university instructor in psychology; special interest in problems of "national character."

(7) DOCUMENTS ANALYST (Ernest G. Kingsley): British

civilian; native of Berlin; former student and traveler in Europe; general interest in social research.

Others who served the Intelligence Section of PWD for briefer periods conformed to the same general pattern of training, skills, and interests: Charles Stubing and Edward Y. Hartshorne were American college professors; Thomas K. Derry and WAC Captain Ruth Shaver were school teachers; Elisabeth Askonas and T/Sgt George K. Schueller were Viennese, whose prewar careers had been disrupted by events of the Nazi decade, but whose basic interests are illustrated by their postwar careers, respectively, in British government research and American academic research. Captain Alexandre Behr, born in Russia, a cosmopolitan at home everywhere in Europe and fluent in five of its languages, had lived in Berlin during the early Nazi years.[9]

Sykewar field intelligence personnel possessed comparable background and skills, adapted to different uses. The production of systematic field intelligence for quantitative analysis required interviewing hundreds of German prisoners every week. Among the most successful results were those obtained by a special PWD interrogation team, known informally as "Kampfgruppe Rosenberg" (after its leader Captain Albert G. Rosenberg) and composed of the following men (all non-coms): Richard Akselrad, Ernest S. Biberfeld, Leo D. Fialkoff, Michael Josselson, Max M. Kimental, and Alfred H. Samson. Some indication of the experience and skills these men brought to their work is evident from the following facts.

Every member of the team either was born in the German-speaking area of Europe or was brought there at a comparatively early age. Every member had received higher education, some part (if not all) of it in Germany. Every member was at least bilingual, most were trilingual, and several quadrilingual. Their pooled resources comprised some familiarity with all the major European languages, including the Scandinavian. More important, among them they had some mastery of every important dialect of the German language as actually spoken in Germany and Austria. They were deeply interested in, and excellently informed about, European politics. This background of environment, educational level, linguistic ability, and political interest was invaluable to a team which had to work rapidly on enormous numbers of German POW's. In "processing" so large and incessant a flow, they had perforce to operate by "feel"

(as some of them put it, by "smell") in rapidly separating strong Nazis from non-Nazis, lies from truthful responses, voluble from tongue-tied personalities.

Other types of field intelligence required a somewhat different array of similar skills. These included such diverse procedures as the prolonged interview of "representative individuals" and systematic community studies. Among the conspicuously successful Sykewar interrogators along these lines were Saul K. Padover, Paul R. Sweet, Lewis F. Gittler, Jacques Arouet, and Charles Stubing—all former teachers at American universities, some with supplementary experience in government and journalism, and all with superior knowledge of German language, history, society, and politics. Their methods and findings are illustrated in Dr. Padover's dramatic account entitled *Experiment in Germany.*

This brief survey of the composition of Sykewar personnel has named only a few representative individuals in each of the major functions, with only some bare indications of the skills they brought to their jobs. It should be remembered that each of these persons was an individual configuration of talents, experiences, skills, and interests. The following section presents a somewhat more detailed account of three individuals who, in the judgment of their colleagues, performed with outstanding success the major functions of Sykewar: policy, output, intelligence.

3. *Three Sykewarriors: What Makes a Propagandist?*

We turn first to R. H. S. Crossman, who was regarded by most Sykewarriors as the outstanding all-around propagandist in PWD. His main function in PWD was the policy direction of actual Sykewar operations, and the following autobiographical sketch which he has supplied contributes to our understanding of what makes a good policy propagandist:

Richard H. S. Crossman: Autobiographical Sketch

Son of a judge, who was also a classical scholar of some repute, Crossman followed his father to Winchester College and New College, Oxford, winning scholarships to both. He obtained a double first—that is, first-class in Greek and Latin

philology and first-class in ancient philosophy and history, and was elected a Fellow of his College before he took his degree.

Regarded as too young to start teaching at the age of 22, he was sent to Germany for a year to continue his study of Aristotle's doctrine of the soul. The year was 1929-30, in the course of which the Nazis had their first considerable election success.

Up to this time he had shown no particular interest in politics, beyond the natural inclination of the rebellious son of a Conservative parent to swing Left during, for instance, the general strike, when he was the head boy of Winchester. At Oxford, he had combined football with poetry and was a close friend of W. H. Auden, his exact contemporary, as well as knowing Stephen Spender and Day Lewis. His year in Germany turned his attention from poetry to politics and from ancient philosophy to the study of modern politics. His first political associations in Germany were with the Communists, and he became friendly with Willy Münzenberg, then the controller of the Berlin Communist press, later editor of the *Brown Book of the Hitler Terror* and victim of Communist assassination.

Returning to Oxford, he began studying Plato and Marx simultaneously, lecturing for eight years on Plato's *Republic,* the subject of his first book, *Plato Today*. At this time, Marxism was not recognized as a philosophy at Oxford, and Crossman was the first Oxford don to master Marx's early philosophical work. Simultaneously, he introduced a minor revolution in the teaching of Plato by treating him not, as had been done for fifty years, as the spiritual father of British democracy, but as a politician *manqué* who, in a period of democratic decline, sought salvation in the totalitarian state.

Academic teaching was soon insufficient. In 1934, he was elected to the Oxford City Council and became the leader of the Labour group of the Council until the outbreak of war. Meanwhile, he was spending part of every year in Germany, making a close study of National Socialism and broadcasting about it on the BBC. This brought him into association with the small group of Socialists, headed by Bevin and Dalton, who were fighting the prevalent pacificism of the Party and standing for a policy of rearmament to save the League of Nations. He became a member of this then unpopular group in the Party, condemned by such people as Stafford Cripps as ultra-Right-wing and reactionary.

While Dean of his College, in 1937, he fought a parliamentary by-election in Birmingham during vacation. The election overran the beginning of term and, when he returned, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, the Warden, told him he must choose between practical

politics and the academic study of it. Eight months later he resigned his Fellowship and was soon appointed Assistant Editor of the *New Statesman and Nation,* a post he still holds. He combined this with teaching modern politics in the Workers Educational Association, which brought him into contact with the Labour movement in all parts of the country.

During the "phoney war," his expert knowledge of Germany was not used by the men of Munich but, after the formation of the Churchill Coalition, Dr. Dalton was put in charge of psychological warfare against enemy and enemy-occupied countries and, against the furious opposition of Foreign Office officials, put Crossman in charge of the German Department. During 1940-1942, he took a leading part in reorganizing the BBC German broadcasts and, in the spring of 1943, was sent to Algiers as the senior British official in PWB, where he first met his wartime associates, C. D. Jackson and William Paley.

On the day on which he was due to fly to Berlin for PWD/SHAEF, the General Election in Britain was announced, and he went back to fight East Coventry in the Labour cause, where he had been adopted as candidate in 1938. He won against a Conservative, a Liberal and a Communist.

From December 1945 until May 1946, he served on the Anglo-American Commission on Palestine, and, when the British Government, in his view, had shown itself unwilling to implement the Commission's Report, he came into violent collision with Mr. Bevin, warning the Foreign Secretary that, in backing the Arabs, he was backing the losing side, and proposing the partition of the country between Israel and Transjordan.

From November 1946 until the summer of 1947, he was prominent as the leader of the "Keep Left" group in the Parliamentary Labour Party, and the advocate of a "third force" policy and of a Western Union, whose aim it would be to achieve an equipoise of power between America and Russia. When the Marshall Plan was announced and the Russians turned it down, Crossman gave full support to ERP, and the internal feud in the Labour Party lapsed.

Publications: *Plato Today; Government and the Governed; Palestine Mission.*[10]

To illustrate the career out of which emerged one of Sykewar's outstanding operational personnel, an autobiographical sketch supplied to this writer by Major Martin F. Herz is reproduced below. This career is of special interest because Herz was considerably younger than such persons as L. M. Fraser,

W. H. Hale, and Hans Habe, who have already been mentioned as outstanding individual performers in the propaganda media. On the other hand, Herz had a very long and continuous experience with sykewar in World War II. It is this factor of brief prewar experience, followed by an extended sykewar experience —which was perhaps his first major undertaking—that makes Herz's extraordinary success at PWD particularly revealing.

Martin F. Herz: Autobiographical Sketch

Born July 9, 1917, in New York, N.Y., of German-speaking parents. Brought up bilingually, German and English. When he was five years old, his family moved to Vienna, Austria, because of father's business. (Father made annual trips between Vienna and New York, thus maintaining contact with U.S.) Spent period from 1922 to 1936 in Vienna, where he received entire primary and secondary education, plus one year of university training. Returned to U.S. in 1936, and graduated (B.S.) from Columbia University in 1937.

Of his childhood, the following information seems pertinent in explaining his qualifications for later activities in psychological warfare: Starting with a perceptible language deficiency, Herz by the age of 13 had not only overcome any handicap but was at the head of his class, in Vienna, in the subject of German. Owing to a gift of expression, he was eventually elected class president *(Klassensprecher),* a position which he held in the last three years of the *Realgymnasium.* At the same time, being a foreigner, he remained aloof from all local Austrian politics, joining, for instance, the Austrian Boy Scouts in preference to the Pan-German or Socialist youth organizations, which some of his classmates joined.

Factors bearing on his attitude toward Germany and Nazism, during this formative period, were the following: (1) First-hand experience of the emotional content of Pan-Germanism and German romanticism, as manifested in poetry, legends, Wagnerian opera. (2) Camp-fire romanticism of the Boy Scouts, who, although internationalist in outlook, sang old German soldiers' songs and had certain military attributes; at the same time, internationalism and pacifism of Boy Scout movement, which resulted in some conflict with Pan-German youth organizations. (3) Experience of an essential conflict between pacifism and nationalism. Herz gave lectures on pacifist themes, which were coldly received not only by the Nazis in his class, but also by anti-Nazi Austrian nationalists.

(4) Most important, during that period, was the first-hand experience gained of Nazi subversive propaganda in Austria during and after the civil war of 1934. Herz studied journalism on the side, and collected exhibits of political propaganda, showing little interest, however, in the merits of the political controversies which were raging in Austria at that time, except for his general rejection of all dictatorship, and particularly of political mysticism and Pan-Germanism. When he returned to the U.S. he was 19, quite immature politically, and much more interested in Far Eastern than in European problems. This attitude of political aloofness in which he left Austria in 1936 (well before the Anschluss) may have been an important factor in his later dispassionate analysis of intelligence bearing on Nazism and on the mentality of German soldiers. When he returned to America, Herz was not a refugee, harboring no rancor toward Europe, though he was linguistically as qualified as any highly articulate German.

When the war broke out in Europe, Herz was engaged in business in New York, having tried and failed during two years to establish himself in the literary field. To his surprise, his qualifications as a translator and propaganda analyst were found useful by the broadcasting networks, and he occasionally worked in those capacities for NBC and CBS. He was drafted into the Army in 1941 and, while a private in Headquarters II Corps, wrote a brief study on the possibilities of "tactical psychological warfare." This turned out to be one of the first studies written on the subject in America and, later, after he had won his commission as 2nd Lieutenant at the Infantry School, he was assigned to the War Department, Military Intelligence Service, primarily to carry on his work in combat propaganda.

As significant as any formal education, from the point of view of his later activities in combat propaganda, were his experiences during the early, confused, groping days of psychological warfare in the U.S. Herz was assigned to the Office of War Information as Intelligence Officer of the Planning Staff in Washington. During his service there, he was forcibly struck by: (a) the spilling over of domestic propaganda about Germany into foreign war propaganda. Many, for instance, believed that what the American people were told about Germany should also be told to the Germans, or could be used as a basis for propaganda planning; (b) the importance of adequate intelligence for propaganda planning and operations, since what the enemy knows and believes *now*—and not what he should be knowing and believing—must form the point of departure of effective

psychological warfare; (c) the consistent overemphasis of strategic over tactical ("planning" over "operational") aspects of propaganda, and the inability of some planners to recognize that *how* something is said in propaganda is not a subsidiary question but one of co-equal importance to that of *what* is said in propaganda. (d) Association with scholars experienced in public-opinion research, and their systematic approach to psychological warfare, also proved of value, particularly since some of them appreciated that the *mot juste* in propaganda may be as important as the *idée juste.*

Herz's field experience in combat propaganda can be considered in three phases, the final one being his work in SHAEF where the findings were finally applied on a large scale. The first phase was an experimental one in the Sicilian campaign. Herz came to Europe as captain and chief of the propaganda section of a large and over-ambitiously organized combat propaganda unit (the 1st Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company), which soon proved to be too unwieldy, and which was subsequently broken up into small task forces. One such task force, part of a larger psychological-warfare team attached to Headquarters, 7th Army, wrote and disseminated the first American artillery-fired leaflets, interrogated prisoners, and attempted to check the effectiveness of the first surrender-propaganda appeals.

The second phase of his combat-propaganda experience was at Headquarters, Fifth Army in Italy, where he was in charge of leaflet writing and psychological interrogation (under the direction, first, of Lt. Col. John T. Whitaker, then of Lt. Col. John O. Weaver). During this phase, the following significant progress was made: (a) development of the Fifth Army Safe Conduct, which he later perfected as the SHAEF Safe Conduct; (b) invention of the prisoner-of-war-poll, which enabled the charting of trends in P/W thinking. (The Intelligence Section of PWD/SHAEF later continued these trend studies.); (c) "tactical contingency leaflets," which were held in readiness by corps and division artillery and disseminated, on advice of corps liaison officers, when the tactical situation warranted; (d) The first coordinated leaflet campaign in several stages, in conjuction with a military offensive—that of the British X Corps across the Garigliano River.

The third phase, that at SHAEF, where Herz as Major wrote most of the tactical leaflets and a large proportion of the leaflets addressed to German civilians, is more adequately described elsewhere in the present study. During the SHAEF phase, close association with Herz's immediate superior, Mr. R. H. S. Crossman, a man who combined live imagination with a scholarly

approach and excellent insight into German psychology, was greatly conducive to the efficient operation of the Leaflet Section.

Toward the end of the war, the exigencies of tactical propaganda changed radically, necessitating novel kinds of tactical appeals to German civilians, the devising of leaflets appealing to both soldiers and civilians, and the projection of military government as a concrete alternative to blind last-ditch resistance. When the war was over, as domestic American civilian propaganda again began to spill over into military psychological warfare (then called reeducation), Herz asked to be relieved from SHAEF and transferred to the U. S. Forces in Austria, where a psychological atmosphere more conducive to reorientation prevailed. He was not assigned to information activities in Austria, however, but became active in political reporting, which later led to his application and subsequent admission, after examinations, to the U. S. Foreign Service. He is at present a Foreign Service Officer assigned to the Department of State, having completed two years' duty with the American Legation in Vienna.[11]

The intelligence function, as we have seen, involved three varied uses of roughly similar skills. A man who conducted prolonged interrogations and community studies in the field, and at the same time demonstrated unusual powers of systematic and penetrating policy analysis at the highest level, was Dr. Saul K. Padover. His autobiographical sketch indicates the background from which came a conspicuously successful intelligence Sykewarrior.

Saul K. Padover: Autobiographical Sketch

I was born on April 13, 1905, in an Austrian village, of which I have but a faint recollection, since I left it as a child. All I know about it is that the house and grounds had been in our family—mother's—for well over a century. My mother had been born in it, and her father, and her father's father.

My father's people were American and my mother's Austrian. I didn't know my father until I was about fifteen. My mother, daughter of a "good" family, refused to join her husband in America: only "paupers and bankrupts" went to America. My mother considered herself a gentlewoman, member of the local gentry. For a woman born around 1870, she had received an unusually good education. She could not only read and write,

an unusual accomplishment in those days, but she was also fluent in German, Polish, and, I think, Hebrew.

My father had no influence on me. I left home not long after I met him. For all practical purposes, I was fatherless. Mother's influence had been strong in my formative years. She was undemonstrative, unsentimental, and self-controlled. She did not believe in showing either affection or approval. Disciplined herself, she imposed the same hard controls upon my brother and me. I left home quite early in life, and I confess that, while I have always admired my mother, I have never missed her.

When World War I broke out, my mother, brother, and I moved to Vienna, where I went to school. The goose-stepping of the Vienna days did me no harm, so far as I know; it only taught me to like walking. It did not make me military-minded. When World War I was over and Europe was partly in ruins, mother decided, at long last, to join her husband in America. We arrived in Detroit in 1920. A new life began at fifteen.

Detroit was a real shock, an ugly, sprawling, slummy, dirty city, without a cultural center, without beauty, seemingly without a soul. After the beauty of Vienna, it was dreadful, drab, and dreary. What used to bother me most was the absence of stone houses. Detroit's shingle houses and wooden shanties gave me a disturbing feeling of impermanency.

Detroit made me an American, and it did it the hard way. I went through, there, all the stages, every painful one of them, of transformation and adaptation to a harsh, exciting, raw but wonderful new land. But not quite, really. I was not a "typical American," at least as judged by the prevailing Detroit standards. Unlike nearly all my contemporaries, I did not strive for success in money terms. I wanted to be neither businessman nor lawyer nor doctor. I wanted to be a scholar and writer. It was the kind of ambition which, alas, was not hailed with enthusiasm by my elders; nor was this sort of thing wildly appreciated by the men who then ruled America. I grew up, be it remembered, in the days of Calvin Coolidge, who symbolized the whole epoch by his unforgettable saying: "America's business is business."

I registered in Grammar School, in the third grade, became the school's spelling champion before I could speak English fluently (by osmosis, I suppose), and graduated within a year or so. Then I went to High School and there I studied with intensity, absorbing the English language, American history, and American literature. In college—Detroit's Wayne University—I was one of the intellectual "rebels" of the 20's. Our rebellion consisted largely of going to speakeasies and of reading Menck-

en's *American Mercury*. I don't remember which was more fun.

Upon graduation I went to Yale to study history. That was a mistake. Yale then was provincial and reactionary. Some of the professors went out of their way to show their contempt for us, especially those of us who came from the West, and who had not attended Yale as undergraduates. In New Haven I saw a side of America I had hitherto known only from books—cold, snobbish, bigoted. I left Yale as fast as I could and never saw it again.

I went to the University of Chicago and there I spent some of the happiest years of my life. They were also years of fundamental influence upon my mind. The University of Chicago, in the 1920's, was in its golden age. A number of great scientists and distinguished scholars made it, unquestionably, the most exciting center of learning in the Americas. Chicago was the one place in the United States where ideas really mattered. Above all, it was vitally, dynamically democratic. I observed no class distinctions or race prejudice in the University. One of the most popular members of our circle was a Negro, who has since become an eminent scholar. Unlike the caste-ridden, frozen-faced New England college, Chicago, both the University and the city, was hospitable, warm, direct. Professors, even famous ones, mingled with students on a basis of social equality, of friendly give and take. There were constant discussions, parties, gatherings, and talk, talk, talk. And we studied hard, too.

At Chicago I first got interested in Jefferson, through Professor William E. Dodd, and learned about the new social sciences, through Harold D. Lasswell. To Lasswell I must pay special tribute, both as a friend and mentor. I considered him then, as I do now after twenty-odd years, a true pioneer, a (to use a German phrase) "path-breaker"—endlessly adventurous in the kingdom of ideas, ruthless in the pursuit of knowledge, and just about the subtlest mind I have ever known.

To me, the chief value I found in the study of history was the discovery of Jefferson. His influence on me has been pervasive and, to use an old-fashioned word, spiritual. It was Jefferson who, if I may say so, caused my conversion to the religion of humanity.

I had a year in Paris as a Guggenheim Fellow and observed the last days of the dying Third Republic. When I returned from Europe, disturbed by the apparent drift to war, I entered Government service, as Personal Assistant to Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes. I spent five years in his office, exciting and deeply affecting years. The Washington period gave final shape to my thinking and definitely fixed my outlook. I had

made the complete circle, from a student-researcher of history and politics to a participant-observer. I learned, in other words, aspects of political life that are not to be found in books. I learned to appreciate the value of political power and to be wary of those who exercised it.

There is no need to repeat here my war experience as a Psychological Warfare officer, since I have already told the story in my book, *Experiment in Germany*. Insofar as my work as a "Sykewarrior" had value, it was due, I think, to the following qualifications: a personal background based upon profound cultural-intellectual readjustments, which heightened awareness of one's self and others' selves; a knowledge of the language and history of the enemy; a training in history and politics; a passionate belief in democracy and a loathing of all forms of autocracy; a knowledge of political men and public figures, and an awareness of how they are likely to operate or react; an ability to observe conditions and analyze ideas objectively. I think that some such qualities, and more, are necessary for effective intelligence work, as well as for psychological warfare.[12]

In terms of personality, these three individuals—Crossman, Herz, and Padover—were extremely different. Their sketches reveal also significant differences in birthplace and upbringing, family status, educational specialization, postgraduate interests, occupational history, and personal outlook. Even more striking, however, is the coincidence of certain common factors in these three careers. For example, a good education and impressive early experiences in European metropolitan centers, the development of an intense interest in political affairs, a verbalizing disposition revealed in literary fluency (viz., the facility of self-expression shown in their autobiographical sketches)—these are among the characteristics of good propagandists.

That three superior performers like Crossman, Herz, and Padover, despite their individual differences, could employ such common elements of experience and training in all the major propaganda functions may be evidence that there is a distinctive animal known as "propagandist" who can be trained. Crossman, in addition to his skill as policy director of operations, demonstrated that he could actually write leaflets and broadcast radio talks. Herz had done an outstanding intelligence job at PWB in the Mediterranean Theater, before he came to PWD to concentrate on producing leaflets. Padover supplemented his excellent work in field intelligence by helping Radio Luxem-

burg convert raw intelligence reports into a "black" radio show known as "Operation Annie," and at Paris, where he helped to analyze intelligence data for policy purposes.

We note, too, the striking recurrence of the same elements of training and experience, in varying degrees, among most of the personnel mentioned more briefly in the preceding section. This leads us to extend the hypothesis that propagandists can be trained, and assert that it is possible to delineate the essential elements of training necessary to answer the question we have posed: "What makes a propagandist?" While the evidence furnished in this chapter is much too sparse to permit any firm conclusions, a brief summary may serve at least as a basis for further and more systematic investigation.

4. *Summary: Talents and Skills*

The summary here attempted is based on the view that propagandists are the users of certain skills; that these skills are acquired by education, experience, and occupational training; and therefore that good propagandists can be "made." The contrary view—that "propagandists are born, not made"—is taken to be an ambiguous derivation from irrelevant ways of posing the problem of "inheritance *versus* environment." [13]

Without being dragged into this fruitless controversy, we may start from the view that an indispensable ingredient in the propagandist mixture is *intelligence*. Since this qualification would seem to be required in all "intellectual" occupations, it tells us nothing about the distinctive characteristics required of the propagandist. We turn next, therefore, to the two factors stressed by Mr. Crossman: empathy and timing.[14] By these terms, he intends to isolate as factors in the personality structure of the propagandist the ability to project oneself into the way of thinking of one's audience and the ability to recognize, in the moods of that audience, the correct moment for saying something (or saying nothing) with optimum effects.

Mr. Crossman showed himself, during the Sykewar period, to be a master of both "empathy" and "timing." For this we adduce as explanation not merely his considerable intelligence, but also his background of experience and training. Intelligence alone did not distinguish him from his associates among the PWD policymakers. There was not a single unintelligent per-

son among that group. What mainly distinguished Crossman as policymaker was his superior knowledge of German, Germany, and the Germans in the context of contemporary European and world politics. This rich background of experience and knowledge enabled him to use his first-rate intelligence to project himself into the German mind and to "sense the psychological moment" with respect to that audience. Crossman would surely have been a less successful director of propaganda policy to the Japanese. This is the point Crossman himself made in comparing Goebbels' great successes among the German audiences, which he knew so well, with his dismal failures among foreign audiences, which he knew very little. Involved here was not a failure of Goebbels' intelligence, which obviously remained constant, but a failure of his education, experience, and knowledge.

This point has been made by one of Crossman's closest collaborators, C. D. Jackson, who helped to direct PWD policy from North Africa through France with great skill, but who refused to participate in the direction of daily policy in Germany, because he felt that he did not know enough. Jackson writes:

> As for myself, I think that the most important ingredient was prior knowledge of Europe and the Europeans, and included in that was knowledge of the French and Italian languages. In fact, I think the language thing is so important that, if I had to choose in the future between a number A-1 candidate without language and a number A-2 candidate with language, I would choose A-2.[15]

Stated in general terms, then, some essential qualifications for the propagandist are:

(1) Intimate knowledge of the background of the audience —its language, history, myths, institutions, practices, social composition, and politics.

(2) Detailed knowledge of the current developments among the audience—its unifying beliefs and practices; its divisive beliefs and practices; its current grievances; its current fads in dress, speech, and manners; and its "propaganda case-history" (the recent flow of propaganda from all sides to which its attention has been exposed).

(3) A systematic "policy conception" of the propaganda proc-

ess, which requires constant awareness that the purpose of sykewar is to use the target's hopes, fears and wishes (in addition to one's own) in manipulating symbols to achieve policy purposes.

(4) A systematic conception of the psychocultural process of opinion-formation, which constantly involves awareness that sykewar operates within a vast environment. Any element of the environment is capable of affecting the attitude-structures of any target. The skill required of the propagandist is the ability to discover the decisive affective elements in a given target and how to manipulate them.

(5) A "nose for politics." This characteristic is harder to define than to recognize. It is not important that a propagandist's nostrils should dilate when a political theme is raised. It *is* important that he should sense the political (as well as psychological) consequences of any theme, whether it deal with high doctrinal symbols or the most elementary symbols of life in a primary social group.

(6) A "flair for expression." For a sykewarrior, the verbalizing tendency, which is characteristic of diverse personality types, should be present but brought under control. The effective sykewarrior probably will not be an *emmerdeur*. Ease and grace and fluency of expression are uncommon skills—as is the "gift of tongues."

These are not intended as an exhaustive catalog of characteristics required to make a propagandist. They are intended merely to indicate the kinds of talents and interests, acquired by experience and education, which "the propagandist" can convert into usable skills. Additional specific skills are required for specific functions: the policymaker must know how to convert into propaganda policies the political purposes he serves; the leaflet writer must know how propaganda policy can be most effectively converted into texts designed for the eyes of the audience; the broadcaster must know how to do the same with texts designed for the enemy's ears; the intelligence reporter must know how to select, observe, and systematically record the data on which all the other members of the propaganda team depend.

Here we enter the field of "know-how"—which Americans will readily recognize as the outcome of experience and training. Given the requisite factors of knowledge outlined above, and

an intelligence adequate to convert such knowledge into usable skills, training can short-cut the trial-and-error methods of unaided common sense by providing systematic summaries of past experience. Such training would involve, for optimum results, many years of travel and education. Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, regarded by some as the Navy's outstanding sykewarrior in World War II, shows uncommon insight into his own career as a propagandist when he begins his autobiography by reprinting the Navy order which, twenty years earlier, sent him to "shore duty beyond the seas" explicitly "for the purpose of acquiring a knowledge of the Japanese language and the Japanese people."[16] With all his intelligence, Zacharias could not have become an outstanding propagandist without this long prior training. Even with both his intelligence and his training he would not, for example, have been an outstanding contributor to Sykewar against Germany. Knowledge of the specific target, through long experience and education, is the basis of training for successful propagandists.

It is quite clear that training of the kind which has been emphasized here will not automatically produce great individual propagandists or guarantee that all propagandists so trained will be equally efficient. Differences among individual propagandists involve psychiatric problems of personality which this writer recognizes but is not competent to discuss. Certain it is, however, that training will produce a higher level of propagandists, among whom the most brilliant individuals will readily be detected by their performance. Perhaps more important than brilliant individuals, in the long run, training will produce those "skill-clusters" which are essential to sustained team work.

Chapter 4. Notes

1. Lt. Col. M. I. Gurfein notes that the term psychological warfare is "an unhappy one in that it brings to mind the picture of unsoldierly civilians, most of them needing haircuts, engaged in hypnotizing the enemy." *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer 1948), p. 331.

2. A full Colonel of the regular army, through some misfortune assigned to PWD for a period, was outraged when he heard a PWD Lieutenant address by given name the Lieutenant Colonel who was his chief. He reprimanded both officers.

3. Letter from C. D. Jackson to this writer, deposited in The Hoover

Library. On this point Colonel Gurfein writes: "The greatest struggle waged by American psychological warriors was within our own ranks. Propaganda to the enemy was permitted to grow without legitimate parentage. As a result, trained Army officers were often reluctant to recognize a new military function which did not have the benefit of a traditional place in the table of organization." *Loc. cit.,* p. 331.

One important reason why higher Army officers lacked interest and knowledge about sykewar may be its absence from their prewar training. P. M. A. Linebarger, *op. cit.,* p. 77, writes: "The War College files, for example, show that not one single officer was assigned full-time to study of these problems during 1925-1935. For the entire period 1919-1929, there are listed only two War College research papers on the subject." C. A. H. Thomson adds: "I know of no Navy effort at all during this period [1918-1940]. The Army commenced to study psychological warfare in the summer of 1941; the Navy, shortly afterwards. The State Department gave no serious study to the field, and turned over responsibility for liaison with psychological warfare organizations to its press officer." *Op. cit.,* p. 113 (note 2).

4. Lockhart recounts a story which illustrates the stratagems civilian propagandists had to use in order to "get through to" the military. In making his first approach to a group of senior British officers, Lockhart, who had been "forewarned by General Ismay that a decent modesty was the civilian's best road to the military heart," opened his discourse with this revealing self-denigration: "You have probably heard that there are four arms in this war. There is the sea arm; there is the land arm; there is the air arm—and there is the hot-air arm. I've come to you today to talk about the hot-air arm." *Op. cit.,* p. 198.

5. Since this chapter deals with people who are still very much alive, common courtesy and discretion are required. Where illustrations from PWD are used, as in the above note 2, names will be omitted. Wherever possible, representatives of other propaganda organizations will be called upon, viz., the remark of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Director-General of PWE: "I cannot say that PWE was an easy team. Every good propagandist must possess the qualities of a prima donna or, as Ernst Toller once said, must be born with one eye." *Op. cit.,* p. 155.

6. See P. M. A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare,* pp. 32-36. See also the account of Wallace Carroll, *Persuade or Perish,* p. 157:

> Americans proved apt at learning the tricks of front-line psychological warfare. Perhaps it was because this type of propaganda, unlike political propaganda, bore a superficial resemblance to advertising. You did your "market research" by studying intelligence reports on the morale of the enemy units facing you. Then you wrote your copy on the merchandise you had to sell—humane treatment, good food, a chance to live and return home after the war. If the advertisement brought results, you continued to run it. If it failed, you questioned prisoners until you found out what was wrong with it, and then you tried again. A German officer in Tunisia told his interrogators: "You Americans are great advertisers. You made your prison camps sound so attractive that our men could not resist."

7. Letter to this writer, deposited in The Hoover Library. Confirmation of Hale's view is given by Wallace Carroll:

> These exiles brought with them priceless gifts. . . . But unfortunately some of them had brought with them passions and political convictions which sometimes proved too much for their good intentions. . . . Not until William Harlan Hale, one of the ablest propagandists developed by OWI, began to exert his influence upon the German broadcasts in the middle of 1943 did they begin to rise above the level of soapbox oratory.

Op. cit., p. 133.

8. Letter from Colonel Gurfein to this writer, deposited in The Hoover Library.

9. The two men largely responsible for the governing conceptions of PWD Intelligence exhibit a similar background of interest and experience: Dr. Henry V. Dicks, Professor of Psychiatry, and member of the famed Tavistock Clinic in London; and Edward A. Shils, Professor of Social Science at the University of Chicago, and Reader in Sociology at the University of London.

10. Original on file in The Hoover Library.

11. Original on file in The Hoover Library.

12. Original on file in The Hoover Library.

13. Compare Bruce Lockhart's account of the composition of the British PWE, in the course of which he asserts: "A propagandist is born and not made." *Op. cit.*, p. 156. However, in trying to account for Crossman's enormous single-handed influence in PWD, Lockhart turns in explanation not to Crossman's distinctive prenatal and congenital characteristics but to his "knowledge and technical skill," p. 236.

14. See his Supplement to this study.

15. Letter to this writer, deposited in The Hoover Library. Dr. Saul Padover, on the first page of his vivid account of his own highly successful field operations, also lays stress on the importance of knowledge: "In this business of separating the German soldier from his military loyalties we were not, despite the paucity of our numbers and the bias of some West Pointers, without success; but we would have achieved more, *had we known more.*" (Italics mine.) *Experiment in Germany*, p. 3.

16. E. M. Zacharias, *Secret Missions* (New York, 1946), p. 3. The foregoing account of Sykewar, and particularly PWI, personnel, may be compared with Leonard W. Doob's "The Utilization of Social Scientists in the Overseas Branch of the OWI," *American Political Science Review* (1947), Vol. 41, p. 649. See also the latter's discussion of "The Propagandist" in his *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York, 1948), Chapter 12. See, finally, the report prepared by the OSS Assessment Staff, *Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the OSS* (New York, 1948).

Chapter 5

ROLE OF SYKEWAR INTELLIGENCE (PWI)

If knowledge of his target is a primary requirement for the propagandist, then propaganda intelligence is one of his most important tools. Especially is this true during a war, when even the most expert propagandist is cut off from his normal sources of information. The position is outlined by Dr. Padover:

> I lived in Germany in 1920 and again in 1931; I had taught German history and had written a book and articles on the subject. I was considered a specialist on Germany when I landed in Normandy. But of Hitler's Germans I had only second-hand or third-hand knowledge, and in this of course I was no exception in the Army.[1]

The task of PWI (Psychological Warfare Intelligence) was to bring the Sykewarriors up to date on "Hitler's Germans." Involved here were some of the knottiest problems of the whole Sykewar operation, a number of which have not yet been solved.[2]

The development of a distinctive morale intelligence apparatus was among the major accomplishments of Sykewar. The story of PWI is all the more impressive in that it started, in terms of personnel and experience, almost "from scratch." The historian of the Sykewar operation at Twelfth Army Group has written:

> When the first PWI teams were given their assignments . . . in May 1944 . . . it is safe to say that practically nothing was known about the processes of gathering intelligence for combat PW Operations. There had been a history of intelligence activity in the North African and Italian campaigns, it is true, but little information about this operation ever came back to those who were setting out to support the invasion of France. And the operation which was to be undertaken by the Armies in the ETO was to dwarf anything done previously.[3]

Problems other than inexperience confronted a new military function which, in Colonel Gurfein's words, "did not have the benefit of a traditional place in the table of organization." There was serious doubt, for example, among the established "general staff" sections at SHAEF as to whether PWI should be permitted to report on German morale at all. The apex of the military intelligence pyramid, G-2, looked askance at any apparatus based on field intelligence which planned to operate outside its chain of command. Even when the function of integral morale intelligence was shown to be indispensable to the Sykewar operation, G-2 still remained indifferent to the idea of sharing its combat intelligence with PWI's morale analysts and policymakers. When agreement was finally obtained to install a PWI liaison officer at SHAEF G-2, to enable constant surveillance of military intelligence for Sykewar purposes, fresh difficulties developed with G-3, the general staff section of SHAEF in charge of Allied operations. Close liaison with G-3 was essential, for just as Sykewar needed G-2 estimates of the enemy situation and intentions to evaluate adequately enemy morale, so it required current and authoritative information on Allied plans and operations to plan adequately Sykewar propaganda output.

The early history of Sykewar, and particularly of PWI, is a record of such difficulties confronted. That they were solved at all adequately is a tribute to General McClure and his deputies, and, in matters pertaining to PWI, particularly to the intellectual clarity and organizational skill of its Chief, Lt. Col. Murray I. Gurfein. This chapter, however, is concerned less with PWI's organizational growth than with the intellectual and methodological problems which PWI confronted. These are discussed, in turn, as PWI's "special problem," dual function, sources of data, methods of analysis, and forms of reporting. The next chapter summarizes some basic PWI analyses of the German target which guided Sykewar operations.

1. *The Special Problem: Attitudes and Action*

> A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part somewhat doubtful.[4]
>
> —*Karl von Clausewitz*

This is among the choicest "nuggets" in the treasury of Clausewitz's reflections on war. Modern methods of military intelligence, which have adapted some of the successful critical techniques of the social sciences, are able to cope with, if not eliminate, information which is "contradictory" or "false." In this process, the category of information which is "somewhat doubtful" has been reduced, but today as in Clausewitz's time it still comprises "by far the greatest part" of our wartime information.

The conditions of war limit the applicability of social science methods, which normally set no time limit on investigations. Military operations are always "timed," and as often as not the schedule is set by the enemy. Military intelligence officers, therefore, still operate largely on the basis which Clausewitz describes:

> What is required of an officer in this case is a certain power of discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgment can give. The law of probability must be his guide.[5]

This general problem of military intelligence, the overwhelming amount of information which is "somewhat doubtful" and the methods by which it can be evaluated, applied with special force to Sykewar, because PWI was mainly concerned with a kind of information which always appears nebulous and "somewhat doubtful"—information about the *attitudes* of an enemy population.

To comprehend the complexities of this kind of intelligence, we need only examine the concept of attitude. Professor L. L. Thurstone, writing on the problem of attitude-measurement, defines attitude as:

> the sum-total of a man's inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and convictions about any specific topic.[6]

Attitude, thus defined, presents methodological problems which have not yet been adequately solved by social science—even in its studies of individuals, with the time and data required for systematic analysis readily available.[7] PWI tried to cope with the behavioral consequences of attitudes on a group basis, as indicated by Colonel Dicks' definition of morale as "a convic-

tion of personal power, competence and worth animating a group in relation to the task in hand." [8] The application of such a definition to large segments of a populous nation, with neither time nor data available in adequate measure, posed problems of considerable complexity.

The chief point of entry into German "attitudes" was via German "opinions." One competent social scientist in this field has defined opinion as the "verbal expression of attitude." [9] For purposes of Sykewar analysis, the limitations of such a definition had to be carefully scrutinized. In general, it is clear, an opinion may be a "mis-expression" of an attitude. That is, the person giving an opinion may, consciously or unconsciously, be misrepresenting his "real" attitude.[10] PWI considered that the level of unconscious suppression was particularly high in Nazi Germany, where free expression had been eliminated from the social *mores* for more than a decade. Further, most PWI surveys of German opinion were conducted by American personnel in Army uniform, and therefore Sykewar had to reckon also with an extremely high factor of conscious suppression.[11] However, since PWI treated German utterances not as the analysis of data, but as data for analysis, all expressions of opinion, even when mis-expressions of the "real" opinions held privately by Germans, were grist to the PWI mill.

Thus, although Sykewar relied heavily on the expressed opinions of Germans as an index to German attitudes, it was not misled into facile assumptions concerning the validity of its findings. From the start, PWI clearly faced a chronic problem of social science: the relation of attitude to behavior. The PWI task was to observe both for the purpose of enabling more accurate forecasts as to what, in a given situation, German soldiers and civilians were likely to do. Accordingly, PWI sought to test its analyses of German verbalizations by reports on other forms of German behavior from other sources. German sources gave some help, for Nazi morale-analysts had absolutized the distinction between *Stimmung* (Morale) and *Haltung* (Conduct) into a rigid dichotomy. More useful was the attitudes-in-action data which could be combed from the battle reports by Allied G-2's and G-3's. That is, no amount of opinion data indicating that morale was low in the Panzer Lehr Division, for example, was regarded as acceptable if battle reports showed that fighting activity in that Division or on

that front was high. Such reports from outside sources were hard to come by, however, and PWI had to develop its own careful methods of collecting, collating, verifying, and reporting verbal and behavioral data. These methods are described in detail in the sections which follow.

The discovery and evaluation of German attitudes in the light of German behavior thus was the most distinctive contribution of PWI to Sykewar policy. The intelligent formulation of propaganda policy must be based on an accurate estimate of the audience to be propagandized.[12] It was the job of PWI to keep Sykewar's policymakers informed of what the Germans were saying and thinking, as the war progressed, to provide a basis for careful forecasting of what they might soon be doing, in response both to Sykewar propaganda and to other events.

This was the "pure" intelligence function of PWI. At the same time, it was the task of PWI to provide the "operational sections" of Sykewar with materials useful for "output." This duality of function constantly complicated the work of Sykewar's Intelligence section.

2. *The Dual Function: "Pure" and "Output" Intelligence*

It is important to distinguish these two main functions of PWI, for they provided the critical transition from policy directives to propaganda output. In a preceding chapter, we examined our highest-level war policies. Although these policies made few overt references to intelligence, they rested clearly on certain intelligence assumptions concerning the audiences to which they were directed.[13] The policy of Unconditional Surrender, for example, made sense only on the assumption that the enemy forces could and would surrender in the face of certain defeat. That such an assumption involved an important intelligence estimate (even if the estimate was never clarified on a more explicit level than "intuition"), will be better understood if one recalls the enormous publicity in America, during the first year of the war, given to the view that Japanese soldiers never surrender. The belief was widespread that the concept of surrender did not exist in the Japanese lexicon, that their equivalent concept was suicide (hara-kiri). A less extreme, but similar, view gained currency with regard to the Wehrmacht, whose

members had sworn an oath of loyalty to the Führer considered to bind German soldiers to "fight until death." [14]

If the view that German soldiers would not surrender had been taken literally, a policy of Unconditional Surrender could have led to nothing short of the extermination of every last member of the Wehrmacht. This was clearly not the intention of the Allied high command, whose evaluation of available information on surrender led to the conclusion that German armies *would* surrender. For example, intelligence on the collapse of von Arnim's army in Tunisia, the first German mass-surrenders to Allied forces, provided the basis for an important Sykewar assumption on Unconditional Surrender, made in the *Standing Directive* (Section 12):

> We should assume that the German Army in the West will, like von Arnim's Army in Tunisia, fight on *as a whole* until it collapses *as a whole*.[15]

Similarly, the announcement of peace aims such as the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter was based on the intelligence assumption that their contents corresponded to the desires of the peoples of the Allied nations. It would simply make no sense to promise freedom of religion, if they fought successfully, to a people who regarded freedom of religion as a heretical attack on the one true faith, e.g., various Moslem sects. After such an announcement, the outraged people would very likely cease fighting altogether.[16]

Policy, clearly, is never divorced from an intelligence estimate. The more specific the policy, in fact, the more specific must be the intelligence on which it is based. In the earlier chapter on Sykewar Policy we saw this principle in operation. The *Standing Directive* even cautioned the readers of its intelligence estimates to remember that: "Except where specifically stated, the following generalisations apply to the German Army, not to the Air Force or Navy." (Section 12)

This need for accurate intelligence remained constant. Broad estimates of German attitudes served a useful purpose in framing high policies, but a continuous and detailed flow of accurate information, properly evaluated, was required to keep these high policies applicable to the dozens of decisions which Sykewar had to make from day to day. For example, it was useful to know in general that German soldiers would surrender. But

it would be worse than useless to warn the 16th SS Panzer Division to surrender because it was surrounded, when in fact the 16th was fighting in the clear, and the 2nd Division further south was surrounded. It would be equally idiotic, on the day after an official increase in the sugar ration had been announced, to tell the German civilian audience that never had the German people been so poorly fed.[17]

On a more sophisticated level, PWI had to be prepared to tell Sykewar policymakers whether the German Army was psychologically "ready" for a grand leaflet campaign to induce surrenders. Further, Sykewarriors wanted to know whether large-scale surrenders could best be induced by promises of good treatment, or whether it would be more effective to emphasize that German surrenders would help shorten the war, and thereby alleviate the distress of the civilian population at home. They wanted to know, also, whether a leaflet attack on Hitler would be a help or a hindrance in convincing German soldiers to surrender.[18]

Along the same lines, PWI had to advise Sykewar policymakers whether the German civilians could be induced to cooperate with advancing Allied troops by hanging out white flags and by compelling their local political leaders and military units to stop fighting. Sykewar propagandists wanted to know, too, what the state of mind was of the estimated 10-12,000,000 foreign workers and internees on German soil. Here was an explosive mass of humanity, and our propaganda approach to them had to be based on reliable intelligence.[19]

These were the sorts of questions which absorbed PWI throughout the campaign. There were dozens of questions concerning events in Germany, concerning the state of mind of one or another segment of the population in Germany, military and civilian, native and foreign. PWI had to find the answers, or be prepared to say that there were no reliable answers because its information was, as Clausewitz put it, "somewhat doubtful." This was PWI's most important, and most difficult, function: to separate the known from the unknown, the certain from the probable and from the doubtful, in such a way that policy could be made on a sure basis.[20]

In addition to this "pure" intelligence function, PWI performed a highly useful "output" function. That is, once policy had been set, there remained the problem of putting it into

words which the German audience would understand, and by which it would be affected. Words are the raw material of propaganda, and their effective use was the Sykewarrior's art and science.[21]

For example, an effective linguistic device for Sykewar was the use of the enemy's own words and phrases, within a context supplied by one's own propagandists. This was particularly useful on the radio, where it gave some Germans the feeling that their enemy was omniscient (and, possibly, omnipotent?).[22] There is evidence that some Germans were amused, bewildered, and sometimes even frightened by the rapidity with which Allied radio retold anti-Nazi jokes as they became current in some part of Germany.[23] For this sort of operation, Sykewar required intelligence reports that Rhineland Germans had taken to calling Nazi party functionaries *goldene Fasanen* (in addition to the older term *Bonzen*); or that in Berlin, Goebbels was commonly known as *Juppchen;* or that, on a more serious level, the pervasive counterargument that Germans were developing against Allied charges of German guilt was expressed in the phrase that they had been *belogen und betrogen*.[24]

Intelligence, as an aid to Sykewar operations ("output"), brought in both the German stories and the very words in which they were told. The value which output personnel put upon this type of intelligence is indicated by David Hertz, who was in charge of radio Sykewar against the besieged German garrison at Lorient:

> Our existence as a functioning tactical weapon depended on intelligence from prisoners. We ate, slept, and drank with prisoners. Many nights I was awakened by members of our crew dragging in deserters, who sat on my bedroll, dripping the waters of the river Scorff as they told us the latest Winchell dope on what went on inside the fortress.[25]

As the quotation above indicates, "output intelligence" was often gathered at the tactical level by members of the operating sections. The BBC, which laid more emphasis than other Allied stations on the exact German words, later in the campaign even took to sending out its own broadcasters equipped with portable recording machines. By this means they were able to record whole conversations with German prisoners and civilians.[26]

The increasing use of output personnel for this nominally intelligence function was due to two factors. First, the output sections often needed material in a hurry, and from areas where no PWI personnel was available. Therefore, they had to hustle and get the material for themselves. Second, the divergence of requirements for the two kinds of intelligence was often so wide that one section could hardly satisfy both completely.[27]

"Output" intelligence required stories and phrases whose accuracy mattered little, as compared with their verisimilitude. On the other hand, "pure" intelligence was exclusively concerned with accuracy. Its main business was to eliminate the obscurantist and atypical stories, to "see through" the dramatic and colorful aspects to what was accurate and representative. Since both of these functions were performed by the same PWI personnel, in the field and at headquarters, the effects often bordered on schizophrenia of the analytical faculty. The case was worse than the right hand not knowing what the left hand was doing; more often, the right hand was aware that the left hand might be doing something harmful, but had to let it continue doing so.[28]

One illustration will serve. The German decision to raise a *Volkssturm* (people's resistance) was a golden opportunity for Sykewar's output personnel. The prospect of an army of aged, infirm, and crippled being rushed to the defense of the Fatherland on crutches and stretchers raised limitless possibilities for jokes about "scraping the bottom of the barrel," for indignant attacks on the Nazi leadership responsible for such inhumanity to its own people, for stern admonitions to surrender quickly lest the whole German people be made to perish.

Dozens of stories illustrating such themes were received by PWI during the days following the creation of the *Volkssturm*. However, the first "pure" intelligence reports of the *Volkssturm* in action gave evidence that this might possibly be more than just an army of cripples which required an army of the Wehrmacht behind it to keep it in the combat zone. Our G-2 reports from Saarbrücken and other places also seemed to indicate at first that the *Volkssturm* was actually fighting.[29] What, then, was PWI to do? If it withheld the "output" stories, which clearly made good copy, the output sections would protest furiously. On the other hand, it was difficult to release these misleading stories for output when its "pure" intelligence task was

to inform Sykewar policy makers of the contrary state of affairs and advise against the use of such stories.

PWI finally slipped between the horns of this dilemma of dual functions by setting up at a separate headquarters two of its officers, Captain Adam Levengood and Marine Lt. Alan Magary, with the task of culling "output stories" from all the available material received daily at SHAEF.[30] The main attention of PWI could thenceforward be concentrated on its proper function of "pure intelligence."

3. *PWI Sources*

The sources of Sykewar Intelligence were as widespread as the fields of Sykewar interest. Since these interests ranged from the highest levels of international politics to detailed comparisons of intimate daily life in German and American homes, PWI had to be prepared to supply evaluated information on these matters. The great bulk of PWI effort, naturally, was directed toward presenting an accurate picture of life in wartime Germany.

For matters of general "background intelligence," PWI's sources were the normal sources of scholarly research—with the wartime supplements designed to keep the "background" up to date. The credit for heroic achievements in this field must go to the Political Intelligence Department (PID) of the Foreign Office. To check on the biography of a German whose record became of interest, PWI could supplement its copies of the standard *Wer Ist's?* with PID's more recent and pointed *Who's Who in Nazi Germany.*[31] In case the German's claim to fame was too recent even for its *Who's Who,* PID obliged harassed Intelligence sections by printing the relevant data in its periodical *Nazis in the News.* To check on the exact location of a given building in a given town, PWI could supplement its threadbare Baedekers with *PID*'s *Town Plans,* a series of volumes giving details of the terrain and layout of every major city, and many smaller cities, in Germany. Was the phone number of a certain German in Trier or Regensburg required? PID could usually supply the number or the appropriate telephone directory.

For "hard" information of this kind, the most difficult to come by in wartime and the most useful in giving the authen-

ticity of verisimilitude to propaganda, PID was a tower of strength and contributed to the reputation of British Intelligence. For "background" information of a more general and analytical nature, PWI could supplement the standard histories with PID's *Basic Handbook* and *Special Handbooks* on Germany. These *Handbooks* were a monumental labor, which brought together prodigious researches on key aspects of German history and social organization, with a view to illuminating the character of Nazi Germany in 1944-45. The *Basic Handbook* gave the history of Germany by geographical areas, based mainly on the Laender. The *Special Handbooks* each took up a specific aspect of German society. Farming, fishing, banking and finance, trade unions, police systems, industries (from textiles to pottery), resources (from coal to synthetic fertilizers)—all these matters, and many more, were reported clearly and authoritatively in single volumes of the series which PID, with characteristic British understatement, called *Handbooks.*

Up-to-date information in each of these fields was supplied by a multitude of daily, weekly, and monthly serials produced by various agencies of the British and American governments. No complete catalog of these wartime serials has been made, but their range can be indicated by the following highly selective list of "supplementary intelligence" serials, classified according to issuing agencies, which were most frequently used by PWI: [32]

SHAEF	PWD (Forward)	*Periodical Intelligence Digest*
	PWD (Rear)	*Intelligence Reports*
	PWD (Main)	*Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare. (This was the chief PWI publication.)*
	G–5	*Civil Affairs Weekly Field Report*
	G–5	*Weekly Intelligence Summary*
	G–2	*Weekly Intelligence Summary*
	G–2	*Fatherland*
	G–2 (CIC)	*Counter-Intelligence Periodic Report*
OSS R & A		*Field Intelligence Studies*
		Paris Intelligence Weekly
		European Political Report
WAR OFFICE		*Weekly Intelligence Report*
	MI–4	*Mitropa*
	MI–19	*Interrogation Report*
	PWIS	*Reports*

	DIC, MIS	*Detailed Interrogation Report*
	CSDIC	*Reports*
	Directorate of Army Psychiatry. *Morale Studies.*	
BBC		*Daily Digest of Foreign Broadcasts* (2 vols.)
FOREIGN OFFICE	RDFO	*Northern Region Intelligence Review*
	RDFO	*Weekly Political Intelligence Summary*
	PID	*News Digest* (printed daily)
	PID	*Daily Digest for Germany and Austria*
PWE		*German Propaganda and the German*
MEW (Ministry of Economic Warfare)		*Weekly Review*

The enormous volume of reports indicated by this selective list calls to mind the dictum of the German master of intelligence, Colonel Nicolai: "The value of an intelligence service can not be measured by its extent but only by its successes." [33] The quantity of Allied intelligence reports was undoubtedly excessive, and there was considerable duplication. However, most of the serials listed actually provided essential data on political, administrative, industrial, financial, and other matters relating to Nazi Germany.

PWI was not equipped to raise its own intelligence data on such key questions as "Pol" (the SHAEF abbreviation for petroleum products), or "secret weapons" (*Panzerfaust,* V-weapons, etc.), or the level of industrial production, or the state of battle in a given sector. Such matters, and particularly the German attitudes toward them, were of key importance to the output of Sykewar. On the basis of "hard" information supplied by other specialized agencies, PWI took up its proper function of discovering German attitudes by evaluating German opinions.

In a literal sense, everything was grist to the PWI mill. However, there were several main sources which regularly supplied the bulk of PWI intelligence. Apart from the "liaison intelligence" from other agencies listed above, the chief sources from which PWI drew its own data may be classified as follows:[34]

(1) German prisoners of war (POW's)
(2) German civilians

(3) Allied intelligence agents
(4) Foreign workers returned from Germany (FW's)
(5) Exiles and refugees from Germany
(6) German (and neutral) radio
(7) German (and neutral) press and publications
(8) Captured German documents

From the point of view of chronological availability, the chief sources of intelligence prior to D-Day were the radio, press, and publications of Germany (and neutral countries with regular German sources, e.g., Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey). From those sources, by the use of methods to be described shortly, could be pieced together a continuing picture of daily life in Germany.[35]

An additional source, prior to D-Day, were the refugees from Germany living in Britain and America. Their contribution to the general intelligence picture was limited, partly because their personal involvement with some aspect of the Nazi program tended to obscure their view of the whole. More important, the greater number of these refugees had left Germany years before the outbreak of war, and had been cut off from their sources of information inside Germany. Better current information was therefore available from Allied observers, particularly Americans who had remained in Germany between 1939 and 1941. (A large number of these Americans found their way into OWI and OSS, and thence into PWD.) However, from the refugees came the best information on the fields in which they were professionally expert. A former German physicist could testify on the state of scientific research; a former justice of the Prussian Supreme Court could describe Nazi changes in the German legal codes and their administration; former editors and publishers could give a fairly reliable account of the Goebbels Ministry and Hinkel's Kulturkammer, and the changes they had wrought in the German media of public information. These are examples of reports by exiles and refugees that were actually received by PWI and used in Sykewar.[36]

A third source of pre-D-Day intelligence was the Allied agents operating in occupied and neutral countries, principally those bordering upon Germany. The American agent apparatus was directed by the OSS, the British apparatus by PID (for the Foreign Office) and a special section of the War Office. No sober history of these organizations has yet appeared, but brief com-

ment on the usefulness of OSS to PWI can be made here.[37] These remarks should be read in the context that OSS was a pioneer organization, the first American attempt at an integrated and global apparatus of secret intelligence, and that the present discussion touches upon only one aspect of its multifarious activities around the world.

During the years 1942-44, the reports of OSS agents were a main source of regular information about current developments within Germany which did not appear in the German or neutral press. Even after D-Day, OSS remained an essential source, on which PWI (and SHAEF) depended for information beyond that available from its own sources. As such, the chief responsibility of OSS reporters was reliability. Yet, so far as PWI was concerned, they were largely a failure in this respect. The choice and important items of information they frequently produced were all but lost among the mass of "somewhat doubtful" half truths, irrelevant details, and misleading opinions which they reported.

Among their difficulties was one common to all secret agents —the unreliability of their own sources. OSS agents, like all others, bought information from "contact men" who reported to them regularly. Naturally, few "contact men" will pass up their weekly or monthly payments simply because they have no reliable information to report. They will sooner make up a story that sounds plausible. Other OSS contacts were among Germans, who, for business or other reasons, were permitted to travel in neutral countries. Such sources were not paid, and in principle their stories could be true or false, but not necessarily one or the other in any specific case. The same consideration applied to nationals of neutral countries who were permitted to travel in Germany. In these cases, the task of the field agent is to weed out, to the limit of his equipment, fact from fiction. Where ability to distinguish goes beyond his scope, he must provide higher headquarters with some basis for evaluating the information he reports.[38]

The OSS outposts made an attempt to provide a basis for evaluation. They stamped on each report a code symbol identifying the source (usually by nationality and occupation only), and evaluating his authenticity ("excellent," "usually reliable," "poor," etc.). Every intelligence officer familiar with the OSS modus operandi recognized that these symbols, if taken seri-

ously, could only mislead. Sources which seemed to a given OSS agent "excellent" frequently told stories which turned out—upon close inspection of inherent probability or collation with information from other sources—to be extremely unreliable. Apart from this device, OSS made little effort, so far as PWI could see, to separate fact from fantasy, and the great mass of undifferentiated reports continued in increasing volume throughout the war. These reports from "the Swedish haberdasher" and the "Ankara rumor-factory" became a standard joke among PWI (and among some OSS) personnel.[39]

With the invasion of Normandy, all these sources took second place. Here an enormous wealth of first-hand data became available. First of all, Allied intelligence pounced upon the "captured German documents." These included the secret orders issued by units of the German Army, confidential memoranda by high-ranking officers, diaries of all ranks, letters from soldiers to their families at home, and letters from civilians to soldiers at the front. Every conceivable subject of interest to Germans was discussed in this flow of "captured documents." They were particularly valuable to Sykewar because, when carefully analyzed, they were the most revealing evidence available on the "intimate" attitudes of Germans toward the war and its problems.[40]

Another flow of information, which began regularly with D-Day and increased to a flood by VE-Day, was from the German POW's. One American correspondent, who filed some of the less misleading stories on this subject, complained in the title of his magazine article that "German Prisoners Talk Your Ears Off." [41] For PWI purposes, this flood of words was of the highest value. This stream of information was thoroughly identified by source, place, date, and circumstances of utterance. Some of the data necessary to separate the true, false, and doubtful were thus available. Even more important, the data were available on the basis of which POW utterances, irrespective of truth or falsity, could be related to POW and, cautiously, German attitudes. A similar, although more limited, procedure was applied to the progressively increasing flow of words from foreign workers (e.g., returning from Germany to France) and from German civilians.

We turn now to an examination of the methods by which these sources were exploited, for a chief function of PWI was

to act as a filter. From the enormous mass of undifferentiated information which it received, PWI had to distill an intelligence picture which was clear, accurate, and useful.

4. *PWI Methods*

The three chief methods which PWI applied to its voluminous sources may be distinguished, for convenience of discussion, as qualitative, quantitative, and textual. These methods were used separately in the field, by the PWI personnel best qualified to use them, on the kinds of data best suited to their use. For the purpose of final analysis at SHAEF, as in the preparation of PWI's *Weekly Intelligence Summary,* the results obtained by all methods were integrated.

Qualitative methods were applied chiefly to the interrogation of single individuals. At the start, these methods were fairly random. That is, the individuals interviewed were not selected as representative, the questions asked were not identical in all cases, and therefore the results obtained could not be systematically collated for high-level analysis. As the campaign developed, however, the force of circumstances and the lessons of experience speeded adaptation of individual interrogation to Sykewar needs. Fairly rapidly it became evident that the most useful subjects for PWI purposes were "representative" individuals, those whose characteristics corresponded closely to some considerable segment of the German population. For example, a Bavarian farmer who was of Protestant faith would be less representative of his occupation and his area than a similar person of Catholic faith. On the other hand, as between two policemen from Magdeburg, the Protestant would be the more representative. But PWI did not, for this reason, eliminate the Bavarian Protestant or the Magdeburg Catholic as sources. For purposes of evaluation, it simply took cognizance that, in this respect, his testimony was less "representative."

The need for identical, or at least similar, questions to be used by all interrogators during a given period soon became pressing. From the start, the special PWI team ("Kampfgruppe Rosenberg") had operated with a basic questionnaire which was given to all POW's whom they interviewed. This was the famous "Dicks Questionnaire #3" (see page 121), the result of many months of laborious investigation by Lt. Col. Henry V.

Dicks, with the collaboration of Edward A. Shils in evolving the final form. This questionnaire, which is reproduced at the end of this chapter, even made it possible for PWI to quantify the comparable data from "qualitative" interviews and report it in a time-series running from D-Day to VE-Day (See Chart V, page 114). The application of this questionnaire produced the most systematic data contributed by PWI to the *long-run* interests of Sykewar policymakers.

After D-Day, the rapid sequence of events made it necessary to develop systematic methods of gathering information on matters of *current and pressing* interest. PWI did not have sufficient personnel to undertake the more elaborate, if more exact, methods of quantification to meet these needs. Some sample polling on current questions was done under the PWI aegis—initially by a team headed by Elmo Wilson, and for a longer period by a team consisting of Major Brice Gallie (British) and Corporal Max Ralis (U. S.).[42] However, for broader and quicker reports on pressing problems, PWI had to rely mainly on prolonged interrogation of individuals. The value of such qualitative reports could be improved by making them responsive to central direction.

Accordingly, fairly early in the campaign, PWI headquarters at SHAEF undertook to formulate a periodic "briefing" for the use of all interrogators in the field. This document explained the chief matters of current Sykewar interest, and indicated the lines along which field interrogations were to be made. Gradually the briefings were refined, as the result of studied efforts to harness intelligence reports to policy needs. The briefing became a regular weekly issue, in which current problems were succinctly outlined and a questionnaire was appended which contained a series of specific questions. Some questions were to be asked precisely as handed down to interrogators in the field, and in such cases the German version of the question was given. Some questions were not to be asked directly, and the interrogators were instructed to work out their own method of eliciting the desired information.[43]

For the purposes of systematic PWI analysis, this practice proved immensely valuable. A wide range of German opinions bearing directly on questions of immediate policy import was made available regularly. By careful classification of interrogees, and collation of responses within each category, it was possible

to gain reliable and useful insights into the trends of opinion among the social classes, geographical areas, and special population-groupings of Germany.

The system never worked perfectly. Some interrogators were less adept at selecting subjects, asking questions, and reporting responses than others. Further, the difficulties of communication between forward and rear areas often delayed field reports beyond the limits of their usefulness to PWI. But no system ever works perfectly in a war situation, and, within the limits indicated, qualitative analysis was probably the most fruitful aspect of the PWI operation for the daily guidance of Sykewar policymakers.[44]

As the campaign developed, some interrogators began to demonstrate unusual skill at "prolonged interrogation." This is a variant of the qualitative method, familiar to social scientists and psychiatrists as "the life history" or "the interview in depth." Its distinguishing feature is that it attempts to accumulate sufficiently detailed data from the subject to permit a reconstruction of his "personality structure." Subsequent analysis of such data, in the light of the subject's biography, and particularly his social-political environment, often produced insights yielded by no other method.[45]

The staff of PWI interrogators in the field included no professional psychiatrists.[46] It numbered historians and social scientists in abundance, including men of considerable professional standing. With little attention to formal techniques, and none at all to formal terminology, under field conditions that were often difficult and occasionally dangerous, these men developed the "prolonged interrogation" into a highly useful method. Particular merit attaches to the series of reports on "German types" which were produced by this method.[47]

Qualitative methods (unrelated interviews) could be applied to any isolated individuals—refugees, German or other civilians, prisoners. Quantitative methods, on the other hand, required a substantial number of people, homogeneous with respect to at least one relevant characteristic. During most of the campaign, the most relevant (and the only available) body of sufficient size were the German POW's. As a source of "samples," this body of POW's was in some respects a pollster's dream: It was conveniently gathered into large enclosures; it could be questioned whenever and as often as desired; it was more than

willing to talk; it was enormous in size; and it was sufficiently varied, within its homogeneity, to have provided "stratified" samples.[48]

Two considerations gave the dream some of the aspects of a nightmare. One was the lack of reliable census data on the German population, or even on the German army. In the absence of such data, any attempt at a "stratified" sample would have been meaningless, for a stratified sample exists only when the ratio of strata in the sample is in mathematically exact proportion to the ratio of strata in the population as a whole.[49] When the total population is not known, much less the ratio of strata within it, then clearly no stratified sample is possible. The most that PWI quantitative surveys could achieve, therefore, was reasonably "true random" and, most often, "random random" surveys.[50]

A second consideration was the unusual unreliability, for survey purposes, of the German respondents to PWI questionnaires. The probability that Germans, as an outcome of the Nazi decade, would exhibit a high factor of both conscious and unconscious suppression of freely given honest opinion has already been discussed. This factor was especially important among the German POW's, from the nature of their situation.[51] Qualitative interrogations could cope with the factor of unreliability by "probing" further into answers that seemed evasive, improbable, or false expressions of attitude. The "impressionistic observations" available to an interrogator who kept his subject under continuous scrutiny were, when used with discrimination, very useful in this respect.[52] For the quantitative survey, which was based mainly on written "yes-no" answers or brief categorical expressions of opinion, the problem of unreliability was more difficult. The normal corrective devices are certain statistical calculations for "probability of error" and the careful (ideally, "pretested") framing of questions. Since the slide rule was not available to PWI, and would have been little help in this situation, chief reliance had to be placed upon the intelligent formulation of questions. Chart V, page 114, shows some of the main questions and the method of tabulating responses.

PWI's quantitative surveys, therefore, like its qualitative "interviews in depth," operated somewhat in the rear of advanced scientific methodology and terminology. By the nature of the case, this had to be so. On the level of practical achieve-

ment, however, the PWI surveys represented by Chart V were among the historic first attempts by a military staff section to make systematic analyses of enemy morale on the basis of comparable data.[53] If they provided none of the high probabilities of stratified samples, at least they contributed continuous checks upon the "impressionistic" insights produced by the qualitative methods. Used together, prolonged interviews and sample surveys produced a fairly high order of intelligence data on morale.

The third main method used by PWI was textual analysis. Traditionally a characteristic method of historians and political scientists, this has more recently been developed as a method of philosophers (especially the "logical positivists") and social scientists (especially in propaganda analysis). Many variants of the method were employed by PWI, at the SHAEF level.

The aims of textual analysis may be described as twofold: (1) to establish accuracy in the documentary record; (2) to predict behavior from the documentary record. For the first purpose, the texts of captured German documents were subjected to careful scrutiny by an especially qualified "documents subsection" within PWI (and within most other intelligence sections which used these documents). Similarly, the texts of German radio and press releases were checked in the monitoring department of the BBC before they were released to the intelligence agencies which normally received them.[54] The second aim of analysis, the prediction of behavior, was really the crux of the PWI operation—"behavior" being understood as any course of action, reaction, or inaction. The key questions, against which every Sykewar policy had to be measured, were: How will the Germans react? What will this make them do, or not do? Before the end of the campaign, PWI had begun to learn how to make its sources yield data relevant to these questions. Individual interviews, quantitative surveys, captured documents, textual analysis—all these were "coordinated" so as to enhance the probable accuracy of Sykewar forecasts about German behavior.

In this connection, an especially interesting application of textual-analysis methods was the field of "propanal" (propaganda analysis). During the war, this was handled mainly as a subsidiary form of "news analysis." Everything that came from the German press and radio was subjected to analysis, for the light it would throw on German opinions, attitudes, and intentions.[55] Social scientists have brought the methods of propanal

CHART V. TRENDS IN WEHRMACHT MORALE, BASED ON WRITE-IN QUESTIONNAIRES

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Date of Capture		June 26–28 1944	July 1–17 1944	Aug. 1–10 1944	Sept. 1–10 1944	Mid-Sept. 1944	Mid-Oct. 1944	Nov. 15–30 1944	Jan. 1–14 1945	March 1945
No. of Prisoners		363	155	160	643	634	345	453	324	388
Place of Capture		Cherbourg	Carentan to St. Lo	St. Malo to Le Mans	Metz–Nancy Region	West Front	West Front	Aachen–Metz	West Front	West Front
QUESTIONS		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Do you trust the Führer?	Yes	67	57	68	65	60	42	64	62	31
	No	18	27	17	19	24	43	22	30	52
	No Answer	15	16	15	16	16	15	14	8	17
Do you think it is possible to eject the Allies from France?	Yes	42	37	49	27	—	—	51	39	10*
	No	38	49	29	51	—	—	30	47	83*
	No Answer	20	14	22	22	—	—	19	14	7*

Do you believe that Germany is winning the war?	Yes	—	—	52	38	46	28	50	44	11
	No	—	—	11	39	33	57	27	42	78
	No Answer	—	—	37	23	21	15	23	14	11
Do you believe that revenge will be taken against the population of Germany after the war?	Yes	16	13	36	28	21	18	—	—	—
	No	75	81	51	61	67	74	—	—	—
	No Answer	9	6	13	11	12	8	—	—	—
Do you believe that Germany still has war decisive "Secret Weapons"?	Yes	37	44	66	49	48	33	53	47	14
	No	35	37	15	37	32	52	29	40	77
	No Answer	28	19	19	20	20	15	18	13	9

* Question in March 1945: "Do you think it is possible to eject the Allies from Western Germany?"

Reproduced from M. I. Gurfein and M. Janowitz, "Trends in Wehrmacht Morale," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1946), p. 81. Original appeared in *Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare,* No. 25 (19 March 1945).

to an advanced stage of refinement within a comparatively short period.[56] The war gave an additional impetus to research in this field, particularly in the form of "content analysis" and its two main procedures of "theme analysis" and "symbol analysis."[57] Some applications of content analysis, far less rigorous than the methods which social scientists now designate by that term, were incorporated into the work of PWI and other wartime agencies performing propanal. Since the primary emphasis of PWI was not upon refining methodology, but upon achieving quick and useful results, here, as in the methods already discussed, PWI lagged considerably behind the most advanced scientific attainments. Often, indeed, methodology went begging while reliance was placed (as it had to be) on a shrewd inference or a sophisticated guess. Nevertheless, some notable successes were achieved.

It has been claimed, for example, that propanal alone (in this case a theme analysis) was responsible for an accurate British forecast that the Nazis were planning an early military action against Norway.[58] A PWI propanal (in this case a combined theme-symbol analysis) predicted, two days after the von Rundstedt counteroffensive started, in December 1944, that the German tactical goal was neither Liège nor Paris, nor any specific place, but simply to go as far as necessary to upset the stability of the Allied front and thereby delay a possible Allied offensive.[59] Because it came at a moment of considerable confusion and speculation concerning von Rundstedt's goal, and because of its tactical implications for the Allies, this propanal aroused unusual interest among military commanders.[60] Eventually this became the accepted view of the Allied High Command and was incorporated in General Eisenhower's final report (although there is no evidence that the propanal was responsible for this).[61] The value of such an analysis to Sykewar policymakers is evident when we recall their decision to make Sykewar output "commit" the enemy to take Antwerp. As Colonel Gurfein has pointed out, we were confident that he would fail in this "last attempt" and therefore, by committing him publicly to an objective he could not attain, we were raising German hopes which his failure would undermine.

For purposes of Sykewar output, PWI rarely made explicit predictions on any such direct basis as: if we tell the Germans such, they will do this; if we tell them so, they will do that. Such predictions would not only have violated the unwritten

Army warning against "sticking one's neck out," but would also have exceeded by far the canons of valid inference and scientific caution. PWI reporting, as will be shown in the section which follows, was much more modest.

5. *PWI Reports*

The PWI reporting system followed, in the main, the regular Sykewar "chain of command." That is, reports originated in the field and worked their way up the echelons of higher authority, one step at a time. At each echelon, the reports were used for whatever local purposes they served and then passed up, together with all other reports received from below, to the "next higher headquarters" until they reached SHAEF, which was the "supreme" level for intelligence reporting, as for other matters.

Original "morale interrogations," the core of PWI intelligence, were made by PWI personnel in the field and passed up to PWD/SHAEF through the PWI sections at Army and Army Group, after their contents had been noted for purposes of local Sykewar output. The lowest echelon at which PWI units were permanently established was Army Hq. Below this level, interrogators were sent into POW cages or captured towns alone, in teams, or as "PWB Combat Teams" attached to (or "on detached service" with) the tactical headquarters in whose area they were operating. Their reports, once received at SHAEF, were disseminated in their original form, or were collated with other reports on the same subject to make a "consolidated report" (e.g., on confidence in victory among junior officers, on the progress of Nazi evacuation measures in the Rhineland, on increased signs of anti-Nazi sentiment after Allied bombings).

The transmission of captured enemy documents to PWI was made through liaison with the special "documents channel" organized through the G-2 chain of command. PWI maintained liaison with the G-2 documents sections at all levels, and particularly effective work was done by the PWI "documents team" installed at the headquarters of G-2, SHAEF, with access to the whole Allied haul of captured documents. These were selected, serialized, evaluated, annotated, summarized in English, and disseminated to all operating sections of Sykewar. Some indication of the volume and value of the documentary reports made

by this PWI team, headed by E. G. Kingsley, is given by the check list of short titles in the Bibliography.

Other PWI reports were based on intelligence obtained by liaison. One PWI officer, Major Eric Fontaine, regularly assigned to liaison with SHAEF G-2, prepared a daily and weekly analysis of the combat situation, for Sykewar purposes, based on G-2 information about order of battle, enemy capabilities and intentions, etc. Two other PWI officers, Lt. Alan Magary (USMCR) and Capt. Adam Levengood, were quartered at SHAEF Forward, after this headquarters moved from Versailles to Rheims, with the task of reducing all incoming reports to a daily digest adapted to the "output" needs of Sykewar.

From a variety of other sources, mentioned in a preceding section—from London and Washington, from OSS and PID, from the Mediterranean, and even the distant CBI theater—came a steady flow of reports originating outside of PWI and SHAEF. But for the agile work of Sgts. John Fisher and Charles Chapman, assigned full-time to the receipt and distribution of reports, the flow would have inundated the small group of analysts whose task it was to produce the major PWI report—the *Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare.* This *Summary,* which was edited from its first to its last issue by the present writer, was, throughout most of its life, the work of the same few men. Its main task was to sift the mass of incoming data, to separate the relevant from the irrelevant and the probable from the doubtful, and to integrate what remained into a cogent, reliable, and readable summary of the week's intelligence "for psychological warfare." The *Summary,* which was published in 37 weekly issues from 1 October 1944, to 11 June 1945, consisted of three basic sections written throughout the campaign by the same three men: (1) German Home Front (Lerner); (2) Battle Front (Fontaine); (3) Wehrmacht Morale (Janowitz). During the early months, a fourth section on France (Derry-Shaver) was published. With the complete liberation of French territory, this section was dropped. A new fourth section was added many months later, bearing the discreet title "Broadcasts of Our Russian Allies To and About Germany" (Behr-Lerner). These analysts were in constant touch with one another, and the final version of controversial points usually was worked out in discussion among the writers and the executives of the section, Colonel Gurfein and Michael Balfour, before the

Summary was "put to bed." The methods by which this handful of men converted the enormous influx of data from PWI and outside sources into a weekly *Summary* should be noted. They were rough-and-ready methods, often applied "intuitively," but they helped to produce a report of fairly high quality.

The main tests applied to non-PWI data were the reliability and heterogeneity of their sources. A source was considered to be reliable when the information it provided regularly turned out to be accurate, unreliable when its past performance did not justify confidence in its accuracy. Ideally, in an intelligence operation, sources should be ranked on a calibrated scale of reliability to enable all analysts to assign identical weightings, and thus objectify "confidence." In practice, this was hardly feasible at PWI, where the handful of analysts dealt with an enormous volume of reports, many of them from irregular and nonrecurrent sources. Since, by virtue of their limited number, these same analysts were able to maintain constant intercommunication and thus "talk out" questionable sources on specific issues, the need for formally stated criteria of reliability was not urgent.

The criterion of heterogeneity, which is a function of both the number and variety of sources, is usually (even under optimum conditions) a broad rule-of-thumb rather than an exact measure. It asserts that the probability of accuracy for any specific item increases with the number of different sources which independently report it as accurate. As the number of reports received at SHAEF increased, PWI found this criterion of accuracy increasingly difficult to apply. Reporters untrained in scholarly and scientific techniques would habitually "lift" passages from other reports without identifying their source. The result was that the reporting system at SHAEF occasionally took on the viciously circular character of an unintentional rumor-factory. PWI analysts frequently found their material reproduced elsewhere in identical form, but without mention of its true source. To the unwary reader of both reports, these sources would seem to confirm, rather than merely duplicate, each other. To guard against this practice—and to protect its prestige—Colonel Gurfein eventually affixed to the PWI *Summary* a legend requesting that all quotations therefrom be identified by source "to avoid the dangers of a false confirmation."

To the data supplied through its own channels, which con

sisted mainly of interrogation reports, PWI applied the tests of *frequency* and *direction*. In analyzing the vast flow of German verbalizations, PWI wanted to know, with respect to key issues, the answers to two questions: (1) Were more or fewer German soldiers and civilians paying more or less attention to—i.e., saying more or less about—any given issue? (2) Was their attention, whether more or less in frequency, increasingly favorable or unfavorable in direction to the Allied or Nazi presentation of this issue?

Since the Sykewar battle, as we have seen, was for the German focus of attention, the PWI criterion of *frequency*—the volume and variety of German attention—was of considerable importance to Sykewar policymakers. This type of evidence was their most reliable way of knowing whether they were reaching the German audience on issues they considered important. The test of *direction*—the polarizing of German responses into favorable or unfavorable—gave Sykewarriors some clues as to how effectively the Germans, once their attention was gained, were being persuaded to accept (or behave in ways favorable toward) Allied views on these issues.

The overall objective of these analyses, as of the whole PWI effort, was to provide Sykewarriors with current and accurate information on the shifting attitudes and behavior of "Hitler's Germans." This kind of information, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter, was what Sykewarriors most needed. Knowledge of the attitudinal structures and opinion changes among any propaganda audience is important because, it is generally recognized, propaganda is most likely to evoke a desired response when it stimulates a predisposition in the target to make such a response. This was, in fact, a basic Sykewar assumption.[62] PWI's main contribution, therefore, was to provide the makers of Sykewar policies with continuous descriptions of the changing predispositions in the German target. Each of these descriptions, as can be seen from Chart V, contained an implicit prediction about the probable effectiveness of any related propaganda policy. For example, if PWI analysis of the frequency and direction of German verbalizations showed an overwhelming and tenacious "loyalty to Hitler," to Sykewar policymakers that description of "predisposition" implied a prediction that direct propaganda attacks on Hitler would probably be ineffective. Thus PWI's descriptions of German predispositions, inso-

far as they were heeded, were the basis for the selection and formulation of propaganda themes, which are central to propaganda content. In this respect, the PWI summary of German predispositions will be examined in the next chapter as a key to the course Sykewar followed.

STANDARD FORM,
PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION NO. 3*
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION

Name _____
Rank _____
Unit _____
Job in Armed Forces _____
Former Occupation _____
Region of Origin _____
Place of Residence _____
Age _____
Education _____

Personal History:
Interrogator's estimate of POW reliability _____
Military career and experience _____
Circumstances of capture _____

Allied Propaganda (contact & reactions):
Leaflets _____
Radio _____

German Propaganda _____

Attitude towards "Last Ditch Warfare" _____
_____

Outcome of War:
Germany wins _____
Stalemate or compromise _____
Doubt _____
German defeat _____
No opinion _____

*Attitude towards Allied Occupation*_____

Specific concerns:

Revenge against civilian population — yes____ no____

Looting, destruction of property, rape — yes____ no____

Unemployment — yes____ no____

Lack of food — yes____ no____

Post-War Expectations:

Germany destroyed as state_____
Resurgence of Nazis_____
Reasonable democratic regime_____
Communist state_____
No opinion_____
Personal fate?_____

Attitude towards National Socialism:

Complete faith_____
Belief with reservations_____
Doubt_____
Rejection_____
Unpolitical_____
No opinion_____

Attitude to Hitler Personally:

Strong devotion and uncritical approval_____
General approval though admitting errors_____
Doubt_____
Strong hostility_____
No opinion_____

*Attitude to Other Nazi Leaders, including Lower Party Functionaries*_____

War Guilt:
Nazis, not German people
Leaders and people
Allies guilty
Other (specify in comments)

No opinion

Feeling of Political Responsibility:
Politics should be left to those on top
Feels own responsibility, but German people not capable
Feels own responsibility, and also German people capable
No personal responsibility, favors German democracy
Other (specify in comments)

No opinion
Not covered in interview

Fear of Ill Treatment as POW's:
Fear
Uncertain
No fear
No opinion

Attitude to Senior Leaders:
Trust
Doubt
Mistrust
No opinion

Attitude to Immediate Officers:
Devotion, trust
Acceptance of authority
Doubt
Mistrust, contempt
No opinion

Reaction to Allied Weapons

Service Conditions (food, health of unit, mail, types of reserves encountered, etc.)_____

*Rivalries in Wehrmacht*_____

Home Front (underground opposition, foreign workers, family life, morale effects of air raids)_____

*Additional Observations, Comments, and Suggestions*_____

*Signature of Interrogator*_____

*Date of Interview*_____

*Place of Interview*_____

* This is the "Dicks Questionnaire No. 3," which Dicks brought to its final stage as a "structured interview" susceptible to quantification, in collaboration with Edward A. Shils. It was authorized for PWI use in POW enclosures on the Continent by Colonel Gurfein. It was administered mainly by the Special PWI Team at SHAEF ("Kampfgruppe Rosenberg"), and their results were tabulated and evaluated by Morris Janowitz.

(The form actually used by PWI was five pages long. This has been compressed for reproduction here by eliminating the blank spaces left for recording responses.)

Chapter 5. Notes

1. S. K. Padover, *Experiment in Germany*, p. 3.

2. For example, no satisfactory solution has yet been worked out for the persistent "problem of the thousand yards." What, PWI always wanted to know, was the mechanism that operated to distinguish the German POW who had crossed to our lines from the German soldier who, only a thousand yards away, continued to fight on his own lines? The answer to this question was essential for a proper evaluation of POW data in terms of the morale of soldiers who continued to fight. Upon this appreciation depended our ability to translate intelligence data into guidance for Sykewar policy and operation. PWI produced many illuminating analyses, but it was never able to develop thoroughly satisfactory studies on such problems. Only now, five years later, have former PWI personnel begun to develop detailed analyses of the plausible hypotheses on this problem suggested during the war. See Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer 1948), p. 280.

3. *History: Publicity and Psychological Warfare* (no place or date of publication), p. 211. This record of 12th AG Sykewar operations was edited mainly by Gordon H. Cole, its Deputy Chief of Operations, under the authority of Colonel Clifford R. Powell, the Sykewar Officer at 12th AG. It is cited hereafter as *History: P & PW.*

4. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War,* p. 51.

5. *Ibid.,* p. 51.

6. L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, *The Measurement of Attitude* (Chicago, 1929), p. 6. For a more recent critical review, see Quinn McNemar, "Opinion-Attitude Methodology," *Psychological Bulletin* (1946), Vol. 43, p. 289.

7. The difficulties of precise attitudinal analysis are acknowledged by every student, particularly those who specialize on the propaganda aspects. One study calls the measurement of relations between propaganda and attitudes "the question which is central in the minds of scientific students of the communication process." B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, and R. D. Casey, *Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Reference Guide,* p. 121. See the section in that volume on "Measuring Relations Among Content, Predisposition, Response," pp. 365-377.

8. H. V. Dicks, *Psychological Foundations of the Wehrmacht* (Directorate of Army Psychiatry, Research Memorandum No. 11/02/9A, Feb. 1944), p. 24.

9. H. L. Childs, *An Introduction to Public Opinion,* p. 42.

10. An illuminating general treatment of this point in relation to the attitudes involved in war is *A Social Psychology of War and Peace* (New Haven, 1943), M. A. May.

11. D. V. McGranahan and M. Janowitz, "Studies of German Youth," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 41:1, 3 (January 1946). This article by two Sykewarriors, which summarizes PWI studies made soon after the surrender, points out that: "The validity of information derived from anonymous questionnaires administered by U. S. personnel in Germany may be called into question. There is no doubt that, on a number of topics, the youth answered with an eye cocked on the American eagle. The results, particularly on the more direct questions, must therefore be viewed with this fact in mind."

12. Otherwise one is guilty of "the most dreadful weakness," which Lord Vansittart describes, of "settling the issues of life and death for millions without either knowing or feeling the need to know the relevant facts." *Bones of Contention* (New York, 1945), p. 38. Vansittart levels this accusation specifically against Sykewar in his pungent, if somewhat misleading, discussion.

13. Sections 12 and 13 of the *Standing Directive* (see Appendix B) are explicitly a summary of intelligence estimates for Sykewar purposes.

14. These points can be documented by casual inspection of U. S. press comment throughout 1940-42.

15. This extremely important assumption made on the basis of von Arnim's collapse is given in the *Standing Directive,* Appendix B, Section 12 (VIIa).

16. Cf. Hans Speier, "War Aims in Political Warfare," *loc. cit.*, pp. 157-180.

17. These examples show the importance of intelligence data which PWI obtained, by liaison, from outside sources. The first illustrates the constant need for intelligence on "Enemy Order of Battle," which was supplied by a special subsection of G-2 at each echelon. The second illustrates the usefulness of daily surveys of German and neutral press and radio sources.

18. These are selected examples of questions on which PWI actually provided continuous information. They can be studied in detail in the PWI files available in The Hoover Library.

19. Special files on these problems, under the heading "Foreign Workers in Germany, 1944-46," have been collected (by nationality) in The Hoover Library.

20. In the absence of a descriptive literature on the applicability of this point to Sykewar, see the extensive literature on its applicability to peacetime mass media. The most systematic work has been done for radio, e.g., P. F. Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page* (New York, 1940).

21. Eric Boden, "The Raw Material of Radio," *Hollywood Quarterly* 2:4, 393-400 (July 1947).

22. "The nuances of German phraseology employed frequently were tested by presubmission to friendly prisoners of war." *History: PWD,* p. 32.

23. Cf. R. T. Colwell, "Radio Luxembourg Uses Jokes As Propaganda Against the Nazis," *Life* 18:17-18 (5 March 1945).

24. The PWI aspects of this point are discussed in detail in S. K. Padover, *op. cit.*

25. David Hertz, "The Radio Siege of Lorient," *Hollywood Quarterly* 1:3, 293 (April 1946).

26. Detailed accounts of this method are contained in reports written by the broadcasters after their return. These reports have not been published, but were kept in the offices of the BBC at Bush House, Aldwych, London.

27. "In the gathering of material for output, there was probably a certain amount of lost motion. This was because the men who were writing the output did not have direct control over the activities of the men who were gathering the material, nor did the Intelligence Section have any direct control over the Output Section. It is probable that collection of material for output purposes might be done more efficiently by 'legmen' whose only purpose is to act as reporters for output." *History: P & PW,* p. 215.

28. The *History: P & PW* concludes gently: "A separation of straight intelligence was not possible during the campaign, but should certainly be given serious consideration by anyone fighting another propaganda war...," p. 215.

29. A large file of intelligence reports on the *Volkssturm* is available in The Hoover Library. The file contains specimens of both the "output" stories and the "pure intelligence" reports.

30. The results of their efforts were published as: PWD/SHAEF (Forward), *Periodical Intelligence Digest.* (A nearly complete file of this publi-

cation is in The Hoover Library, as is the publication of similar purpose and title issued by P & PW, 12th Army Group.)

31. Fairly extensive collections of all the PID documents mentioned are in The Hoover Library. It is likely, however, that the only complete collections are in the Research Department, Foreign Office, Whitehall, London.

32. Files of each of these documents, in varied stages of completeness, are in The Hoover Library. It is quite possible that complete files of all these titles no longer exist anywhere.

33. W. Nicolai, *The German Secret Service* (London, 1924), p. 225.

34. Compare the list given in the *History: PWD,* p. 29.

35. Max Seydewitz, *Civil Life in Wartime Germany* (New York, 1945). This is a good example of the use of German press sources, on a nonsystematic basis, for this purpose. An important exception to the statement above was the work of Dicks, which was based both on documents and on interrogations of captured German airmen, submarine crews, and prisoners from North Africa.

36. These reports are in The Hoover Library.

37. Several journalistic accounts of OSS operations have appeared, as, for example, C. Ford and A. MacBain, *Cloak and Dagger* (New York, 1946) and Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, *Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage* (New York, 1946). A. W. Dulles' *Germany's Underground* confines itself to a limited aspect of OSS Swiss operations and is mainly a political tract.

38. All accounts of agents and espionage work must be read with considerable skepticism, but nearly all discuss the unreliability of their sources. The rash of spy stories which followed World War I has not yet occurred this time. Cf. Kurt Singer, *Spies and Traitors of World War II* (New York, 1945).

39. The foregoing account of OSS intelligence goes as far as it is now possible to go. All activities of OSS were classified and, until their files are declassified, no complete account may be published. It seems likely that none will be published.

40. On the historic "newness" of this type of material, see the *History: P & PW,* p. 211.

41. E. O. Hauser, "German Prisoners Talk Your Ears Off," *Saturday Evening Post* 217:12-13 (June 1945).

42. For a survey of such materials, see H. L. Ansbacher, "Attitudes of German Prisoners of War," *Psychological Monographs* No. 288 (1948).

43. The increasing restriction of their activities by these briefings was distasteful to some PWI interrogators in the field. Their view is expressed in a letter from a former interrogator:

> From time to time the interrogator received pointers as to what kind of intelligence was considered most vital by headquarters. He consequently steered the interrogation in the desired direction. But finally he received so much poop as to what to ask the prisoner that he did not know what to ask first.

Letter from Charles Weston to this writer, deposited in The Hoover Library.

44. The final results of these analyses are available in PWI's *Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare.*

45. Striking applications of this technique, relevant to PWI purposes, have been made by Harold D. Lasswell. See his *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1930), especially Chapters 6 and 7. See also his *Power and Personality* (New York, 1948), especially Chapter 4. For a lucid analysis of this technique as actually used by various social scientists, see John A. Dollard, *Criteria for the Life History* (New Haven, 1935).

46. A team of British psychiatrists, headed by Lt. Col. H. V. Dicks, from the Directorate of Army Psychiatry (War Office) did work together with PWI (Rear) in London, and later made some brief studies in the field, under the PWI aegis, to supplement its data. Their main findings are summarized in the next chapter.

47. These are on file in The Hoover Library. Their chief author, Dr. Saul K. Padover, has summarized his experience in *Experiment in Germany.* Dicks used the more systematic techniques of psychiatry in prolonged interviewing of POW's and in "screening" anti-Nazi personality types. This work proved so fruitful and promising for occupation purposes that, after the Anglo-American SHAEF dissolved, Colonel Gurfein called to the PWI staff Dr. David M. Levy, an American psychiatrist, who organized a "personality screening center." This is described in a file of ICD/USFET reports available in The Hoover Library, and in Dr. Levy's *New Fields of Psychiatry* (New York, 1947), Chapter 10. See also the book by Dr. Levy's successor: Bertrand Schaffner, *Fatherland* (New York, 1948). See also David Rodnick, *Postwar Germans* (New Haven, 1948).

48. The general principle of stratified sampling is summarized in the few paragraphs which accompany all reports issued by the National Opinion Research Center, now in Chicago.

49. Cf. Stuart C. Dodd, "On Reliability in Polling: A Sociometric Study of Errors of Polling in War Zones," *Sociometry.* For summaries of specific polls in the Mediterranean Theater by Dr. Dodd, consult files of the American Documentation Institute, especially ADI Documents 1817-1818.

50. Some of the unavoidable gaps in our data are indicated by officers charged with evaluating Wehrmacht morale:

> Professional statisticians would certainly be amused at the prospect of being called upon to draw a representative sample of the enemy army from prisoners of war. The exact size and composition of the enemy army was unknown, nor could it be assumed that all those taken prisoner were equal in fighting quality to those who were not captured.

M. I. Gurfein and M. Janowitz, "Trends in Wehrmacht Morale," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1946), p. 79.

51. See Note 11 in this chapter.

52. See Padover, *op. cit., passim,* on this point.

53. See M. I. Gurfein and M. Janowitz, *loc. cit.,* p. 79. A serious attempt at systematic analyses of enemy morale was made by American intelligence during World War I, but apparently limited itself to establishing simple ratios between other single factors and civilian morale, and did not con-

sistently use "comparable data." See G. C. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918* (Palo Alto, 1938), especially the chart on p. 192.

54. Copies of the PWD "captured German documents" files are in The Hoover Library, classified under the code symbols: DE, S, SM, SR, PID.

55. For this purpose, the two admirable summaries produced daily by the British served as chief sources: *News Digest* and *Daily Digest of Foreign Broadcasts.*

56. The course of this development can most easily be studied in the files of the *Public Opinion Quarterly.* Most useful is the recent volume by Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and Associates on *The Language of Politics* (New York, 1949).

57. The prime mover was Harold D. Lasswell, who directed the Experimental Division for Study of Wartime Communications at the Library of Congress. An intensive application of such methods to German propaganda was made by the Research Project on Totalitarian Communications at the Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, New York City. See Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, *German Radio Propaganda.*

58. Cf. E. T. Lean, *Voices in the Darkness.*

59. A copy of this document is in The Hoover Library. Incidentally, the *History: PWD,* p. 33, erroneously states that "no attempt was made by the Intelligence Section to cover propaganda analysis." In addition to occasional propanals like the one mentioned above, PWI's *Weekly Intelligence Summary* carried a regular section analyzing Soviet propaganda to the Germans through most of 1945. All of these are in The Hoover Library.

60. This writer prepared the propanal under discussion. It was based on a comparative analysis of German leaflet, press, and radio announcements for the troops, for home consumption, and for Allied consumption during the two days following the counterattack. On the day after it appeared, the Commanding General of PWD notified PWI that several staff sections of SHAEF had asked for a daily propanal of this type, and that PWI was to prepare these.

The sequel to this "order" illustrates the earlier point about the "civilian" atmosphere of PWD and the importance of the "social science temperament" in PWI. Realizing that its method was far from foolproof, PWI deliberately refrained from issuing a daily propanal. In fact, only one more appeared, and that carefully refrained from making any predictions. PWI guessed that this less dramatic report would lessen the interest of staff officers not qualified to read a propanal with the caution it required. This proved to be the case.

61. In order to fully appreciate the desperate risk which the enemy undertook in making this venture it must be recognized that he aimed his blow, above all, at the will of the Allied Command. If he could weaken our determination to maintain that flaming, relentless offensive which, regardless of his reaction, had carried us from the beaches to the Siegfried Line, his sacrifice would not be altogether futile.

Report by the Supreme Commander. . . , p. 75.

62. The *Standing Directive* (Section 4), Appendix B, states: "It is recognized that in the execution of Psychological Warfare it is a fundamental principle not to antagonize the audience. Direct denunciation or direct offence against known susceptibilities will therefore be avoided in all Psychological Warfare. . . ." The *History: PWD,* p. 23, puts this view even more bluntly: "One leaflet or one broadcast . . . will never, save in exceptional cases, achieve the end of causing a soldier to desert *unless he was nearly of a mind to do it anyhow.*"

Chapter 6

TARGET GERMANY: THE SYKEWAR PUBLICS

1. *The Special Problem of Nazi Germany*

NAZI GERMANY, just before the Normandy invasion in June of 1944, presented a very special problem to Allied Sykewar—the problem of the totalitarian state. Political "totalization" of Germany during the preceding decade had prepared it effectively for the requirements of military "totalization." None of the Western Allies had been so well prepared by its peacetime social structure for transition to total war with a minimum of frictions. The differences are revealed by comparison of German and Anglo-American theory and practice of psychological warfare.[1]

For Sykewar the difficulties posed by a totalitarian "target" ranged from the technical problems of merely getting our propaganda into Germany to the most delicate considerations of policy. On the technical side, the situation was this: The Nazis had completely monopolized the channels of communication in Germany. That is, all news printed or transmitted in Germany had to come from a single central source or be cleared by that source. Since this central source was controlled by the Goebbels apparatus, with the clear purpose of eliminating news items considered "undesirable," Sykewarriors were deprived of an important channel for distributing Allied propaganda in Germany. In the United States, by contrast, any press or radio agency was free to pick up and use news items released by DNB or Transocean, the Nazi news agency especially designed to send Nazi propaganda into foreign countries.

Since Dr. Goebbels had thoroughly "purified" the editorial personnel of all news channels, he could be fairly certain that cooperation on the local level would prevent infiltration of the Nazi news channel either by deviationists or by journalists unwittingly making use of Allied news distributed through the

neutral countries. In the United States, by contrast, the use of news items released in Sweden and Switzerland was fairly common, and often gave free publicity to Nazi views "planted" in the neutral press and radio.

This control of all German news at the source deprived Sykewar of an important weapon—the transmission of Allied news and commentary through German channels for Sykewar purposes. In World War I, Allied propagandists had made much use of their leaders' pronouncements on such themes as the rights of self-determination, peace with justice, and the Fourteen Points of Wilson.[2] In World War II, Sykewar use of such pronouncements as the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations, etc. was eliminated by enemy controls (as well as by Allied directives). The favorable slant which Allied propaganda could have given these themes was eliminated in favor of the slant provided by Dr. Goebbels. Every Allied pronouncement of this sort was thoroughly "diabolized" before it was released to the Germans.

Nazi control of the important fields of press, magazines, books, films, and newsreels was almost complete.[3] The one channel which, at this time, excluded absolute control was radio. But even here the Nazis severely limited the effectiveness of Allied broadcasting by the early manufacture and cheap distribution of the *Volksempfänger* (People's Radio), which carefully limited reception in Germany to frequencies used by Nazi-controlled stations. This boomeranged later in the campaign, when the Allies captured Radio Luxembourg, western Europe's most powerful transmitter, which had been counted as a Nazi-controlled station and therefore got perfect reception on *Volksempfänger* sets, particularly in the western areas of Germany. But the Nazis compensated for this sort of leakage by increasingly severe and frequent punishments for "black listening," i.e., to forbidden stations like BBC and Radio Lux. Late in the war, the Nazis even used a wired radio-transmission system *(Drahtfunk),* which "broadcast" through the German telephone lines, thus preventing the Allied monitors from hearing what was being said.

In the standard media, therefore, Sykewar was severely restricted as regards the civilian population. Its audience was composed of the "illegal" listeners it could attract to its radio programs, plus whatever curious or hardy individuals could be

counted on to pick up and read leaflets and newspapers dropped by Allied bombers. These were peculiarly nonstandard modes of dissemination, and this unfamiliar character of its channels operated to restrict the size of the Sykewar audience. The channels to German civilians improved, and the audience increased, as Allied troops progressed across France. Disappearance of the Luftwaffe made leaflet drops easier; capture of Luxembourg opened a strong new radio weapon; increasing proximity to Germany brought our smaller transmitters within range; Allied capture of printing and paper establishments on the Continent facilitated quicker and greater production. Most important, the worsening military situation and the weakening of effective controls caused more and more Germans to turn to Allied news sources.

For tactical Sykewar operations against the Wehrmacht, the situation had been somewhat more favorable from the start. Tons of leaflets and newspapers could be shot over the enemy lines by artillery pieces, whose accuracy guaranteed less wastage than the early efforts of aircraft. Air-drops to soldiers could be made with fewer hazards than were presented by the strong anti-aircraft positions that ringed German cities. The German soldiers opposing us were always closer than the civilians in the interior of the Reich. Those with receivers thus could easily tune in our local radio programs, and all soldiers could hear the direct broadcasts addressed to them from our mobile loudspeakers, which sometimes operated within a few hundred yards of the enemy's most advanced positions.

The difficulties of sheer physical communication with the Germans, although enormously complicated by totalitarian control of their channels, were steadily (though never wholly) overcome. The difficulties of psychological communication with the Germans were even more complex, for these involved considerations far more subtle than the engineering problem of physically reaching the audience. A totalitarian state is also a "police state." It authorizes police supervision over all aspects of the life of its subjects. The apparatus we had to reckon with in Germany included, besides an expanded version of the normal police forces of modern urban society, the SD (*Sicherheitsdienst* of the SS), the Gestapo, and the Party structure—all designed to keep the population of Germany, from the single city block to the Party Chancellory, under constant and fairly close surveil-

lance. The existence of this apparatus for a decade before we landed at Normandy presented us with the following odd situation: *There was no articulate opposition in Germany.*[4]

Since a major effort of strategic sykewar always must be to foster internal disruption, by playing off opposition groups against the elite and one another, the fact that the active opposition in Germany had been killed or imprisoned in concentration camps considerably limited Sykewar's scope. Unconditional Surrender prohibited Sykewar from exploiting internal dissensions by promises to dissidents, but it was the absence of organized dissidents which limited such Sykewar activity by means other than promises.

To begin with, from the propagandist's point of view the people in concentration camps were hardly more useful than those already in their graves. They received no newspapers or broadcasts, except via the camp bulletin or loudspeaker. Even if Sykewar propaganda should reach them, as in a few isolated cases it did, they could not as a result be influenced to take any concerted action that might help destroy the enemy's will-to-resist. They were unarmed and starved, and therefore incapable of any active resistance to the Nazis; further, they were isolated and therefore could not even weaken the morale of other Germans by spreading rumors.[5]

At the other end of the scale from the prisoners were the police, and in the Nazi state this included all persons who regarded themselves as ideological defenders of the new order. Those not in police uniform acted as informers and psychological defenders; those in uniform made the arrests. Altogether, this group of "hard-core Nazis" was moderately estimated at 10 percent of the German population, and every reasonable test put them beyond the reach of our propaganda, psychologically even more than physically.[6]

The largest group of Germans contained mainly those who were later to make themselves notorious as *unpolitisch* and *kleine Leute.* These were the average people, including the nonpolitical, who constitute the chief target of Sykewar in any country. The Nazi program of *Gleichschaltung* (psychological coordination) not only had neutralized potential opposition, which is in varying degree the effect of war in every country, but had compelled the average man to support the regime, even if in only the mild form of frightened silence.[7]

This, briefly, was the composition of the "police state" which Sykewar was to disrupt. It posed two large questions for Sykewar, and particularly for the PWI analysts charged with describing the "predispositions" in the German target. First, which were the vulnerable points in the psychology of these *gleichgeschaltet* people, and by what means could they be reached?[8] Second, having found the vulnerable points and the means to reach them, in what way should Sykewar be conducted so as to produce results more fruitful to its mission than the occasional incarceration or death of a few Germans who had been moved beyond discretion by our propaganda?[9]

The answers which Sykewar's policymakers formulated to these questions produced results which in retrospect may seem startling: e.g., a propaganda campaign against one of the world's most highly politicalized nations, in which politics played an almost negligible role. In part, as we have seen, this orientation was a consequence of Allied war policy, and particularly of the basic war aim of Unconditional Surrender. In large measure, too, these Sykewar policies derived from the PWI picture of changing attitudes and predispositions among the Germans who composed Sykewar's target. In this case, audience ("to whom") exercised an influence as potent as policy ("why") upon the flow of Allied symbols to Germany. Policy defined the limitations, i.e., what Sykewar could *not* say. Audience determined the themes, i.e., what Sykewar in fact *did* say. We turn, then, to a more detailed account of the German publics which composed the Sykewar target.

2. *Composition of the Audience*

The idea that "all Germans are alike" may have had some value as a morale weapon at home. As a guide for Sykewar, it was useless. For purposes of persuading the enemy, it was obvious that among Germans there were differences important enough to make repulsive to one group the very appeals that were attractive to another group. Allied propagandists to Germany, like propagandists everywhere, had to cope with the existence of "multiple publics" within the given "target."[10] Stated another way, Allied propaganda was directed against all of Germany as "the enemy." This common characteristic was sufficient to distinguish Germans from, say, Belgians. It was

not sufficient, however, to distinguish groups *among* Germans whose differences from one another, for Sykewar purposes, often were decisive.

In order to make valid distinctions, several kinds of "pure" intelligence were required. A wide range of useful distinctions, known commercially as "market" and "audience" research, was produced by the type of intelligence designated as "target research." [11] In this field, PWI sought answers to such questions as: how many German radio sets, capable of receiving Allied signals, were in operation in any given area at any given time? how many sets were actually being used to receive Allied broadcasts? which broadcasts? by which Germans?

Precise information of this type constitutes the main basis on which all mass media form accurate estimates of the size and composition of their audiences. Market research in the United States has grown to a considerable industry on which the mass media spend many millions of dollars annually.[12] Sykewar did not have millions available for this purpose, nor could PWI have done much better if millions had been available. The circumstances of war make it difficult to use "areal" or "quota" sampling, telephone interviews or other such techniques of peacetime research, on the enemy audience. This lack of accurate information meant that frequently PWD had no clear idea of how many, and what sorts of, Germans were receiving its propaganda. A former Sykewar broadcaster has recalled that the Radio Luxembourg staff, depressed by their ignorance of the audience to which their efforts were addressed, would "sometimes talk wistfully" of inserting in their broadcasts to German soldiers this simple announcement: "In surrendering, please mention our program." [13]

Constant efforts were made to assess the Sykewar audience. The approximate base figures for most estimates were those issued in 1941 by the German statistical journal, *Wirtschaft und Statistik,* shown in Chart VI, page 137. The BBC, mindful mainly of its own customers, issued a periodic *European Audience Report,* which provided more current information.[14] PWI made continuous surveys of German prisoners, to determine the range and character of German exposure to leaflets and radio. However, the results of such surveys perforce lagged several months behind the period surveyed, and never were

clearly applicable to the nonprisoner audience or to the German audience as a whole.[15]

Nevertheless, if PWD could rarely describe the audience which was listening, it did have in mind a fairly clear picture of the audiences to which it was speaking. The overwhelming fact about Sykewar's German target was the existence of the Nazi dictatorship. "Nazism" conditioned every decisive area of

CHART VI. EUROPE'S LISTENERS

A survey of the number and distribution of listeners was given in the German paper *Wirtschaft und Statistik* in August 1941. No allowance is made, of course, for unregistered listeners, but in most countries the existence of listening bans could have little effect on registration, which had been carried out beforehand. Poland is excluded, on the legal ground that no one of Polish nationality might own a set. The figures in brackets refer to 1940, the others to 1941.

	Radio Listeners in Thousands	*Radio Listeners per Thousand Inhabitants*
Sweden	1,470.4	230.8
Denmark	863.4	224.6
Great Britain	(9,132.2)	(190.3)
Greater Germany (including Austria and Sudeten district)	14,880.0	194.7
Netherlands	1,440.6	160.8
Switzerland	637.6	150.8
Iceland	18.3	149.7
Norway	429.4	145.2
Belgium	(1,148.7)	(136.8)
France (excluding Alsace Lorraine)	5,133.0	128.1
Finland	348.5	89.1
Eire	179.6	60.3
Hungary (New Area)	609.9	44.7
Slovakia	83.0	31.3
Italy	1,400.0	31.2
Roumania (New Area)	244.3	18.3
Portugal	98.0	12.8
Bulgaria	83.0	12.4
Spain	281.4	11.0
Turkey	91.2	5.1

Chart reproduced from E. T. Lean, *Voices in the Darkness* (London, 1943) p. 240.

social life, and with it every German had to make a more or less conscious accounting. For this reason, the basic Sykewar analysis of its German "publics" was in terms of their various accountings with Nazism. From their responses to the Nazi stimulus, Sykewar forecast the probable reactions of different German groups to various Allied propaganda themes.[16]

The most significant single contribution to the Sykewar analysis of German political attitudes in terms of personality types was made by the British Lieutenant Colonel H. V. Dicks.[17] The basic document to be consulted is his "Psychological Foundations of the Wehrmacht," issued by the Directorate of Army Psychiatry (British) in February 1944, as "Research Memorandum No. 11/02/9A." On the basis of statistical analysis of POW interrogations, supplemented by documentary materials, Dr. Dicks established the following five categories of response to Nazism among German males of military age: [18]

(1) fanatical "hard-core" Nazis (10%)
(2) modified Nazis "with reservations" (25%)
(3) "unpolitical" Germans (40%)
(4) passive anti-Nazis (15%)
(5) active anti-Nazis (10%)

These figures were regarded as only approximate, particularly since they were based wholly on samples of the younger and more active segment of the male population. It was considered that a distribution of the total German population, including a higher proportion of the older men and all the women, would probably show a relative increase in the doubting, disillusioned, apathetic, and unpolitical groups.[19] In any case, these groups, arranged in terms of decreasing adherence to Nazism, were conceived as interlapping by degrees into one another, rather than as fixed and immutable categories.

One great value of this analysis was that it supplied a context within which the old pre-Hitler political and social groupings could be translated into terms applicable to the Nazi period. Thereby it reduced the approach to Germany from the level of irrelevant dispute over "good" and "bad" Germans to terms useful for propagandists who had to prepare the leaflets and broadcasts which were sent, day after day, into Germany. Only bare indications can be given here of the rich and detailed "translations" made by Dr. Dicks. His elaboration of the five categories listed above may be summarized briefly as follows: [20]

(1) *"Hard-core" Nazis (10%):*

(a) *Idealistic Zealots*—Included most of the better-educated Nazis. Many of these were persons of metaphysical tastes "ready to defend even their [the Nazis'] most shameful acts by some high-falutin' argument which is always ready at hand." This group was variously illustrated in the Nazi leadership by Rudolf Hess and Alfred Rosenberg.[21]

(b) *Party Toughs*—Included most of the Nazis from lower social levels. Together with some pure gangster types, these were probably "not devoted to the cause so much as to the gang and its activities and chained to them through a sense of comradeship in guilt, excitement and adventure." Represented in the hierarchy by the archetype Julius Streicher and Robert Ley. (These first two groups compare roughly with the "armed bohemia" which Konrad Heiden considers to have been the backbone of the Nazi movement.)[22]

(c) *Concealed Fanatics*—Included the inconspicuous, and often middle-aged, Germans "with a private fantasy world into which the Nazi ideology and practice of brutality fits as a perfect expression of a thwarted and distorted mentality." The type was illustrated in the leadership by Heinrich Himmler, who became conspicuous mainly by converting his private fantasies into public practices.

(2) *Modified Nazis (25%):*

(a) *Pseudo-Doubters*—Included the type of person who, after capture, "declares that he has never really been a very keen Nazi, is loud in his condemnation of certain features of Nazi policy, such as atrocities or anti-Semitism, and who will nevertheless defend the regime as a whole. . . . He takes for granted the authoritarian attitude towards life." The nearest approximation to this attitude-model among the defense pleas of high Nazis at Nuremberg was that of Hans Frank.[23]

(b) *"Idealists"*—Somewhat sobered by encounters with the facts of Nazi politics, "these people often take the view that the Nazi movement and the Führer were the gifts of God, whose original glorious visions fallible men had not been able to carry out. . . . These people are sometimes found already searching for a new type of idealism, not very different from the one with which they have become disappointed."[24] Among Nazi leaders,

certain characteristics common to this group were strikingly exhibited by Baldur von Schirach.

(c) *Cynics*—These were beneficiaries of the Nazi regime who felt that "having burnt their boats, they must sink or swim with the Party. These men are likely to become renegades when they see that the prospects are hopeless." The Nazi figure commonly associated with this type is Hjalmar Schacht.[25]

(3) *The Unpoliticals (40%):*

This largest group among the German prisoners could be broken down into social classes more precisely than any of the others. Dicks analyzed the group into the following components:

(a) *Rural population*—Numerically, this group corresponded almost exactly to the German rural poulation, and "on the whole it is found that peasants, agricultural labourers, and other country dwellers of similar social status in fact make up the majority of this type. These are men who are concerned mainly with private aims and interests: family, livelihood and homestead." [26]

(b) *Village artisans*—These small-town or village craftsmen represented the typical old-world German who religiously "sticks to his last," unconcerned and largely untouched by political issues.

(c) *Minor officials*—"Mainly concerned with security of job and pension . . . likely to work faithfully for any authority . . . at bottom typical civil servants playing safe."

(d) *Professional soldiers*—These were chiefly the "time-serving" senior noncommissioned officers, who shared the concern of minor officials for security of job and pension. Included also were the professional soldiers and officers whose primary loyalty was to the Wehrmacht (in the tradition of the old Reichswehr), and who kept aloof from politics.[27]

What all the classes within this group had in common was an extreme compulsion toward security and orderliness. Private economic and family interests heavily outweighed the appeal of public and political interests. Members of this group were less likely than others to be stirred by flaming appeals—Nazi appeals little more than Allied. On the other hand, they believed in obedience to orders and a contented faithfulness to any regime which was helpful to them. The Sykewar intelligence data on this group is rich and varied. It was largely from

this group that the cry first arose which was soon to be heard by Allied interrogators all over Germany: "Ich bin nur ein kleiner Mann." [28] Nazism maximized such privatization.

(4) *Passive Anti-Nazis (15%):*

(a) *Disillusioned idealists*—These people at first were attracted by the fine words and sentiments of the Nazis. Subsequently, they were repelled by the violent practices which belied the words, by the broken pledges which strewed the Nazi road to war, and by the Nazi failures in the war. "Wir waren belogen und betrogen" was the slogan of this group. Later it became almost a national hymn.[29]

(b) *The Middle-Aged*—These were mainly people who had struggled unsuccessfully to "make a living" and "live a normal life" during the Weimar Republic. Many of them turned to the Nazis in despair as the only way out of economic chaos and the danger of Bolshevism in Germany. The Nazis had brought not stability, but war. "Die alte Ruhe ist hin" was a characteristic phrase of these people.

(c) *The Very Young*—This curious group was composed of youngsters who had "missed the excitement of the early years of the Nazi struggle for power." To them the Hitler Youth had become drill and duty, with little compensating fun. The clearest expression of this view was the disaffected youth group in the Rhineland known as *Edelweiss-Piraten,* whose dissidence clearly turned toward romantic rather than political forms of activity.

(d) *The Opportunists*—This group included a section of the officers' corps and their social peers, who once accepted Nazism from purely self-interested and career-making motives, and later found themselves in danger of losing all status. Some of these were "sympathizers with the abortive putsch of July 20th, whose motives for opposition are no higher than identification with their caste." [30]

(5) *Active Anti-Nazis (10%):*

(a) *Political Anti-Nazis*—These had to be distinguished in terms of their positive political beliefs. Studies of German prisoners had shown that anti-Nazism in itself, whether on political or other grounds, usually was not a sufficient common denominator for concerted political action. It was not sufficient, in any

case, for purposes of judging what types of Sykewar themes would be effective. Dr. Dicks distinguished:

(I) *Nationalist Conservatives*—Composed mainly of people with upper-class or upper middle-class background, this group rejected Nazism as a petit bourgeois mass movement. Frankly reactionary, this group was favorably predisposed toward the British as representing an aristocratic tradition and more successful *Herrenvolk,* but pretty clearly scorned the concept of democracy as advanced by the Allies.[31]

(II) *The Centrists*—These were men, largely from the Rhineland, who had retained belief in "certain conservative decencies of political life" as expressed in the former Catholic Center Party (*Zentrum*). Bruening had remained their political hero.

(III) *The Democrats*—These were remnants of a pulverized working class movement. Included were limited numbers of educated men who had retained loyalty to moderate liberal and socialist concepts.

(IV) *The Communists*—These men, under constant danger from the Nazi security police, were forced to operate in tiny groups of from 3 to 4 members. With many of their top leaders in Moscow, and with only an erratic intercommunication system, their main problem was survival. Some of their wartime converts, and particularly such undisciplined "sympathizers" as Harro Schulze-Boysen in Berlin, displayed a characteristic and melodramatic tendency toward recklessness.

(b) *Religious Anti-Nazis*

(I) *Roman Catholics*—In addition to the political Centrists just mentioned, a limited number of Catholics derived their active anti-Nazi inspiration from antagonism to Nazi views on education, marriage and family, and Roman Catholicism.

(II) *Evangelicals*—For reasons similar to those just mentioned, some active anti-Nazism was encountered among members of the Confessional Church (headed by Pastor Niemöller), Apostolic Church, Adventists, Baptists, and other small sects. "These men were often characterized by a fairly violent nationalism and fanaticism for their own point of view." [32]

(c) *Individualists*—The common factor among this group was "a sound and cultured family background," of the sort which raises individuals capable of forming intelligent, far-seeing, and decent views in the light of commonly accepted civilized stand-

ards. "Among this type have been found some intellectuals and artists, the larger type of peasant farmer, businessmen with wide experience of foreign countries, and their sons." [33]

This was the general picture, based on surveys of German prisoners in Allied hands, which Sykewar elaborated during the European campaign. It helped to distinguish the "multiple publics" within the German target, and supplied some clues for estimating the probable effects of specific themes among the various German groupings. Naturally, these "types" and "models" constructed by Dr. Dicks were subject to deviation in specific cases, and had to be continuously scrutinized in the light of fresh intelligence. (The methods by which PWI did this were described in Chapter 5, and some of the variations are indicated in the final section of this chapter.) [34]

There were, too, numerous criteria other than response to Nazism by which the German publics could be distinguished. Of these, undoubtedly the most important was the extent of direct daily involvement in the conduct of the war. The most convenient dichotomy in this respect was that between German soldiers and civilians. The distinctions between these groups, as Sykewar targets, are detailed below.

3. *The Wehrmacht as Target*

All generalized distinctions between segments of a given population must be regarded with some skepticism, and perhaps none more so than the distinction between soldiers and civilians in modern war. Modern mass armies are characteristic of the societies from which they are drawn, and, in basic patterns of response, soldiers express the values of their societies as clearly as their civilian compatriots.[35] Under the impact of modern military technology, moreover, the old notion of the valiant soldier sacrificing all to protect the sheltered women and children at home has weakened considerably. The development of "strategic bombing" has made war more dangerous for women and children in key cities than for soldiers garrisoned in small towns.[36] Artillery and tanks endanger civilians in the battle zone far more directly than soldiers at the service and command echelons in the rear. Finally, most armies in World War II were probably better fed and better clothed than their civilian compatriots.

Nevertheless, the mere fact of military status still serves to distinguish soldiers from civilians. The symbol of the uniform—which denotes the duty of bearing arms, the forced submergence of personal identity and freedom, the transfer to separate legal status under military law—becomes a symbol of cohesion among all its wearers and of distinction from all nonwearers. We have seen how the uniform divided soldiers from civilians in Sykewar's own organization. Among Germans, this was an even stronger psychological factor with which Sykewar had to reckon. Some of the special characteristics of the Wehrmacht, which distinguished its members from German civilians as targets of Sykewar, are discussed in the *Standing Directive* (see Appendix B). The sources of strong Wehrmacht morale vis-a-vis Allied Sykewar were outlined in the *Directive* as follows (Section 12):

(1) Habit of discipline
(2) Comradeship
(3) Professional pride
(4) Material interests [37]
(5) Bolshevik bogey
(6) Expected rewards of victory in the West

On the other hand, certain weaknesses in Wehrmacht morale vis-a-vis Allied Sykewar were also discernible (Section 13):

(1) Shaken myth of invincibility
    (a) Doubts about the Führer
    (b) Doubts about equipment
    (c) Doubts about the news
    (d) Doubts about the Luftwaffe
(2) Manpower
    (a) Worries about foreigners in the ranks
    (b) Worries about lack of effective reserves
(3) A war gone wrong
(4) Loss of honor—increasingly uncomfortable awareness of:
    (a) atrocities, especially in Russia
    (b) hostility of occupied countries
(5) Respect for the Western powers
(6) Shadow of the two-front war

This list indicates that Sykewar made few absolute distinctions between German soldiers and civilians. These matters were more central in propaganda to soldiers because they figured more prominently in the daily focus of attention among soldiers. Hence, it was calculated, reactions to these situations in

the Wehrmacht would be more pointed and pervasive than among civilians, who were more directly concerned with such matters as shortages of food and clothing, black-market prices, and avoiding the compulsory labor services.

One situation, however, sharply distinguished some soldiers from all civilians—the combat situation. The soldier in combat is a very special "public" for Sykewar. The general patterns of behavior he has acquired in home, school, and society often are inadequate to enable him to cope with the special stimuli of battle. Military training is designed to equip him with more appropriate responses, but even these are often insufficient in combat, and particularly in defeat. For military training in most mass armies, as in the Wehrmacht, is based mainly on the offensive and victory. For obvious reasons, relatively little effort is made to provide soldiers with responses appropriate to the circumstances of defeat. The importance of this situation for sykewar lies in the paradox that defeat, in the nature of the case, presents much more difficult demands upon the psychological apparatus than victory.

Confronted with this situation, Sykewar formulated its theory and practice regarding propaganda to the soldier in losing combat with a clarity and consistency attained in none of its other operations. This can be discerned, for example, in Sykewar operations designed to induce surrender of specific German units in a losing situation. Here Sykewar made a sharp distinction between the "commander in person" and the "main body of troops." The bases of the Sykewar approach to German commanders were described clearly in the PWD Staff study entitled "Psychological Warfare Operations against German Army Commanders to induce Surrender" (3 November 1944). This document is discussed in Chapter 10, and the full text is reproduced in Appendix C.

The Sykewar effort to induce surrender among the "main body of troops" in a losing unit was based on special considerations. A consistently winning combat unit is usually a high-morale unit. Its losses of men are comparatively few, and replacements are readily available. Its lines of communication are firm, which means a regular supply of food, equipment, and letters from home. Each victory breeds new confidence and hope in further victories. In a consistently losing combat unit, all these conditions are reversed. Losses mount and replacements

seem never to come. Letters, food, and essential equipment are in short supply or nonexistent. Loss of confidence becomes cumulative.[38] The sustained and increasing pressure of discomfort, doubt, and fear raises tensions among soldiers in the losing unit to the level where the demand for release becomes urgent. This feeling spreads from soldier to soldier, and the mechanisms for inhibiting this demand begin to collapse. As the available alternatives vanish, the Sykewar suggestion that surrender is the easiest or the only way out becomes increasingly plausible and attractive to the German soldier.[39]

It is important to note that the Wehrmacht made a sustained effort, during the latter part of the war, to provide German soldiers with psychic defenses in a losing situation. The most important device used in this connection was the soldier's oath of "loyalty to Hitler." So long as the Wehrmacht was winning or holding its own, this oath strengthened the fellowship of German soldiers on the tactical level; but when defeat and retreat became chronic, the loyalty oath was too frail a mechanism to repress the demand for, among other things, survival. Two former PWI officers, who have made a systematic study of the disintegrative elements in the Wehrmacht, give the following account:

> One of the most elaborated aspects of soldierly honor as related to combat behavior dealt with the conditions under which surrender could be honorably performed. In this respect, great stress was laid on the oath which bound soldiers not to desert or surrender, and much casuistical effort was expended to make surrender compatible with soldierly honor. In some cases, soldiers arranged circumstances in such a way as would appear to others, as well as to themselves, that they had been captured against their will. In other cases, surrender was excused as legitimate according to accepted military standards. In a few cases, fortification commanders required that a token round of phosphorus shells be fired against their position in order to satisfy the requirements of their honor. Deserters often attempted to appease their conscience by ingenious arguments to the effect that the oaths which they took were signed with pencil, or that the sergeant who administered the oath turned his back on them, or that they had been forced into signing the oath which was incompatible with the "requirements of a free conscience." [40]

Various other techniques were tried, late in the war, by the OKW (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*) to reinforce soldierly superegos which had been inadequately prepared for the strain of a constantly losing situation. Noteworthy among these was the establishment, after the putsch of July 20th failed, of a special "Guidance Officer" system. These were the NSFO's (*Nationalsozialistiche Führungs-offiziere*), operating via an independent chain of command which enabled them to spy on the generals and "pressure" the soldiers. Such efforts to maintain morale in a losing army, however ingeniously contrived, could be expected to bring only limited successes. As Hans Speier has pointed out:

> Morale is a function of a situation in which human impressibility and propagandistic attempts to make use of it are only two elements among many. The effectiveness of propaganda is by no means determined merely by the skill with which it is conducted, but depends also on the responsiveness of the public, which in turn depends on various elements, including objective facts.[41]

The objective facts which confronted the German soldier during the final year of the war gave little aid to Wehrmacht efforts to bolster his morale. The facts were on the side of Allied Sykewar.

4. *The Home Front as Target*

Among the various publics that composed the German home front, there was no group which presented Sykewar with so clearly defined a target as the German soldier in combat. The nearest civilian approach to such a target was any group of Germans caught in an Allied air raid. Here, for the duration of the raid, Sykewar could reckon that the diverse traits of the individuals involved had been subsumed temporarily under some general reaction (e.g., fear, anger), and that their social status had been reduced to the common denominator of the air-raid shelter. However, this group homogeneity imposed by Allied bombing was only transitory and offered only limited possibilities for exploitation by Sykewar.[42]

In consequence, Sykewar propaganda to the German home front was mainly "strategic," as compared with the "tactical" propaganda directed against the German combat soldiers. The differences in detail between these two approaches will be

described in the next chapter, but it may be noted here that strategic propaganda concerns itself with the longer-term causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. With such an approach the interests of larger and more varied publics could be reached, and the lines of political differences among Germans could be crossed by Sykewar.

Sykewar's political distribution of the German population, summarized earlier in this chapter, indicated how various social classes were aligned in terms of attitudes toward Nazism. This distribution was made from samples which excluded women, and Sykewar never undertook a comparable study of the political attitudes of German females. The evidence was fairly clear, however, that their responses to Nazism, with the exception of the not inconsiderable group whose devotion to Hitler apparently derived from sexual motivations, were similar to those of their men. Dr. Dicks summarized the female position thus:

> With the exception of a small educated and intelligent minority, the vast mass of German women has acquiesced in the status assigned to them by the men in this very patriarchal nation. Accordingly, they have found their main fulfillment in devotion to home duties and, looking up to their lord and master, have accepted his political views. . . . It is likely that on the whole the women will be divided into roughly the same classes as the men.

During the months after D-Day, the evidence available to Sykewar showed that politics had become a very minor item among the preoccupations of German women. No simple generalizations could be valid for the whole sex, which comprised over 50 percent of the total population. In terms of age group and social class, their attitudes corresponded roughly to those of the males.[43]

The most important group were the housewives and mothers. These had suffered much greater emotional loss and, in many cases, more severe material hardship than the men. Dr. Dicks wrote:

> War-weariness, difficulties of catering [i.e., housekeeping], death of sons and husbands, separation through evacuation, and the general impoverishment or even loss of domestic life, are likely to have induced a fairly violent swing towards disillusionment and apathy.

The factors which were complicating the life of the German housewife and mother were present, increasingly after D-Day, among the whole civilian population. Daily life for the Germans had descended from the high pinnacle attained in 1940-42, when, with their great victories just behind them, they commanded the territories and wealth of Europe, and the future looked bright. By 1944-45, victories had turned to unrelieved defeats; each day was a battle for a share of ever-shorter food and supplies; each week brought forth some new demand for ever-longer hours of work and service.[44] Invasion of the homeland threatened from all sides, and the future looked hopeless. There were important fluctuations in the attitudes of German civilians between D-Day and VE-Day, but the prevailing trend was declining morale.[45] The evidence supported Dicks' forecast of what the Allied armies would find in Germany:

> The great mass of civilians and ex-soldiers of maturer years will suffer from profound war-weariness and stunned apathy. Malnutrition and overwork will be only two factors in a mental depression, in which anxiety, loss of national pride, and complete disillusionment with the leadership will vie with material loss and bereavement as chief causes.

5. *"Special Publics" in Germany*

There were in Germany two large population segments which presented Sykewar with quite "special" problems. One of these was composed of forced laborers of non-German nationality, who had been brought into the Reich mainly by coercion.[46] These laborers numbered among them twenty-odd nationalities and an infinite variety of social backgrounds and personality traits, but all of them were commonly designated by Allied intelligence as "Foreign Workers" (FW's).

The second such "special public" consisted of the inmates of Nazi prisons and concentration camps. This group included Germans as well as non-Germans, criminals as well as political prisoners. Its social strata ranged from the very lowest to the very highest reaches of European society—at Buchenwald, for example, from the depraved habitual criminals to such Frenchmen as Léon Blum and Julien Cain, such Czechs as Klement Gottwald and Richard Blank, such Germans as Werner Hilpert and Eugen Kogon. Among the inmates of Buchenwald was even

such a representative of European royalty as the Italian Princess Mafalda.[47]

A third group continually made claim to be "special." These were the anti-Nazi Germans, who stayed inside of Germany but outside of concentration camps. The size, composition, and activity of this group have been a matter of loud controversy, particularly since the end of the war. The validity of their claims can be examined after the first two groups have been described in greater detail.

(1) *Foreign Workers*—An exact count of FW's in Germany, by nationality, was not made until after VE-Day and the demise of PWD. Early estimates, based on the information that the Wehrmacht had evacuated 12 million Russians to Germany during 1942-44, were found to be too high.[48] Later estimates placed the total number of FW's of all nationalities in Germany at approximtely 12 million. Account was taken, too, of the large number of foreigners serving in the Wehrmacht and in separate military formations (e.g., Vlassov's Army). Accordingly, a more reliable estimate of the importance of FW's in the German economy was reached. From the estimate that, by May 1943, native German workers numbered only 18-19 millions, FW's were calculated to compose 25-40 percent of the total labor force in Germany.[49] This was corroborated by an outstanding research agency on European population data, which concluded in 1944 that "at the time of writing perhaps one-quarter of the German labor force comes from outside the national boundaries." [50]

Even at this more modest figure, the FW's in Germany were an enormous population segment, which might have been expected to play an important, if not decisive, role in overthrowing the Germans they presumably hated. Sykewar, however, was able to make practically no "tactical use" of the FW's. It was all Sykewar could do to help the military "contain and control" this mass of people, whose potential explosive power was incalculable.[51]

There were several reasons for this, first among them the difficulties of simple communication with the FW's. The initial problem was to determine where specific language-groups were located. This problem was "solved" by printing leaflets and newspapers in a half-dozen European languages, one of which most literate FW's could read, and by repeating radio announce-

ments to FW's in all these languages.[52] The next problem was how to transmit printed or broadcast announcements to the FW's, the majority of whom were housed in barracks and huge camps, with no communication facilities save those provided and controlled by the German camp administration. During the combat period, this difficulty was never adequately solved.[53]

Problems of high policy were also involved. Assuming that Sykewar's message could be transmitted to the FW's, there was a grave question about what that message should be. Should the FW's be urged to turn against their German oppressors? It was feared that this might lead to massacres, in which the FW's might well suffer more than the Germans, and which the Allies might not be able to bring under control. Even if the Anglo-Americans had been willing to risk this, it was quite likely that their Allies, such as the French and Russians, with whom they were bound by high political considerations to clear their decisions, would have refused to consent to turning into slaughter-houses the FW camps occupied by their own nationals.[54]

The basic Sykewar message to FW's, after considerable fumbling on the policy levels, became the instruction to stay put and await liberation, victory, and repatriation. This policy decision was based partly on the political considerations just mentioned, partly on an awareness of the condition of the FW's themselves. An enormous number of FW's had worked a 10-12 hour day, with one day off every two weeks, during most of their stay in Germany. Their rations during this period, especially for the *Ostarbeiter* (Russians, Poles, and other Slavic FW's), had been miserably inadequate.[55] Added to their physical debilitation was a high degree of neuroticism, expressed in such forms as exaggerated worries about their status in their home countries and (partly a result of long subjection to the incessant propaganda of Nazi superiority) unreasoning fear of the Germans.[56]

Given all these factors, Sykewar chose what seemed to be the only feasible line. With the decision to "contain and control" the FW's, however, it should be noted that Sykewar wrote off their possible contribution to the main Sykewar mission—to undermine the enemy's will to resist.

(2) *Concentration Camps*—These Nazi institutions were commonly known as "Kz," an abbreviaton of the German "Konzentrationslager."[57] No accurate count of their inmates has been,

or ever will be, made. The Nazis kept their crematoria running on a full-time basis, buried the ashes, and in most cases were agile enough to destroy their lists of the dead before the Allies arrived.[58] The Kz inmates of main interest to Sykewar were the political prisoners. Whatever their differences, which in many camps were extremely serious, they were all anti-Nazi and, in this sense at least, pro-Allied. By temperament, they were a group hungry for news and ideas, in whose lives radio and newspapers had always played an important part.

One of the most dramatic stories of how an anti-Nazi cell was organized within a Kz illustrates this hunger for outside communication, particularly among the political prisoners. This became part of their fantasy world. A former inmate of Lager Börgermoor recollects how the Communist-led group initiated its control over all anti-Nazi forces in the camp by simulating an outside radio broadcast, after "taps" one night. Their spokesman, muffling his voice in his blanket, commenced with the announcement: *"Achtung! Achtung! Hier ist der rote Sender. . . . Genossen, von heute Nacht ab wird der rote Sender regelmässig zu Euch sprechen."* This device aroused such interest among the other prisoners that the Communist "coup" was accepted without challenge and the "rote Sender" became the main channel by which the Communist "leadership" announced their news and instructions to their followers.[59]

Some indication of the role played by sykewar in filling this need is given in the following passage by Dr. Eugen Kogon, a veteran of several Kz camps. His book *Der SS-Staat* is the best social analysis of the Nazi concentration-camp system which has yet been published:

> Knowledge of foreign radio reports spread a little further in the course of time. Not to fall either into useless depressions or futile illusions was of the greatest importance. One had to get news, therefore, about the situation in Germany and in the world. The kaleidoscopic information brought into the Kz's by newcomers from all near-by nations was collected, utilized, and passed on to the men concerned by the leading political forces (so that sometimes a truer picture was gained than most Germans on the outside could get). These were effectively supplemented by listening in to foreign broadcasts. The organization of this illegal news service was of course extremely difficult and dangerous. Central places of this kind in most camps were

> the construction offices and the electricians' workshops. The prisoners taking over the task of listening in reliably and regularly were in constant danger of death. Although in Buchenwald no one ever met his death on account of "black listening" (*Schwarzhören*), in other camps like Dora and Sachsenhausen dozens of comrades were hanged for this offense. . . . In the last critical weeks everything depended for us on getting reliable information about the situation at the front, so that we could decide upon adequate measures in due time. We listened in to "The Voice of America" and "Soldatensender West," to take shorthand notes of the news of importance.[60]

Yet this group, despite its superior political intelligence, organization, and integrity, also had to be written off for Sykewar purposes. More overworked and less fed than the FW's, the inmates were further weakened by constant exposure to weather, night drills, floggings, and other devices used by the Nazis. As a result, their physical condition was dreadful and their psychological condition, it hardly seems necessary to add, was extremely unbalanced. Finally, they lived within high, electrified barriers, surrounded by SS guards and police dogs, and a false step detected meant immediate death, or worse. Clearly, Sykewar could count on these men for only slight contributions toward undermining the enemy's will to resist.[61]

(3) *German Resistance*—The myth of an anti-Nazi German resistance was born before the war in the minds of Germans abroad, and largely, interesting to note, in the minds of anti-Nazis who had fled Hitler.[62] Since the war it has been revived by a number of publicists, whose purpose is transparently political, not historical.[63] Because the problem of a German "resistance" has often been confounded with meaningless disputes about whether or not there are "good Germans," the analysis here outlined may be clarified by the following propositions:

(a) There are undoubtedly "good Germans," the number of them depending upon the test of virtue used.[64]

(b) There were certainly a substantial number of Germans with strong anti-Nazi inclinations—probably some 10 percent of the total population, as indicated earlier in this chapter.

(c) There were even a limited number of active anti-Nazi groups, such as the Schulze-Boysen group in Berlin.[65]

(d) None of these statements is equivalent to the statement that there was a "German resistance."[66]

The term "resistance," as it was applied to Norway, France, and other European countries during World War II, signified a mass movement that engaged in overt operations designed to help overthrow the Nazis and their indigenous collaborators. No such movement existed in Germany. There was, in fact, only one group for which the status of a "resistance movement" has been claimed—the 20th of July conspirators; and the claim has been elaborated publicly by only one Allied figure of importance—Allen W. Dulles. Since Dulles himself indicates that, by calling this "conspiracy" a resistance movement, he is mainly trying to encourage living anti-Nazis, we may avoid beating a dead horse of terminology and indicate the importance of this distinction for Sykewar purposes.[67]

Each of the genuine European resistance movements worked more or less closely with the Anglo-American command. When this command became SHAEF, liaison with the resistance movements was a regular part of its functions. Because all these were mass movements, PWD, which operated the "mass media" for SHAEF, maintained a constant communication of news, ideas, instructions, and encouragement to all their members.

The 20th of July conspiracy had no mass base. It neither wanted nor received Allied ideas and instructions, for it showed no intention of destroying the Nazis under Allied orders and subject to any terms the Allies might later clarify. This was the basis on which all the genuine resistance movements elsewhere in Europe cooperated with the Allies. The 20th of July conspiracy, on the other hand, apparently wished to overthrow the Nazis in advance of the Allies, and thereby be in a position to negotiate with the Allies on the basis of its own terms.

For Sykewar purposes, a clique is a far different "target" than is a mass movement. A clique such as the 20th of July conspiracy is, properly speaking, not a Sykewar target at all. The *ex post facto* claims that the "German resistance," of which the July 20th conspiracy was the outstanding illustration, constituted a "special group" to which Sykewar should have devoted itself thus seems absurd. For there was no such "group" in this sense.[68]

Chapter 6. Notes

1. The general theory of "total" control of Germany's channels of communication is best studied in the writings of Hitler and Goebbels. A legion of Nazi theoreticians echoed them. One important supplement to Goebbels,

by the chief of Nazi radio, is Eugen Hadamovsky, *Propaganda und Nationale Macht* (Oldenburg, 1933). The organization which embodied the general theory of Goebbels is described in *Das Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda* (Berlin, 1940), G. W. Mueller. A more critical, if not wholly accurate, survey of the application of the general theory is *The Goebbels Experiment* (New Haven, 1943), D. Sington and A. Weidenfeld.

The general theory has been elaborated *ad nauseam* in relation to specific channels of communication. In the neighborhood of 100 titles such as "Die Tageszeitung (or Rundfunk or Film or Musik or Malerei) als Führungsmittel" were collected by the Library of Congress Mission in Germany, of which this writer was a member during 1946-47. Much more revealing than theory about the specific media is the account of the organization which actually directed the Nazification of all the media, by the man who directed the organization: Hans Hinkel, *Handbuch der Reichskulturkammer* (Berlin, 1937). This can be supplemented by a less authoritative, but more critical, account: Hervé Bigot, *La Chambre de culture allemande dans le regime totalitaire du IIIe Reich* (Paris, 1937) and also by such accounts of the various "chambers" within the Kulturkammer as: Emil Dovifat, "Die Reichspressekammer" in his *Zeitungslehre* (Berlin, 1937); Cedric Larson, "The German Press Chamber," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (October, 1937), pp. 53-70; and Heinz Ihlert, *Die Reichsmusikkammer* (Berlin, 1935). An illuminating postwar German account is: Verlag Archiv und Kartei, *Presse in Fesseln. Das Zeitungsmonopol im Dritten Reich* (Berlin, 1947).

Indispensable to an understanding of Nazi Kulturpolitik and propaganda on the operating level are the periodic "directives" issued to German editors and writers by the Pressekammer. A generalized version of early directives was issued in book form as *Richtlinien für redaktionelle Hinweise in Tageszeitungen, Zeitschriften, und Korrespondenzen* (Berlin, 1934). A broken file of later directives is available in The Hoover Library.

2. See J. R. Mock and C. Larson, *Words That Won The War* (Princeton, 1939), especially the evaluation of Wilson's effectiveness, on p. 235. The limited extent to which the United States officially censored news from abroad during World War II is shown by a former official's account of the wartime Office of Censorship: Theodore F. Koop, *Weapon of Silence* (Chicago, 1946).

3. Absolute control of all channels in a large, modern country is quite impossible. Dr. Padover has reported how a Rhineland Catholic in Nazi Germany illegally received information involving half a dozen enemy, neutral, and Allied countries:

> He said that he knew about the Soviet Union from a recent book. It was written by an American named Villkie Vendell. A German translation was printed in Sweden, and a copy came to him, through a friend, by way of Budapest. He had the loan of it for one day, and he read it avidly, and then he secretly passed it on to his friends. What impressed him most about the book was Villkie Vendell's description of Russia and his idea on the "oneness of the world."

S. K. Padover, *Experiment in Germany*, p. 235.

4. This has the appearance of an overstatement, but the essential word for Sykewar purposes is "articulate." For serious overstatements in the other direction (i.e., overlooking the term "articulate") see the accounts of the 20th of July conspiracy: Ulrich von Hassell, *Vom Andern Deutschland* (Zurich, 1946); Fabian von Schlabrendorff, *Offiziere Gegen Hitler* (Zurich, 1946); and H. B. Gisevius, *Bis zum bittern Ende*, 2 Vols. (Zurich, 1946). The argument of the foregoing volumes is ably summarized in A. W. Dulles, *Germany's Underground* and in Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler* (Hinsdale, 1948). See also Rudolf Pechel, *Deutscher Widerstand* (Zurich, 1947).

5. The words "weaken the morale" save this from overstating the Sykewar view. For accounts by inmates which illustrate the attempts of political prisoners to use the concentration camps as rumor-factories to the "outside" see: Wolfgang Langhoff, *Die Moorsoldaten* (Zurich, 1935), pp. 209-211; Walter Hornung, *Dachau* (Zurich, 1936), pp. 129-133; Benedikt Kautsky, *Teufel und Verdammte* (Zurich, 1946), pp. 191-193; and Eugen Kogon, *Der SS-Staat* (Munich, 1946), Chapters 12 and 19. Note, however, that the best of these accounts make very modest claims, or none at all, that Kz rumors weakened German morale.

6. See especially the PWI studies of the "hard core" among the Wehrmacht, by Morris Janowitz, on file in The Hoover Library.

7. A Nazi writer, contrasting the accomplishments of British propaganda in World War I with Allied potentialities in World War II, seizes triumphantly on this point:

> Als England seine Propaganda in Deutschland begann [in World War I], sah es sich freilich nicht einem geschlossenen Block gegenüber. Eine Vielzahl von Kräften, vor allem aus dem Lager des deutschen Marxismus, hatte das Reich schon weitgehend unterwühlt. England verwandelte die innerdeutsche Opposition in sein Sprachrohr. . . . Wenn wir nun [in World War II] auf die Fragen der Einfuhrmethoden etwas näher eingehen, so deshalb, weil eine gewisse Zahl der damaligen Feindpropagandisten heute wieder gegen uns tätig ist mit der gleichen Taktik. Schlauer werden sie inzwischen kaum geworden sein. Die Neulinge aber betrachten diese Weltkriegsdrahtzieher als ihre grossen Lehrmeister. Die Sache hat allerdings einen Haken: *Die Helfer in Deutschland fehlen!*

Hans Bähr, *Britische Propaganda* (Berlin, 1942), p. 55.

8. The same writer, again contrasting World War II with earlier periods, discusses the changed psychical position of Germany as target, in the following terms:

> Der Erfolg der Taktik und der Strategie der britischen Propaganda in den vergangenen Jahrhunderten und Jahrzehnten war an zwei Voraussetzungen geknüpft, die beide nicht mehr gegeben sind: Allgemeine Anerkennung der liberalen sowie der christlichen Werte und Fehlen einer wirksamen Gegenpropaganda.
>
> Längst ist der Glaube an Demokratie und Humanität aus den Reihen der entscheidenden Völker geschwunden. Und vor allem: Der Führer und der Feldherr seiner Propaganda haben eine Aufklärung geschaffen, die mit Hammerschlag der Wahrheit in die britische Schlangenbrut hineinfuhr . . . und [sie] damit wirkungslos gemacht hat.

Ibid., pp. 80-81.

9. Another Nazi propaganda theorist echoes Hitler even more clearly than his confederate, cited above, viz:

> Die Spaltung des deutschen Nationalwillens im Weltkreig liess eine feindliche Propaganda den Krieg gewinnen. Heute steht der feindlichen Propaganda ein geballter und unerschütterlicher deutscher Nationalwille gegenüber—und je stärker die Propagandawelle anbraust, desto kräftiger wird sie zurückgeschlagen.
>
> Diesmal missglückt jede Spekulation der Propaganda auf eine "Opposition" in Deutschland, jede britische Hoffnung auf ein "heimliches, anderes" Deutschland. Diesmal klärt Deutschland die Welt mit der Wahrheit auf.

Hermann Wanderscheck, *Englands Lügenpropaganda im Weltkrieg und Heute* (Berlin, 1940), p. 70.

10. The general theory of "multiple publics" has already been discussed. See Chapter 2, above.

11. An academic approach to this type of commercial work was Columbia University's Office of Radio Research, now Bureau of Applied Social Research. See especially the publications of Paul F. Lazarsfeld.

12. The best known of these are the Crossley Poll and the Hooper Rating, whose awful power over commercially sponsored broadcasts has become a standard jest among radio comedians.

13. R. T. Colwell, "Radio Luxembourg Uses Jokes as Propaganda against Nazis," *loc. cit.*, p. 18.

14. Several of these BBC *Reports* are in The Hoover Library. Unfortunately, none of these covers the German audience. This writer saw the German reports regularly during the war, but has been unable to get copies from the BBC for use in this study.

15. Several files of these PWI surveys, under the designation "Sykewar Audience Reports," are in The Hoover Library. Among the most useful are the pre-surrender report entitled "German Reactions to Radio Luxembourg" (8 March 1945), and the two post-surrender reports entitled: "Listening to Allied Radio Broadcasts by Germans under the Nazis" (5 June 1945), and "Exposure During the War of German Civilians to Allied Leaflets," (28 June 1945).

16. Cf. "Talking Points" (February, 1945), a PWI paper designed by Michael Balfour to acquaint American soldiers with the arguments they would probably hear in occupied Germany and to indicate the correct rebuttals. This forecast was based on the general analysis of German groupings presented in this chapter, and it turned out to be remarkably accurate. (All PWD-PWI reports cited in this chapter are, unless otherwise noted, in The Hoover Library.)

17. Recently Professor and Head of Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University of Leeds; now at London's Tavistock Clinic. Substantial contributions to the final form of this work were made by Professor Edward A. Shils, sociologist at the University of Chicago, now teaching at the London School of Economics.

18. Of the numerous studies signed by Dicks and issued by the Directorate of Army Psychiatry, War Office, London, the following papers not mentioned in the text (all of which are in The Hoover Library) elaborate the analysis summarized above:

"An Appreciation of Some Psychological and Medical Aspects of Post-Invasion Duties" (August, 1943)

"German Political Attitudes. An Analysis and Forecast of Likely Reactions Confronting the Allies in Occupied Germany" (October, 1944)

"National Socialism as a Psychological Problem" (January, 1945)

"Germany after the War. A Resumé with Commentary." (February, 1945)

Dr. Dicks informed this writer, in a conversation in Paris in October, 1948, that his data had survived close postwar scrutiny: a change of only one percentage point has been made. The fruitful results of Dr. Dicks' wartime work are to be incorporated in his forthcoming book *Love, Money and War.*

19. This qualification was of some importance to Sykewar, a large part of whose propaganda effort was directed toward these groups of women and older men.

20. The most concise statement of this analysis by Dicks himself was in "German Political Attitudes" (October, 1944), mentioned in note 18, above, from which the summary of the "five categories," in our text, is made.

21. Dicks did not make the parallels between the groups and the individual Nazi leaders. These were added, mainly by this writer, for the purpose of illustrating his points to new Sykewar intelligence personnel being trained for duty in occupied Germany, prior to the surrender. These amateur parallels later were compared, where possible, with the Nuremberg defense documents and were found to stand up fairly well. A valuable account is *Nuremberg Diary* (New York, 1947), G. M. Gilbert. On Hess in particular, see *The Case of Rudolf Hess* (New York, 1948), J. R. Rees (ed.).

22. Konrad Heiden, *Der Führer* (New York, 1944), Chapter 2.

23. A complete record of Nuremberg pre-trial interrogation reports, as well as the defense pleas before the International Military Tribunal, identified by name of defendant, is available in The Hoover Library.

24. On the extent of charismatic disassociation of Hitler, as a superior being, from the ugliness of Nazism, see the response to the question, "Do you trust the Führer?," in Chart V, above.

25. Schacht's recently published *Abrechnung mit Hitler* (Hamburg, 1948) is the most brazen published illustration of this point. Compare this overall distribution of "hard-core" and "modified" Nazis with the analysis presented by Hans Gerth, "Composition of the Nazi Party," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 45, p. 517; also, that given in "Observations on the Characteristics and Distribution of German Nazis," *Psychological Monographs* No. 276 (1945), Helen Peak.

26. Cf. "The German Peasant Speaks," a PWI report by Boris Shub (19 July 1945), which indicates that PWI actually found these attitudes among the rural population after the surrender.

27. Cf. "POW Opinion on German Junior and Senior Officers," a PWI consolidated report by Morris Janowitz (21 December 1944).

28. Some of the illustrative PWI data on this theme has been published by Stefan Heym, "I Am Only A Little Man; Alibi of German Prisoner when Charged with Sharing Guilt of the Nazis," *New York Times Magazine* (10 September 1944). In the mouth of one man, this phrase threw the

whole war into the perspective of an era. Shortly after the fall of Frankfurt, Prince August Wilhelm was brought to a dingy hotel room by PWI interrogators. Pressed hard with questions concerning his Nazi affiliations, "Auwi," who thirty years earlier was addressed by Germans only in the third person, is reported helplessly to have uttered the deathless phrase "Ich bin nur ein kleines Würstchen."

29. A series of brilliant PWI interrogation reports on this theme was written by S. K. Padover, later summarized in his *Experiment in Germany.*

30. Cf. H. de Watteville, "Hitler and His Generals," *The* (British) *Army Quarterly* 50: 1, 52-62 (April 1945). Also, Fabian von Schlabrendorff, *op. cit.* On the civilian side, see *Der Altherrenbund* 4: 5-6 (November-December 1941).

31. A dominant political element in the July 20th conspiracy apparently belonged to this group. See Ulrich von Hassell, *op. cit.* See also Friedrich Krause (ed.), *Goerdelers politisches Testament* (New York, 1945). This volume appears with the subtitle *Dokumente des anderen Deutschland.*

32. The following three documents, in The Hoover Library, give useful insights into the types of controversy between the Church and the Nazis:

Friedrich Wieneke (Oberkonsistorialrat), "Denkschrift über das Verhältnis der NSDAP zum Christentum" (Berlin-Grunewald, 28 December 1937)

Bishop of Berlin (to Minister-President Hermann Goering), "Denkschrift zu der Broschüre, 'Die grosse Lüge des politischen Katholizismus.' " (Berlin, 16 December 1938)

Gau Schwaben, "Klosteraktion in Gau Schwaben" (undated)

33. The "Kreisau Circle" of the July 20th conspiracy, apparently the only group concerned with a "new ideology," probably comes within this category. Compare the views of Hans Rothfels, *op. cit.;* and A. W. Dulles, *op. cit.,* Chapter 7.

34. Useful supplementary data on these groups are provided in the PWI consolidated report by Morris Janowitz, "Types of Anti-Nazi POW's" (7 April 1945).

35. German military men early recognized, and made much of, this point. See the works of Ludendorff and von der Goltz. A recent American commentary is *The Armed Horde, 1793-1939* (New York, 1940), Hoffman Nickerson.

36. See United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Overall Report* (Washington, 1945).

37. The *Standing Directive* notes: "Thousands of officers and tens of thousands of NCO's have signed on . . . for periods varying from 7-14 years, and are fighting not only to preserve the German Army as a war machine, but as a means of livelihood." (Section 12)

38. "The presence of hunger, thirst, fatigue, ignorance of plans, idleness increases the danger from fear." John Dollard, *Fear in Battle* (New Haven, 1943), p. 8.

39. See the excellent analysis by Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer, 1948). An interesting comparison can be made between the

views of German POW's obtained by PWI methods, as summarized in this paper and that previously cited by Gurfein and Janowitz, and those obtained by impressionistic methods of American journalists: M. Gellhorn, "Hangdog Herrenvolk," *Colliers* 114: 24 (29 July 1944); L. S. Gannett, "German Soldiers," *Nation* 159: 433-5 (14 October 1944); and E. O. Hauser, "German Prisoners Talk Your Ears Off," *Saturday Evening Post* 217: 29-30 (13-20 January 1945). Hauser's articles were expanded into a book entitled *The German Talks Back* (New York, 1945).

40. E. A. Shils and M. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," *loc. cit.,* pp. 294-5.

41. Hans Speier, *War in our Time,* p. 308.

42. The Strategic Bombing Survey also discovered a "saturation point," beyond which bombing had no appreciable effect in lowering civilian morale: "Continuous heavy bombing of the same communities soon led to diminishing returns in morale effects. The morale in towns subjected to the heaviest bombing was no worse than in towns of the same size receiving much lighter bomb loads." *Op. cit.,* p. 96.

43. A somewhat special group were those, aged roughly 18-30, whose normal relations with men had been upset by the war. Of these, Dr. Dicks wrote: "There is evidence that many German girls have, to an even greater extent than in other countries, lost all moral hold and can be described as 'sex-mad.' " On Dicks' general point about German patriarchalism, see Bertrand Schaffner, *Fatherland.*

44. See Max Seydewitz, *Civil Life in Wartime Germany.* Compare W. W. Schütz, *German Home Front* (London, 1943).

45. Fluctuations in morale were described regularly in PWI's *Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare.*

46. This discussion refers throughout to the later mass influx of foreign workers after September 1941, not the half-million who were recruited for service in Germany prior to the war. Of this later number, only a minority of small groups had come voluntarily, of which the largest unit were French and other western females. Cf. Edward Shils, "Social and Psychological Aspects of Displacement and Repatriation," *Journal of Social Issues* (August, 1946).

47. Of the persons named: Blum is the well-known Socialist leader; Cain is director of the Bibliothèque Nationale; Gottwald is now Czech Premier; Blank is a Communist political leader in Pilsen; Hilpert is a director of the Christian Democratic Union, and mainstay of the German Administration in Frankfurt a/M; Kogon is author of *Der SS-Staat,* editor of *Frankfurter Hefte,* and one of the keenest social analysts in Germany today. Princess Mafalda died in Buchenwald, apparently as the result of an air raid.

48. Cf. "Russians in Germany," a PWI report by Boris Krass to P & PW/12th AG (4 December 1944). The most systematic information on this subject was published in the German statistical journal *Wirtschaft und Statistik,* with occasional contributions in the *Reichsgesundheitsblatt.* (Files of both periodicals are in The Hoover Library.)

49. Cf. Max Seydewitz, *op. cit.,* Chapter 5. Seydewitz claims that in the factories, and especially in armaments works, the proportion of FW's was

much higher than 40 percent. He cites the account of a "typical" factory published in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung:* "78% of the personnel are foreigners from all parts of Europe. In the manufacture of bombs, only 8 to 12% are members of German organizations, and in the manufacture of shells only 8 to 10%. Eighty percent of the personnel live in barracks near the works." (p. 251)

50. F. W. Notestein and others, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union* (Geneva, 1944), p. 16.

51. The fullest records concerned with the FW's were kept by the Displaced Persons Section, G-5, SHAEF. After the surrender, both FW's and non-Germans released from concentration camps were lumped together as "Displaced Persons," a category to become notorious under the abbreviation "DP's." Partial, but very useful, files on both the FW's and the DP's, classified by nationality, are in The Hoover Library.

52. Illuminating records of the discussion of these policy problems, with numerous illustrations of the solutions proposed by Sykewar personnel, are gathered in The Hoover Library under the title, "Radio Luxembourg—FW Broadcasts." See especially the report to 12th AG by R. T. Gordon-Walker, "Report on Listening Conditions in Some DP Camps in the American Third Army Area" (10 May 1945).

53. See the PWI report by Daniel Lerner, "Report on Interrogation of Two Russians in Frankfurt a/M": "The two men displayed the uncanny knowledge of world events during the past three years which is found among a large number of intelligent foreign workers. In addition to German newspapers, from which they tried to cull fact from fantasy, apparently they got occasional access to the news from Radio Moscow and the BBC, either by word-of-mouth transmittal from a man who happened to hear the news or by pumping the German guards." (15 April 1945).

The FW's, who later became known as excellent "scroungers" of supplies, an attribute which enhanced their repute among some not inefficient Germans and GI's, were able to "scrounge" Allied news as well. Some FW's, working on farms, had access to the radios of the German farmers. On their day off, they would spread the latest news among their compatriots in town. Often enough, the news spread by this method bore only a casual resemblance to the news actually announced over Allied transmitters.

54. A continuing analysis of available information on these problems was given in PWI's *Weekly Intelligence Summary For Psychological Warfare* (complete file available in The Hoover Library). The valuable records of PWD discussion of Russian DP's, e.g., with the Soviet General Dragun, seem to have been destroyed or lost.

55. See "Russians in Germany" (note 48 above).

56. See "Notes on a Trip Through Occupied Germany," a PWI report by Daniel Lerner to PWD/SHAEF (18 April 1945).

57. See the Sykewar pictorial treatment: *Kz. Bildbericht aus fünf Konzentrationslagern,* published by OWI (no place or date of publication). Some of the best accounts by former inmates are cited in note 5, above.

58. Enough such records remained, however, to serve the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.

59. Wolfgang Langhoff, *op. cit.,* pp. 154-156. An interesting generalized

treatment of this point is given in Max Picard, *Hitler in Uns Selbst* (Zurich, 1946), especially in the section entitled "Der Mensch des Radio," pp. 43-47.

60. Two editions of *Der SS-Staat* were published in Germany, at Munich and Frankfurt, during 1946. No English version has yet been published. The passage quoted above is taken from p. 352 of a translation prepared at the Information Control Division under this writer. A copy is in The Hoover Library.

61. Maintaining their lives and sanity may be regarded as a contribution, for in some cases they were able to infect their own SS-guards with serious doubts about Germany's chances for victory. Their record contains many heroic, if isolated, contributions, such as the rescue of a captured British intelligence officer from certain death at Buchenwald by injecting milk into his veins and removing him from the Kz as a corpse. This writer, in his official capacity at PWD, received written testimony both from the British officer involved and the Foreign Office, which establishes the authenticity of this incident beyond doubt. (These papers are now in the possession of Dr. Eugen Kogon, Am Hang, Oberursel/Taunus, Germany.)

62. A spokesman of this school in England was Heinrich Fraenkel, author of: *The German People vs. Hitler, Help Us Germans to Beat the Nazis, Vansittart's Gift for Goebbels.* Similar spokesmen in America were Fritz Sternberg, who used *The Nation* as his vehicle, and Carl Zuckmayer, whose play *Des Teufels General* was performed in Zurich in April, 1946. This writer, who attended the opening performance, was interested to note that Swiss critical opinion divided neatly according to the pro- or anti-German bias of the critics.

A useful bibliographical guide to the writings of German exiles is W. A. Berendsohn, *Die Humanistiche Front* (Zurich, 1946). The inadequacy of their testimony grew, as their psychological distance from Germans inside the Reich increased and their sources of information diminished. See the report of their conference, at war's end: Schweizerische Zentralstelle für Flüchtlingshilfe, *Flüchtlinge Wohin?* (Zurich, 1945).

63. Mainly by the survivors of the July 20th conspiracy, and a number of former OSS personnel who exaggerate their claims: von Hassell, von Schlabrendorff, Gisevius, and Dulles. Also Pechel and Rothfels. (See Bibliography.)

64. Even Lord Vansittart, popularly considered the foremost supporter of the notion that there are no good Germans, has denied "that I have lumped all Germans together as bad. I have said explicitly the opposite. I have said that the good exist, but that they have hitherto not been numerous enough to turn the scale." *Black Record* (London, 1941), p. iv. Some interesting examples of this controversy are: H. J. Laski, *The Germans—Are They Human?* (London, 1941); Parliamentary Peace Aims Group, *Germany's Record* (London, 1941); and Heinrich Fraenkel, *Vansittart's Gift for Goebbels* (London, 1941). Vansittart seems to have had the last word, with *Bones of Contention* (New York, 1945).

65. The activities of this group were dramatized by one of its members, Günther Weisenborn, in the play *Die Illegalen* (Berlin, 1946). The play was performed in Berlin with great success during the winter of 1947. Documentary materials are in The Hoover Library; of particular interest

is one POW report (by his brother-in-law) entitled "Der Fall Schulze-Boysen."

66. At least one German anti-Nazi, a woman member of a group in Berlin known as "Onkel Emil," which collaborated with a similar group called "Gruppe Ernst," has clearly distinguished between their activities and that of a "resistance." She writes: "It is not my intention to vaunt deeds of political heroism, to uncover conspiracies, or to tell of armed resistance to Gestapo and Hitler tyranny. The whole world is aware that we did not eliminate Hitler; did not overthrow Goebbels; did not kill Goering." Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, *Berlin Underground* (New York, 1947), p. xiii.

67. The Germans, themselves, will have to take the vital decision to break with the past. . . . But in trying to [do this], the Germans will naturally hope to find somewhere in their own history those better traditions which can serve as a guide in the work of regeneration. Here may lie the value of the evidence that even in the blackest Hitler days there was a better strain which, though submerged and often relatively powerless, was not entirely crushed.

A. W. Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

68. See M. I. Gurfein and D. Lerner, "Germans Are Found Still Nazis in Viewpoint," *New York Herald Tribune* (26 May 1946). This gives a brief summation of PWI information: "The 10% convinced anti-Nazis were a potential core of resistance, but there were many factors inhibiting action, such as the divergent personal or political bases of their anti-Nazism. On the basis of our [PWI] analysis, we predicted there would be no organized opposition to the Nazi regime, even in its dying days. And as we swept across Germany, events confirmed this."

During the winter of 1946-47, this writer had the opportunity to examine some of the documentation of anti-Nazi activity which has been gathered in Berlin by the Communist-dominated "Hauptausschuss, Opfer des Faschismus." This material, which was being prepared for publication under the literary direction of the non-Communist Günther Weisenborn, confirms the view that there was no "German resistance" in anything like the sense described above.

Chapter 7

SYKEWAR THEMES

1. *The Making of Themes*

THE FORMULATION of themes was possibly the most critical step in the whole Sykewar process. Between any policy directive issued in Washington and a leaflet or broadcast picked up in Germany, three major operations had been performed: translation of the directive into a theme; elaboration of the theme into a text; dissemination of the text to a designated target. The first of these operations constituted the "what" of the propaganda process. Here the Sykewarriors ("who"), having informed themselves "why" they were talking and "to whom," got down to their craft. The making of themes was the crucial point at which considerations of policy, intelligence, and target (discussed in the three immediately preceding chapters) were brought to focus upon the use of available media by means of the most effective techniques (discussed in the two chapters immediately following). It may therefore be useful here to review some of the points already discussed which were important to the making of Sykewar themes.

Unconditional Surrender was, as has been indicated, the basic political directive which conditioned all Sykewar activity. It excluded from the Sykewar armory of themes the whole range of propaganda appeals known as promises. The *Standing Directive* explicitly stated:

> No specific promises will be made concerning the treatment of Germany after the war, other than those expressly made by Government spokesmen. In particular, there must be no suggestion that the Atlantic Charter applies to Germany by right. (Section 9)

The basis for such scrupulous limitation of propaganda to the actual intentions of policy was a theory of propaganda effectiveness. There are two such main theories, which in application

become "strategies." The core of divergence between them is the question of truth in propaganda, the criterion of truthfulness being that political propaganda should faithfully reflect the policies (i.e., the known purposes) which the propagandist serves. As we have seen, the major adversaries in World War II supported contrary theories.

From the Nazi perspective, the job of propaganda was to persuade people to accept any given view favorable to policy, irrespective of its truth or falsity. Falsity in propaganda (i.e., failure to reflect Nazi purposes) was regarded as often the most effective method. The Nazi "strategy of the big lie" was clearly an outcome of this propaganda theory, expounded by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*. There Hitler announced the dictum:

> Propaganda . . . has not to search into truth as far as this is favorable to others, in order to present it then to the masses with doctrinary honesty, but it has rather to serve its own truth uninterruptedly.[1]

This was a rather oblique sanction of "the big lie"—which is what emerges when propaganda serves "its own truth uninterruptedly" instead of truthfully reflecting the known aims of the policy which guides it.

Whatever Hitler's success with "the big lie" at home, in the field of international politics the long-run effectiveness of such a strategy appeared dubious. Even before the war began, Allied counterpropagandists had done an impressive job of discrediting Nazi sources, as a result of this strategy. A well-known illustration is Hitler's famous line: "I have no further territorial demands in Europe." Allied counterpropaganda so effectively exploited Nazism's use of this particular "big lie" that any statement of intentions by Hitler came to be regarded as fairly safe evidence that he meant to do something else. Sykewar made extensive use of this counterpropaganda tactic. A report called "Propaganda Nuggets," devoted mainly to Hitler-Nazi forecasts and assertions which had turned sour, was issued periodically by PID for the use of BBC and Sykewar propagandists, who regularly broadcast them to the Germans. A particularly delightful brochure on this subject was issued by the OWI staff in Paris under the title *L'art de mentir,* with the following subtitle: *"Petit manuel à l'usage de tous ceux qui s'exercent à l'art délicat du mensonge, illustré de quelques exemples choisis, dûs*

à la plume des 'Maîtres du Monde' par A. Hitler et J. Goebbels." [2]

Propaganda strategy is not a special function of national virtue. For scientific purposes, in fact, any propaganda strategy can more fruitfully be analyzed in terms of the power position of the nation which uses it, the sociology of its population, and the psychology of its leadership. It is interesting to observe, for example, that *Frontpost,* a Sykewar newspaper to German soldiers, carried in the upper right-hand corner, on the front page of each issue, the motto: "The Strong Need Not Fear The Truth." [3] In any case, Allied propagandists had good reason to doubt the effectiveness of the Nazi strategy of the big lie, and to estimate that Allied policy would be better served by a strategy of truth. The basis for this Allied estimate has been stated clearly by a BBC spokesman:

> For quick opportunist success the German model was almost perfectly designed, but, for a long war and for a peace to follow, the opportunist machinery was fatal. The British model . . . neglected opportunist possibilities, worked to retain and increase its audience, and had its eye on the peace.[4]

Without exaggerating the differences, therefore, it is useful to distinguish the basic Nazi strategy from the long-run Allied Strategy of Truth, which insisted that propaganda should in no case belie known policy. This was handed down clearly in the *Standing Directive:*

> The use of Psychological Warfare in military operations must be strictly subordinated to the long-term policy of our Governments, in the sense that nothing must be done with the object of undermining fighting morale during operations which would prejudice Government policy to Germany after the War. (Section 7)

Once committed to a "strategy of truth," Sykewar had to trim its propaganda themes to conform with the policies of the Allied leadership. Unconditional Surrender constituted a difficult policy directive because it prevented Sykewar from promising the Germans a better life after the war. It did not, however, commit Sykewar to threatening the Germans with hotter fire and brimstone after the hell of war was over. This clearly would have violated a basic tenet of propaganda practice: "In the execution of Psychological Warfare it is a fundamental principle not to antagonize the audience." (Section 4)

The task was to find themes which would observe the letter (and spirit) of known Allied intentions toward Germany, and yet would effectively persuade Germans to accept views considered desirable for Allied policy. Theme-making had, therefore, to steer a precarious course between the limitations imposed by policy and the possibilities indicated by intelligence (i.e., knowledge of German predispositions).

A clear illustration of this process was the treatment of Hitler by Sykewar. Official statements by the Allied political leadership made it perfectly plain that the elimination of Hitler and Nazism was a primary war aim. For propaganda marksmen, this was equivalent to declaring "open season" on Hitler as target. Some Allied leaders and propaganda agencies—Winston Churchill and the early OWI, notably—pursued this target with gusto.[5] Sykewar, on the other hand, confined itself to attacks against Nazism as a creed and against other Nazi leaders, but deliberately refrained from attacking Hitler. The reason for this was Sykewar's desire, in skirting the Scylla of Allied policy, to avoid crashing against the rocky Charybdis of German predispositions. All available intelligence showed that loyalty to Hitler personally, particularly among the Wehrmacht, was widespread and deep-seated. Even among Germans who were not particularly strong Nazis, and who actively disliked other leading Nazis, Hitler remained very largely inviolate as a symbol. This charismatic role of Hitler, which is attested by the quantitative data given in Chart V, page 114, was noted in Sykewar's *Standing Directive:*

> At present, the average soldier, despite the awareness that he has made serious mistakes, is not inclined to blame Hitler, as the generals and other informed persons already do. Hitler is still his lucky talisman. (Section 13)[6]

Therefore, in order to avoid "direct offense against the known susceptibilities" of its main German target, the "average soldier" and civilian, rather than "the generals and other informed persons," PWD *never openly attacked Hitler.* Unfortunately, PWD went beyond abstention from attack in one leaflet, the only one among the several hundred Sykewar leaflets this writer has examined which makes Hitler its central theme. The full text of this leaflet follows: [7]

HAT DER FÜHRER DAS GEWOLLT?

MASSEN-STERBEN: "Mit nackten Händen kommt man gegen Stahl nicht an"—so sagen deutsche Landser, denen befohlen wird, gegen die alliierte Übermacht an Menschen, Panzern, Fahrzeugen, Artillerie und Fliegern anzukämpfen. Tausende sterben so jeden Tag in hoffnungsloser Lage. Und viele sterben mit der Frage: *Hat der Führer das gewollt?*

MASSEN-VERWÜSTUNG: Eine alte deutsche Kaiserstadt, Aachen, wird von den Alliierten eingeschlossen. Es ergeht die Aufforderung: Ergebt Euch—wir schonen Euch und Eure Stadt. Die Antwort: Nein! Das Resultat: Weitere Menschenopfer, und Aachen wird in wildem Kampf zu Schutt und Asche. *Hat der Führer das gewollt?*

MASSEN-ELEND: Jeder Tag, den der verlorene Krieg weitergeführt wird, bedeutet mehr Elend, Chaos, Not und weiteres Sterben junger Männer, die auf ewig ausgeschaltet werden. Dennoch geht das Massen-Elend weiter, ohne dass sich jemand findet, der diesem Irrwitz Einhalt bietet. *Hat der Führer das gewollt?*

"Die Geschichte wird auch diejenigen vor ihren Richterstuhl fordern . . . die unser Volk in Not und Verderben führten, und die im Unglück des Vaterlands ihr eigenes Ich höher schätzen als das Leben der Gesamtheit." (Mein Kampf)

HAT DER FÜHRER DAS GESCHRIEBEN?

(Reverse side of Leaflet)

DER WAHRE FEIND . . .

WER SEHNT SICH NACH DEM FRIEDEN?

Der deutsche Soldat, der fünf nutzlose Kampfjahre erlebt hat.

Er hasst den Krieg:

Denn er weiss, dass selbst die Weissblutung der Wehrmacht die Heimat nicht retten kann.

Er hat nur einen Gedanken:

WER ZITTERT VOR DEM FRIEDEN?

Die Parteibonzen und die Herren von der SS, die diesen Krieg entfesselt haben.

Sie brauchen den Krieg:

Denn sie wissen, dass nur die deutsche Wehrmacht zwischen ihnen und der Vernichtung steht.

Auch sie haben nur einen Gedanken:

Die letzten Wochen des Krieges zu überleben, an seinen Arbeitsplatz und zu seiner Familie zurückzukehren.

Den Krieg zu verlängern, weil jeder Kriegstag noch einen Tag der Macht und des Lebens für sie bedeutet.

Die Partei und SS sind bereit, den letzten deutschen Soldaten—ja, den letzten Schuljungen, der nur ein Gewehr tragen kann, zu opfern.

DIESE LEUTE SIND DER WAHRE FEIND!

(English Translation)

DID THE FUEHRER WANT THIS?

Mass-Death: "With naked hands one can not fight against steel"—so say German soldiers who are ordered to fight against Allied preponderance of men, tanks, vehicles, artillery, and planes. Thousands die this way daily in a hopeless situation. And many die with the question: *Did the Fuehrer want this?*

Mass-Destruction: An old German imperial city, Aachen, is surrounded by the Allies. They proclaim: Surrender—we will spare you and your town. The answer: No! The result: Further human sacrifices and Aachen is reduced to rubble and cinders after a wild fight. *Did the Fuehrer want this?*

Mass-Misery: Every day that the lost war is continued means more misery, chaos, deprivation and further dying of young men who are snuffed out for ever. Yet this Mass-Misery continues without anyone stepping forward to try and stop this idiocy. *Did the Fuehrer want this?*

"History will also order before its tribunal those . . . who have led our people into distress and misery, and who in the hour of need of the Fatherland valued their own ego higher than the life of the community." (Mein Kampf)

DID THE FUEHRER WRITE THIS?

(Reverse Side of Leaflet)

THE TRUE ENEMY . . .

WHO LONGS FOR PEACE?

The German soldier who has lived through 5 useless war years.

WHO FEARS PEACE?

The Party Bosses and the Gentlemen of the SS, who have started this war.

He hates the war:	They need the war:
Because he knows that the Army, even if it is bled white, can not save the country.	Because they know that only the German Army stands between them and destruction.
He has only one thought:	They also have only one thought:
To live through the last weeks of the war, to return to his job and his family.	To prolong the war, because each day of war means one more day of power and life for them.

The Party and the SS are ready to sacrifice the last German soldier —yes, even the last schoolboy, so long as he can carry a gun.

THOSE PEOPLE ARE THE TRUE ENEMY!

Far from being an attack on Hitler, this leaflet, extremely skillful in other respects, was a tribute to the popular myth that Hitler was the "kindly father" who had meant only well for Germany. It pandered also to the notion that Hitler did not know what his miserable underlings were doing in his name, that the real situation was hidden from him by the *Bonzen*. The copy of this leaflet which circulated in Allied headquarters was accompanied by this note:

> Belief in Hitler has not gone down as fast as German battle morale. Even where he may be thought a failure, his good faith is rarely questioned. We do not question it in this leaflet, either, but demonstrate that there is even less reason to fight if Hitler does not want that to happen to Germany which is happening to her now.

This was a grievous error of tactics, equivalent to yielding a mile to gain an inch. It illustrates the erroneous conception, as close as some Sykewarriors got to any general theory, that "psychological warfare is in essence a vast task of publicity, similar in many ways to modern advertising." [8]

This view, characteristic of many Americans, was corrected at PWD by experience and by the salutary influence of the British element, which had learned earlier to value the strategy of truth and to shun the siren charms of expediency. A BBC spokesman put the matter clearly:

> Generalizing from their experience, advertising agents concluded that life was a business of finding out what people

> wanted and selling it to them. They allowed their sense of values to obtrude as little as possible. But this demand for a simple consumer-producer relationship assumes a great deal. It assumes that political and commercial warfare are the same; that policy should abdicate in favour of consumer demands; that responsibility should be replaced by a technical consideration of what is expedient. It assumes, in fact, too much.[9]

The leaflet quoted above clearly derived from the assumption, quoted in the extract just given, "that policy should abdicate in favour of consumer demands." It was an offer for a low-grade intellectual swap, i.e.: We will agree with you that Hitler has always meant well, if you will agree that despite his good intentions things have gone badly and are sure to get worse (and therefore, that you ought to quit the whole mess and surrender to us). But this offer—considerations of its possible success in encouraging surrenders aside—clearly "assumes too much" on the Allied side of the bargain. The destruction of both Hitler and Hitlerism was as public and explicit as any Allied war aim, and this leaflet clearly violated the *Standing Directive:* "Nothing must be done with the object of undermining fighting morale during operations which would prejudice Government policy to Germany after the war." (Section 7)

I have dwelt upon this leaflet at length, mainly to illustrate the extraordinary complexity of the theme-making process. This was an exceptional piece of Sykewar writing, an infrequent departure from the rule that *both* Allied policy *and* German predispositions ("consumer demands") had to be consulted in the formulation of Sykewar themes. There were—the anguished accusations of Lord Vansittart to the contrary notwithstanding—few other aberrations so extreme as the specimen cited.[10] This is clear from analysis of the normal range of Sykewar themes.

2. *Themes and Situations*

Sykewar themes all were aimed, in the first instance, to support the mission of the Allied armies in Europe—the unconditional surrender of Germany. In this sense, all Sykewar efforts were merely variations of the grand theme. The variations were important, because the audiences were various. Themes were tailored, therefore, to fit the different situations in which the German publics found themselves.

Chapter 6 indicated that basic Sykewar distinctions among groups of Germans were framed in terms of the character and intensity of their response to Nazism. As we have seen, the Sykewar analysis showed: (a) that the largest group of Germans were politically apathetic and probably could not be roused by any Sykewar political or ideological appeals; (b) that the small minority of convinced anti-Nazis were powerless; and (c) that the larger group of "hard-core" Nazis and their hangers-on could be undermined only by complete military defeat, not by propaganda. In consequence of this analysis, certain very important potential themes were excluded from use by Sykewar. The PWD final report on "Leaflet Operations in the Western European Theater" puts the matter thus:

> As the operation progressed and more and more intelligence accumulated, it became clear that a number of obvious propaganda arguments were either ineffective or could not be used for policy reasons.[11]

These arguments, which were excluded somewhat more rigorously from leaflets to German soldiers than from broadcasts to German civilians, centered about the following subjects:

(1) Outright revolutionary propaganda
(2) Personal attacks on Hitler
(3) Ideological themes
(4) Appeals by German generals
(5) Internal German dissensions
(6) Counterpropaganda

The grounds for excluding several of these themes have already been discussed. "Outright revolutionary propaganda" was obviated because there was no anti-Nazi resistance to which the Allies could have directed any revolutionary appeals, even if they had been so minded (and we have seen that Allied policy in World War II was anything but revolutionary). Hitler's personal hold upon Germans, as we have seen, was regarded as too strong to permit effective "personal attacks" on him by Sykewar. Dr. Leighton has summarized with great cogency the reasoning which caused American propagandists in the Pacific to abstain from attacking Hirohito; and similar considerations (in modified form) governed the Sykewar abstention from attacking Hitler:

> Attacking the Emperor with the means available in psychological warfare seemed at best wasteful, since arguments in leaflets stood little chance of penetration. One cannot effectively attack with logic that which is not logical. At worst it seemed probable that such efforts would serve to remind people of their belief and its resources and hence tighten their grip and increase the support from this factor at a time when other factors were giving way.[12]

Dr. Leighton's point needs to be underscored. The attack logical upon beliefs which do not rest upon logic may be a waste of time, or worse. An illustration may be useful. A BBC commentator, given to broadcasting small ironies about Hitler, on one occasion mentioned without comment that Der Führer frequently consulted an astrologer before making important decisions. This was intended to show the proper contempt of an Oxford-trained mind for the superstitious imbecility of Hitler. Perhaps "the generals and other informed persons" among the Germans were properly amused by this delicately underplayed irony. However, three years later, in occupied Berlin, this writer was told by a German fireman that he was more grateful to this broadcast than to any other of the BBC about which he had heard. It came at a trying moment for him and his wife, when they had not heard from their son on the Russian front for three months. This broadcast gave them the idea that an astrologer might tell them if their son was alive. They went to see one, and sure enough, he did!

The last two themes were eliminated mainly on technical grounds of effectiveness. It was considered a less effective technique to recognize and contradict Nazi assertions in Allied "counterpropaganda," thereby giving them further publicity, than "to ignore them entirely or to negate them with a positive line of propaganda." Similarly, to play openly upon "internal German dissensions," thereby providing evidence that Allied propaganda was seeking to divide Germans, was considered technically maladroit in overt output. Actually, as Hans Speier has shown, all strategic propaganda can be regarded as variants of subversion (i.e., the exploitation of dissensions):

> The ultimate aim of strategic propaganda cannot be surrender but is subversion, i.e., action of the enemy population or elements of it against their government. All other actions,

> or failures to act against the enemy, which strategic propaganda may try to induce are either derivatives of political acts of subversion (malingering, slowing down, "griping," etc.) or non-political substitutes for subversive activities, such as privatization or panic.[13]

In this sense, Sykewar devoted considerable effort to subversion. For the most part, however, Sykewar preferred to use the techniques of indirection typical of the "gray" media, which simply presented news items in such a way that German audiences could make their own invidious comparisons, and themselves encourage internal dissensions.

The two middle themes were excluded on the basis of combined intelligence and policy considerations. "Appeals by German generals" in Allied hands, many of whom (according to the official historian) "would have been willing to recommend surrender" to their colleagues and lesser members of the Wehrmacht, were not utilized because the Allied leadership was publicly committed to render impotent or destroy the whole German general staff. Sykewar use of such people would therefore have violated the Strategy of Truth. In order not to lose the propaganda value of their defection, however, appeals and statements by German generals in Soviet hands (the von Seydlitz-Paulus group) were occasionally reprinted and rebroadcast by Sykewar. This technique is illustrated by Sykewar leaflets ZG-40 to ZG-42, which reproduce in full, and with considerable fanfare, the speeches and appeals of German generals in Russian hands. ZG-39 treats the theme "Die Generale Wussten!", asserting that the generals who made the 20th of July putsch against Hitler knew that German defeat was inevitable.

The exclusion of "ideological themes" was keynoted in Winston Churchill's pre-D-Day statement to the House of Commons: "As this war has progressed, it has become less ideological in its character . . ." [14] This assertion was attacked heatedly in Commons and elsewhere, but Churchill stuck to his view, which Sykewar acknowledged in these terms:

> Reeducation of the German soldier (and civilian) was conceived of as a post-hostilities problem. As more and more lost faith in victory, they likewise became ripe for new ideas. In that final stage, however, the unconditional surrender propaganda made it necessary to concentrate on the futility of fighting on, rather than on the promises offered by the democratic

way of life. We were not offering democracy to Germany, but Military Government.[15]

The exclusion of six such basic themes was a decision of considerable importance to the Sykewar operation. Despite the limiting effects of this decision upon the content of our propaganda to Germany, in the light of actual Allied policy the exclusion of these themes was dictated by the Strategy of Truth and was probably essential for long-run effectiveness. When the record of World War II Sykewar is written into the history of 20th-century propaganda, the exclusion of these themes may figure as weightily as the inclusion of the themes Sykewar actually used.[16]

The distribution of themes employed was guided largely by the Sykewar division of its German audiences, as indicated in Chapter 6 into soldiers and civilians. Each group was addressed in terms appropriate to its situation. The special themes addressed to German soldiers in combat, for example, dealt mainly with the following subjects:

(1) The fact of captivity
(2) Good treatment of POW's
(3) Observance of the Geneva Convention
(4) Desertion *versus* surrender
(5) Material superiority of the Allies
(6) The meaning of capitulation

These themes were held together by a logical, as well as a chronological, thread of development. The initial "block" of psychological resistance that had to be hurdled by Sykewar was the feeling among German (as among all) soldiers that captivity was something strange, and therefore fearful. For this reason, "the theme of captivity was constantly kept before the mind of the German soldier."[17] It was calculated that, once the idea of captivity had been made more familiar, the theme of good treatment would probably reach a more attentive audience. This theme emphasized that German POW's received the same rations as American GI's (as well as cigarets); that they were removed rapidly from the battle zone to a safe, warm, dry place in the rear; that they could write and receive letters from home; that those who surrendered would probably be among the first released to go home after the war.

At 12th AG, and subordinate Sykewar units mainly concerned with tactical output to German combat troops, these themes were worked into a formula known as "the six points," which "became a sort of standard form for the reverse side of practically all leaflets." As summarized by their official historian, these six points, which appeared somewhere in the majority of tactical leaflets, were:

(1) Immediate removal from the danger zone
(2) Decent treatment as befits soldiers
(3) The same food as American soldiers ("the best-fed army in the world")
(4) Hospital care
(5) Postal privileges
(6) Return home after the war "as soon as possible" [18]

The last point was especially important to German soldiers, and Sykewar emphasis on the strict observance of the terms of the Geneva Convention by the Allies was designed to reassure them on this point.

> Insistence on our observation of Article 75 of the Convention was an especially useful weapon in countering German claims that prisoners would be shipped to Russia.[19]

The distinction between desertion and surrender was made in order to circumvent the deep-rooted feeling that desertion was dishonorable. The attempt was made, therefore, to portray surrender as something which "just happened" to a German soldier.

> It was found that such a distinction had no noticeable effect on the volume of desertions, while avoiding the danger of alienating the German readers who rejected the idea of desertion, although quite willing to stretch a point when it came to getting captured.

For the benefit of those soldiers who feared reprisals on their families, Sykewar emphasized that the identity of those who surrendered was never made public. Later in the campaign, this distinction was supplemented by the "Surrender Order." This came into use when it became clear that, with large numbers of German soldiers, the habit of obedience to orders was stronger than both the reasons for surrender offered by Sykewar and their own inclinations to end it all ("Schluss machen!").

> Consequently an order was designed which tried to substitute the authority of General Eisenhower for that of the German's own immediate superior, and to pit his prestige against that of his German counterparts. Instructions were given by SHAEF to use this order only in acute tactical situations where there were good chances that German soldiers would use it as an alibi for surrender.

Sykewar emphasis upon the overwhelming superiority of Allied materiel, like the distinction between desertion and surrender, was intended further to weaken the German soldier's feeling against surrender as an immoral and dishonorable act. The technique, again, was largely indirect. "Widerstand ist Selbstmord!" (Resistance is Suicide!) was the phrase used over and over in connection with themes asserting overwhelming Allied material superiority. Its intention was to convince the German soldier that suicide was no part of his soldierly duty.[20]

There were serious objections to the use of this theme by Sykewar. It was predicted, and the prediction soon began to be validated by PWI evidence, that emphasis upon Allied material superiority would provide Germans with a ready-made alibi for the loss of World War II (equivalent to the "stab-in-the-back" alibi, also attributed to Allied propaganda, after World War I).[21] The final leaflet report, somewhat self-consciously, asserts:

> It has been deliberate policy to furnish the German soldier with a sop to his honor by continuously pointing out that, however great his bravery, he was confronted by a crushing superiority of war materiel against which his soldierly qualities were useless.

With the theme of capitulation, finally, Sykewar reached the area of overlapping interests between German soldiers and civilians, for all Germans had been subjected to the incessant Goebbels propaganda that defeat meant the total physical destruction of Germany, the total impoverishment of its economic life, and the total reign of unrelieved terror for its inhabitants. For the soldiers, Sykewar emphasized that general capitulation would introduce an Allied Military Government under the "firm but just" regime of General Eisenhower:

> Capitulation as such was shown to be a military act with many precedents, never—if on a tactical level—robbing the surrendering German soldier of his privileges under the Geneva Convention.

For the German civilians, the theme of capitulation was elaborated in a sustained radio campaign known as the "Voice of SHAEF," as well as in leaflets.[22] The major effort here was to prepare the German population, before the fact, to accept the authority of Military Government under the Supreme Commander. This campaign capitalized on General Eisenhower's "firm but just" personality and character. As before, no direct attack was made on Hitler.

> Rather, the National Socialist "terror system" and particularly its foremost representative, Himmler, were held up as the alternatives to Military Government.

While the theme of general capitulation was featured more prominently to German civilians than to soldiers, considerable attention also was given to a group of themes which bore directly upon special situations faced by civilians only. The Nazification of German society, as indicated earlier, was so pervasive that even those Germans who might have been willing to do something to bring the war to an end did not know just what to do. To fill this gap, Sykewar devised a number of "limited action" themes.

These themes dealt with immediate problems facing the civilian population. They avoided ideology and omitted any effort to incite revolt. Instead, they urged types of action which did not require group organization, and therefore did not expose the compliants to risking their lives. However, because their instructions dealt with immediate problems on which some sort of action was required, it was believed that these themes might produce a cumulative "snowballing" effect of important dimensions, if a few properly placed individuals ("opinion leaders") in each community supported them. The themes had the further weighty advantage that the instructions they gave corresponded more closely to the desires of the population ("German predispositions"), in most cases, than the contrary orders issued by the Nazis. Some of the main "limited action" themes were:

(1) Non-compliance with Nazi general evacuation orders
(2) Compliance with later Allied limited evacuation orders
(3) Anti-*Volkssturm* campaign (tied in with evasion of service and surrender)
(4) Slow-down campaign (tied in with evacuation theme)

(5) Talk-to-the-soldier campaign (tied in with surrender theme)

(6) Avoid destruction of your town (by urging surrender)

The Allied advantage in these themes can best be understood in the context of events. Nazi *general* evacuation orders were part of the broader "scorched earth" policy, which Hitler had abandoned (allegedly under pressure from Speer) soon after it was undertaken. They meant complete abandonment of homestead and disruption of family life, including the separation of family members, for German civilians in western Germany. Civilian feeling against these orders ran high. The extremely difficult position of the masses of earlier evacuees to central Germany, due to inadequate housing and short rations, was already well known. The baggage limit was 30-40 pounds per person, which meant that evacuees had to leave the bulk of their earthly possessions behind, perhaps never to be recovered. Further, the evacuation operations were put under the local Nazi Party units, and therefore were often conducted with a certain characteristic tactlessness and brutality which, added to the actual dangers of travel, increased the strength of civilian resistance.[23]

Allied *limited* evacuation orders were a different story. They were addressed only to towns designated as "danger areas." Residents of these areas were warned that they were shortly to become the target of concerted military operations. In some cases, even the exact date and character of these operations (e.g., air bombing) were made known. Inhabitants were not instructed to depart permanently, but merely to go into the surrounding countryside and seek safety until the danger was past. Such instructions, which gave "fair warning" and demanded no sacrifices, usually were obeyed by large numbers of German civilians. There was some evidence that German civilians, in taking the "limited action" indicated by such leaflets, felt gratitude to the Allies for telling them what to do in a crisis situation, as well as respect for powerful Armies which deliberately took the trouble to avoid killing civilians. An early illustration of this Sykewar theme, counterposed directly to earlier German orders, is the leaflet on "The Lesson of Aachen" (Series WG-18k) addressed mainly to German civilians west of the Rhine:

SYKEWAR LEAFLET WG-18k

Auf die Landstrasse geworfen . . .

DIE LEHRE VON AACHEN

Tausende von Zivilpersonen, die sich der Zwangsevakuierung widersetzt haben, haben sich aus der brennenden Stadt Aachen gerettet. Sie befinden sich in amerikanischen Auffangs-Quartieren in Sicherheit. Was aber ist mit jenen geschehen, die dem wahnsinnigen Evakuierungsbefehl Folge geleistet haben?

1. Die Nazis haben Männer, Frauen und Kinder in Omnibusse und Eisenbahnzüge verladen und aus der Stadt hinausgeschafft. Die Züge sind 30 km von der Stadt entfernt stehen geblieben. Die Evakuierten wurden an den Bahngeleisen abgesetzt. Die Omnibusse fuhren 20-25 km—dann wurden die Zwangsevakuierten auf die Landstrasse geworfen. Nur wenige wurden weiterbefördert. Die Rückkehrstrasse nach Aachen wurde von SS abgeriegelt.

2. Die Nazis haben den Evakuierten nicht erlaubt, auch nur Teile ihrer Habe mitzunehmen. In der Stadt begann sofort nach der Evakuierung eine Plünderung, an der sich die SS, die Gestapo und zahlreiche Parteifunktionäre beteiligten. Unter anderem wurden auch die Brotkarten und Rauchwarenkarten der Bewohner von den Parteibonzen gestohlen.

3. Die Nazis haben im letzten Moment vor der Evakuierung gewisse Männer bis zu 65 Jahren zurückgehalten, und unter schwerem Feuer zum Schaufeln eingesetzt. Wohin ihre Frauen und Kinder gebracht worden sind, ist diesen Männern nicht mitgeteilt worden.

Für den Deutschen in den Kriegsgebieten gibt es nur eine Frage: Befolgung der Evakuierungsbefehle oder Kampf gegen die Zwangsevakuierung.

EVAKUIERUNG = Verlust von Heim und Familie, und Flüchtlingselend auf der Landstrasse.

KAMPF GEGEN DIE EVAKUIERUNG = Erhaltung der Familie und Mitarbeit am Wiederaufbau der Heimat.

This attack on Nazi evacuation orders was followed, on the reverse side of the leaflet, by specific Allied instructions on "What to Do":

VERHALTUNGSMASSREGELN

1. Widerzetze Dich dem Evakuierungsbefehl solange es geht. Gestapo und SS fliehen selbst. Sie haben keine Zeit, jeden Einzelnen auszuheben.

2. Hüte Dich vor grösseren öffentlichen Ansammlungen. SS und Partei verschleppen Leute ohne Warnung aus Gaststätten, von Bäckereien usw.
3. Versorge Dich rechtzeitig mit dauerhafter Nahrung und notwendiger Kleidung. Nahrungsmittel, die Du jetzt abführst, werden von Partei-Emigranten gestohlen. Was Du behältst, gehört Dir.
4. Wenn es nicht anders geht, verstecke Dich in Luftschutzkellern oder sicheren Unterständen. Auch Häuser, die verlassen scheinen, bieten Unterschlupf. Suche im Notfall benachbarte Wälder oder Bauerngehöfte auf. Von diesen kannst Du nach der Besetzung durch die Alliierten heimkehren. Von fernen Evakuierungsorten gibt es bis lange nach Kriegsende keine Rückkehr.

Wer zurückbleibt, bringt den Krieg hinter sich.
Wer sich evakuieren lässt, flieht in den Krieg.

(English Translation)

THROWN OUT ON THE ROAD . . .

THE LESSON OF AACHEN

Thousands of civilians who resisted the forced evacuation have saved themselves from the burning city of Aachen. They are safe in American camps. But what has happened to those who obeyed the mad evacuation order?

1. The Nazis loaded men, women and children into busses and trains and shipped them out of the town. The trains stopped 30 kilometers from town. The evacuees were unloaded on the tracks. The busses travelled for 20-25 kilometers—then the evacuees were thrown out into the road. Only very few were taken any further. The return road to Aachen was blocked by SS.

2. The Nazis did not allow the evacuees to take along even a part of their belongings. Immediately after the evacuation, plundering started in the town, in which the SS, the Gestapo and numerous party functionaries participated. Among other things, the party bosses stole the bread- and tobacco-cards of the residents.

3. The Nazis held back, at the last moment before the evacuation, certain men up to 65 years of age, and used them for digging trenches under heavy fire. These men were not told where their women and children were brought.

For the Germans in the combat areas there is only one question: To obey the evacuation order or to fight against the forced evacuation?

EVACUATION = Loss of home and family, and refugee misery on the roads.

FIGHT AGAINST EVACUATION = Maintenance of the family and cooperation in the reconstruction of the homeland.

(Reverse Side)

RULES OF CONDUCT

1. Resist the evacuation order as long as possible. The Gestapo and SS are fleeing themselves. They haven't time to arrest every individual.
2. Beware of large public gatherings. SS and party kidnap people without warning out of restaurants, bakeries, etc.
3. Provide yourself beforehand with durable food and necessary clothing. Food which you deliver up at this time is stolen by the party-emigrants. What you keep, belongs to you.
4. If you cannot do anything else, hide in air-raid shelters or safe dugouts. Houses which seem to be abandoned also afford shelter. In case of emergency go to neighboring woods or farms. From those you can return after the occupation by the Allies. From distant evacuation places there is no return until long after the end of the war.

He who remains puts the war behind himself.
He who lets himself be evacuated flees into the war.

Other Sykewar instructions varied with the special position of the target addressed. Leaflets to Hamburg, Bremerhaven, and Emden, for example, were addressed particularly "to the workers and port officials" of those key port cities. These people were warned that: "In these last weeks of the war, the future of your town is in the greatest danger from fanatics who may make a last-minute attempt to make the port unusable." They were instructed to prevent wrecking, evade further mobilization, and preserve stocks of food and fuel. The leaflets included the following notice in bold print:

> **The following are needed for immediate re-employment: stevedores, crane workers, drivers, storekeepers, dockyard workers, fitters, port and water police, customs officials, pilots, crews of tugs and ferries, lock-keepers and masters and other employees. (WG-52 to WG-54)**

The powerful appeal of such a notice to an unsettled population, and worried workers, is fairly obvious. The remaining

themes gave Allied sanction and an approved form to powerful German predispositions. For example, the war-weary and overworked German civilians, sensing that all further effort would be vain, needed little urging to slow down on the job and evade the *Volkssturm*. The favorable response to Sykewar instructions that they hang out white flags, signifying willingness to surrender their towns, was fairly widespread. The PWI data, from direct observation and interrogations, gave evidence that in several cities German women were cajoling, threatening, and pleading with German soldiers to lay down their arms, and even going so far as to provide them with civilian clothing, food, and hiding places to facilitate desertion.[24]

All these "limited action" themes to civilians, like the combat themes to soldiers, were considered as "tactical," and were hooked into the incessant "strategic" themes which preceded and accompanied them. The major "strategic" themes were:

(1) that German defeat was inevitable, illustrated by the continuous stream of German setbacks and Allied advances on both fronts

(2) that Allied occupation was preferable to the continued hardships of war and Nazism

(3) that the sooner it was over, the better for the Germans

Among the soldiers, the aim was to induce desertion, surrender, capitulation. Among the civilians, the aim was to discourage resistance, encourage capitulation, and prepare the ground for occupation under Allied authority.

3. *Distribution of Themes: Sample Counts*

Any attempt to indicate the frequency of occurrence, or distribution, of the themes discussed above must begin with the statement that "news" constituted the bulk of Sykewar output. A writer on the BBC has made the following comment:

> The European Service is primarily a news machine and its job is to penetrate Hitler's news blockade every day. Seventy-five percent of the output is sheer news, and every man of the Service knows that people are risking their lives to hear his words.[25]

Emphasis on news also characterized Sykewar radio and newspaper output, with slighter proportionate weight in leaflets, and

provides the background against which any quantitative assessment of theme frequencies must be understood. No single theme, and no combination of themes, loomed as large in its total output as "the news," in the broad sense construed by Sykewar. For Sykewar was not a news machine devoted to the dissemination of "straight news." It is a platitude that all news is "slanted," but the direction of the slant remains an important variable in any propaganda operation.

It would be an error to minimize the propaganda value of Sykewar news dissemination. We have seen that the initial Sykewar battle was for the attention of its German audience. It was Sykewar's reputation for credibility (i.e., the accurate dissemination of important news) that was mainly responsible for winning it a German audience. This reputation became increasingly important as Nazi propagandists, faced with a consistently losing situation, were compelled to rely increasingly upon the withholding or suppression of news important to the Germans. One survey of German POW's showed that "disbelief of Anglo-American leaflets" among those who had seen them ranged from 34 percent to 56 percent during the Italian campaign. During the first weeks after D-Day "disbelief" was at 33 percent. However, only two months later (3 August 1944), although the number of POW's who said they had seen Sykewar leaflets increased enormously (84 percent), the number who expressed "disbelief" had declined to a nearly insignificant proportion (8 percent). During these two months, the Allies had broken through at St. Lo and established themselves firmly on the Continent, and the German generals had made their July 20th attempt to assassinate Hitler. The news was consistently bad, and the German soldier was not getting an adequate account from Nazi sources of events about which he was hearing from Allied sources or witnessing with his own eyes.[26]

However, all this effort to capture German attention was only a necessary preliminary to the ultimate objectives of Sykewar: to destroy the German fighting spirit, undermine the will-to-resist, facilitate the victory of Allied arms. For this task, a credible news service designed to gain the attention of German audiences was not enough.[27] Once German attention had been gained, Sykewar had to present it with a rationale for defeat and defeatism. Those who were disposed to quit resistance had to be encouraged, and those who had decided to quit had to

be told how to do this in ways most useful to the Allied armies. "Telling" in such situations is the art of propaganda, and much depends on *exactly* "what" and "how" people are told. It is for light on these points that we turn to an analysis of Sykewar themes.

The present discussion of Sykewar themes is subject to the following considerations. Neither the preceding description of themes, nor the following account of their distribution, includes the "gray" and "black" output of Sykewar. Because they did not function as official voices of the Allied nations or their armies, the "gray" and "black" operations were *not* bound to use only themes which could be squared with the Strategy of Truth. The range of their activity will be considered in the chapters on techniques and special operations. The present discussion of themes is confined to the output of "white" propaganda which constituted the major operation of Sykewar.

The theme-counts given below were made by tabulating four separate leaflet series, available in The Hoover Library. None of these has been completely reconstituted, nor would the theme-count of any series, even if complete, be identical with that of any other series. Also, "one-shots" have been consistently eliminated from the count. ("One-shots" are themes used in only one leaflet or broadcast, as illustrated in the single leaflet "Hat Der Führer Das Gewollt?" which used Hitler as a main theme.) The count has been made on a 1:1 ratio—that is, one theme per leaflet. Only the main theme of each leaflet has been counted. Systematic exception to this rule has been made for those leaflets whose reverse side treats a theme entirely distinct from, and not explicitly related to, its front side. Two themes are counted in each of these leaflets. For this reason, the total number of themes is in every case slightly larger than the number of leaflets counted.

The latter is an especially important consideration in the interpretation of the following tables, because the vast majority of leaflets used several themes, and tried to relate all of them to some central point. In fact, the attempt to entwine a variety of themes so that they all help to elicit a desired response is essential in any long-term propaganda operation. Finally, a bare theme-count stresses the factor of *frequency* (i.e., repetition), but omits all factors of *intensity,* such as the use of maps, colors, illustrations, type face, and layout.[28] From all these caveats it

is clear that the following tabulations are not intended to give an exhaustive description of the content of Sykewar output, but merely to convey an accurate impression of its major emphases.

The first series counted was the PWD/SHAEF "ZG" series, containing eighty-four leaflets addressed to the Wehrmacht. The results, arranged in order of decreasing frequency, are given in Chart VII, below.

CHART VII. THEME COUNT: 84 ZG LEAFLETS TO WEHRMACHT

Twelve Main Themes	*Number of Occurrences*
Inevitable German defeat	16
West front defeats	15
Save yourself!	14
Good treatment of POW's	13
You are cut off (or surrounded)	11
East front defeats	9
SHAEF notices and instructions	6
"Schluss machen!"	4
What capitulation means	3
Allied strength (especially American materiel)	3
Landser vs. High Command (you have been written off!)	3
Destruction of German towns	2
Total	99

Some of these themes tended to overlap, but distinctions could be made for the purpose of this count by using the literal text of the leaflet. For example, the words "Ergebe Dich!" or even "Rettet Euch!" (counted together in the category "Save yourself!") constituted a fairly specific injunction, and were frequently tied in with such specific announcements to particular units as "You are cut off!" or "You have been written off!" On the other hand, the phrase "Schluss machen!" was a more generalized counsel, and was more frequently used in connection with such themes as "Inevitable German defeat."

The distribution of themes in the ZG leaflets in Chart VII may be compared with that of the "CPH" series given in Chart VIII, following. The ZG series was produced at PWD/SHAEF

for dissemination among the Wehrmacht on the whole western front. The CPH series, of which thirty-nine leaflets were counted, was produced by a special leaflet team with the 9th U. S. Army for dissemination among Wehrmacht units on that army's sector. Consequently, the CPH themes were more "tactical" than the strategic ZG themes. For example, the generalized "Schluss machen!" of the ZG series was replaced with specific points on "*how* to surrender." The tactical theme of "good treatment of prisoners" moved from fourth place to first place in frequency of occurrence.

CHART VIII. THEME COUNT: 39 CPH LEAFLETS TO SMALLER ARMY UNITS

Twelve Main Themes	*Number of Occurrences*
Good treatment of POW's	10
Inevitable German defeat	8
Save yourself!	8
West front defeats	7
You are cut off (or surrounded)	7
How to surrender	3
What capitulation means	3
"We demand unconditional surrender!"	3
Landser vs. officers	3
Suffering of German civilians	3
East front defeats	2
Destruction of German towns	2
Total	59

The third series counted was the PWD/SHAEF "WG" series. This was a group of thirty-eight leaflets, addressed mainly to German civilians in western Germany during a shorter period. For this reason, the theme distribution given in Chart IX, on following page, shows greater variation than the other two series, and is to be considered as somewhat less representative of total Sykewar output.

The emphases in the WG series are clearly quite different from those in the ZG series to the Wehrmacht. The category "Save yourself!" does not exist here in the same sense, since civilians did not have the alternatives of desertion or surrender available to the soldiers. This theme was merged with the idea

CHART IX. THEME COUNT: 38 WG LEAFLETS TO GERMAN CIVILIANS

Six Main Themes	*Number of Occurrences*
Instructions to threatened cities	11
Hasten the end and help yourselves ("Schluss machen!")	9
What Allied occupation means	8
This is the end (inevitable defeat is in sight)	5
Attacks on Nazi leadership	5
(a) Himmler 3	
(b) Wilck 1	
(c) Non-specific 1	
Miscellaneous Special Publics	11
(a) German railway workers. 2	
(b) German women 1	
(c) Foreign workers 8	
Total	49

that civilians could help themselves only by helping to end the war ("Schluss machen!"). Specific leads on how to help end the war were included, as indicated earlier in this chapter, in the form of "Instructions to threatened cities." Particularly revealing of Sykewar's effort to subordinate propaganda to policy were the leaflets dealing with "What Allied occupation means," in which points usually were made by quotation of Roosevelt or Churchill.

A count was made, mainly for purposes of comparison, of a fourth series, an OWI series containing leaflets prepared by the OWI outpost in Switzerland, for general distribution in Germany without regard to special targets. In analyzing this series, it must be remembered that the Bern outpost of OWI was not subject to the control of SHAEF or the propaganda guidance of Sykewar. Further, since it operated on neutral territory, its major output was "gray" (not identified by source). Finally, since its output was addressed to an undifferentiated audience, OWI Bern used a much wider variety of formats and styles than Sykewar. In addition to the standard leaflet formats, its output materials appeared as simulated German newspapers (mainly the *Frankfurter Zeitung),* simulated German postage stamps,

seed packets, wall stickers, pamphlets, and brochures. The count given in Chart X, herewith, which was made on a strict 1:1 ratio without exceptions, excluded these special formats, and included only wall stickers and standard leaflets in its sample of 300 items.

CHART X. THEME COUNT: 300 OWI LEAFLETS TO GERMANY

Thirteen Main Themes	*Number of Occurrences*
Inevitable Nazi defeat	52
Germany vs. Nazis (overt dissension)	49
German hardships under Nazis and war	38
Attacks on Nazi "system"	33
Attacks on Hitler	21
Attacks on Nazi *Bonzen* as a class	19
Attacks on Nazi propaganda	14
Attacks on other Nazi leaders	13
(a) Himmler 7	
(b) Goering 2	
(c) Goebbels 2	
(d) Papen 1	
(e) Rommel 1	
Special Publics	13
(a) Women 5	
(b) Workers 4	
(c) Minorities ..... 4 (one each for Catholics, Bavarians, Austrians, Alsatians)	
"Schluss machen!"	9
Specific Nazi defeats	8
Allied retribution for Nazi crimes	6
Miscellaneous (topical ironies and "one-shots")	25
Total	300

Particularly noteworthy in the distribution of these OWI themes is the large number of direct attacks upon the Nazi leaders, Nazi system, and Nazi propaganda. Of the 300 leaflets counted, exactly one-third (100, according to the count given in Chart X) used such atttacks for their main theme. The frequent attacks on Hitler (21) make an interesting comparison

with Sykewar output, which *never* attacked Hitler personally. A similar contrast to Sykewar themes is revealed by the frequency of OWI attempts openly to exploit frictions within Germany and foster dissension between the Nazis and other Germans, with 49 occurrences under the category "Germany vs. Nazis." This presents a picture quite different from Sykewar output, which followed the instruction of its *Standing Directive* to avoid such *overt* attempts to promote dissension (on the counsel of propagandists at least as far back as Machiavelli that such attempts often boomerang).

One theme which runs consistently high through these series, including the OWI, is that of "inevitable German (Nazi) defeat." This theme has the highest occurrence in two of the series, next highest in the other two series. Taking all four series as a whole, this theme is by far the most frequent in the total sample. The reason for this is fairly obvious. Professor Lasswell gives a lucid account of the point in his study of *Propaganda Technique in the World War:*

> The will to win is intimately related to a chance to win. The thesis of ultimate victory is indispensable to the conduct of war, if discouragement is not to sap determination and to precipitate internal friction and strife. . . . This review of the problem of demoralizing the enemy seems to show that the principal theme is the impossibility of victory. . . .[29]

In concluding this survey, it must be noted that propaganda themes have no independent life of their own. They spin the plot of propaganda stories, but until they are elaborated into a text, and disseminated by some medium of communication, they remain untold stories. The following two chapters describe the Sykewar "how?": the *techniques* by which Sykewar themes were made into texts, and the *media* by which Sykewar texts were disseminated to the German target.[30]

Chapter 7. Notes

1. *Mein Kampf* (New York, 1939), p. 236.
2. Allied Information Service, *L'art de mentir.* No place or date of publication was given, but the brochure may be traced through its serial number FP/108.
3. See the specimen front page of *Frontpost* reproduced in Appendix D.
4. E. T. Lean, *Voices in the Darkness,* p. 99.

5. In a speech broadcast by the BBC, Churchill assailed Hitler as "this wicked man, the repository and embodiment of many forms of soul-destroying hatred, this monstrous product of former wrongs and shame. . . ." (Broadcast, 9 November 1940).

The wartime OWI-Bern attitude toward Hitler, which equally disregarded the Sykewar view, can be seen in the leaflet collection available at The Hoover Library under the title "Propaganda Material Produced by the Office of War Information in Switzerland during the War." Hitler is pictured as everything nasty, from the Grim Reaper to an idiot studying horoscopes. Compare Chart X, page 189, showing the distribution of OWI themes, with the distribution of Sykewar themes given in the other charts in this chapter.

6. A valuable sociological account of this phenomenon is found in Max Weber's studies of "charismatic authority." See his papers edited by Talcott Parsons under the title, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (London, 1947), pp. 329-354.

7. Every Sykewar leaflet was designated by a serial number within the series in which it was placed. The leaflet quoted above was ZG-78, i.e., the 78th leaflet in the ZG series. Unless otherwise noted, all leaflets cited in this chapter are in The Hoover Library.

8. *History: PWD,* p. 23.

9. E. T. Lean, *op. cit.,* p. 183.

10. Lord Vansittart's diatribe against Sykewar ran as follows:

> For years I asked in vain that we should stand up and not suck up to Germany; but although it is impossible to have it both ways in dealing with the German, we went on trying. Then the Americans stepped in, set up their own broadcasting station here, and a department of their own political warfare attached to General Eisenhower. From that moment the situation became hopeless. The Americans outdid us in softness. The Germans got a double daily dose of appeasement instead of one. This did the Germans no good, and nauseated our allies, to whom we seemed dwellers in another world, though here also the Americans achieved a most unenviable advantage. If only we had not been so frightened, in our broadcasts, of appearing anti-German, we should certainly have appeared more human. The plain fact is that much of our broadcasting, particularly our broadcasting in German—and still more American broadcasting—was out of touch and sympathy with the occupied countries. The reason for that was that the voices were those of men with no feeling against Germany. How could we ever expect the Germans to take seriously threats of retribution if we continually undid with one hand what we did with the other? Whenever anyone in this country, including myself, took the strong line, our political warriors got on the air and explained him away in German."

Bones of Contention, p. 35.

11. "Leaflet Operations in the Western European Theater," a final report by Major R. H. Garet to PWD/SHAEF. The text of this report is reproduced as Appendix C to the *History: PWD.*

12. A. H. Leighton, *op. cit.,* p. 93. Leighton's lucid discussion of the thematic content of American propaganda to the Japanese suggests most interesting comparison with the themes here discussed.

13. Hans Speier, "The Future of Psychological Warfare," *loc. cit.*, p. 15. However, see also the warning of Machiavelli, *The Discourses,* Chapter 25 (New York, 1940), p. 371.

14. Churchill, "A World Survey" (Speech to House of Commons, 24 May 1944). Churchill repeated and elaborated this idea, despite opposition, in his next survey to the Commons on 2 August 1944.

15. "Leaflet Operations in the Western European Theater," Section 2b (7)(d). See under note 11, this chapter.

16. See the paper on this subject by Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, "Trends in 20th Century Propaganda," *loc. cit.*

17. "Leaflet Operations . . .," Section 2b (1).

18. *History: P & PW,* p. 129.

19. "Leaflet Operations . . .," Section 2b (5). The quotations which follow are from this section of the report.

20. Cf. leaflets CPH 30, 33, 37. A good specimen of the PWD "attrition leaflet" based on this theme is "Material-Schlacht!" (ZG-81), which is reproduced in Appendix D.

21. The prediction was made by several PWI officers, on the basis of interrogations. See *Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare* for February-March 1945.

22. The complete texts of the "Voice of SHAEF" series of radio broadcasts are reproduced as Appendix B to the *History: PWD.*

23. Cf. "Conditions in Western Germany" (1 January 1945), a PWI consolidated report by Michael Balfour on evacuation west of the Rhine.

24. *Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare* (March-April 1945). See also PWI report by Daniel Lerner, "Notes On a Trip Through Occupied Germany" (18 April 1945).

25. T. O. Beachcroft, *Calling All Nations* (BBC 1942).

26. This survey, along with others of considerable interest for comparison of the campaigns in Italy and France, is reported in H. L. Ansbacher, "Attitudes of German POW's," *loc. cit.*, p. 6. The PWI surveys, which carried the investigation through the whole campaign, show a similar association between the withholding of bad news by German sources and increasing confidence in Allied sources. The logic of this relationship has been stated by Hans Speier:

> Naturally the importance of informative propaganda within the ranks of the enemy is greater when an inconvenient truth has been withheld by his censors or distorted by his deceitful propaganda, or when he has tried to divert attention from it or when its realization requires comparisons of immediate with remote facts. It was an American idea [in World War I] to distribute the same newspaper in the trenches of both the American and German soldiers. Its demoralizing effect was believed to lie simply in its true information.

War in Our Time, p. 313.

27. Dr. Speier claims that "One of the . . . shortcomings of American propaganda during the last war was the lack of political planning beyond the news of the week." Speaking particularly of the civilian agencies in Washington, he notes the following consequence of propaganda conceived

only as a news service: "The most important news during the war was 'produced' in battle and by the statesmen or their ghost writers. The propagandists had virtually no influence on these productions; they functioned as wholesale and retail agents in the news business. Consequently, their prestige within the government was low and their influence limited." "The Future of Psychological Warfare," *loc. cit.,* p. 7.

28. An incisive brief discussion of advanced methods of content analysis is given by H. D. Lasswell, "Describing the Contents of Communications," in *Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion,* B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, R. D. Casey. See also the methods applied by Hans Speier and Margaret Otis, "German Radio Propaganda to France during the Battle of France," in *Radio Research* (New York, 1943), P. F. Lazarsfeld and F. N. Stanton. The authoritative work is by Lasswell, Leites & Associates, *The Language of Politics.*

29. H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War,* pp. 113, 184.

30. Compare the foregoing account with the brief summary of Sykewar themes in C. A. H. Thomson, *op. cit.,* pp. 106-108. Also the examples given, *passim,* by Linebarger, *op. cit.* and L. J. Margolin, *Paper Bullets* (New York, 1946).

Chapter 8

SYKEWAR TECHNIQUES

1. *Long-Term and Short-Term Techniques*

> It is true that you may fool all the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all of the time; but you can't fool all of the people all the time.
>
> —*Abraham Lincoln*

FOR THE PROPAGANDIST, there is still good sense in this aphorism out of the Lincoln apocrypha.[1] It represents a view of human experience which runs through all of modern Western history under some variation of the slogan "Truth will prevail—in the end."[2] Many able contemporary propagandists, and nearly all Sykewarriors, have acknowledged the importance of this concept. They have changed little in their attitude toward it except, under the influence of smart language inherited from the field of commercial publicity, as regards the emphasis of its phrasing: e.g., "Truth needs a trumpet."[3]

Acceptance of the view that truth will prevail in the long run commits the propagandist to a "strategy of truth"—for the long run. As we have seen, such a strategy does not compel the propagandist to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" to everybody on every occasion. Selection and arrangement of "the truth" are inevitable, and must be made carefully by the propagandist. The Sykewar view of the matter has been stated as follows:

> Since the technique of waging a campaign of psychological warfare depends upon the slow building of acceptance by the audience, it follows that truth is the most important ingredient. . . . Such truth, to be sure, can, and sometimes must, be selective, for often the truth is not credible to the enemy. However, selective or not, use by overt propaganda of falsehoods which can be proved false by the enemy is the same as killing the goose that might eventually lay golden eggs.[4]

Implicit in this statement are several operating rules of technique, which were never explicitly formulated but were fairly scrupulously observed by the output sections of Sykewar. These rules may be distinguished as follows:[5]

(1) When there is no good reason to suppress or revise the facts, tell them.

(2) Aside from considerations of "military security," the only good reasons for suppressing or revising the facts are that the audience will not believe them or will detect their inaccuracy.

(3) Every time your audience catches you in a lie, of omission as well as of commission, your power over it is seriously weakened.

(4) For this reason, overt ("white") Sykewar output will *never* tell a lie in which it might be caught by the audience.

The first three rules could apply to any propaganda organization which seeks to win the confidence of its audience on a long-term basis. The fourth point indicates the special condition imposed by Sykewar upon its own "white" propaganda, which was issued in the name of the Anglo-American armies and was therefore regarded by the German audience as "official." There was no obligation to tell all the facts, particularly those facts which would not be believed. There was only the obligation to tell no lies which would be caught. Between these two extremes lay a wide range of "selected facts" from which "white" output was free to draw. In its discussion of Sykewar's long-term tasks, the *Standing Directive* instructed output personnel to "concentrate therefore on those facts which the German soldier can accept as facts, illustrating the inevitability of ultimate defeat." (Section 18)

The long-term campaign to win audience-confidence sometimes used measures which struck some outsiders as fantastic. At the elementary level, it took such forms as beginning a leaflet designed to encourage German surrenders with the bold-face caption:

KRIEGSGEFANGENSCHAFT IST KEIN VERGNÜGEN

This device of disarming enemy skepticism by disclosure, however, continued by explaining why captivity, although no pleasure, was preferable by far to death:

Niemand gibt gerne seine Freiheit auf. Über 800,000 deutsche Soldaten haben sich bisher im Westen ergeben müssen. Nach Gefangennahme wurden die Angehörigen von Kriegsgefangenen durch das Internationale Rote Kreuz benachrichtigt. Keine andere Namensveröffentlichung erfolgte. Sie wie alle anderen Kriegsgefangenen stehen unter dem Schutz des Genfer Abkommens. Sie wären gewiss lieber frei als kriegsgefangenen. Sie hatten sich aber entschieden, dass es in ihrer Lage besser war, Kriegsgefangener zu werden als sinnlos zu sterben. (CPH 21)

(English translation)

CAPTIVITY IS NO PLEASURE

Nobody likes to give up his freedom. Over 800,000 German soldiers have had to surrender in the West: After capture, relatives of prisoners were notified through the International Red Cross. The names were not made public in any other way. They, like all other prisoners of war, are under the protection of the Geneva convention. Certainly they would rather be free than captured. But they had decided that in their situation it was better to be a prisoner of war than to die a senseless death.

Other leaflets (e.g., ZG-100, CPH-15) developed even further this effort to win confidence and prisoners simultaneously. One PWD leaflet, for example, followed the caption KEIN VERGNÜGEN with a "frank admission" that no self-respecting German soldier surrendered because captivity promised special benefits. However, it went on to say that 850,000 of "your comrades" had surrendered because they "had to." (We have already noted the peculiar susceptibility of Germans to the modal verb *müssen*.) This reasonable leaflet went on to state the inescapable conclusion: "Better free than prisoner. Better prisoner than dead."

Nein, Kriegsgefangenschaft ist kein Vergnügen. Kaum einer der 850,000 Deiner Kameraden, die im Westen in Kriegsgefangenschaft geraten sind, hat sich ergeben, weil das Leben als Gefangener besonders zusagt. Sie mussten sich aber ergeben. Und immer häufiger passiert es Kameraden, dass sie sich entscheiden müssen, ob sie den Frieden erleben wollen oder sich in hoffnungsloser Lage opfern. Und sie entscheiden sich:

LIEBER FREI ALS KRIEGSGEFANGENER.
LIEBER KRIEGSGEFANGENER ALS TOT.
(ZG-100)

(English translation)

No, captivity is no pleasure. Hardly one of your 850,000 comrades, who have landed in captivity in the West, surrendered because the life of a prisoner seemed especially promising. They had to surrender. And it happens ever more frequently that comrades have to decide whether they want to live to see the peace or to sacrifice themselves in a hopeless situation. And they decide:

BETTER FREE THAN A PRISONER OF WAR.
BETTER A PRISONER OF WAR THAN DEAD.

The dilemma posed in this leaflet was, formally, so patently false that any German soldier could "see through" it. If used prematurely, it would be certain to arouse antagonism rather than compliant action. It was reserved, therefore, for situations to which it applied so clearly that its formal fallacy would antagonize none but the logicians among its audience. Personnel responsible for the dissemination of such leaflets were instructed that they must be used only against combat troops *actually* in a losing, if not hopeless, situation. With German soldiers in the rear (the celebrated "Etappenschweine"), no effective results could be achieved by posing the soldier's dilemma as a choice between captivity or death. These terms simply did not apply. For the soldier in losing combat, however, the dilemma was quite "real": other soldiers in his outfit were being killed pretty regularly. (The phrase "passiert es Kameraden" in the above leaflet illustrates the technique, discussed in Chapter 7, of depicting captivity as something which "just happened" to soldiers.)

On the more complex "strategic" level of output, the attempt to build audience-confidence went even further. The BBC made it almost a fetish to stress Allied setbacks, or to emphasize those items in the news which seemed unfavorable to the Allied cause. The psychological analysis from which this procedure derived is indicated as follows by a BBC commentator:

> What thoughts must have awakened in minds used to such denials [of losses by the Nazis] on hearing London give the loss of a cruiser its fair prominence, or begin, "The news from the Pacific is grave," when the Afrika Korps was decimated and Moscow was out of danger? The stray listener was probably tempted to come again; the radio criminal, who had heard the

truth from us about defeat, can scarcely have doubted the victories.[6]

Sykewar followed the same line, not only sticking to the facts good or bad, but even omitting favorable items which might be disbelieved among the German audiences, thereby lessening their confidence in our truthfulness. In response to a questionnaire from this writer, Martin F. Herz, chief leaflet writer at PWD, and one of Sykewar's ablest craftsmen, has made the following statement about a leaflet used in Italy (FL-19), which described the treatment of German POW's in Canada:

> Experiments with POW's showed conclusively that the facts, although true, seemed so fantastic that they considered them the crassest "propaganda." The leaflet was consequently discarded. The rule was adopted that "propaganda must not only be true, but also credible: if truth seems exaggerated, we must deliberately understate it." For instance, although some prisoners got eggs for breakfast, we did not mention it in leaflets after it was found out that the balance of the leaflet was disbelieved because our assertion seemed too incredible.

Such considerations influenced also the "black" operators, although their intention usually was to make audience-confidence "pay off" decisively at some specific tactical point. In other words, black operators were ready to stop telling the truth at any point where their *immediate* purpose could be served better by lies. One participant in "Operation Annie," a black radio operation carried out at 12th AG, has stressed the importance of this point on the "tactical" level:

> The accuracy and freshness of our news made Annie attractive to German Battalion commanders. That was important, for when our armies were ready to try for a quick break-through to the Rhine, Annie was to forsake truth and become an instrument of deception.[7]

Although "strategic" white Sykewar never attempted to make this kind of direct exploitation of audience-confidence on the combat level, it did use the techniques of "sober and factual" reporting to achieve certain broad psychological reactions that could be manipulated among the audience in which confidence had been built up. This it did with rather more subtlety than some of the "black" operators, and with considerable difference of emphasis. Occasionally, however, "black" operators "justi-

fied" their use of "truth" on the same grounds as "white" operators. The point is illustrated by the following account of how "Operation Annie" decided to treat the surprise offensive launched by von Rundstedt in the Ardennes just before Christmas 1944:

> The decision was to roll with the German punch, accept the German propaganda line, be frank about our retreats and our losses, admit our chagrin and, without openly saying it, assist Goebbels in every way to make the German people believe that the tide of war had changed in their favor. If this was done properly, the letdown that would follow the American counter-push might be sufficiently widespread to start the disintegration process which is the goal of war propaganda.[8]

Interesting experiments with the Strategy of Truth were attempted by the Sykewar radio unit which broadcast to the besieged German garrison at Lorient. "For instance, in one case, after capture of a doctor, the names of many V-D infected girls in the town were broadcast."[9] A more striking case resulted from this unit's broadcast statements that any German soldier in Lorient who surrendered would, if he decided he did not like captivity, be returned to his own lines. One German sergeant, after a short stay, indeed requested that he be returned. Sykewar personnel suspected he was a "plant" and decided to make the most of him. They loaded him with rations and cigarets, and returned him to the German lines:

> The German sergeant's return home became the sensation of Lorient for the next few days, and there were various rumors as to the reasons for his release. . . . Shortly thereafter, even the official town newspaper carried the statement that our pledge to the Germans had been kept—thereby gaining for the station an official reputation for truthfulness and increasing our effectiveness immeasurably.[10]

The Strategy of Truth bore most weightily upon personnel concerned with making "white" propaganda, because "white" was the Sykewar effort most consistently devoted to building and keeping a large audience. But all Sykewar operations, including "gray" and "black," were involved in the Strategy of Truth in the degree that they aimed at maintaining audience-confidence. This indicates that much of the usual distinction between overt ("white") and covert ("gray" and "black") out-

put is misleading. The basic distinction in practice was between techniques used to support a short-term, as contrasted with a long-term, campaign.[11]

2. *Basic Techniques: Factualism and Indirection*

To an appreciable extent, Sykewar planners took cognizance of this fact. The *Standing Directive* (Section 17), in its discussion of the techniques to be used by output personnel, made its basic division in these categories:

(1) Long-term tasks
(2) Short-term tasks, pre-D-Day
(3) Short-term tasks, post-D-Day

The differences among the tasks and techniques allocated under these rubrics are elaborated in the *Directive* itself (Sections 18-20). However, careful examination of its prescriptions for the execution of each of these tasks reveals a pervasive Sykewar technique common to all: the technique of *indirection* (based on "factual and objective" output). In paragraph after paragraph outlining Sykewar tasks, the *Directive* instructs output personnel to avoid "all boasting or sneering," "ideological dissertations," "open appeals," anything "which looks like commercial publicity." For the purposes subsumed under long-term tasks, the following general instruction was issued:

> Throughout this phase all psychological warfare in all media, whether tactical or strategic, will remain factual and objective, avoiding terms, phrases, or pictures which the German soldier will dismiss as "propaganda." (Section 18)

For the execution of the short-term tasks preceding D-Day, the *Directive* again cautioned output personnel: "Do not try to heighten the tension by a deliberate war of nerves. The German will see through this and dismiss it as propaganda." (Section 19) The same line was repeated in the outline of short-term tasks following D-Day: "The treatment should remain formal and objective, and avoid boasting or creating an atmosphere of undue excitement." (Section 20)

The techniques of indirection were recommended in every case. The facts, it was held, when skillfully arranged and presented, would speak for themselves. The *Directive* advised: "Treat the German as a man who, if openly incited by the

enemy to cowardice, will do the opposite." (Section 18) Or again, in discussing the Sykewar line on strategic bombing:

> "Fear propaganda" designed to intensify the effect of bombs has been rendered unnecessary by the bombs themselves. . . . Avoid giving any impression that we are trying to break German morale. Seek *indirectly* to arouse resentment against the fact that air power, which the Nazis claimed as their invention, has now been turned against Germany. (Section 19)

The basis for factualism, which was an application of the Strategy of Truth to the writing of propaganda texts, has already been discussed. The basis for indirection was an estimate of the responses which the human organism makes to verbal symbols offered by an enemy in time of war. In general, even cursory examination of the record, or reflection on the logic of the situation, supports the view that the enemy's symbols are naturally suspect. Those themes or symbols which obviously serve the enemy's interests are worse than useless: They not only fail to secure the desired effect, but often encourage the reverse effect and usually put the audience on guard against his enemy's further efforts. The point has been applied summarily to early Sykewar attempts to promote dissension, by Major Herz:

> Divisive propaganda—which our side attempted as regards German Army and SS, or field soldiers and Nazi party—nearly always was a failure when attempted by white media. Reason: the motivation of the enemy is too obvious.[12]

With the German audience that Sykewar faced in 1944-45, this factor was especially important. What may be called the "propaganda case-history of the target," a factor whose importance has not been explicitly recognized by students of propaganda, illustrates the point. The German soldiers and civilians to whom Sykewar spoke were people who had grown up with the legend that Allied propaganda (assisted by a "stab in the back" from the home front) had lost them World War I. Now, in World War II, the same enemy again directed his propaganda against the Germans, in greater quantity and with improved techniques. Further, the Goebbels machine had thoroughly diabolized Allied intentions toward the Germans, in advance of any statements Sykewar might make. Clearly, a thick layer of skepticism separated Sykewar from its German target. In these circumstances, Sykewar had little recourse other than

to a systematic factualism, the "sachliche Darstellung" of which Germans are reputed to be particularly fond.[13]

Indirection was, of course, a technique by which Sykewar made facts serve its purpose. The historian of 12th AG, as usual, puts the matter plainly:

> The *Frontpost* never lost sight of the fact that they were propagandists first and journalists afterwards. In other words, they did not regard it as their function merely to supply the German troops with news, but to score propaganda points through the printing of news.[14]

The propaganda points to be scored were all on the same counting-board: the inevitability of the German defeat, hopelessness of further resistance, and consequent desirability (for the Germans) of early surrender. Along this line, the Sykewar attack on German morale was drawn. Whatever the starting point, this was the line to which all Sykewar themes returned.

The importance of this unified line of attack can be seen by comparison with that of World War I. Dr. George C. Bruntz, an historian of Allied propaganda in World War I, has classified its output in the following five types:[15]

(1) enlightenment
(2) despair
(3) hope
(4) particularistic
(5) revolutionary

In World War II, as indicated earlier, Sykewar eliminated all revolutionary propaganda, largely on the basis of Allied war policy (Unconditional Surrender) and target intelligence, i.e., no usable German revolutionists were available. Particularistic propaganda was eliminated on the same basis, i.e., separatist sentiment was neither strong nor usable.[16] Propaganda of hope was eliminated on the basis of Allied policy, i.e., Unconditional Surrender and Allied Military Government. Propaganda of "enlightenment," in the limited sense of propaganda which makes use of accurate factual information, was abundant. Whatever the function of "enlightenment" in World War I, however, its intent in World War II was not to enlighten but to cause despair.[17] The propaganda of despair, in Dr. Bruntz's term, was in fact the inclusive category of Sykewar output in World War II.

The reason for this was discussed at the end of the preceding chapter.

3. *Technical Devices*

It must not be supposed that Sykewar output, because its ultimate theme was the counsel of despair, became a continuing record of unrelieved gloom. Devices to attract and hold the attention of the German audience were plentiful. All these devices, however, were planned ultimately to attract the audience to the facts which would make them despair, rather than to divert them from these facts. The 12th AG historian writes:

> It was felt by the editorial staff that a publication containing nothing but news which, from the viewpoint of the German soldier, was depressing, discouraging and hard to take would soon arouse a feeling of hostility and revulsion. Every effort was made, therefore, to produce a paper which, while directed as a whole at the objectives above, would be eminently readable. To this end all the devices learned through journalistic experience on two continents were employed. These devices ranged from the sober, factual presentation of major news stories in the manner of the *N. Y. Times,* through the eye-catching tricks and human interest appeals of the Hearst press and the boulevard papers in Europe. It was felt that any and all of these devices, so long as the basic rule of truth was not violated, were justified as being methods by which propaganda shafts would easily and certainly find their targets.[18]

The normal journalistic devices were used also in determining the production, treatment, and even subject matter of most printed propaganda issued by Sykewar. Great attention was paid to such production features as layout, headlines, art work, type faces, and quality of printing. Occasionally, secret German documents captured by the Allies were reprinted in Sykewar newspapers or leaflets under the bold heading GEHEIM! (secret). The intention was "to give the German soldier the feeling that he was getting a peek into matters not intended for his eyes, as in fact was the case."[19] An excellent illustration of this device is the leaflet CPH-11, which is available in The Hoover Library.

Sykewar selection of subjects, as well as the techniques by which they were treated, also followed the journalistic formulas, particularly on the "tactical" level. The aim was to produce "clear, concise stories unencumbered by useless details and ex-

traneous comment." Some of the subjects treated were closely analogous to the features characteristic of American army newspapers: e.g., "Aus der Kompanie" (Company Items) and "Streiflichter aus der Wehrmacht" (Sidelights from the Wehrmacht). Columns like these were put into Sykewar newspapers to German soldiers in the belief that the *Landser,* like the GI, would rather gossip and giggle than cerebrate and puzzle.

Humor, too, was fashioned to fit popular German tastes and, in "tactical" output, played an important part among the techniques intended to catch and hold the attention of the audience.[20] The content of these jokes was designed, sometimes a bit heavy-handedly, but more often quite cleverly, to "score propaganda points." The historian of 12th AG records the dependence of current humor on intelligence reporting, and indicates the validity of the instructions on propaganda strategy given by the *Standing Directive* (cited in the preceding chapter):

> Though cleverness may heighten the effectiveness of combat radio, there is no substitute for accurate intelligence. Whenever, under proper conditions, accurate and ample intelligence has been available, combat radio has succeeded. Where intelligence has been lacking, the results have been negative, or at least non-apparent.[21]

Two types of humor used by Sykewar may be mentioned to illustrate the range of its efforts. One was a regular feature of Radio Luxembourg, broadcast as "Corporal Tom Jones." Tom was represented as a typical American GI, friendly and easy-going by nature, with a keen sense of fair play and a deep-rooted love of justice. Because he grew up in the Green Bay area of Wisconsin among a large German population, it was explained, Tom had learned to speak German in his youth. He spoke in the open and candid manner which many Europeans used to associate with Americans (before their liberation or occupation). His broadcasts ended with a "joke"—usually a *gemütlich* little story with a comical aspect, but invariably with a moral lesson.

Richard F. Hanser, the Sykewar broadcaster who played the role of "Tom Jones," has responded to this writer's questionnaire with the following description:

> The originality lay in creating a simple, homey character talking to the enemy as man to man—not as merely a disembodied voice representing the U.S. Army or the U. S. government. "Tom" was designed to create a recognizable personality to which listeners could respond with some warmth and interest, and in this we evidently succeeded. Tom spoke with an atrocious American accent, which was all to the good; there was no suspicion that he was a German-born turncoat. He told human-interest anecdotes in a simple and even naive way, which left him free of the taint of cleverness, sharp dealing or underhanded needling. And he finished off each night's stint with a joke—an anti-Nazi joke, to be sure, but still something you could laugh at and pass on to a neighbor or fellow-soldier. As [one] can see from the comments of PW's and others, the joke was a great factor in Tom's appeal.[22]

There was adequate evidence that Tom's "jokes" were well received by his audience (although there is little reliable evidence concerning the size and composition of that audience).[23]

Another type of Sykewar humor, at the other end of the laughter scale from Tom's "jokes," aimed at producing the wry grin of despair. Quite early in the campaign, PWI interrogators discovered from their conversations with POW's that a special variety of humor was current among the Germans, and particularly among the Wehrmacht. This variety the Germans themselves had aptly named *Galgenhumor*—literally "gallows humor," the bitter jest of the man condemned to die. An illustration of "Galgenhumor" was the response given by a young SS captain, taken captive shortly after the appearance of the Germans' fearsome Royal Tiger tank, and with V-2 in the air, to a Sykewar interrogator's query whether he knew of any new German secret weapons. "Oh, yes," was the SS captain's deadpan reply, "we've got a new tank with a 150-man crew. One man steers and 149 push."[24]

Naturally, Sykewar adopted *Galgenhumor* for its very own, and exploited the self-pity and despair from which it derived to encourage surrenders. The V-2 weapon, which was no laughing matter to the inhabitants of London and Liège, was treated in the *Galgenhumor* fashion in the leaflet whose text is given below. The joke about V-2, which had not yet made its appearance, despite considerable advance publicity by the Nazis, had been disclosed by PWI interrogation to be current and widely

known in the 183rd V.G. Division. Accordingly, it was made the "punch-line" of the leaflet addressed to this Division.

"GALGENHUMOR": 9th U.S. ARMY LEAFLET (CPH-2)

VOLKSGRENADIERE

Der 183. Division:

Unser Panzerpflug ist keine Geheimwaffe. Wir Amerikaner zeigen Euch offen unsere Waffen.

Unsere stark bewaffneten Panzerpflüge begraben viele von Euch lebendig in Euern Schützenlöchern. Lt. Schneps befahl den Männern des 1. und 3. Zuges (6/343 I.R.) die Pflüge einbrechen zu lassen und die nachfolgende amerikanische Infanterie anzugreifen. So wurden rund 60 Mann wehrlos in ihren Erdlöchern stehend zugedeckt. Lt. Schneps ist für ihren Tod alleinverantwortlich. Ihr Tod hat ihm das E.K. I eingebracht.

Eure beste Abwehr gegen Panzerpflüge:

SETZT V-2* EIN!

*V-2 bedeutet beide Arme zur ehrenvollen Übergabe zu erheben.

(English translation)

PEOPLES' GRENADIERS

Of the 183rd Division:

Our tank-plow is no secret weapon. We Americans openly show you our weapons.

Our heavily armed tank-plows bury many of you alive in your fox holes. Lt. Schneps ordered the men of the first and third platoons (6/343 I.R.) to let the plows through and to attack the American infantry which followed them. In that way about 60 men were buried in their fox holes without a chance to defend themselves. Lt. Schneps alone is responsible for their death. Their death has brought him the Iron Cross, first class.

Your best defense against tank-plows:

USE V-2!*

*V-2 means to raise both arms in honorable surrender.

The "tank-plow" which figures so prominently in this leaflet was simply the name German soldiers had given to the American bulldozer. The front side of this leaflet showed an enormous head-on view of a bulldozer with the caption, "Vorschlag zur Abwehr" (Proposal for Defense). This leaflet was used heavily, and apparently with notable effects, by the 2nd Armored Division.

Not all these devices used at the subordinate "tactical" echelons could be used at the SHAEF level. PWD, which issued "strategic" propaganda on behalf of the Supreme Commander, the Allied armies in Europe, and the Allied governments, did not indulge its own or German humor. Its tone remained at all times "sober and factual." In the language of the *Standing Directive:* "All psychological warfare will give the impression of Anglo-American reliability, reticence, soldierly dignity and decency." (Section 18) This instruction supported the long-term aim of "white" Sykewar: the image of the Allies to be transmitted to the German publics was that of a calm, confident, disciplined, reasonable, and responsible authority.

It seems clear that the limited range of Sykewar themes did not seriously restrict its use of the technical devices available to the propagandist. To illustrate briefly, one may recall that the prewar Institute for Propaganda Analysis arranged propaganda devices in the following seven main categories: glittering generalities, band-wagon, name-calling, card-stacking, plain folks, transfer, and testimonial.[25] In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear at a glance that Sykewar used most of these devices. Name-calling, for example, a stratagem to which Nazi propaganda was particularly prone, figured less prominently but perhaps more subtly among Sykewar techniques.[26] Occasionally, Sykewar would even use a fairly brazen version of one or another of these devices, such as the band-wagon appeal of the "Unit Surrender Pass." This leaflet was serialized as ZG-102 produced by PWD. Its text, appearing over the facsimile signature of General Eisenhower, and bearing the official seals of the British and American armies, was as follows:

EINHEITS–PASS

FÜR KOMPANIEN, BATAILLONE UND ANDERE KAMPFEINHEITEN

Dieser Einheitspass ist für die Übergabe grösserer Einheiten—Kompanien, Bataillone und andere Kampfgruppen—zu verwenden. Dieser Einheitspass ersetzt eine vom Kompaniechef (Bataillons-Kmdr., Kommandeur der Kampfgruppe usw.) gezeichnete Urkunde der Übergabe. Der Einheitspass muss vom Kompaniechef (Bataillons-Kmdr., Kommandeur der Kampfgruppe usw.) oder dessen beglaubigtem Vertreter überbracht werden. Der Überbringer des Einheitspasses verpflichtet sich, die betreffende Einheit ohne Widerstand zu übergeben. Die Einheit wird sogleich in ihrer Gänze aus der Kampfzone entfernt. Der Einheit ist, wie allen kriegsgefangenen deutschen Soldaten, die strikte Befolgung der Genfer Abmachungen zugesichert. (Siehe Rückseite dieses Dokumentes.) Im Nachstehenden sind die alliierten Vorposten angewiesen, dem Überbringer dieses Einheitspasses seine Aufgabe nach Tunlichkeit zu erleichtern.

(English translation)

UNIT–PASS

FOR COMPANIES, BATTALIONS AND OTHER COMBAT UNITS

This Unit Pass is to be used for the surrender of larger units, such as companies, battalions and other units. This unit pass takes the place of a document signed by the company commander (battalion commander, commander of a combat group, etc.). The unit pass must be delivered up by the company commander (battalion commander, commander of a combat group, etc.) or by his authorized deputy. The bearer of the unit pass agrees to surrender the unit in question without resistance. The unit in its entirety is taken out of the fighting zone immediately. Strict adherence to the Geneva Convention is guaranteed to the unit, as to all captured German soldiers. (See reverse side of this document.) The allied advance guards are instructed herewith to do everything possible to facilitate the mission of the bearer of this unit pass.[27]

Along the borders were printed the following two instructions: "Sofort an Einheitsführer Weitergeben!" (Pass on to Unit

Commander immediately) and "Ersetzt Eine Urkunde der Übergabe!" (Replaces a Surrender Document).

The Sykewar use of "transfer" was indicated by the instruction, already cited from the *Standing Directive,* on how to treat Allied bombing: "Seek indirectly to arouse resentment against the fact that air power, which the Nazis claimed as their invention, has now been turned against Germany." (Section 19)

The Sykewar use of "card-stacking" usually was even more discreet. The preceding section quoted several admonitions from the *Standing Directive* against any attempts at the blatant and transparent shuffling of facts. Where the cards were stacked, as in the leaflets which posed the German soldier's dilemma as a choice between surrender and death, the hand was not to be dealt until the *Landser* was down to his last chips. These admonitions derived from the basic Strategy of Truth, and were generally observed by output personnel.

Other devices which went into the making of Sykewar texts require no detailed description, for they were the devices employed in most propaganda activity and have been examined elsewhere in this text. Their range, however, may be indicated briefly. An important device was the use of maps to present, vividly and without comment, the discouraging situation in which the Germans found themselves.[28] Other devices exploiting the technique of graphic presentation are illustrated by the leaflets in Appendix D.[29] Sykewar used, as well, all the usual devices of audio-stimulation, such as special signatures (e.g., the famous telegraphic V-sign), musical leitmotivs, etc. The BBC carried this device rather far:

> Each military campaign had its own signature tune: *Die Wacht am Rhein* for the Battle of France; *Wir fahren gegen Engelland* for naval victories against England; *Bomben auf England* for air attacks; *Prinz Eugen* for the Balkans; and a combination of Liszt's symphonic poem *Les Preludes* with part of the Horst Wessel chorus *Kameraden, Die Rotfront und Reaktion erschossen,* for the invasion of the USSR.[30]

Patrick Gordon-Walker made extensive use of this device in Radio Luxembourg broadcasts to the foreign workers of various nationalities in Germany.

More important than any device as such was the propagandist's "sense of timing" about when to use them—the special

skill involved in accurately picking the "psychological moment" to launch a theme, to abandon it, or even, curiously enough, to keep quiet. One of the most spectacular successes of pre-invasion broadcasting has been judged by many to have lost effectiveness because it was prematurely launched and built up:

> The V-campaign (of the BBC) came in many ways too early. As a perfect plan it should obviously have immediately preceded invasion of the continent.[31]

On the technique of silence, it was strongly argued—during the period of the Falaise Gap and the Ardennes offensive—that silence to the German front soldiers was Sykewar's best course. The psychological reasoning was based on our knowledge that at least those German troops in the actual fighting had been cut off from their normal sources of information. Hence, it was argued, an effective technique initially would be to say nothing from the Allied side until the fear which is associated with isolation in combat had been increased to a point at which receptivity to Sykewar surrender suggestions was maximized. The point has been made by the Spanish psychiatrist Emilio Mira:

> More simply, the unforeseen is more dreadful than the certain and immediate. The knowledge of what will occur is less terrifying than ignorance or doubt. Men frequently feel more hopeless and miserable when unsure of their fate than when death is a certainty.[32]

The military reasoning on this situation has been reported by General Eisenhower's Naval Aide, Captain Harry C. Butcher (USNR).[33]

Special note must be taken, in passing, of one technique which figured quite prominently in Sykewar output—the technique of logical argument. Much useless, and some useful, discussion has concerned itself with the dubious dichotomy of rational-emotional appeals.[34] What is here asserted is only that much of Sykewar's output sought to persuade on the basis of reflection rather than simple neuromuscular response. One characteristic which distinguished this technique from the devices just outlined may be described as follows: What was offered as a syllogism usually turned out to be, indeed, a syllogism and not an enthymeme; and the major premise, if not always precisely accurate, was at least susceptible of verification.[35] Supplementing

the other devices, which sought to engage the focus of attention among potential German audiences, the technique of rational discussion sought to exploit the attention thus gained among intelligent Germans (and it was presumed that a large number of those who regularly attended to enemy propaganda were intelligent). The "strategic" broadcasts of Lindley Fraser and William Harlan Hale were models of persuasive rational discussion, as were a large number of the "strategic" leaflets of Martin F. Herz.

The interest of all these technical devices, for the present discussion, lies mainly in their application to the themes that Sykewar selected for its campaign against German morale. It was this application of techniques to themes that produced the propaganda texts which were actually transmitted to the Germans. The process can best be seen from a consideration of representative texts.

4. *Analysis of Representative Texts*

The techniques used in elaborating Sykewar themes into texts ranged, we have seen, from homey humor to stern instructions. The devices employed had to be in accord with the intention of the text, and this intention was always in terms of the German response which Sykewar wanted to elicit. Did Sykewar wish to convince Germans to stop resistance in their city? A "Voice of SHAEF" broadcast was better suited to this purpose than the jokes of "Tom Jones," and an "Instruction to Threatened Cities" leaflet signed by General Eisenhower was more suitable than a leaflet jesting grimly about V-2.

If, on the other hand, the intention was the more generalized one of spreading discouragement, this purpose could be served by such a light-hearted leaflet as the following:

WENN MEINE TANTE RÄDER HÄTTE

. . . wäre sie schon längst an der Westfront eingesetzt.

Denn alles, was Räder hat und was sich fortbewegen kann, muss heran, um den unaufhaltsamen Strom amerikanischen Kriegsmaterials zu dämmen.

Daher die russischen Kanonen, die tschechischen Panzer, die französischen Maschinengewehre, daher auch die tartarischen Legionäre, die georgischen Hilfstruppen, der slawische Tross.

Mit diesem Mischmasch kann man doch nicht Krieg führen! Da gibt's eben nur eins:

SCHLUSS MACHEN! (MW-110)

(English translation)

IF MY AUNT HAD WHEELS

. . . she would long ago have been activated on the Western Front.

Because everything that has wheels and can move must get there in order to dam up the irresistible stream of American war material.

That explains the Russian cannon, the Czech tanks, the French machine guns. That explains also the Tartaric Legionnaires, the Georgian auxiliary troops and the Slavic services of supply.

With this mishmash one cannot fight a war! There is only one solution:

END IT!

This leaflet begins with a traditional German jest, *Wenn meine Tante Räder hätte, dann wäre sie ein Omnibus* (If my aunt had wheels, she would be an omnibus). Used in this context, the phrase played semantic tricks on the increasing skepticism in the Wehrmacht about the chances of German victory. The caption was intended to catch the reader's eye and lead it quickly down the corridors of improbability to the only logical exit: "SCHLUSS MACHEN!" For this reason, the art work of the leaflet was simple: a delightful cartoon of an elderly auntie on her way to war, with wheels instead of legs and a parasol slung over her shoulder in the place of a rifle. The layout spread the brief text, in very clear type, over lots of white space. The "argument" of the text was concise, and was strung on a bare minimum of logic. And the language was the hearty colloquialism of the *Landser:* "Mit diesem Mischmasch kann man doch nicht Krieg führen! Da gibt's eben nur eins . . ."

Sykewar techniques, and the characteristic devices they employed, were thus a function of Sykewar intention in any given text. Since Sykewar intentions were broad in scope and few in number, they could readily be "typed" and categorized. The following eight categories were actually used by Sykewar to characterize the techniques and contents of its output. They are illustrated in each case by brief comment on a representative

PWD leaflet. (All these leaflets are reproduced in facsimile in Appendix D.): [36]

(1) *"Official Statement" or Policy Leaflets* (ZG-61, "Passierschein"). This "Safe-Conduct" (Passierschein) was generally regarded as the most successful leaflet produced by Sykewar. Based on an idea found in Soviet combat leaflets, it was developed to its final stage on the basis of detailed POW interrogations. Major Herz, who was largely responsible for its development, states that it went through five stages, progressively eliminating objectionable features and absorbing desirable features suggested by interrogation of POW's.[37]

The intention of this leaflet was clearly to provide German soldiers willing to surrender with an authority for doing so. Everything about the leaflet was designed to appear *authoritative:* the format, handsomely engraved on good paper in a rich color, has been described as "looking like a college diploma"; [38] the language of the text was formal and official; the art work consisted mainly of the British and American army seals and the signature of General Eisenhower as "Supreme Commander."

(2) *"Strategic" Leaflets* (WG-27K, "Anweisungen Zur Lebensrettung"). These leaflets dealt with long-run problems of the war faced by Germans, civilian or military, and their intention was to produce a long-run attitude toward these problems desired by the Allies. In terms of technique, these leaflets ranked just below the "official statement" type in sobriety of presentation and dignity of tone. They omitted the Allied seals and Eisenhower's signature, and used little or no fancy art work. They neither debated nor discussed; they merely asserted. Often, as in the leaflet cited above, they contained instructions, obliquely stated, as though they were merely statements about "the facts of the situation."

(3) *"Attrition" Leaflets* (WG-50, "Sie Kommen"). This type of leaflet dealt mainly with "the inevitable advance of the Allied tidal wave," for the intention was to persuade Germans that their defeat was inevitable and further resistance was hopeless. Chief reliance here was on the themes of "Allied material superiority" and the consequent "inevitable German defeat." The techniques varied from the strident melodrama of the leaflet cited above to calmer "statements of the facts." "Sie Kommen" (They are coming) used a background of Allied plane formations which covered the whole face of the leaflet

(i.e., Allied airpower blotting out the German sky). Over this background was repeated, in type face of increasing size, the phrase "Sie Kommen." This tone, achieved largely by flashy art work, was found more commonly in leaflets produced at the lower echelons (e.g., CPH-3E, "Habt Ihr Uns Gehört?" and CPH-9E, "Der Angriff"). The calmer presentation of these themes is illustrated, in Appendix D, by the leaflet ZG-81 ("Material-schlacht!").

(4) *General "Tactical" Leaflets* (ZG-108, "Eine Minute, Die Dir Das Leben Retten Kann"). This type of leaflet was intended to cover the generic situation of combat. "It was designed for distribution to areas of stiff enemy resistance, and again and again proved its effectiveness in prisoner returns. Its lack of any political appeal, and its short-term soldier-to-soldier language, seem to have been among the factors of its success."[39] We shall see below that the type of caption used on this leaflet occurred frequently in Sykewar output, perhaps indicating, among other things, a lingering awe of the magic of numbers (among Sykewarriors as well as Germans?).

(5) *Specific "Tactical" Leaflets* (ZG-98, "Der Letzte Versuch"). Such leaflets were written to meet a specific situation in a specific area, with the intention of exploiting local developments for Sykewar purposes. The leaflet cited was directed to Wehrmacht units in the West after the failure of the Ardennes counteroffensive. It gives three reasons why the German high command "had to" undertake this last effort, and five reasons why it "had to" fail. These reasons look like a recapitulation of the major Sykewar themes.

Most leaflets of this type were written at the lower echelons, where local information was most readily accessible in time to be useful. The tactical CPH series contains numerous examples: e.g., CPH-6, "Geilenkirchen Umzingelt!"; CPH-7, "Würselen Abgeriegelt"; CPH-14, "Deutsche Soldaten in Brachelen"; CPH-15, "Würm im Kessel!"; and CPH-31E, "Lebendige Zielscheiben." A particularly interesting example of the specific tactical leaflet is MD-109, "Höhe 192." Headed by a picture of "Hill 192," this leaflet addressed itself to the "soldiers of the 5th Paratroop Regiment" and began with these staccato sentences: "Hill 192 was your left flank-guard. Hill 192 was a strong point, defended by your comrades of the 9th Paratroop Regiment. HILL 192 FELL THE NIGHT BEFORE LAST."

(6) *"Tactical Contingency" Leaflets* (ZG-86, "Ihr Seid Jetzt Abgeschnitten"). These were prepared to cover commonly recurring combat situations, like that of a German unit which had been surrounded, cut off, or bypassed by advanced Allied troops. Large numbers of such leaflets were held in readiness to be dropped immediately, whenever one of these situations occurred. Their texts and technical devices differed somewhat from those of the leaflets written to cover specific tactical situations. "Contingency" leaflets could not draw pictures of the surrounded town or name names, since the exact place where they might be dropped usually could not be foreseen. They merely characterized the situation (e.g., "You are now cut off!" in the above leaflet). They relied more heavily, therefore, on the general Sykewar themes which were illustrated by such "tactical contingencies."

(7) *News Leaflets* (ZG-34, "Generale Proklamieren Friedensregierung"). The intention of these leaflets was to penetrate "the Nazi news blockade" with the purpose—ancillary to the purpose of Sykewar newspapers in bringing Germans news which they did not receive from Nazi-controlled sources—of getting the Allied view of highly important events to the German reader *before* his mind-set had been conditioned by the Nazi news treatment of the event. The leaflet cited, which dealt with the 20th of July putsch, is an excellent illlustration. It deftly introduces the Allied slant with the phrase "gab Hitler zu" (Hitler admitted) in the opening sentence. "Such leaflets were rushed into print whenever an event occurred of sufficient importance to warrant such treatment. They were in addition to the regular daily news sheets, and were distributed in great quantity. They were usually the first information on the subject matter received by the rank and file of the enemy's front-line troops." [40]

(8) *Civilian "Action-type" Leaflets* (ZG-121, "Das War Dürwiss"). The action leaflets to civilians, based on the technique of indirect instruction, have already been discussed. The leaflet here cited illustrates the use of this technique. Under an air photo of the ruined town of Dürwiss, the text says that this once-peaceful village might have come through the war untouched, except that a small group of fanatics tried to use it as a strong point, thereby making it a target for Allied bombers, which promptly destroyed it. The obvious moral: "Those who

do not live in areas of military targets can prevent their home towns from becoming military targets." [41]

The technique of indirection, in elaborating "action" themes, was also predominant in leaflets addressed to soldiers. Illustrations are provided by the many leaflets which begin with an innocent-appearing numerical caption:

"EINE MINUTE, die Dir das Leben retten kann"
"ZWEI WORTE, die 850,000 Leben retteten"
"DREI ARTEN, nach Hause zu kommen"
"SECHS ARTEN, das Leben zu verlieren"

The "ONE MINUTE which can save your life" turned out to be the minute required to read the leaflet. The "THREE WAYS to get home" assumed that getting home was the main objective of most German soldiers, and indicated that surrender to the Allies was a comparatively safe and sure way of doing this. The "SIX WAYS to lose your life" were another indirect way of pointing out the advantages of getting home, preferably by way of surrender, over getting killed.

The leaflet "ZWEI WORTE" deserves careful analysis. The "TWO WORDS which have saved 850,000 lives" turn out to be the words "I Surrender." In connection with these words, the leaflet employs a device which was used in a very large number of Sykewar leaflets issued by the lower echelons. The device was simply to spell out the two words phonetically—as "Ei Ssörrender." One reason for this was to give German soldiers confidence that, in attempting to surrender, they would be understood immediately by their American-British-Canadian captors. This was valuable, for PWI interrogations showed that an important deterrent to surrender among otherwise-willing German soldiers was the fear that they might be shot by Allied posts before they could make clear in the German language their intention to surrender. The device had also a more profound and pervasive psychological intention, which illustrates the technique of indirection:

> The value of the phrase went far beyond its actual employment by the German soldier in surrendering. By making it a byword among German troops about which they could talk and joke—and even sneer—the phrase gained currency and stayed in the back of the mind, for possible future reference. It did what the leaflets were intended to do, i.e., make the German

familiar and at home with the idea of surrender, so that the switch-over to action became that much easier. The idea of English phrases in phonetic German spelling was carried further to include such expressions as, "I need another blanket," "want a cigaret, please," etc. German soldiers were told that these phrases would come in handy in captivity, thereby conveying indirectly that blankets, cigarets, and other comforts were readily available "on the other side." [42]

This discussion of the techniques by which Sykewar converted its themes into texts has drawn mainly upon Sykewar leaflets for illustration. This was mainly a matter of necessity, for the Sykewar printed texts have been preserved, while the majority of Sykewar oral scripts seem to have disappeared.[43] Of particular interest, therefore, is the following statement by Lt. Arthur T. Hadley, one of the most experienced Sykewarriors who survived the use of combat loudspeakers, concerning the techniques of using this distinctively oral channel of psychological warfare:

Loudspeaker broadcasts can be divided into three types (discounting civilian broadcasts known as "get your asses off the Strasses" in the trade). The first is the broadcast in a static situation in which the enemy cannot possibly surrender. Here the material is much the same as that which would be used in any good leaflet; stressing late news which can be put out over the loudspeaker much faster than it can be gotten into a leaflet. Each short sentence should be repeated twice, as it is difficult to get a man's attention and make him understand on a battle field. This type of broadcast does not look to any immediate action on the part of the enemy, but rather to the building up of long-range attitudes favorable to the Allies in general and *to loudspeaker broadcasts in particular.* This was the type that we were in large measure restricted to, until the advent of the tank-mounted loudspeaker.

The second type is the before-battle broadcast. The operations against "pockets," which were the theoretical delight of the people who were always waiting for a favorable loudspeaker situation to develop, were of this type. Here, just before the final stage of the fire-fight commences, the firing is stopped and a broadcast is made. Your intelligence in these cases is usually good enough for you to address the enemy unit by name. If this is not the case, a detailed geographic description should be given to your foes, e.g.: "Soldiers in the three pillboxes to

the north of Brauchen along the Foberg River!" These broadcasts should be short and, again, the sentences should be repeated twice. The following is an example of a typical broadcast. While this specific one was never delivered, broadcasts the same in wording were delivered by the hundreds. (Material between brackets is repeated twice.)

> "Attention, Attention, 1st Battalion, 84th Volks-Grenadier Division. [A strong armored task force has taken Immenrath and Suggerdorf behind you.] You are cut off. [Further resistance in this bypassed position is suicidal, while to be captured means safety.] Why die under artillery fire when you can live through the war in safety? [You will be well treated according to the Geneva Convention.]"

Note that this broadcast contains no hint of actual surrender instructions. Nothing so increases a man's determination to fight as to be instructed how to surrender, too soon.

If the reaction to this type of broadcast is successful, that is, if the enemy holds his fire by and large, or if white flags appear on some of the civilian buildings, then the loudspeaker and the attackers should be advanced to a point where it is practicable to issue surrender instructions to the enemy. Thus the enemy feels that he is surrendering to the force, and not to the propaganda. At this time the type of broadcast that I call a fluid broadcast can be made, often while the tank is moving. Note the brevity of the broadcast. It should be forceful. The disorganized enemy is looking for a symbol around which to rally his confused mental powers. The broadcast provides this. The shock of the battle situation provides a favorable background on which the broadcast operates.

> "Attention, Attention, soldiers in Bad Heim! You are surrounded by a powerful armored task force. [Further resistance is hopeless.] Take off your helmets, lay down your weapons, raise your hands. [We will not shoot.] We see you but we will not shoot. [You will be well treated according to the Geneva Convention.]"

Loudspeakers can also be used to call out the commander of an enemy garrison for a parley with your commander. This was effectively done by me several times during the later days of the war, with notable success at Bad Piermont (I believe). Of course, this type and all the other types of broadcast only work when you have COORDINATION.[44]

These comments by Lt. Hadley make it clear that, although the general considerations of technique discussed in this chapter apply to all Sykewar media, there were significant differ-

ences of detail, from medium to medium. The "how?" of propaganda process involves the application of any given technique to a specific medium, and the separation has been made here only for convenience of analysis. Accordingly, the next chapter reviews the media used by Sykewar, and indicates how each of them figured in the operation as a whole.

Chapter 8. Notes

1. A. K. McClure, *Lincoln's Yarns and Stories,* p. 124. Cited in John Bartlett, *Familiar Quotations,* 11th ed. (Boston, 1937), p. 457.

2. Perhaps the best-known is Milton's passage "Let Truth and Falsehood grapple . . ." in the *Areopagitica.*

3. John Hargrave, *Words Win Wars* (London, 1940), Part II.

4. *History: PWD,* pp. 23-24.

5. The rules were not collected and stated in precisely this form by Sykewar. Their intent, however, was made plain to all Sykewar personnel by the *Standing Directive* and the periodic *Guidance.*

6. E. T. Lean, *op. cit.,* p. 70. The following sentences from a letter of Martin F. Herz are also relevant: "All propaganda is useless, if not harmful, if it goes much beyond recitation and admission of failures during such a period (when our side is losing). Attempts to artfully compound material favorable to us with admissions of failure were probably unsuccessful in the case of enemy targets." Compare, however, the view of Hans Speier, "The Future of Psychological Warfare," *loc. cit.,* p. 10 ff.

7. Brewster Morgan, "Operation Annie," *Saturday Evening Post* 218: 36 (9 March 1946), p. 18.

8. *Ibid.,* p. 18. We have already seen that "white" Sykewar took the same line, for the same reason. PWD not only tried to "assist Goebbels in every way," but even "committed" the Wehrmacht to take Antwerp, on the view that the greater the temporary German morale buildup, the graver the final letdown.

9. *History: Second Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company* (no place or date of publication), p. 54. Hereafter cited as *History: 2nd MRB.*

10. *Ibid.,* p. 51. Apparently, in this as in other propaganda matters, the Bolsheviks had learned the value of such a technique earlier. See the documents relating to "fraternization" in *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918* (Palo Alto, 1934), James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher.

11. An attempt to elaborate analytically the "phases" into which responses to war situations group themselves, on a chronological basis, is presented in *Psychiatric Aspects of Civilian Morale* (New York, 1942), American Psychiatric Association, Military Mobilization Committee.

12. Letter to this writer, deposited in The Hoover Library.

13. This reputation we know mainly from authoritarian Germans who have attacked the "objectivity" of their countrymen. Ludendorff made this trait the root of German troubles: "Wir Deutschen schmeichelten uns vor dem Weltkrieg, Herrenmenschen und ein Herrenvolk zu sein. Wir waren

alles andere als das . . . Wir lernten *sachlich statt persönlich denken,* wir waren Schwarmgeister statt Menschen der rauhen Wirklichkeit." *Kriegführung und Politik* (Berlin, 1923), Introduction.

Hitler constantly attacked "German objectivity," in *Mein Kampf* and later. On this point, see the extremely interesting review by H. D. Lasswell of Svend Ranulf's *Hitlers Kampf Gegen Die Objektivität* in the *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer, 1947), p. 274.

14. *History: P & PW,* p. 122.

15. G. C. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918,* p. 85.

16. A few limited appeals to Austrians in the Wehrmacht were made, but little was expected from this, as from other "divisive" appeals. (See the quotation cited in note 12 above.)

17. On wartime propaganda as "enlightenment," the reader should note the statement by Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago, 1942), Vol. II, pp. 1084-85:

> The symbols behind wars are usually richer in affective than in informative meaning. They often refer to fiction, myths, and stereotypes with little relation to conditions. Opinions about such symbols are expressions of attitude. They manifest feelings which vary from individual to individual and are not necessarily related either to observation or to logic. They are. therefore, to be distinguished from truths which describe conditions verified by experience, or which express the relation of such conditions through the logical ordering of symbols which have informative meaning.

18. *History: P & PW,* p. 118.

19. *Ibid.,* p. 118.

20. R. T. Colwell, "Radio Luxembourg Uses Jokes. . . .," *loc. cit.*

21. *History: P & PW,* p. 160.

22. Letter to this writer, deposited in The Hoover Library. Mr. Hanser kindly made available to the writer his scrapbooks, containing newspaper notices of Sykewar activities with which he was connected, together with letters from Germans and other data showing the popularity of his "Tom Jones" broadcasts.

23. Mr. Hanser concludes his letter on "Tom Jones" as follows: "All this convinces me that our propaganda, by and large, often made a mistake in pitching itself on too high a plane, taking a too lofty attitude, and being too stuffy in tone and content. The success of the 'Jones' broadcasts indicates that corn is an ingredient which cannot be ignored in propaganda." This pride in one's own product, and the tendency to generalize from it, was characteristic of many Sykewar "output" craftsmen, and was useful to their morale. As Mr. Hanser would agree, however, it is dangerous to generalize from limited evidence in one case.

24. David Hertz, "The Radio Siege of Lorient," *loc. cit.,* p. 291 ff.

25. Institute for Propaganda Analysis, *Propaganda Analysis,* Vol. 1 (1938), pp. 5-7. This classification of propaganda techniques is clearly inadequate for purposes of systematic analysis. See H. L. Childs, *op. cit.,* p. 83.

26. For the scope of name-calling in common parlance, and for an explanation of its consequent adaptability as a propaganda device, see "Essay

on Ethnophaulisms" in *A Dictionary of International Slurs* (Cambridge, 1944), A. A. Roback. Name-calling is merely one of the more obvious forms of linguistic derision. Subtler forms were used by Sykewar, and particularly by the OWI (as, for instance, in their leaflet series discussed in Chapter 7). The French are particularly adroit at these subtler forms, of which a classic example is the remark attributed to General Gamelin: "If Italy remains neutral, I shall need 5 divisions to watch it. If it joins Hitler, 10 divisions will be needed to defeat it. And if it comes in on our side, we shall need 15 divisions to rescue it." Quoted in *Terror In Our Time* (New York, 1941), p. 339, R. W. Rowan.

This type of innuendo depends largely upon a topical context within which certain words take on a special reference. See the analysis in "Le changement temporaire du sens des mots dans les crises sociales," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie,* Vol. 44 (Nov.-Dec. 1936), André Joussai.

27. This leaflet was not generally regarded as a conspicuous success (see Chapter 11).

28. Cf. Hans Speier, "Magic Geography," *Social Research* (September 1941). Also Karl Haushofer, "Die suggestive Karte," in *Bausteine zur Geopolitik* (Berlin, 1928), pp. 342-348. It is interesting to compare the Allied use of maps as propaganda in the two wars. See the illustrations for World War I in *Secrets of Crewe House* (London, 1920), pp. 32, 48, 112, Campbell Stuart.

29. These may be compared with the heavier-handed use of similar devices in World War I. See, for example, the appeal based on American rations: Heber Blankenhorn, *Adventures in Propaganda* (Boston, 1919), p. 79; also J. R. Mock and C. Larson, *Words That Won The War,* p. 250.

30. E. T. Lean, *op. cit.,* p. 30.

31. T. O. Beachcroft, *op. cit.,* p. 34. Timing was important also in the broadcast schedule of any given program, viz., E. T. Lean, *op. cit.,* p. 40: "The first announcer, after calculating that eleven seconds remain for the closing announcement, adds, 'And that is the end of our programme on the 289th day of the year for which Hitler has promised you final victory. He has now 79 [sic!] days left!' "

32. Emilio Mira, *Psychiatry in War* (London, 1944), p. 27. See also John Dollard, *Fear in Battle.*

33. H. C. Butcher, *op. cit.,* p. 729.

34. H. L. Childs, *op. cit.,* p. 94:

> The disposition of many writers on the subject of propaganda, to think of it solely in terms of emotional appeals, tends to limit our perspective of the whole phenomenon. Rational appeals play quite as important a part in modern propaganda campaigns as irrational. Fortunate indeed is the propagandist who has at his disposal such masterpieces of argument as Karl Marx's treatise *Capital,* Locke's *Treatise on Government,* or Thomas Paine's *Common Sense.*

35. This brief discussion is not intended to obscure the importance of Quincy Wright's conclusion that "the symbols behind wars are usually richer in affective than in informative meaning." (Note 17 above.) It is intended merely to support Harwood Childs' emphasis that rational processes are important techniques for the propagandist, as against the cynical

notion that the "mass media" are *inherently* inimical to reason. In this connection, we remain aware of Tolstoy's remark, in *War and Peace,* about "the most powerful weapon of ignorance—the diffusion of printed matter"; also, Earnest A. Hooton's more careful, if more colorful, statement: "Such a device as the radio extends to the uttermost parts of the earth the range of one person's potentiality for misleading and befuddling his fellow men, either by taking advantage of their semantic difficulties or by broadcasting his own." *Twilight of Man* (New York, 1939), p. 47.

36. The facsimile leaflets reproduced in Appendix D, relative to this study, were taken from the *History: PWD.*

37. The writer is obligated to Martin F. Herz, whose excellent response to his questionnaire (see Chapter 11) made many of the points discussed in this section.

38. L. J. Margolin, *Paper Bullets,* p. 50: "From a rather crude beginning, the Allied surrender leaflet ended the war looking like a cross between gilt-edge bonds and a college diploma." (This book is valuable for the variety of leaflets it reproduces, although its unrestrained comments should be read as exuberant journalism rather than analysis.)

39. See comment at foot of leaflet ZG-108, "Eine Minute," Appendix D.

40. Quoted from comment at foot of leaflet ZG-34, "Generale Proklamieren Friedensregierung!", Appendix D.

41. Quoted from final paragraph of leaflet ZG-121, "Das War Dürwiss," Appendix D.

42. *History: P & PW,* p. 130.

43. All Sykewar radio texts which had been officially preserved in Berlin were turned over to this writer in 1946 by Charles Lewis and Richard Condon, the conscientious and able directors of ICD radio operations, with the approval of General McClure. These texts have been deposited in The Hoover Library, but the labor of sorting and classifying them has not yet been completed.

44. Letter to this writer, deposited in The Hoover Library.

Chapter 9

SYKEWAR MEDIA

1. *Media of the Broadcast Word*

THE WORD of Sykewar took many and strange forms. When the human voice, originally designed for short-range communication, is modulated and broadcast into space, a new and different medium is created. The problems of broadcasting differ in kind, as well as in degree, from the problems of conversation.

Most of the details have been elaborated in the literature of radio, so only the generic differences need be reviewed here. Probably the most important difference is that of equipment. All the equipment required for ordinary conversation is available on the person of the communicators. Any individual or group, therefore, can set up shop at any place or time that requires conversation. Not so the broadcasters. Their medium requires external technical equipment at both ends of the communication process. Not only does the speaker require a microphone powered to "amplify" his voice, a technician equipped to "modulate" it, and a transmitter to "broadcast" it, but even all this does not establish communication unless at the other end sits a listener equipped with a "receiver" tuned to the speaker's "frequency"—and with a desire to hear him.

This final requirement indicates a second special problem of broadcasting, which must be faced after the problem of physical communication has been solved. This is the problem of the audience, of the peculiar speaker-listener situation imposed by broadcast communication. In normal conversation, the speaker and the listener see each other. As a result, all the sensory equipment of both parties becomes involved in the communication, and helps to direct its flow. The speaker notes from the listener's look of confusion that a point has not been understood; he thereupon repeats it, puts it in other words, clarifies it. The speaker notes a snort of anger; he thereupon retracts his point, puts it in other words, modifies it. The speaker notes a yawn

of drowsiness, he thereupon raises his voice or hurls an expletive.

In broadcasting, this relationship does not exist. The speaker faces an audience he can not see or hear. Except under the best conditions of current audience research (which, as indicated, were not available at Sykewar), he does not know how many people are in his audience, what kinds of people they are, or even if he has an audience at all. For one of the peculiarities of the broadcasting relationship, as has been observed frequently, is that the listener can "turn off" the speaker without having to insult him or even to notify him.[1]

These considerations indicate the usefulness of conceiving propaganda as a "unilateral flow of symbols selected for their persuasiveness of a given audience to a given purpose" (see Chapter 1). It was precisely these factors which determined Sykewar's use of the broadcasting media. For example, it was early discovered that studio broadcasting was of limited usefulness as a "tactical" medium by which to induce surrenders among German combat soldiers. Both the physical and psychological gaps between speaker and listener were too great. The situation of the man at the front changed too rapidly for the man in the studio to keep pace with him. Furthermore, the German soldier at the front frequently had no receiver with which to "hear" the siren voices of Sykewar's excellent studio broadcasters.[2]

Sykewar's next step (psychologically, not chronologically) was the *mobile* radio transmitter, which brought broadcasting closer to the front and the soldier in combat. This lessened the psychological distance somewhat, but the physical gap remained—the German combat soldier still had no receiver. The final step, therefore, was the development of the "combat loudspeaker." This medium brought the broadcast word directly up front, thus closing the psychological gap as far as possible. It eliminated also the physical gap, since the German listener needed only his own auditory apparatus to hear this speaker. It is indicative of the complexities faced by the Sykewar media that, despite this fact, the combat loudspeaker was not an outstanding Sykewar success until it was mounted on tanks and put into action against German troops in defeat, during the last phase of the campaign. The reasons for this become clearer after a resumé

of the activities conducted by each of the broadcasting media mentioned above.

(1) *Studio Broadcasting.* Sykewar operated only one major static transmitter in Europe during most of its campaign against Germany: Radio Luxembourg. PWD participated, as consultant on policy and source of intelligence, in the "world-wide network beamed toward the European continent," which was formed by the static transmitters of the British Broadcasting Corporation, American Broadcasting Station in Europe, "Voice of America" (United States), and "United Nations Radio," AFHQ (Mediterranean). But only "Radio Lux" was actually under the complete operational and administrative control of Sykewar. This powerful 150-kilowatt transmitter, one of the most important in all of Europe, produced a signal which could be received clearly over most of Germany. This fact made it an ideal "chosen instrument" for Sykewar purposes.[3]

Although Radio Lux was controlled by PWD/SHAEF, its operation was shared with P & PW/ 12th AG. The division of functions was along the lines of "strategic" and "tactical" broadcasting—a division, in other words, based upon themes and techniques rather than upon media considerations. The medium employed by both was still, of course, studio broadcasting via a static transmitter.[4]

The "strategic" programs were produced by PWD. These included straight news programs, based partly on the news files of the established commercial agencies (Reuters, Tass, AP), and partly on a special file distributed by the PWD news service in London (later called "Allied Press Service").[5] Distinctive features of Radio Lux news programs were the use of special intelligence items reported by PWI and other Allied intelligence agencies operating in the military area, and news commentaries by Allied war correspondents. Music programs constituted a substantial part of the "strategic" output, in which special emphasis was given to the music of composers banned by the Nazis.

Another substantial portion of PWD's broadcasting schedule was the series of programs designed for foreign workers in Germany. These programs contained variations of content best suited to the interests of the nationality addressed, and were broadcast in nine languages: German, French, Flemish, Dutch, Polish, Italian, English, Czech, and Russian. Under the direc-

tion of Patrick C. Gordon-Walker (now a Labour M.P.), these programs used as their signature a distinctive musical theme known as "The Song of the Trojan Horse," which "came to be recognized by listeners all over western Germany."[6]

A final, and perhaps the most clearly "strategic," portion of the PWD schedule at Radio Lux was the series in which Sykewar spoke to the German audience in the name of the Supreme Commander (Eisenhower) and on behalf of the Allied governments. Two separate and continuing programs served this purpose: "The Voice of SHAEF" and "The Voice of Military Government." In addition, Radio Lux issued special broadcasts upon the request of the Supreme Commander:

> These included the broadcasts of proclamations and instructions issued from Supreme Headquarters to German troops and civilians in Germany in connection with combat operations . . .[7]

(2) *Mobile Broadcasting.* This type of broadcasting was performed by means of transmitters which could be moved, as contrasted with the enormous static transmitters of Radio Lux. Several of these mobile transmitters were mounted in standard army trucks, with mobile "studios" housed in companion trucks adapted to this purpose. Five main types of mobile units were used by Sykewar: SCR-399, SCR-696/698, Marconi 2KW, ST&C 2KW, and Westinghouse 5KW.

Great technical difficulties arose in connection with the use of these units. There was, first of all, the difficulty of movement. Not everything classified by the Army as "mobile" turned out, under actual wartime conditions, to be mobile in fact. The fate of one Sykewar unit is described laconically in the final report of PWD's chief radio engineer, F. C. McLean, a Briton trained in the tradition of understatement:

> The first of these 5KW air-cooled transmitters was shipped from the UK at the end of August and was destined to be erected at Strasbourg. Considerable difficulties were experienced in the shipment of this equipment, which took place through the beachheads, and up to the end of 1944 some cases of equipment were still missing.[8]

Once the "mobile" unit had been moved, there were further technical difficulties. Of the units mentioned above, only the SCR-399 was available in sufficient numbers and was genuinely

mobile under wartime conditions. However, the output of the SCR-399 in the broadcast band was limited to 400-500 watts. Its effective radius varied, depending upon antennae efficiency, from 10 to 25 miles.[9] This restricted radius within which the SCR-399 could be heard at all severely limited its usefulness for combat purposes in a fast-moving military situation such as developed in western Europe between D-Day and VE-Day.[10] The one type of combat situation in which the SCR-399 became useful was that in which propaganda could be broadcast to a German "pocket" or surrounded garrison.[11] In such a completely static situation, however, the SCR-399 was used as a medium of "studio broadcasting" (from a studio which happened to be on wheels), rather than as a genuinely "mobile broadcasting" medium. A useful resumé has been prepared for this study by Guy della-Cioppa, the Sykewar specialist on the use of mobile transmitters:

> The few operations in which these instruments were engaged as tactical weapons were not effective. One only can have been considered useful and that is the use of an SCR-399, 400-watt transmitter directed against the enemy pocket at St. Nazaire. As a general principle, let me say that mobile radio transmitters can be effective tactically only in an ideal situation where enemy forces are isolated from lines of supply and inevitably must surrender because the tide of battle has turned against them. The full time of a single or several small powered transmitters, adjacently and protectively located, can be directed against this pocket. Although there are plenty of other broadcast signals being received, allied strategic transmitters cannot concentrate upon such isolated and relatively unimportant targets as effectively as mobile transmitters arranged in the manner just mentioned.
>
> When you have two well-defined lines, small tactical transmitters are ineffective because their low power will not penetrate sufficiently into enemy held areas to reach sufficient bodies of enemy troops equipped with radio broadcast receiving sets.
>
> So much for the use of these transmitters as tactical weapons. But as mobile units to have immediately available for installation and use in reoccupied areas their value is enormous. We had installed, and had in operation, a 400-watt mobile transmitter in Cherbourg within a week after that city's capture. For the next four months that station served as a right arm of the military government. The same occurred in Rennes, in Frankfurt and a number of other cities.[12]

(3) *Combat Loudspeakers.* These were essentially, from the technical point of view, mobile adaptations of the civilian instruments known as "public address systems." That is, they were instruments designed to increase the volume of sounds transmitted in such a way (amplification without modulation) that they could be heard beyond their normal radius by the unaided human ear. Five types of loudspeakers were used, ranging in output from a 15-watt battery-operated system to a 250-watt system powered by two small gasoline generators.[13]

In PWD's overall plan of characteristic uses for its various media, the combat loudspeaker's special functions were never very clearly defined. The normal Sykewar distinction between "consolidation" operations (designed to bring a newly liberated or occupied area under control) and "combat" operations (designed to liberate or occupy an area still under German control) could not be applied too strictly, because the loudspeaker units were useful in both situations. The "consolidation" functions they performed have been described as follows:

> In almost all instances public address units attached to armies performed the primary consolidation work. Because of their mobility, they could move quickly into a liberated town and without further ado give the people their first hard news of the progress of the fighting, of the details of their own liberation, and what Civil Affairs wanted them to do. . . . In certain areas, such as in Normandy, electric power failures often at least temporarily cut into radio listening. By the same token, it was often impossible immediately to start newspapers. Thus, the mobile sound unit was the simplest and often the only contact between the military command and the people of a newly liberated [or occupied] area.[14]

The combat functions were more clearly defined during the course of the campaign, as the technical requirements and methods of employment were clarified by the lessons of actual use in combat operations. By the time the Westwall had been reached, the low-powered, self-contained combat loudspeaker of Normandy days had been adapted to the requirements of mobile combat in World War II. High-powered loudspeakers were mounted on tanks and moved along with the armored spearheads, "ready at the psychological moment of breakthrough to assist in and exploit the disintegration of the enemy." [15]

According to the chronicler of psychological warfare at 12th

AG, the following are the chief uses to which the combat loudspeaker was put during the period from June 1944 to May 1945:

1. To liquidate pockets of enemy troops.
2. To address surrender appeals to points of resistance, road blocks and woods where enemy troops were hiding.
3. To deliver surrender ultimatums to towns holding up the advance of tanks.
4. To do consolidation work in by-passed towns: citizens were asked to clear all roads for traffic, to report all booby traps and mines, to surrender all enemy soldiers in civilian clothing, on furlough, or hiding in cellars, to turn in all weapons, pending the arrival of Military Government.
5. To conduct white flag missions prior to attack.
6. To aid in static situations, where there was evidence of poor morale, to intensify this situation and encourage desertions by appropriate talks and news, and by supplying simple instructions on how to surrender safely.
7. To obtain prisoners without the use of patrols.
8. To control civilians, displaced persons, and prisoners of war.[16]

The operation of these loudspeakers directly against a German combat unit was the most hazardous occupation of regular Sykewar personnel. The loudspeaker unit made a good target and frequently drew fire. The historian of the 2nd MRB, one of the "Mobile Radio Broadcasting" companies whose personnel engaged extensively in loudspeaker operations, has given the following account of the method by which they were employed:

> A loudspeaker unit (jeep-trailer, half-track weapons-carrier or tank) with a minimum crew of a driver-technician and a language announcer, stationed at corps headquarters, would receive instructions from the G-2 to proceed to a certain division in the line and report to its G-2. From there, the unit would be sent to a regimental S-2, who would explain the tactical situation, usually a pocket of the enemy that was to be asked to surrender. The S-2 would provide a guide or might himself accompany the individual in charge of the loudspeaker unit on his reconnaissance to acquaint him with the lower echelon S-2's. If a suitable position were found at the front, arrangements would be made for coordinated artillery fire and, perhaps, for a cub plane to fly overhead during the broadcast to silence enemy artillery in the area. When all plans had been

> laid, the loudspeaker unit would move forward to the selected position and, after a few words of explanation to our own troops, the announcer would deliver a surrender appeal to the enemy. Despite all precautions, some enemy fire would almost always be attracted by the unit. The above description applied to operations in a relatively static situation, but for armored thrusts and spearheads, a tank-mounted unit would move with the foremost elements, carrying out missions for the S-2 as they arose, such as addressing towns or flushing enemy stragglers.[17]

The combat use of the loudspeakers was devoted largely to calling upon German soldiers within earshot to surrender, an operation which military personnel designated amiably as "hog-calling" (or *Schweinheils*).[18] Estimates of the successes achieved along these lines decrease in inverse ratio to the administrative level at which the estimate is made. For example, the Sykewar personnel who actually operated the loudspeakers in combat made the most enthusiastic claims for achievements of the operation.[19] At 12th AG, a higher Sykewar echelon, these claims were qualified. Here it was asserted that the common attempt to evaluate the success of loudspeakers, in terms of numbers of prisoners taken in response to single operations, is based upon an erroneous conception of their function. Their function, as with all Sykewar operations, was the "attrition" of German morale and this function was successfully accomplished.[20] At PWD, the highest Sykewar level, a more restricted view was taken of the kinds of successes achieved by the combat loudspeakers:

> These are tremendously useful to convey instructions and information to the public, after recapture or seizure of an area, before normal media of information are again in operation. They are of inestimable value against the enemy when there is a fluid tactical situation resulting in the isolation of numerous pockets of enemy troops, such as at Cherbourg, in Brittany and Patton's cutting up of lower Germany. They are no good defensively and are practically useless when you have two well-defined battle lines. On rare occasion can these instruments be broadcast close enough to a fixed line to be worth while as a weapon.[21]

These estimates are not incompatible, but simply vary in emphasis. All agree that the greatest effectiveness of combat loud-

speakers is in a "fluid tactical situation." The basis for this judgment is made clear in the final section of this chapter.

2. *Media of the Printed Word*

The basic media in which the printed word of Sykewar reached its German audience were leaflets and newspapers. As with the broadcast media, numerous problems, involving both mechanical and psychological considerations, confronted the printed media. The normal problems of production which harass people responsible for modern publications were aggravated at Sykewar by the incalculable pressure of wartime conditions on a disorganized continent.

To these problems were added others, such as the extreme shortage of newsprint, which did not normally enter into the prewar calculations of people who publish. The competition for the limited available supply was fierce among all organizations in Europe which used paper instead of, or in addition to, lead. The statement of the official historian may be no exaggeration:

> It is probable that PWD faced no single problem quite as complex and as difficult of solution as that involving the supply of newsprint for its own operations and those in which it was interested secondarily.[22]

Sykewar's audience problems were also considerably more complicated than those normally faced by purveyors of the printed word. To begin with, among the audience it wanted to reach, and particularly among the foreign workers in Germany, Sykewar had to reckon with a considerable factor of illiteracy or bare literacy. Even where members of this multilingual target could be presumed to have a reading knowledge of their native tongue, there was often difficulty in determining how many of which language groups were quartered where. These problems, and the main solutions adopted by Sykewar, have already been discussed. The following pages examine problems peculiar to the Sykewar media of the printed word.

(1) *Dissemination.* One special Sykewar problem was the dissemination of its printed output. As has been pointed out, even after an Allied policy had been translated into a Sykewar theme, and the theme elaborated into a text, one decisive operation still remained: dissemination of the text to the target for

which it was intended. No such problem agitates civilian dealers in the printed media, who simply put their wares into bookshops, drugstores, lobbies, kiosks, and other normal marketing channels. Nor did the Sykewar broadcast media face any such problem in disseminating its goods over "no-man's land" into and beyond the enemy lines. Electric power accomplished this operation.

Newsprint, however, once it had been accumulated in sufficient quantity for Sykewar purposes, was clearly too weighty a matter for ethereal currents. Aircraft and artillery were required for this operation. In a war situation, where other uses for these machines were normally given higher priority than propaganda, it is clear that Sykewar's leaflets and newspapers had to make a strong case. Although the machines themselves undoubtedly were indifferent whether they carried explosives or newsprint, the soldiers responsible for operating the machines usually showed little enthusiasm for using Sykewar "confetti" as ammunition. What may be called, to keep the language of this study fit to print, a strong preference for explosives as against newsprint was demonstrated vigorously by airmen and artillerymen.[23]

This preference was discernible among all ranks, from the officers who directed the operations of these machines to the men who actually operated them. The attitude was epitomized by Bill Mauldin in one of his "Up Front" cartoons. Depicted are the perennial "Willie" and "Joe," busily loading and firing an extremely active and overheated heavy-artillery piece. Without interrupting their activity, "Willie" is calling over his shoulder to the battery's telephone operator: "Tell them leaflet people the krauts ain't got time fer readin' today." [24]

The prevalence of this attitude among Allied personnel indicated that Sykewar had a task of persuasion to perform in its own bailiwick. This campaign Sykewar conducted with its customary techniques, selecting those appropriate to the audience to be persuaded. On the top rank of policy-making officers, it used the techniques of logical argument with an admixture of special pleading. On the lower level of executive officers, it used various techniques of pressure, direct and indirect, known as "pulling rank" or "politicking." On the lowest relevant level of operational officers and men, it used the techniques of friendly relations and visual aids.[25] Both Sykewar leaflets and,

later, newspapers were produced in an English version, so that the personnel flying or shooting this Sykewar "confetti" over the German lines, at considerable risk of life and limb, would "know what it's all about." [26]

Sykewar's campaign among the Allied air forces was partially successful, but only partially. Even when airmen had been convinced that the Sykewar paper output was worth disseminating, circumstances often disrupted the cooperative relationship which Sykewar considered desirable. The consequences of this situation are summarized in the final report on "Leaflet Operations in the Western European Theater." This report, written after the end of the war, reaches only three general conclusions, in the form of suggestions for "future operations." The second of these is a recommendation that Sykewar should control a fleet of its own aircraft:

> To produce maximum results, it is obviously essential for leaflet messages to be delivered to the desired target at a particular time. To accomplish this, it is necessary for the psychological warfare unit to have aircraft at its disposal which it can send to selected targets when required, and experience has shown that the only way that this can be done is to have certain aircraft assigned permanently and exclusively to leaflet operations. Although the Air Forces have been extremely cooperative, arrangements made with them at some echelons whereby they agreed to schedule special leaflet missions on request from the psychological warfare unit have not worked out satisfactorily. On this basis, it was obvious that regular combat missions had priority and, quite naturally, very often during periods of great ground activity when leaflets were most needed, the aircraft were not available. It is, therefore, believed to be a basic and fundamental requirement that at all echelons of psychological warfare in future operations a sufficient number of aircraft be assigned permanently and exclusively to leaflet missions.[27]

A further point needs to be made concerning the use of aircraft for leaflet drops: This method of dissemination gave wide area coverage but poor accuracy. In the early stages, when leaflets were simply tied in small bundles and dropped through the bomb-bay, it was estimated that "an average of about four percent of leaflets dropped at any time actually found their way into the hands of the population to which they were directed." Considerable improvements were made in the accuracy

of aerial dissemination, particularly with the development of the "Monroe Leaflet Bomb."[28] However, although accuracy varied widely as between various types of heavy and medium bombers, aircraft remained to the end of the campaign primarily useful for "strategic" dissemination to areas deep within Germany, beyond the range of artillery.

For "tactical" dissemination within a limited range, artillery was an instrument by far superior to aircraft. The final report on "Leaflet Operations" contains the following statement, which applied equally to the dissemination of Sykewar newspapers:

> Because of its accuracy, economy and availability, field artillery is the ideal instrument for the distribution of all tactical leaflets to targets within its range. The employment of artillery for leafleting can be traced back to the French use of the 75 mm. field piece for propaganda purposes on the Western Front in 1918. In this war, the idea was first put into practice with the British 25-pounder during the Tunisian campaign of 1942-43.
>
> Despite this previous battle use of artillery leaflets, this method of dissemination, although a known and accepted fact, was, because of lack of information on previous operations, still in the experimental stage when the Allied Armies landed in Normandy on D-Day, 1944. With the first psychological warfare unit (then constituted as a Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company) which landed soon after D-Day, came an artillery liaison officer. On D plus six, the first six rounds of artillery leaflets, mimeographed for a local situation, were fired and proved their efficacy by netting six prisoners. By the end of June 1944, 900 rounds of propaganda shells had been fired on the First U.S. Army sector alone. Artillery leafleting continued on an increasing scale on all of the Allied Army sectors in the West until VE-Day, and proved itself to be one of the most effective weapons used by psychological warfare.[29]

Ideally, the Sykewar aim was to coordinate all the types of machinery, using each for dissemination tasks to which it was best adapted.[30] In practice, this was not feasible, and Sykewar had to take such of the main machinery as it could get, supplemented occasionally by methods useful for dissemination of smaller quantities of printed matter. Balloons, specially adapted to release bundles at a given time after they had been set free, were one such method. Another was the use of Allied patrols or agents operating in enemy territory at night:

> This means of augmenting leaflet distribution is especially valuable because the leaflets are almost certain of reaching the hands of enemy troops. However, the leaflets created an added risk that the passage of a patrol or agent would be given away.[31]

(2) *Newspapers.* The problems of production and dissemination sketched above affected most severely those Sykewar newspapers which, like leaflets, were designed to be dropped immediately after publication and in great numbers. Since they were newspapers intended to supply Germans with news items banned by the Nazis, or to present the news on a given event *before* the Goebbels apparatus had planted its version of the event, speed in dissemination was essential. The old saw, "Nothing is as dead as yesterday's news," applied to Sykewar's "leaflet newspapers."

Although none of these newspapers was actually produced at SHAEF, PWD had much to say about what went into them. The most important was the daily leaflet newspaper *Nachrichten für die Truppe* (News for the Troops), which was dropped continuously on the Western Front from shortly before D-Day (25 April 1944) until the German capitulation (4 May 1945). Originally planned as a combined PID-OSS production, designed especially to support operation OVERLORD, *Nachrichten* was issued as a two-sided tactical newspaper. As its usefulness over civilian targets as well became apparent, *Nachrichten* was expanded, with the cooperation of PWD, to a four-sided daily which added more general themes and features to its "hot" news.

The principal distinguishing feature of *Nachrichten* was considered to be its status as a "gray" product. Its source, that is, was not disclosed. If carried too far, however, this became a distinction without a difference. For, while *Nachrichten* was "neither in style nor in approach avowedly an Allied product," it was evident that "the German soldier knew quite well that it came from the Allies, but its writers took every trouble to avoid reminding him of the fact."[32]

The differences were largely those of make-up and production style. In the main, *Nachrichten* adhered closely to the basic Sykewar techniques of factualism and indirection. Its "gray" status simply made it possible occasionally to "score propaganda points" by a less restrained revision of facts than was permitted in "white" output, viz:

> It was, of course, difficult in time of war to ensure complete accuracy for, and to give authenticity to, news of what was happening in Germany behind the German soldier's back. On the other hand, it was possible through special intelligence and advice received from military headquarters, both forward and in England, to secure reliable and fast news of happenings on the battlefield. It was, therefore, possible, as it were, to carry uncheckable, irrefutable and highly subversive home news on the shoulders of checkable and topical front news. On many occasions, *Nachrichten* was able to give the German soldier his first news of notable military events, such as the Allied landing in the south of France or the Arnhem landing. It, therefore, seems to have acquired a reputation for reliability in its war news which, it is reasonable to assume, many readers transferred unconsciously to its home news. It also carried news from the DNB service, which by presenting the reader with matter he could hear from official German sources gave the sheet an air of objective reporting. (p. 165)

For the most part, however, *Nachrichten* was made up of themes and subject matter such as has already been described for "white" output. The following passage indicates both its contents and the occasional "special twist" with which they were handled:

> In detail, the newspaper was made up as follows: on the front page, and in some columns on the back page, the German soldier found the news story from each front on which German troops were fighting, his own Western Front being covered in great detail. These stories were so written as to encourage the German soldier in the West to look back over his shoulder. For example, it was continually emphasized before and during the Normandy campaign that the Russian front was the only one taken seriously by the Party and the High Command, and the front was represented as an example of useless sacrifice and diversion of strength. On page two was the daily topical commentary by Lt. von O., expressing a critical, browned-off, indignant attitude to the conduct of the war, both at home and at the front, and giving plausible and rational form to the soldiers' suppressed desires to slacken off and give up hope. On page three, the German soldier found startling and worrying news from home, suggesting the flagrant inequality in the sacrifices made by the man at the front and the leader at home, by the ordinary civilian and by the Party member. He learned about the scandals of reserved occupations, of the overworking

of women, of conditions in children's evacuation camps, of "black marketing" in high quarters and of insincere and bombastic appeals for sacrifice by bosses and by wire-pullers hundreds of miles behind the front.

In addition, an attempt was made to keep before the German reader a picture of the world political situation, and Germany's place in it, in which particular attention was paid to the failures of Germany's satellites and allies. Sport news and pictures of pin-up girls assured that this page did not have a purely propaganda content, but plenty of reader interest and entertainment. (p. 165)

In terms of effort and quantity of distribution, *Nachrichten* was the major Sykewar newspaper product of the campaign. Copy was usually prepared between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Normally, the newspaper would be dropped over the German lines from 18 to 24 hours later, with an even shorter interval between production and delivery for some daylight drops. When great events were impending, copy had to be arranged so that the issue dropped on the night the operation occurred would contain at least headlines and a skeletal story outlining the day's happenings. During the night following the D-Day landings in Normandy, for example, several hundred thousand copies of *Nachrichten* were dropped on German reserve divisions which announced that the Atlantic Wall had been breached in several places. High-speed dissemination of this sort required the closest cooperation among the intelligence, policy, and operating sections of PWD, as well as with the other staff sections of SHAEF.

Nachrichten was published daily, without interruption, from 25 April 1944, until 4 May 1945. The final issue announced the end of combat operations in the West. Some notion of the scope of this daily operation is conveyed by the official historian:

> Ten to twelve thousand words were written, sub-edited and headlined daily; news photographs were secured and reproduced nightly through a special service of cars from London to the country headquarters of PID; up to half a million copies daily—sometimes more—were distributed to airdromes, packed in bombs and delivered to general and pinpoint targets selected in daily conferences between military and PWD staffs. The newspaper employed the services of roughly 25 editorial, and between 70 and 80 printers and distribution staff.[33]

Three other leaflet newspapers were produced regularly, all by subordinate echelons of Sykewar on the continent of Europe. *Frontpost,* produced at 12th AG, was a weekly semi-tactical newspaper. Since it was produced in the field, without the elaborate organization of machinery and personnel available for *Nachrichten* in the UK, *Frontpost* was a "semi-hot," slightly less timely medium. It gave special attention to the requirements of the 12th AG front and, as a "white" product, stressed the surrender theme in somewhat the same fashion as the tactical leaflets. *Feldpost,* also produced at 12th AG, was an abridged version of *Frontpost.* It was supplied to the subordinate echelons of 12th AG for artillery dissemination, which delivered this "pony edition" as a supplement to the aerial dissemination of *Frontpost* by means of fighter bombers and medium bombers.

The 7th U.S. Army, operating in the southern area of the Western Front under the 6th AG, published a newspaper designed to meet its own special local requirements. This was *Frontbrief,* a leaflet newspaper produced under field conditions. Since the 6th AG was poorer in personnel and equipment than its fat cousin, 12th AG, in the north, *Frontbrief* was probably the least impressive, and certainly the least timely, of these newspapers. Considering its impoverished condition, however, *Frontbrief* was a valiant effort. Further, during bad weather (particularly during the winter of 1944-45), when the UK-based Special Leaflet Squadron was unable to service the distant 7th Army area with *Nachrichten,* the local *Frontbrief* became the major source of news for Germans in that sector.

Other overt newspapers were produced by Sykewar for distribution in Germany during the last phase of the war. A special PWD team initiated the *Aachener Nachrichten,* and produced it during the first phase of the occupation of Aachen.[34] The 12th AG Sykewar organization produced a newspaper known as *Die Mitteilungen,* which subsequently was used as the basis for a chain of local newspapers bearing distinctive names in the various towns where they appeared (e.g., *Kölner Kurier, Hessische Post).*[35] However, these newspapers were all aimed mainly at German civilian audiences. Although they began to appear during the period of actual fighting, their functions were those of the occupation, which PWD was to assume as the rebaptized Information Control Division, rather than the combat functions of Sykewar which are the subject of this study.

EINE MINUTE

die Dir das Leben retten kann.

Lies die folgenden 6 Punkte gründlich und aufmerksam! Sie können für Dich den Unterschied zwischen Tod und Leben bedeuten.

1. Tapferkeit allein kann in diesen Materialschlachten den Mangel an Panzern, Flugzeugen und Artillerie nicht wettmachen.

2. Mit dem Fehlschlag im Westen und dem Zusammenbruch im Osten ist die Entscheidung gefallen: Deutschland hat den Krieg verloren.

3. Du stehst keinen Barbaren gegenüber, die am Töten etwa Vergnügen finden, sondern Soldaten, die Dein Leben schonen wollen.

4. Wir können aber nur diejenigen schonen, die uns nicht durch nutzlosen Widerstand zwingen, unsere Waffen gegen sie einzusetzen.

5. Es liegt an Dir, uns durch Hochheben der Hände, Schwenken eines Taschentuchs usw. deutlich Deine Absicht zu verstehen zu geben.

6. Kriegsgefangene werden fair und anständig behandelt, ohne Schikane - wie es Soldaten gebührt, die tapfer gekämpft haben.

Die Entscheidung musst Du selber treffen. Sollst Du aber in eine verzweifelte Lage geraten, so erwäge, was Du gelesen hast.

ZG. 108 / One of the most successful of the general tactical leaflets. It was designed for distribution to areas of stiff enemy resistance and again and again proved its effectiveness in prisoner returns. Its lack of any political appeal, and its short-term soldier-to-soldier language seems to have been among the factors of its success.

ONE MINUTE

which may save your life

Read the following six points carefully and thoroughly. They may mean for you the difference between life and death.

1. In a battle of material, valour alone cannot offset the inferiority in tanks, planes and artillery.

2. With the breaching of the Atlantic Wall and of the Eastern Front, the decision has fallen; Germany has lost the war.

3. You are not facing barbarians who delight in killing, but soldiers who would spare your life if possible.

4. But we can only spare those who do not force us, by senseless resistance, to use our weapons against them.

5. It is up to you to show us your intention by raising your arms, waving a handkerchief, etc., in an unmistakable manner.

6. Prisoners-of-war are treated decently, in a fair manner, as becomes soldiers who have fought bravely.

Yon must decide for yourself. But, in the event that you should find yourself in a desperate situation, remember what you have read.

Der letzte Versuch

WARUM musste die Gegenoffensive unternommen werden? (1) Weil die deutschen Reserven an Mann und Kriegsmaterial in der Zermürbungsschlacht zwischen Emmerich und Basel planmässig zerhämmert wurden. (2) Weil Deutschlands Sprit-Vorräte fast erschöpft waren. Vorräte mussten erbeutet werden. (3) Weil Himmler sah, dass sich das deutsche Volk der Zwangsevakuierung immer stärker widersetzte und sich nicht verschleppen liess.

WARUM musste die Gegenoffensive fehlschlagen? (1) Weil Rundstedt nicht genügend Panzer, nicht genügend Flugzeuge, nicht genügend Geschütze besass, um einen erstklassigen Plan zu verwirklichen. (2) Weil neben Elitetruppen halbgeschulte Grenadiere ins Treffen geworfen wurden. (3) Weil die SS-Führung versagte. Manteuffel hatte seinen Teil getan. Er vertraute auf die Panzer-SS. Aber Sepp Dietrich versagte. (4) Weil V-1 und V-2 als Artillerie- und Luftwaffe-Ersatz fehlschlugen. (5) Weil die Alliierten allein an einem Tag 6000 Kampfflugzeuge zur Unterstützung ihrer Truppen in die Schlacht werfen konnten.

WARUM muss der Landser selbst die Entscheidung treffen?

WEIL DIE DEUTSCHE FUHRUNG NACH DIESEM LETZTEN, AUCH VOM FEIND ALS GROSSARTIG ANERKANNTEN VERSUCH, SICH SELBST, DER WELT UND DEM LANDSER BEWIESEN HAT, DASS EIN WEITERKÄMPFEN SINNLOS IST.

ZG 98.

ZG. 98 / An example of a tactical leaflet written for a specific situation in a specified area.

The last attempt

WHY DID the counter-offensive have to come? (1) Because the German reserves in men and material were systematically being smashed in the battle of attrition between Emmerich and Basel. (2) Because German gasoline stores were exhausted. Supplies had to be captured. (3) Because Himmler saw that the German people became more and more opposed to forced evacuation and would not have themselves dragged away from their homes.

WHY DID the-counter offensive have to fail? (1) Because Rundstedt did not have enough tanks, not enough planes, not enough artillery in order to execute a first-rate plan. (2) Because next to elite troops, half-trained grenadiers were thrown into the battle. (3) Because the SS leadership failed. Manteuffel did his part. He relied on the Panzer-SS, but Sepp Dietrich didn't come through. (4) Because V-1 and V-2 failed as substitutes for artillery and air power. (5) Because the Allies were able to throw into the battle 6,000 planes in one day, in support of their troops.

WHY DOES the German soldier have to make his own decision?

BECAUSE THE GERMAN LEADERSHIP—AFTER THIS LAST ADMITTEDLY BRILLIANT ATTEMPT—HAS CONFESSED TO ITSELF, TO THE WORLD AND TO THE GERMAN SOLDIER THAT IT IS SENSELESS TO FIGHT ON.

Ihr seid jetzt abgeschnitten!

Um nutzloses Blutvergiessen zu ersparen, wird Euch dieses Flugblatt zugestellt.

Ihr seid jetzt abgeschnitten. Alliierte Einheiten stehen bereits weit hinter Euch. Ihr habt tapfer gekämpft, aber von jetzt an ist ein Weiterkämpfen nutzlos. Ihr müsst Euch ergeben oder knapp vor Kriegsende sterben.

Ihr erkennt die Lage. Es gilt jetzt, dementsprechend zu handeln. Jeder muss für sich selbst entscheiden. Es ist keine Zeit zu verlieren.

Die Allierten wollen Euer Leben schonen und sichern Euch anständige Behandlung zu. Ihr müsst aber klar zu verstehen geben, dass Ihr aus dem Kampf scheidet.

HANDELT SOFORT!

ZG. 86 / A tactical "contingency" leaflet written to cover a commonly recurring situation and held ready for immediate drop whenever such a situation occurred.

TRANSLATION OF Z.G. 86

You are now cut off!

In order to avoid needless bloodshed, this leaflet is being delivered to you.

You are now cut off. Allied units are already far in your rear. You have fought bravely, but from now on it would be senseless to continue fighting. You must give up or die – shortly before the end of the war.

You realize your situation. Now you must act accordingly. Every one of you must decide for himself. There is no time to be lost.

The Allies want to spare your lives and guarantee you decent treatment. But you must clearly indicate that you are quitting the fight.

ACT IMMEDIATELY!

Trotz misslungenem

Attentat auf Hitler:

GENERALE PROKLAMIEREN FRIEDENSREGIERUNG!

Berlin, 21. Juli: In einer Radioansprache um 1 Uhr morgens gab Hitler zu, dass die gestrige Proklamation der Friedensbewegung von führenden deutschen Generalen stammt.

Goering befahl der Luftwaffe, gegen die Bewegung einzuschreiten und erklärte, dass es sich um „abgesetzte deutsche Generale" handelt. (Von Hitler bisher abgesetzt: Feldmarschalle v. Leeb, List, v. Rundstedt, v. Bock, v. Brauchitsch, Generale v. Falkenhausen und Halder). Von Seiten Goerings und Doenitz' wurde sofort nach Hitlers Rede der alten Reichsregierung Gefolgschaft erklärt. **Keine derartige Erklärung erfolgte vom OKH.**

Die Friedensregierung gab Wehrmachts-Befehlshabern in- und ausserhalb Deutschlands ihre Proklamation und Befehle bekannt. In Deutschland werden Flugblätter verbreitet, die erklären, **dass es unverantwortlich sei, den verlorenen Krieg noch länger fortzusetzen und dass die Stunde zum Handeln gekommen ist.**

Himmler wurde an Stelle von Generaloberst Fromm zum „Befehlshaber der Heimatarmeen" ernannt. Generaloberst Guderian wurde zum Generalstab des Heeres berufen.

ZG. 34 / A typical news leaflet. Such leaflets were rushed into print whenever a news event occured of sufficient importance to warrant such treatment. They were in addition to the regular daily newsheets, and were distributed in great quantity. They were usually the first information on the subject matter received by the rank and file of the enemy's front-line troops.

Despite failure of attempt on Hitler's life:

ZG. 34

GENERALS PROCLAIM PEACE GOVERNMENT

Berlin, 21 July: In radio speech at 1 o'clock this morning Hitler admitted that yesterday's proclamation of a peace movement came from leading German generals.

Goering ordered the Luftwaffe to proceed against the movement and declared that is consisted of „dismissed German generals". (Generals dismissed by Hitler so far: Field Marshals von Leeb, List, von Rundstedt, von Beck, von Brauchitsch, Generals von Falkenhausen and Halder). Goering and Doenitz declared their loyalty to the old government immediately after Hitler's speech. **No such declaration was made by the Army High Command.**

The peace government made its proclamation and orders known to Wehrmachtcommanders both inside and outside Germany. Inside Germany, leaflets are being disseminated which declare that to continue the war is irresponsible since the war is lost, and that the time had come to act.

Himmler was made „Commander of the Home Armies" in the place of Colonel General Fromm. Colonel General Guderian was called to the general staff of the Army.

Das war Dürwiss

ein einstmals friedliches deutsches Dorf im Kreis Eschweiler bei Aachen. Diesem Dorf hätte die Vernichtung erspart bleiben können — aber es wurde von Fanatikern als Widerstandsnest ausgebaut. Dadurch wurde Dürwiss zu einem militärischen Ziel alliierter Bomber. Innerhalb eines Tages wurde dieser Ort von schweren Bombern, Jagdbombern, Artillerie und flammenwerfenden Panzern niedergewalzt.

Kriegswichtige Ziele werden weiter, in steigendem Masse, von der alliierten Luftwaffe bekämpft. **Wer aber nicht im Bereich militärischer Ziele wohnt, kann verhindern, dass sein Heimatort zu einem militärischen Ziel gemacht wird.**

ZG. 121 / An example of the action-type of civilian instruction leaflet which, operating on the premise that revolution was impossible to obtain in Germany, tried to obtain certain limited, specific actions from the German reader.

This was Dürwiss

an erstwhile peaceful German village in the district of Eschweiler near Aachen, which need not have been brought to ruin. Fanatics made a strongpoint out of Dürwiss Thereby it became a military target for Allied bombers. Within one day, the town was smashed to pieces by heavy bombers, fighter bombers, artillery and flame-throwing tanks.

War-important targets continue to be attacked by the Allied Air Force, with increasing fury. **But those who do not live in areas of military targets can prevent their home towns from becoming military targets.**

WAS KAPITULATION BEDEUTET:

Im Kleinen:

Kapitulation bedeutet, daß die Hoffnungslosigkeit der örtlichen Lage anerkannt wird. Alliierte Kommandeure mußten in diesem Krieg in Singapur und auf Corregidor selbst kapitulieren. Deutsche Kapitulationen erfolgten während des vergangenen Sommers örtlich an mehreren Stellen im Osten und Westen, wo rein militärisch erkannt wurde, daß weiteres Blutvergießen nicht mehr gerechtfertigt war. In allen Fällen wurde die Übergabe korrekt und mit vollen Ehren vorgenommen.

Im Grossen:

Kapitulation bedeutet, daß die Hoffnungslosigkeit der Gesamtlage anerkannt wird. Die Alliierten sind der Ansicht, daß man mit dem Nationalsozialismus nicht verhandeln kann, und daß die Kapitulation bedingungslos sein muß, damit nicht noch einmal (wie nach dem letzten Krieg) behauptet werden kann, Deutschland sei auf feindliche Versprechungen „hineingefallen". Deshalb sagen die Alliierten: Keine Versprechungen und keine Verhandlungen mit den Nazis!

WAS KAPITULATION *NICHT* BEDEUTET:

Im Kleinen: Kapitulation bedeutet *nicht*, daß der einzelne Soldat jemals der Willkür eines Feindes ausgesetzt ist. Als Kriegsgefangener untersteht er dem Schutz der Genfer Konvention, welche genaue Bestimmungen über seine Behandlung, Verpflegung, Unterbringung usw. enthält und welche vorsieht (Artikel 75, Vertrag vom 27. VII. 1929), daß Kriegsgefangene so bald wie möglich nach Friedensschluß nach Hause zurückzuschicken sind.

Im Grossen: Kapitulation bedeutet *nicht*, daß der einzelne an Kriegsverbrechen unbeteiligte Deutsche von den Alliierten zur Verantwortung gezogen wird. Massenvergeltung gehört zu den Dingen, gegen welche die Alliierten kämpfen. Präsident Roosevelt hat erklärt: „Die Vereinten Nationen haben nicht die Absicht, das deutsche Volk zu versklaven. Es ist unser Wunsch, dem deutschen Volk die Möglichkeit zu normaler, friedlicher Entwicklung als nützliche und geachtete Glieder der europäischen Völkerfamilie zu geben."

ZG-97

ZG. 97 / Widely distributed over both soldiers and civilians, this leaflet defined the limits of our capitulation policy, at the same time explaining the basic policy of the Allies toward German prisoners on the one hand and toward the German nation on the other. Note that the reverse features the aspect of capitulation as a formal procedure countenanced by the rules of warfare—a point of the utmost importance to the German military mind.

TRANSLATION OF ZG 97

WHAT CAPITULATION MEANS:

On a small scale:
Capitulation means that the hopelessness of the local situation is being recognised. In this war, Allied commanders capitulated in Singapore, Tobruk and on Corregidor. German surrenders took place last summer locally at several places in the East and West where it was recognised, strictly for military reasons, that further loss of lives was no longer justified. In all these instances, the surrender took place in good order and with full honors.

On a large scale:
Capitulation means that the hopelessness of the overall situation is being recognised. The Allies hold that there can be no dealing with National Socialism and that the surrender must be unconditional, so no one can say (as after the last war) that Germany has been "tricked" by enemy promises. That is why the Allies say: No promises and no dealings with the Nazis!

WHAT CAPITULATION *DOES NOT* MEAN:

On a small scale: capitulation does not mean that the soldier at any time will be subjected to the enemy's whim. As a prisoner of war he is protected by the Geneva Convention which contains detailed instructions regarding his treatment, food, shelter, etc. and provided (article 75, Treaty of July 27, 1929) that prisoners of war must be returned home as soon as possible after the peace has been signed.

On a large scale: capitulation does not mean that the individual German who has taken no active part in war crimes, will be held responsible by the Allies. Mass retaliation belongs to the things which the Allies are fighting against. President Roosevelt declared, "The United Nations do not intend to enslave the German people. It is our desire to give the German people an opportunity to become useful, and respected members of the European community of nations."

ALLIIERTES OBERKOMMANDO

(Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force)

BEKANNTMACHUNG

1. In dem unter meinem Oberkommando stehenden Kriegsschauplatz wird hiermit eine Militärregierung für die besetzten deutschen Gebiete errichtet. Die Militärregierung verfügt über die Vollmachten für Verwaltung sowie Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung, die in meiner Person als Oberbefehlshaber der Alliierten Streitkräfte und Militär-Gouverneur vereinigt sind.

2. Die erste Aufgabe der Militärregierung während des Fortgangs militärischer Operationen wird es sein, die rückwärtigen Verbindungen der alliierten Heere sicherzustellen und rücksichtslos alle Umtriebe in den besetzten Gebieten zu unterdrücken, die der baldigen Beendigung des Krieges entgegenwirken.

3. Zugleich wird die Militärregierung die Ausrottung des nationalsozialistischen Systems in Angriff nehmen. Die Militärregierung wird alle Mitglieder der NSDAP und der SS von verantwortlichen Stellen entfernen, ebenso andere Personen, die an führender Stelle am nationalsozialistischen System beteiligt sind. Diese Schritte werden sofort nach Eintreffen der alliierten Armeen und Einsetzung der Militärregierung in Angriff genommen.

4. Die Zivilbevölkerung hat nach Möglichkeit ihren normalen Beschäftigungen nachzugehen. Eingehende Bestimmungen werden für sie von den zuständigen Militärbehörden jedes betreffenden Gebietes erlassen werden.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
General,
Oberster Befehlshaber der Alliierten Streitkräfte

ZG 66

Z G. 66 / An example of the "official statement" type of leaflet addressed to German civilians. The message projects the coming period of Military Government, imposing the personality of the Supreme Commander on the reader to impress him with the finality of the Allied occupation and its reality as an alternative to Nazism.

TRANSLATION OF ZG66

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

NOTICE

1 Allied Military Government is established in the Theatre under my command, to exercise in occupied German territory the supreme legislative, judical and executive authority vested in me as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and as Military Governor.

2 The immediate task of Allied Military Government during the course of military operations will be to secure the lines of communication of the allied armies and to suppress any activities in the occupied areas of Germany which could impair the speedy conclusion of the war.

3 Simultaneously Allied Military Government will begin the task of destroying National Socialism. It will remove from responsible posts all members of the Nazi Party and of the S.S. and others who have played a leading part in the National Socialist Regime. This process begins immediately upon the arrival of the Allied armies in each area and the inauguration of Allied Military Government.

4 The civilian population will as far as possible continue in their normal occupations. Detailed instructions to them will be issued by Allied Military Government in each area.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
General,
Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force

SIE KOMMEN
mit Ihren Stahlkolossen, Jabos und Flammenwerfern.
SIE KOMMEN
denn jetzt kann nichts und niemand sie mehr halten.
SIE KOMMEN
denn jetzt liegen auch Nord- und Mitteldeutschland offen vor den Anglo-Amerikanern und Russen. Der größte Betrug der Weltgeschichte ist bald vorbei:
WO BLIEBEN die deutschen Wunderwaffen?
WO BLIEBEN die operativen Reserven?
WO BLIEBEN die Parteigenossen und „Hoheitsträger", die immer zum fanatischen Widerstand aufgerufen haben? Die alliierten Armeen nehmen Deutschland im Sturm.
SIE KOMMEN
um den deutschen Militarismus endgültig auszurotten.
SIE KOMMEN
um die Kriegsverbrecher ihrer Strafe zuzuführen.
SIE KOMMEN
um den Rechtsstaat aufzurichten, damit der Weltfrieden nicht wiederum gestört wird.

WG. 50 / A strategic leaflet of the attrition type, dramatizing the inevitable advance of the Allied tidal wave and the consequent disintegration of the German defense. The reverse presents a hopeful picture of a possible solution to the dire outlook for the German people.

THEY ARE COMING

with their steel monsters, fighter-bombers and flame-throwers.

THEY ARE COMING

because nobody and nothing can stop them.

THEY ARE COMING

because now also Northern and Central Germany lie open before the Anglo-Americans and Russians. The greatest fraud of the world is almost over:

WHAT BECAME of the German miracle weapons?

WHAT BECAME of the strategic reserves?

WHAT BECAME of the Party members and high officials who always advocated fanatical resistance? The Allied Armies are taking Germany by storm.

THEY ARE COMING

to exterminate militarism once and for all.

THEY ARE COMING

to bring the war criminals to justice.

THEY ARE COMING

to set up a state based on justice, lest the world's peace be disturbed again.

DEUTSCHER VOLKSSTURM
WEHRMACHT

ANWEISUNGEN ZUR LEBENSRETTUNG

Wer Gefahr läuft, vom Volkssturm erfasst zu werden, der lese die nachfolgenden Anweisungen genauestens. Ihre genaue Befolgung kann den Unterschied zwischen Tod und Leben bedeuten:

Wenn irgend möglich, so entziehe Dich der Einberufung durch Nichtmelden, Wohnungswechsel oder « Untertauchen » unter Freunden und Gleichgesinnten.

Kannst Du Dich der Einberufung nicht entziehen, so stelle Dich ordnungsgemäss.

Leiste keinen Widerstand dagegen, wenn man Dich in den Einsatz treibt. Suche Deckung in einer möglichst geschützten Stelle und warte.

Wenn dann die Alliierten angreifen, ergib Dich, indem Du die Hände hochhebst. Die Alliierten tun Dir nichts, Du hast ihnen auch nichts getan.

Nur wer diese Anweisungen genauestens befolgt, kommt in den Materialschlachten des Westens mit dem Leben davon. Kriegsgefangene des Volkssturms werden nach den Kriegsregeln und Bestimmungen der Genfer Konvention behandelt und kehren nach Kriegsende wieder nach Hause zurück.

WG 27 K

WG. 27 / A strategic leaflet which attacks the myth of a "Nation in Arms", corrodes the fabric of the Volkssturm plan and enlists the aid of German civilians in fighting the Nazi plan for raising an effective militia.

ADVICE ON HOW TO SAVE YOUR LIFE

Anybody who is in danger of being called up as a member of the Volkssturm should read the following advice very carefully. To follow these instructions carefully may make the difference between life and death.

1. If it is at all possible, avoid being called up by not registering, changing your address, or going underground among friends and sympathizers.

2. If you are called up and can't avoid it, obey the call-up.

3. Do not resist when they drive you into action. Seek cover in the best protected place you can find and wait.

4. Then, when the Allies attack, put your hands above your head and surrender. You will have done no harm to the Allies. They will do nothing to you.

Only those who follow this advice in every detail will survive in the great battle of material in the West. Volkssturm captured in action will be treated strictly according to the Geneva Convention and the rules of war and will be returned to their homes at the end of hostilities.

ALLIIERTES OBERKOMMANDO

(Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force)

An die Arbeiter und Verwaltungsbeamten in

HAMBURG!

Die Alliierten bedrohen jetzt Eure Stadt. Die deutschen Heere im Westen sind in Auflösung.

Die größte Gefahr für die Zukunft Eurer Stadt droht Euch in diesen letzten Kriegswochen von Fanatikern, die im letzten Augenblick versuchen werden, Euren Hafen unbrauchbar zu machen. Die Macht der Männer hinter diesen Fanatikern ist im Schwinden. Mit Eintreffen der alliierten Armeen wird sie ganz zerbrochen sein. Von Eurem Verhalten in diesen Tagen hängt es ab, ob Euer Hafen dann sofort wieder in Betrieb genommen werden kann.

Auf Befehl des Alliierten Oberbefehlshaber werden

WG. 54

WG. 54 / A strategic leaflet which channels the same general type of message carried in leaflet ZG. 121 to the inhabitants of a specific town, individualizing the theme by tailoring it to the specific local conditions.

TRANSLATION OF W.G. 54

ALLIIERTES OBERKOMMANDO

(Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force)

To the workers and port officials of

HAMBURG!

THE Allies are now threatening your town. German resistance in the West has collapsed.

In these last weeks of the war, the future of your town is in the greatest danger from fanatics who may make a last minute attempt to make the port unusable. The power of the men behind these fanatics is crumbling. It will be broken with the arrival of the Allied armies. It depends on what you do now whether your port will then be reopened at once.

These instructions have been issued to workers and

MATERIAL-SCHLACHT!

VERHALTUNGSMASSREGELN

Wenn der Amerikaner angreift, so tut er das gewöhnlich in grossem Stil. Er verschwendet Granaten, um Menschenleben zu sparen. Er kann sich das leisten, denn er hat die Mittel – er hat übergenug an Artillerie, Fliegern, Flammenwerfern, Panzern, Panzerpflügen und Raketenwaffen, um jeden Widerstand zu brechen, das steht fest.

Wenn der Angriff Dich erreicht, kannst Du versuchen, ihn aufzuhalten – mit unzureichenden Waffen, unzureichender Munition, unzureichender Ausrüstung. Ob Du es versuchst, ist Deine Sache. Millionen sind auf diese Weise schon gefallen.

Oder Du rettest Dich, indem Du in Deiner Stellung liegen bleibst und der amerikanischen Infanterie klar zu verstehen gibst, dass Du Dich ergibst. Ob Du Dich ergibst, ist ebenfalls Deine Sache. Millionen haben sich auf diese Weise gerettet und wissen mit Bestimmtheit, dass sie nach Kriegsende die Heimat wiedersehen werden.

Die umstehenden Ratschläge an deutsche Soldaten sind der amerikanischen Infanterie bekannt. Falls Du gefangengenommen wirst, zeige dieses Flugblatt vor!

ZG. 81 / A good example of a strong attrition leaflet. Building on the obvious abundance of Allied material, it opened up a vista of insuperably unfavorable odds against which the enemy soldier had no possible chance of winning no matter how heroic he personally might be. At the same time it offered the individual a moral argument for saving his life

TRANSLATION OF Z.G. 81

BATTLE OF MATERIAL!

RULES OF CONDUCT

When the Americans attack, they usually do so on the largest scale. They waste shells in order to save lives. They can afford that, for they have the means — they have more than enough in artilliery, planes, flame-throwers, tanks, tankdozers and rocket weapons, in order to break any resistance. That is a fact.

When the Attack reaches you

you can try to stop it — with insufficient weapons, insufficient ammunition, insufficient equipment. Whether or not you try this is up to you. Millons have died in this manner.

Or else you can save yourself by staying in your position and showing clearly to the American infantry that you give up. Whether you surrender, is likewise up to you. Millions have saved themselves in this manner and know for sure that they will see their homes again after the war.

The instructions to German soldiers, which appear on the reverse side, are known to the American infantry. If you are captured, show this leaflet.

A NOTE ABOUT THIS LEAFLET: A general attack leaflet written to conform to battle conditions in winter when experience show the German defense tends towards the villages. Use of this version for American sectors only

Nr. 388, Freitag, 28. April 1945

NACHRICHTEN FÜR DIE TRUPPE

Leipzig und Halle gefallen

Oder-Abwehr durchbrochen

Nürnberg vor dem Fall – Ruhrkessel stellt den Kampf ein

DER Zerfall der Westfront geht mit Riesenschritten weiter. Nur 24 Stunden nach dem Fall von Magdeburg ist Leipzig gefallen.

Die Besatzung in Halle hat den Kampf eingestellt. Halb Nürnberg ist in Hand der Amerikaner. Zwischen Bremen und Hamburg haben die Alliierten die letzten deutschen Abwehrstellungen auf breiter Front durchbrochen, Lüneburg genommen und bei Lauenburg die Elbe erreicht.

Autobahn Hamburg-Bremen und durchschnitten. Taktische Parteien werden zuletzt nur 10 Kilometer südwestlich Harburg in Stadtteil gemeldet und rollen immer weiter vor gegen den Hamburger Hafen.

Der Führer hat Geburtstag

Goebbels verspricht noch immer den Sieg

Der Führer, der heute 56 Jahre alt wird, im Gespräch mit Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels.

Zwei Gross-Luftangriffe zerschmettern Helgoland

Vom Führer aus der Partei ausgestossen

Die Schweiz will keine geturnten Pg.s mehr

Deutscher Botschafter aus Tokio ausquartiert

Einbruch in die Po-Ebene bedroht Bologna im Rücken

Duce ist in alliierter Hand

2 165 627

NACHRICHTEN / Daily German-language newspaper, produced in the United Kingdom and distributed by heavy bombers of the Special Squadron, Eighth Air Force, and the Royal Air Force, to the fighting front and to enemy civilians and troops throughout Germany. Quantities per issue ranged as high as 1,700,000 copies.

11. Dezember 1944
Nummer 37 — 12 AG

Frontpost

„Der Starke braucht die Wahrheit nicht zu scheuen."
Ernst Moritz Arndt

NACHRICHTEN FÜR DEUTSCHE SOLDATEN. HERAUSGEBER: DIE AMERIKANISCHEN TRUPPEN IN WESTEUROPA

Saar überschritten

PARIS. — Vorstöße im Saargebiet und im Vorfeld von Jülich und Düren kennzeichnen die alliierten Angriffshandlungen im Westen. Saarunion und Teile von Saarlautern wurden eingenommen, die Saar in Saarlautern von den Amerikanern überquert. Saarbrücken steht unter Artilleriebeschuß.

Saarbrücken unter Artilleriefeuer

Nordabschnitt: Die britische Zweite Armee hat die letzten deutschen Brückenköpfe am Westufer der Maas verschiet. Mit der Artillerievorbereitung für den Angriff auf die holländische Grenzstadt Venlo am Ostufer der Maas wurde begonnen.

Die amerikanische Neunte Armee ist weiter auf Jülich vorgedrungen und kämpft am Rande der Stadt. Die Ortschaft Leiffert wurde von deutschen Truppen gesäubert, Koersdorf und Flossdorf, beides Ortschaften im Ufer der Roer, wurden von den Amerikanern genommen.

Im Raum Hürtgen

Mittelabschnitt: Die amerikanische Erste Armee unter General Hodges hat den Inde-Fluß bei der Ortschaft Inden überschritten und ihre neuen Stellungen östlich des Inde-Flusses gefestigt. Die große Autobahn Aachen-Köln wurde erreicht. Auch im Abschnitt von Hürtgen machte die Erste Armee Fortschritte. Hürtgen, Jungersdorf, Lammersdorf und die Ortschaft Brandenberg südöstlich von Hürtgen, wurden eingenommen.

Die räumlich größten Fortschritte wurden von der amerikanischen Dritten Armee General Pattons erzielt. Die Frontlinie dieser Armee ist jetzt entlang des westlichen Ufers der Saar von Merzig bis Saarlautern vorgetragen. In Saarlautern selbst haben die Amerikaner die große Betonbrücke über die Saar unbeschädigt erobert, und amerikanische Einheiten haben die Saar überschritten. Saarunion wurde erobert. Saarbrücken wird stündlich im Durchschnitt mit 36 Granaten schwersten Kalibers belegt. Militärische Ziele in der Stadt stehen in Flammen.

Südabschnitt: Deutsche Einheiten wurden vom Westufer des Rheins in der Nähe von Straßburg vertrieben. Während ihres Rückzuges sprengten sie drei Rheinbrücken. Die amerikanische Siebente Armee dringt von Straßburg aus nach Süden vor, und die französische Erste Armee von Mühlhausen aus nach Norden. Zwischen den Spitzen beider Armeen verengt sich immer mehr der Rückzugsraum der deutschen Truppen in den Vogesen.

Vor einem Jahr

„Ueber den Ausgang einer alliierten Invasion des Kontinents kann nach Dünkirchen und Dieppe kein Zweifel bestehen."

Dr. Göbbels, Rede vor den Propagandaleitern, 8. Dezember 1943.

Berlin unter Bomben

LONDON. — Die alliierten Luftstreitkräfte steigern ihre Großangriffe auf deutsche Treibstoffanlagen und Verkehrszentren. Berlin wurde von 550 amerikanischen Großbombern mit über 2000 Tonnen Bomben belegt. Verbände von über 1000 Bombern griffen Verschiebebahnhöfe und industrielle Ziele in Kassel, Frankfurt, Mainz, Giessen an. Auf die Treibstoffwerke in Duisburg wurden 2000 Tonnen Bomben abgeworfen und auf die Hansa-Benzolwerke in Dortmund wurde ein Großangriff unternommen.

Material - unbeschränkt

Das Bild zeigt eines der neueröffneten gewaltigen Materiallager der amerikanischen Armee in Frankreich, in dem Pneus und andere Hilfsmaterialien aufgestapelt sind.

Russen am Plattensee

MOSKAU. — Die russischen Armeen haben in Ungarn die Offensive wieder aufgenommen und bedeutende Gewinne erzielt. In Südungarn wurde die Donau auf einer 140 km breiten Front überschritten. Die Städte Mohacs, Fünfkirchen und Kaposvar wurden genommen und Marschall Tolbuchins Truppen stehen nunmehr am Plattensee. Der wichtige Eisenbahnknotenpunkt Szigetvar an der jugoslawischen Grenze ist in russischen Händen. Russische Truppen sind 32 km von der österreichischen Grenze entfernt. In Nordungarn ist der Eisenbahnknotenpunkt Salgotarjan gefallen und die beiden russischen Armeen in Nordostungarn haben sich vereinigt. Miskolc, das wichtigste Verkehrszentrum Nordost-Ungarns, ist erobert worden. Jugoslawische Truppen sind bis in die Vorstädte von Triest und in die Steiermark eingedrungen.

Ravenna befreit

ROM. — Das Hauptquartier der alliierten Streitkräfte im Mittelmeer-Raum gibt bekannt, daß im Verlauf des alliierten Vormarsches im Abschnitt von Faenza die Stadt Ravenna befreit wurde. Auch die Ortschaften Russi und Godo an der Bahnlinie von Ravenna nach Bologna wurden befreit.

FRONTPOST - Weekly newspaper for German troops, produced by the Twelfth U. S. Army Group and distributed by medium bombers of the Ninth U. S. Air Force and fighter bombers of the tactical air forces.

Passierschein

Der deutsche Soldat, der diesen Passierschein vorzeigt, benutzt ihn als Zeichen seines ehrlichen Willens, sich zu ergeben. Er ist zu entwaffnen. Er muß gut behandelt werden. Er hat Anspruch auf Verpflegung und, wenn nötig, ärztliche Behandlung. Er wird so bald wie möglich aus der Gefahrenzone entfernt.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

OBERSTER BEFEHLSHABER
der alliierten Expeditions-Armeen

Englische Übersetzung nachstehend. Sie dient als Anweisung an die alliierten Vorposten.

SAFE CONDUCT

The German soldier who carries this safe conduct is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

SUPREME COMMANDER,
Allied Expeditionary Force

ZG. 61 / The Safe Conduct was the most successful of all of the leaflets developed during the campaign. It is based on an idea first found in Russian combat leaflets, but its presentation as an elaborate, authoritative signed document is the result of work done by the PWD/SHAEF Leaflet Section. It was dropped in extremely large quantities, both as an individual drop and in drops mixed with other leaflets, throughout the campaign, and in prisoner surveys invariably rated far above all other leaflets.

(3) *Leaflets.* The types of leaflets produced by Sykewar, with illustrations of each type, were discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. The machinery of dissemination for leaflets was approximately the same as that just described for Sykewar newspapers. There remains to be discussed briefly the scope of Sykewar's leaflet operations.

Sykewar's official historian has estimated that:

> The largest single operation of PWD/SHAEF against the enemy was in the field of leaflets—largest, that is, in terms of continuing day by day tasks and in day by day production of materials. (p. 43)

His estimate of total Sykewar leaflet production is given in round figures:

> Between D-Day and the German surrender, PWD disseminated, or supervised the dissemination of, more than *three billion* leaflets. (p. 47)

This is a modest estimate, even when confined to PWD single leaflets actually disseminated. Major Garet's final leaflet report gives the following data:

> From D-Day through April 1945, a total of over 3,500,000,000 leaflet units, covering a range from single-unit leaflets to 48-page booklets were set, printed, and dispatched. (p. 168)

The number of leaflets disseminated under the PWD aegis was slightly more than half of the total number disseminated by UK-based aircraft. Quoting again from the final leaflet report:

> A total of approximately 5,997,000,000 leaflet units was distributed over the Continent by aircraft based in the United Kingdom during the leaflet operation in the Western European Theater. (p. 159)

It is difficult to grasp the immensity of an operation which can drop *six billion* leaflets over a limited area, or more than *three billion* leaflets over an even more limited area, in less than a year. Some indication of scope can be gained from the statistical data compiled in the final leaflet report. For aerial dissemination alone, a Special Leaflet Squadron, together with heavy, medium, and fighter-bombers of the RAF, 8th Air Force, and Allied Expeditionary Air Forces were used. The allocation of paper for these leaflets and newspapers averaged approxi-

mately 1000 tons per month. The PWD Leaflet Section took delivery on 75,277 bombs. Of these, about 55,000 were packed with leaflets at the rate of approximately 4000 *bombs per month.* The trucks assigned to the Leaflet Section averaged some 18,230 *miles per week* on pick-up and delivery trips to the various printers and airfields.[36]

This was the sort of apparatus required for the leaflets which told German soldiers how to say "Ei Ssörrender," and German civilians how to resist evacuation.

3. *Sykewar Media Innovations*

In developing this apparatus as a continuously functioning organization, Sykewar experimented with adapting familiar devices or inventing new devices for its special needs. The number of effective Sykewar innovations was few, but their importance to the conduct of the propaganda campaign was great. Sykewar developed devices in "media" other than the broadcast and the printed word to serve its purposes. These may be classified generally as gadgets, trinkets, and rumors. Since they were used mainly in the covert forms, these subsidiary "media" will be described more fully in the next chapter on "Special Operations." The present discussion aims only to review briefly the main Sykewar innovations in the dissemination of its major media of radio and print. The common direction of these advances was toward increased *mobility,* and their common orientation was *tactical.* Thus, in the mobile warfare of World War II, they help to explain why Sykewar's greatest successes were in the production of combat propaganda.

(1) *The Talking Tank.* Perhaps the most spectacular innovation developed by Sykewar was the tankmounted loudspeaker. As has been indicated, this made possible, for the first time, the direct participation of Sykewar in the actual conduct of battle operations. A "talking tank" could sometimes "capture" more German soldiers than the shooting tanks could kill—thus making a greater net contribution to battle victory than any single shooting tank. Such comparison is not intended to be invidious, for all Sykewarriors are agreed that the talking tank in World War II could have accomplished little without an adequate number of shooting tanks to precede and accompany it. It is intended only to make vivid the impression created by loud-

speaker successes in the last months of the campaign. It is noteworthy that an informal poll of former Sykewarriors conducted by this writer netted more votes for the tankmounted loudspeaker as an "outstanding Sykewar success" than for any other single innovation. (The results of this poll are reported in Chapter 11.)

The basic conception of the tankmounted loudspeaker, as with many strokes of applied genius, was exceedingly simple. All it required was to mount the standard loudspeaker equipment—the ANUIQ-1 (as officially designated in the Army's T/BE) powered by a PE-75 generator—in a tank instead of a ¾-ton truck or a jeep-and-trailer. The tactical gain, however, was enormous in a mobile situation.

When operated from a truck, the loudspeaker provided greater safety for the announcer. Normally, the truck carrying the amplifiers and generator was left in a covered position behind a hill or in a side street. The speaker, connected to the amplifier by heavily insulated Spiral-4 cable (2000 yards to a roll), was advanced to some convenient broadcasting position by the two-man team of announcer and driver. Thus, the crew was separated from the noisy generator, the object most likely to attract the enemy's attention and draw his fire. Should this be hit, therefore, they need not be destroyed along with the generator. An additional 50-100 yards of cable could be used to separate the microphone from the speaker ("bull horn"). In this way, the speaker could be placed to gain maximum range and coverage, and its removal from the microphone reduced the "feedback." From this distant position, too, the announcer could hear the enemy fire (which would be impossible near the generator), and could take appropriate action if it was coming his way. Such an arrangement gave the loudspeaker a maximum range of two miles. The size of the audio-area covered depended upon finding the optimum distance from, and height above, the target to be reached. Although the more aggressive loudspeaker personnel preferred to work from a position under 2000 yards away from their target, the setup as described afforded them maximum protection. However, it was too cumbersome an arrangement to be used in battle situations requiring rapid movement. Hence, the tank.

When mounted on a tank, the loudspeaker gained in mobility at the expense of safety for the announcer. All the equipment

went with the tank. With the combined racket of tanks and generator as background, the "lip-microphone," an awkward gadget which was strapped to the announcer's mouth and which eliminated sounds other than those emitted between his lips, was an indispensable item of equipment. The speaker was mounted on the forward part of the turret, and the generator in an armored housing on the back of the tank. The amplifiers, with their sensitive tubes, were installed inside the tank, in a space cleared by removing the ammunition racks. This symbolic act completed the transformation of a shooting tank into a talking tank. The hazards of operating a tankmounted loudspeaker were increased by the necessity, in working with combat soldiers, of behaving like a combat soldier. As Lieutenant Hadley puts it:

> Third tank in the column is the best place to broadcast from, when going through a town. Occasionally, however, to show the other tankers you believe in your stuff, you have to go first—but no oftener than any good leader goes first to keep the faith of his men. Of course, if you feel that you may be exposing the column to an ambush by directing them to hold their fire and wait for surrenders, it is only fair that you go first.[37]

(2) *The Leaflet Shell.* The printed media of Sykewar developed no innovations quite as spectacular as the tankmounted loudspeaker. In fact, Colonel Thomson has written, apparently with leaflet dissemination in mind, that:

> The big job in developing field propaganda procedures, particularly of combat propaganda, was done by the Psychological Warfare Branch of Allied Force Headquarters [PWB/AFHQ].[38]

This was certainly true of the development of mobile printing units, an invaluable mechanism for combat propaganda teams, particularly those operating with tactical units at some distance from higher headquarters which are equipped with standard high-speed presses. During the campaign in northwestern Europe, improvements were made as experience was gained, and particularly as the slow Davidson flat-bed presses were supplemented by rapid Webbendorfer units. The mobile printing section of the 2nd MRB, for example, produced approximately 7,000,000 copies of 65 different leaflets during the period between D-Day and VE-Day.[39]

Probably the most impressive advances in the printed media were made in overcoming the problems of dissemination, particularly by air. As indicated earlier, artillery dissemination of leaflets had been developed during World War I, and Sykewar leafleteers traced their genealogy back to the French use of a 75 mm. field piece for this purpose on the Western front in 1918. During World War II, the first important innovation was made by the British, who employed their 25-pounder to fire leaflets during the Tunisian campaign of 1942-43. Some of the anguished comments of British generals evoked by this peculiar use of a good artillery piece are quoted in General McClure's Foreword to this study.

The basic weapon developed by American units for firing propaganda shells was the 105 mm. howitzer (M2 or M2-A1), and the shell used was 105 mm. smoke shell (M64 or M84, HC, BE, W/PD). Fortunately, these items were both standard artillery equipment, which meant they were easily accessible and in good supply in all American Army areas, and at the same time filled the Sykewar requirements for efficient packing, desired ranges, and precise distribution. For Sykewar use, the smoke canister was removed and the shell was packed with approximately 500 "artillery-size" leaflets. The leaflets were produced in rolls, and the leaflet sizes were standardized for greater efficiency at $5\frac{1}{4}'' \times 8''$ for Webbendorfer presses and at $4\frac{1}{2}'' \times 6\frac{1}{2}''$ for Davidsons. The rolling of leaflets was usually done in Western Europe by locally hired workers, modification of the shell by ordnance personnel, and loading and packing by especially trained Sykewar personnel.

The leaflet shell was equipped with an M54 fuse. The time-of-flight for this fuse is 25 seconds, which corresponds to an approximate range of 8000 yards. The modifications of the M64 shell for leafleting purposes caused its performance to vary considerably from this standard range. To ascertain whether the shells reached their assigned targets, therefore, most artillery leafleting was done under observation. Since observation under combat conditions was seldom feasible at distances greater than 5000 yards, the M54 fuse gave maximum efficiency required for artillery dissemination.

Other innovations were tried experimentally by Sykewar. To be prepared for tactical situations which might require leafleting at ranges over the 8000 yards covered by the M54 fuse,

Sykewar conducted an experimental "shoot" shortly before D-Day, using an M67 fuse. This has a scheduled time-of-flight of 75 seconds, and thus is capable of utilizing the 105 mm. howitzer's maximum range of approximately 12,000 yards. This fuse was not used regularly by Sykewar, but the historian of 12th AG reported these findings:

> Experiments in artillery ranges proved that the M67 modified will function but to date no tables are yet available even to approximate the settings required for ranges greater than 8,000 yards. A recent combat application of this fuse, even though not visually observed because of the range at which fired (10,000 yards), proved that air bursts had been obtained.[40]

Other Sykewar innovations included use of the 155 mm. smoke shell for artillery leafleting. This shell could fire 1500 leaflets, three times as many as the 105 mm. shell, over a greater range. But this increased range and capacity were found to be uneconomical, partly because no direct observations could be made beyond the 5000-yard range mentioned above. Ordnance officers in charge of ammunition supply and use estimated that normally, excepting only those situations where a definite tactical advantage could be shown, it was more efficient and cheaper to fire three rounds of 105 mm., rather than one round of 155 mm.

(3) *The Monroe Bomb.* Aerial dissemination of printed materials was among the more difficult problems confronted by Sykewar. During World War I, Allied pilots disseminated leaflets by throwing them out of open cockpits. At the beginning of World War II, RAF pilots varied this method by throwing them out of bombers. After a few months, leaflets were dropped by bundles, which were tied (and later fitted with an "aneroid device") so as to break open in the course of their fall. Such a method of dissemination meant, among other things, that heavy bombers flying at 30,000 feet over northwestern Europe had to allow for a 60-mile wind—e.g., leaflets destined for Paris had to be dropped in the vicinity of Brussels.

In the highly-mechanized context of World War II, these were horse-and-buggy methods. They were clearly inadequate to meet Sykewar requirements for the mass distribution of printed propaganda—a job which, under combat conditions, can be done only by aircraft. To meet these requirements, Major James

Monroe of PWD developed a new type of leaflet bomb for aerial dissemination, known as the T-1 or, after its inventor, the "Monroe Bomb." The 12th AG historian has written a vivid account of its first operational use:

> On the night of 19 April 1944, while personnel for Group HQ was training in London and Clevedon, a lone Fortress winged over the North Sea on its way to Normandy. In its belly it carried a new type of bomb, subsequently known as the T-1. . . . As the Fortress neared Oslo, the bomb bay opened and ten cardboard containers, each packed with 80,000 leaflets, dropped earthward. A barometric fuse exploded the containers at 2500 feet and the leaflets were thrown free. On the ground the paper from each bomb made a pattern covering an area of between one-half and one mile square.
>
> From that day, quantity distribution of leaflets to the enemy was assured. Each Fort or Liberator could carry ten of the T-1 bombs (800,000 leaflets of the size $5\frac{1}{2}'' \times 8\frac{1}{2}''$) per mission. Thus the Special Leaflet Squadron set up by the Eighth Air Force, operating with a maximum of twelve planes, carried almost 1,000,000 leaflets each night that weather permitted.[41]

Eventually two versions of the Monroe Bomb were developed, the T-1 and the T-3, as standard equipment for aerial dissemination in the ETO. The T-1 was a cylindrical, laminated, paper container, 60″ long and 18″ in diameter. It was fitted with a barometric nose fuse (British type 860A) which, at approximately 2000 feet, activated a primer cord that destroyed the container and released the leaflets. The T-3, which was used almost exclusively by fighter-bombers, consisted of a converted M-26 metal flare case, with a streamlined nose and tail fin to assist trajectory. The T-3 bomb was considerably smaller than the T-1, only 50″ long and 8″ in diameter, and therefore carried a smaller load of leaflets—15,000 as compared with 80,000 for the T-1.

The advantages gained from Major Monroe's innovation were twofold. First, the quantity of leaflet-dissemination was increased, with no additional consumption of Allied airpower. Second, the quality of dissemination was improved by the barometric device, which eliminated the extremely wide dispersion of leaflets dropped from altitudes above 20,000 feet, at which the B-17 and B-24 aircraft usually operated. Release of the leaflets at 2000-2500 feet, under normal weather conditions, usually

insured accurate coverage over a target area of one square mile or less.

In the course of developing these important mechanical innovations in artillery and aerial disseminations, Sykewar learned a good deal about the tactical aspects of dissemination. From continuous interrogation and observation, Sykewar found that a minimum of 25 artillery rounds was required to "saturate" an area 500 yards wide by 500 yards long. In densely wooded areas, optimum distribution was obtained by firing all rounds on impact, thus avoiding wastage of leaflets which clung to the foliage of trees. Dawn and twilight were discovered to be the periods of dissemination most likely to attract German soldiers, who could pick them up at these hours with less fear of detection by their officers and NCO's. Also, Sykewar learned not to fire leaflets in open fields or in the extreme front lines, where German soldiers feared being detected by their own troops or being shot by ours. Even aerial dissemination taught tactical lessons, viz.:

> The most important lesson learned in air dissemination was a simple one: The best leaflet target is the enemy's ration dumps. News travels with the rations.[42]

Perhaps the most important "strategic" lesson learned in developing these innovations in various Sykewar media was the necessity for close and continuous coordination of all media.

4. *Coordination of Media*

The problems of coordinating media were various, and presented numerous administrative and technical complications. There were, at the simplest level, the problems of coordinating propaganda output within the same medium. Somewhat more complex were the arrangements required to coordinate output among the different media. Most difficult to organize on a continuing basis was the coordination of Sykewar's verbal output with actual military operations. This required Sykewar to make mutually satisfactory arrangements with combat organizations already confronted with numerous problems of their own. Although Sykewar's possibilities as a coordinate arm for combat purposes were never fully realized—so that we never achieved what Major Linebarger calls "warfare psychologically waged"—nevertheless some notable advances were made.

Many illustrations have already been provided of successful coordination of media by Sykewar. On the level of dissemination *within the same medium* (e.g., printed output) the artillery firing of *Feldpost* to front-line Germans, as a supplement to the aerial dropping of its big-brother *Frontpost* on Germans in the rear, provides an excellent example. An illustration of technical coordination within the broadcast media was the use of the Sykewar mobile transmitter near Cherbourg as a relay, rebroadcast, and service station for the big static transmitters used by "Voice of America," ABSIE, and the BBC. This became a common practice in the employment of Sykewar's broadcasting equipment.[43]

Coordination *among the different media* was practiced on several levels. Leaflets dropped on the besieged German garrison of Lorient, for example, acted as advance publicity for the Sykewar mobile transmitter outside the town. It advised its readers as to the broadcasting schedule and frequency used by this "radio station"—which had important news for them. On other occasions, a given broadcast was used to repeat and supplement "propaganda points" made by Sykewar leaflets and newspapers. For example, the Radio Lux "0810 show" was usually based upon the text of a tactical leaflet which had already been disseminated to German troops in the West.[44] Sykewar units sometimes carried off this kind of coordination among the various media with some success on the local and tactical level—only to discover a serious hitch:

> The best example, in this period, of an integrated tactical psychological warfare operation in connection with a large-scale attack was carried out in the XIXth Corps sector on the 4th of July. One hundred and five mm. rounds of leaflet shells were prepared with special leaflets and were made available to the various divisions. The British 13th Amplifier Unit stood ready for immediate call from corps. Special leaflet air drops were requested from higher headquarters in England. Simultaneously, a mobile radio station known as *Amerikanische Feldfunk* broadcast from just behind the lines on a frequency that prisoner interrogators had found was very popular with enemy troops. All phases of the operation were carried out with some degree of success. However, it was discovered that the radio station had reached only rear echelon troops so that, after carrying German, Russian and Polish surrender appeals and musical programs for one day, it was discontinued.[45]

Also, Sykewar coordinated its media on some occasions to use the same texts on a given subject, or as nearly the same texts as the various techniques appropriate to the different media would permit. This was done usually with texts involving matters of high policy, where the exact words used were considered important. The "Voice of SHAEF" texts were of this kind, for they were issued in the name of Eisenhower and regarded as committing the Allied forces. The phrasing of such texts was usually built around an exact quotation from Eisenhower (or Roosevelt-Churchill), and used for both broadcast and printed media.

Probably the most important type of coordination attempted by Sykewar was that *between its own verbal media and the combat operations* of the fighting units. The closest coordination of this sort was achieved by the tankmounted loudspeaker, which was Sykewar's nearest approach to actual fighting. This medium operated with armored battle units, and differed from them only in that it was a "talking" rather than a shooting tank. The development of this instrument as a Sykewar "medium" merits detailed examination. The following summary of its operations was prepared for this study by Lt. Arthur T. Hadley, and has been slightly expanded and edited (with his permission) by the writer:

> Cooperation and coordination with the infantry, armor, artillery, is the key. No loudspeaker mission can work if your own troops are shooting while you talk, or if they start shooting up your prisoners. I would make the flat statement that there comes a time in every engagement when the enemy will surrender if appealed to in the proper manner. For instance, I found it was very impressive if the tanks traversed their guns toward the enemy while the loudspeaker said "we see you" (even if we did not). Also, we would get the artillery, all of which carried leaflets as part of their basic load in the outfits I worked with, to put a couple of leaflet shells into a town just after we told the enemy that American artillery had them in range. (This should not be done, however, while you are telling people to surrender: the sound of incoming shells will stop them.) Small matters of coordination like this are the key to success.
>
> We did not normally get this coordination, because the loudspeaker was from a different headquarters and had not worked with the infantry or tanks before. This was the same trouble as,

during the early Normandy days, in achieving cooperation between tanks and infantry. The army solved this by attaching the *same* Battalion of tanks to the *same* Infantry Division for the *whole* campaign. Now every Infantry Division has it own organic tank Battalion. I believe that this is the only way successful loudspeaker work will be done. The loudspeakers and their personnel must become an integral part of the Division.

A primary lesson of the war, with regard to loudspeakers, was that they were not used enough. Why? Because the infantry could not get at them; they were back at Army Hq some place. By the time they got through checking all the way down the line to make a mission, the mission would be gone. Actually Sommaripa * and I got into the habit of keeping a loudspeaker set with one of the good Divisions that would not talk about it, and thus made many "unofficial" broadcasts. But such attempts to get the loudspeakers down to the Division level where they did some good were continually frustrated.

Another point comes up here. These machines were not shaken loose because the men who should have been operating them were not highly motivated enough. You were around; you know. How many times have you heard people refer to Col. Flynn Andrews * as a fool for wanting to get too far forward? I made several broadcasts with Andrews and actually he was a very careful and thorough soldier; but he was aggressive. The loudspeaker broadcast is different from any other. It is fighting; the rest of PW is not. You remember the trouble I had trying to get men to talk over my speakers: "Go up and get killed with Hadley!" etc.

Loudspeaker personnel must be trained as infantry or tankers; otherwise they will not realize the necessity of being aggressive, and will louse up the combat troops. Our men (and there were honorable exceptions) did not have this outlook, nor was the training they had received calculated to instill it in them.

The rules we followed were pretty simple, though we learned them the hard way. IMPORTANT: Stay well away from words that may act as a superego reinforcement at the last minute, e.g., surrender. That word should almost never be used. It was also important to stay away from voices with Jewish inflections, especially to the Waffen-SS, who were pretty thoroughly Nazified. A strong, clear voice at the microphone improves effectiveness. Much of the loudspeaker impact comes from its shock value during a crisis situation. The strong, clear voice focuses

* Col. Flynn Andrews and Alexis Sommaripa, two outstanding performers with combat loudspeakers, were killed in action during the campaign. (D. L.)

the attention of a confused enemy on stimuli toward which he can orient his responses.

As to timing, it is ideal to start broadcasting before the fire-fight commences and keep talking to the enemy during a show of force. You do much better this way than by breaking into the middle of a shooting match. The idea of being shot at, even for old soldiers, is always worse than the reality. But this brings me back to my old theme: COOPERATION. How can you get coordination like this unless you work with the same unit all the time, so that you know and trust each other's weapons?

The thing to get over to your readers is that the combat loudspeaker functions best as a supporting weapon which is always available for use in appropriate situations, in just the same way that artillery is always available. The loudspeaker is definitely *not* just a "one-shot" or special mission affair, and was rarely successful when used in this way. There were two typical situations, involving enemy troops, besides the broadcast addressed specifically to the enemy commander, in which we got optimum results.

First, loudspeakers were most effective when used constantly in an advance. This situation developed after we had crossed the Roer River, and we found that the best outfits to work with were the cavalry. They are often operating on the enemy flanks, which is a good place to broadcast from, particularly if you want to make the enemy think he's surrounded. With the cavalry, use a light tank. Among other advantages, this goes backwards faster than a medium tank. (I'm getting old; I like that.) The text in this situation should be short and to the point. [See the typical text quoted on the final page of the preceding chapter, beginning: "Attention, attention, soldiers in Bad Heim."] Every sentence should be spoken twice, as anyone will understand who has tried to get the attention of a man while he is fighting. This relates to the point made above, about the value of starting to broadcast before the fire-fight commences. After a while, you move up the speaker a couple of hundred yards, face it in a slightly different direction, and give it to them again.

The second situation is characteristically static rather than mobile. Here, you use the loudspeaker to provide the latest news to enemy troops who have no newspaper or radio communications with their rear. With extra effort, you can get news to them faster than any other source, and, of course, with the selection and development of the news angles you want to

stress. Since this can be done only in a static situation, the enemy troops shoot the hell out of you, especially at first. But if the broadcaster makes sure to keep the cub plane over his head, the pilot will be able to spot them when they fire. Also, if you keep at it regularly, they will be less anxious to shoot at you and more interested in listening to you. So, even though this type of broadcast gets less spectacular results than the "surrender appeal," it certainly pays off in the end.

Does it work? Once you have seen the thankful expression on the face of an infantryman who thought he was going to have to die to take a tough position, and, instead, the position surrenders to a broadcast, you have no doubts about the value of the combat loudspeaker appeal. There was also plenty of objective evidence. For example, you remember that G-2 of the 2nd Armored Division credited its talking tank with 7000 POW's in one week.*

Naturally, this kind of effectiveness becomes possible only when the enemy is in a bad tactical situation, if not at the end of his rope. But, in order to take advantage of such a situation, the combat loudspeaker must previously have built up some audience among enemy troops and some confidence among its own fighting units. To do this, its place as a supporting weapon working together with all other weapons must be secured. In conclusion, therefore, the formula for effectiveness is: "SUCCESS EQUALS COOPERATION WITH THE COMBAT ARMS PLUS AGGRESSIVENESS." [46]

The types of coordination discussed in this section were usually local, specific, and directed only to the more effective "scoring" of a propaganda "point" in a limited tactical situation. For the most intensive coordination of all available media, directed to larger objectives, we must consider those Sykewar activities designated as "special operations."

* This figure should not be taken too literally, for during this final period (i.e., from the Rhine to the Elbe) German soldiers were surrendering everywhere by the thousands. While no precisely accurate accrediting of POW's is possible in such a situation, this act of the Division G-2 can be taken as tribute to the value of the tankmounted loudspeaker in facilitating surrenders—by providing German soldiers with an appropriate occasion and by telling them exactly how to use it. (D. L.)

Chapter 9. Notes

1. A considerable portion of the intelligence effort made by PWI was directed to finding out how Sykewar broadcasting could get the distasteful aspects of its message to the German audience without being "turned off."

This was a purpose of the intensive study of German predispositions described in Chapters 5 and 6.

2. *History: P & PW,* p. 160.

3. *History: PWD,* Chapter 6.

4. This division of labor between SHAEF and 12th AG occasioned many jurisdictional battles among personnel of the respective headquarters. Though interesting, these conflicts were probably not decisive.

5. The OWI London bureau had an important part in setting up the news service which became APS.

6. While Radio Lux programs to foreign workers were under the direction of Gordon-Walker, the problem of Sykewar policy to "DP's" was under the supervision of C. D. Jackson, Deputy Director of PWD, now director of Time International.

7. *History: PWD,* p. 42.

8. See the final report by F. C. McLean, Chief Engineer, entitled "PWD Radio Engineering Activities in Northwest Europe" (13 February 1945). This report is reprinted as Appendix F to *History: PWD,* and is the source of most of the technical data on Sykewar radio given in this chapter.

9. *History: P & PW,* p. 161.

10. The difficulty of "hearing" Allied broadcasts is indicated by Kurt Schuschnigg, who was a guest of the Nazis. He was given "one of those small sets issued by the Government which are just strong enough to receive the local broadcasting stations. All other, more powerful sets were confiscated and replaced by these so-called *Volksempfänger,* lest German ears be contaminated by foreign propaganda." *Austrian Requiem* (London, 1947), p. 183.

11. See David Hertz, "The Radio Siege of Lorient," *loc. cit.,* pp. 291-302; also *History: P & PW,* pp. 161-165.

12. Letter to this writer, deposited in The Hoover Library.

13. "PWD Radio Engineering Activities in Northwest Europe" (see note 8).

14. *History: PWD,* p. 37.

15. Particularly adroit use of the tankmounted loudspeaker was made by Sykewar's Alexis Sommaripa, who was killed in action.

16. *History: P & PW,* pp. 182-183.

17. *History: 2nd MRB,* p. 87. There were five such "mobile radio broadcasting" companies. The first operated in the Mediterranean under AFHQ, and the other four operated in northwestern Europe under the Sykewar structure headed by PWD/SHAEF (although under the "administrative control" of the 72nd Publicity Service Battalion).

18. A vivid, if not wholly accurate, account of these "Schweinheils or pig calls" is given in H. F. Pringle, "The 'Baloney Barrage' Pays Off," *Saturday Evening Post* 217:40, 18 (31 March 1945).

19. For example: "Results of operations in Brittany were considered very good. A large number of desertions had been directly credited to the use of the combat loudspeaker (about 150)." *History: 2nd MRB,* p. 56.

20. Despite these qualifications, the 12th AG rating was still very high: "The combat loudspeakers were responsible for the capture of thousands

of prisoners, the surrender of strong points and road blocks of enemy rear guards, and the capitulation of many towns without a shot being fired by their garrisons." *History: P & PW,* p. 181.

21. Letter to this writer from Guy della-Cioppa, PWD specialist on combat loudspeakers, deposited in The Hoover Library.

22. *History: PWD,* p. 95. For an interesting comparison of this Sykewar problem with its Nazi counterpart, see "Verlag Archiv und Kartei," *Presse in Fesseln,* especially the section in Chapter 6 entitled "Die Papierpolitik des Amann-Konzerns."

23. The same problem faced American propagandists in World War I. Former Ambassador Hugh Gibson has related that "the flyers who have been required to carry bundles of papers with their bombs are usually filled with disgust by the idea and dump their load overboard as soon as they get out of sight of their starting point, often into French trenches or No-Man's Land." Quoted in *Words that Won the War,* Mock and Larson, p. 253.

24. L. J. Margolin, *Paper Bullets,* p. 55.

25. PWD's Leaflet Section included among its number a "liaison man" who maintained friendly relations with the fliers. Assigned for his personal use were a jeep and trailer, the latter, when he left Paris, usually filled with liquor for "liaison" purposes.

26. *History: P & PW,* p. 123.

27. See the concluding section of the PWD final report on "Leaflet Operation in the Western European Theater."

28. *History: PWD,* pp. 47-51.

29. "Leaflet Operations . . .", section 5 (3).

30. "Ideally, a leaflet operation should use all methods of distribution: the artillery for pinpoint local tactical leaflets, fighter bombers for tactical targets out of reach of artillery, medium bombers for close-in strategic and semitactical leaflets, and heavy bombers for strategic leaflets aimed at enemy civilians far behind the line." *Ibid.,* section 5.

31. *Ibid.,* section 5 (4b).

32. *Ibid.,* section 3 (2b). Further quotations from this Report are followed, in parentheses, by the number of the page in the *History: PWD* on which they occur.

33. *History: PWD,* p. 163.

34. *Ibid.,* Chapter 17. Cedric Belfrage, who was (with Eugene Jolas) mainly responsible for the *Aachener Nachrichten,* is preparing a book on his wartime experiences.

35. See *History: P & PW,* pp. 124-126.

36. All the figures in this paragraph are from the final report on "Leaflet Operations . . .", section 4 (1).

37. Letter from Arthur T. Hadley, deposited in The Hoover Library. Much of the technical information given above comes from Mr. Hadley, who has devised improvements in the tankmounted loudspeaker since the war. His forthcoming book, *Battle Propaganda,* which describes all the themes useful in all the combat situations known to him, promises to be an illuminating and highly provocative study.

Additional material on combat loudspeakers is given in the instruction

manual *Tactical Psychological Warfare* issued by The Ground General School at Fort Riley, Kansas (Sept. 1947). Since this manual is classified "restricted," it can not be quoted here. It may be noted, however, that sykewarriors in the Pacific theater mounted the ANUIQ-1 in landing craft, and apparently used this device effectively to facilitate the surrender of Japanese soldiers on small island positions.

38. C. A. H. Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

39. *History: 2nd MRB,* p. 78.

40. *History: P & PW,* p. 140. Most of the technical data given above come from this source. Additional information is contained in the final report on "Leaflet Operations . . ."

41. *Ibid.,* p. 145.

42. *Ibid.,* p. 149.

43. *History: PWD,* p. 37.

44. See Appendix E for specimen scripts of the Radio Lux "0810 show" (i.e., the program broadcast at 8:10 A.M.).

45. *History: 2nd MRB,* p. 36.

46. The full text of Lieutenant Hadley's original memorandum is in The Hoover Library. (See note 37 above.)

Chapter 10

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. *Words and Deeds: Theory of Special Operations*

One of the useful verbal distinctions which, like that between rational and emotional, has gained currency in a vulgarized and absolutized form is the distinction between "words" and "deeds." This distinction, useful for purposes of analysis, has been made into a popular dichotomy which ignores the fact that one can fruitfully treat both words and deeds as variant aspects of human behavior. Emitting words surely is a human activity comparable in many ways to dressing, eating, or kicking the neighbor's cat. For the social analyst, a flow of communication-events is part of the flow of events, and the communication process is part of the historical process.

The tendency to polarize words and deeds has been particularly marked in time of war, when the sustenance of myth and morale seems to require (tales of) strong deeds, not "mere words." A classic statement of this dichotomy is attributed to Bismarck: "Man schiesst nicht mit öffentlicher Meinung auf den Feind, sondern mit Pulver und Blei."[1] This is good "strong-man" talk, but it is quite clear from the record that Bismarck himself, not to mention Hindenburg and Ludendorff and von Rundstedt, acted on the view that public opinion and propaganda can be handy weapons to have on one's side, in addition to powder and lead.[2]

Recent writers have emphasized the emptiness of the dichotomy, and have indicated that the distinction is useful only as it underscores the need for a close coordination of words and deeds. Professor Lasswell, for example, has written recently:

> What we say to the masses through the instruments of communication can be effective, in the long run, when it is correlated with our deeds of diplomacy, economy, and strategy. Words without deeds are sooner or later falsified, even as deeds without words are often misunderstood.[3]

Mr. Elmer Davis, director of the Office of War Information, made this point with reference to sykewar during World War II:

> We in OWI do not overestimate the contribution we can make to victory, but we do not underestimate it either. We know that the war is going to be won primarily by fighting, but we can point to plenty of proof in history, both recent and remote, that victory of the fighting forces can be made easier by what is called psychological or political warfare.[4]

For the responsible officials of Sykewar, this theme became a constant refrain. Again and again, in the Sykewar staff studies, the need for close coordination of the propaganda and the combat weapons was emphasized. This was made the first condition of successful psychological warfare: "It must be tied closely to military events, and without the impressiveness of military success it cannot itself be successful." And again: "Its basic sales argument is the force of military might. This, of course, requires hard evidence." [5]

Before long, in the Sykewar campaign, this recognition of the primacy of coordination with military operations had become standard doctrine, down to the lowest Sykewar echelon. The little unit which conducted an energetic, if largely ineffective, campaign against the German garrison in Lorient, reported its findings to the company historian in these terms:

> With no show of force on our side, there was little hope that Lorient would surrender, no matter what psychological means were used.[6]

With such widespread recognition, the outlook for coordination should have been bright. The difficulty was that recognition, though widespread, was one-sided; it was mainly on the side of those who used the verbal weapons. Those who used the weapons of destruction, or a large number of these persons, often refused to recognize that there was any such problem at all. They simply did not see that coordination of an artillery barrage with a "baloney barrage," for example, could do very much for them. In 1946, after the published "overall" morale reports of the Strategic Bombing Survey had already demonstrated the complexity of factors leading to the Japanese surrender, a responsible general officer (Chief of the Army's

Chemical Warfare Service) could still assert the traditional military view of morale in such a naive, unqualified sentence as the following:

> It is my conviction that incendiary attacks broke the Japanese will to resist before the advent of the atomic bomb.[7]

Even the strictest traditionalists among high military officers understood, if they did not approve, the use of combat weapons to achieve psychological, in addition to military, purposes. Strategic bombing of the "saturation" variety, for example, clearly was intended to cause psychological disruption in the target area as well as disruption of transport, communications, and other "purely military" ends. (The Nazis labeled this kind of bombing simply "Terrorangriff.") On the lower tactical echelons, unit commanders understood, or at least practised, the "strategy of terror" against enemy troops by such simple devices as sending a single plane over an otherwise quiet sector in the middle of the night. This plane dropped neither bombs nor leaflets, and often did not even take photographs. Its main purpose was to waken the enemy troops by dropping flares, frighten them, force them out of their warm sleeping-bags into cold, damp foxholes, and generally disrupt the pleasant rhythm of the sleeping body. The physiological and psychological effects upon morale of such techniques used in isolation probably were not very profound, although the "unsettlement" of nerves, particularly among green troops, must have helped to dull the edge of enthusiasm for war. Such combat tactics were well understood by both sides in World War II.[8]

Less widely understood among Allied combat leaders was the increased degree of psychological effectiveness which could be attained by coordination of combat with propaganda techniques. One variety of such coordination has been described by a group of American psychiatrists as the "combination of threats and action. This attack is specifically designed to produce anxiety."[9] Their more detailed analysis of the Nazi use of this technique was summarized as follows:

> The purpose of this is to arouse as much anxiety and fear as possible. If this can be achieved, there results a considerable interference with morale. The individual and the group lose their aggressiveness and drive, initiative is lacking, and efficiency of the group either as a fighting or a working unit is

> seriously impaired. In carrying out this strategy of terror much use is made of threats. Threats are made that, unless the opponents give in, their cities will be bombed into the ground. This is followed by as severe a bombing attack as is possible and the bombing attack is in turn followed by a series of threats to the effect that this is only the beginning, and that the full force of the Axis air strength is to be let loose upon their opponents. The object of this procedure is to prepare the ground by a series of threats. This heightens the terrifying nature of the bombing attack and the terror produced by this is prolonged by the follow-up threats. This production of anxiety and fear states is of considerable value in reducing morale and thereby lowering the working efficiency of the civilian population.[10]

In the latter stages of the campaign, Sykewar managed to achieve some coordination between its verbal media and the combat media of the military command. Although direct threats were never issued in the name of the Supreme Commander, and were rarely used even by the lower echelons, Sykewar managed to convey the impressions described in the above quotation. Illustrations of the Sykewar technique were leaflets, already cited, which in the name of the Supreme Commander *warned* the inhabitants of "danger areas" to expect a bombing and to take cover or flight.

Such coordination, however, was sporadic during most of the campaign. It was effected most closely in connection with certain concerted efforts, known as Special Operations, designed to achieve goals of clear military value.

2. *Special Operations: Specimen Campaigns*

The Special Operations in which PWD participated were undertaken with the concurrence of SHAEF, and usually involved operational coordination with one or more staff divisions under SHAEF jurisdiction. For this reason, and because these activities sometimes included certain "covert" aspects, the full story of Special Operations has not yet been published in detail. The account which follows gives a concise review of only those operations involving Sykewar which have been declassified and released for publication.[11]

"HUGUENOT": The objective of this plan was to undermine the efficiency of the German Air Force by leading

Luftwaffe authorities to believe that flying personnel were deserting in their aircraft to the Allied side. The method was to plant hints and stories "indicating desertion with Allied connivance" on the regular Allied broadcasts, with the knowledge that these would reach the Luftwaffe officials concerned, through the daily monitoring reports of Allied broadcasts made by German agencies.[12]

The intention was not so much to increase actual desertions as to encourage countermeasures against flying personnel by Luftwaffe authorities. Measures which Sykewar expected to increase included the sharpening of antidesertion regulations, instructions to field police to "keep a suspicious eye on everyone," and the promotion of officers on the basis of political reliability rather than flying efficiency. Such a course, if followed, could be predicted to have "serious effects on morale" among German flying personnel.

"NEST EGG": The objective here was to secure the surrender of the Channel Islands by means of Sykewar alone, during the battle for Brittany, when no Allied assault force was available for this purpose. The plan was first to reach the German commander on the Islands and induce him to surrender. If this failed, a Sykewar radio-leaflet attack was to be undertaken, with two aims: (1) to inform the German troops of their situation; (2) to weaken their morale so that a show of Allied air strength (i.e., by dropping *Nachrichten für die Truppe)* might be sufficient to induce surrender.

On 22 September 1944, contact with the garrison having failed to produce surrender, and there being no sign of demoralization among the troops, this operation against the Channel Islands was called off. The operation was regarded by some as "a final demonstration" that Sykewar required military support to be effective. It may be suggested, however, that the failure of "Nest Egg" teaches only a more limited lesson: that surrender propaganda is not likely to be effective against troops whose living conditions are as good as, or better than, those offered by surrender. The German garrison on the Channel Islands apparently was having a comparatively good time of it, and demonstrated no eagerness to trade their situation for captivity.[13]

"BRADDOCK II": This operation aimed at making effective the potential threat to German internal security of the millions

of foreign workers in Germany. The method was to drop four to five *million* "small, powerful time-fuse incendiaries" on areas in Germany and Austria where foreign workers were concentrated. Each package of incendiaries contained a "how to use" instruction card in nine languages, and a folder indicating likely targets. These gadgets were supported by an unorthodox use of Sykewar media: the call to arms was sounded both in nightly broadcasts by "Soldatensender Calais" (a "gray" station), and separately in "white" leaflets over the signature of General Eisenhower.

The intention of "Braddock II" was twofold: (1) to profit by whatever actual sabotage was committed by the foreign workers; and (2) to strain the enemy's security forces to the utmost. During the early weeks of 1945, when it was clear from the military situation that a quick conclusion of the war was unlikely, the sabotage objective was dismissed. However, "reports from neutral capitals (Stockholm and Bern)" and monitoring of German radio provided evidence that "the appeal considerably disturbed and confounded Nazi officials." The second objective of "stretching the German security service by keeping them in a constant state of apprehension and watchfulness" was continued, therefore, until late April 1945, when it became evident that the end of the war was at hand.

"CLARION": This operation, like "Braddock II," hinged upon the close coordination of military and Sykewar operations. The objective was to disrupt the German rail and water lines of communication, with the twofold aim of: (1) aiding the Allied ground forces; and (2) forcing the enemy to make heavier demands upon motor transport, "thereby depleting his carefully-conserved petroleum supply."

The plan called for intensive and sustained air attacks against the German transportation system, beginning in January of 1945. In coordination with this schedule, the Sykewar media were to build up a heavy emphasis on its effects to the German people. Sykewar audiences, and especially the German railway workers, were warned to stay away from their jobs if they wished to keep out of danger to life and limb. Sykewar output to the German combat troops stressed their isolation, as a result of these bombings, from their bases and supplies. The official historian, with somewhat greater enthusiasm than would seem

to have been justified by PWI data on "Clarion" effectiveness, writes:

> The weapon of psychological warfare was here to be utilized to drive the morale of Germans down to the lowest possible levels when still under the stunning blows of the air offensive and to prevent it from emerging from that state.

"CAPRICORN": This was a plan which toyed with the long-term Strategy of Truth at a point in the war when the long term seemed close to its end. Begun in the last week of February 1945, Operation "Capricorn" had as its objective:

> the undermining of German morale by propaganda talks, based on actual as well as spurious intelligence, proving that Germany had already lost the war and that to continue to fight would only mean to aid in the destruction of German life and economy.

The plan centered around a series of "black" broadcasts, described by the official account in the following terms:

> A speaker, in military tone and by dint of his inside information, purported to report an underground movement within Germany and advocated, amongst other things, the immediate overthrow of Hitlerism as Germany's real enemy and the acceptance of surrender terms as the only way to avoid annihilation of the German nation.

This "black" output was supported by "white" leaflets, produced by the OWI. The plan called for Germany to be "blanketed" with these OWI leaflets, which suggested that the Allies had heard the broadcasts of this station within Germany, agreed with its point of view, and encouraged the German people to listen to this "voice coming from within."

"ASPIDISTRA": This operation was conducted during March 1945, as the end of the war was in sight. Its objective was to spread the confusion reigning in Germany at that period, and to prevent any possible concerted mass action by German civilians. The method used was that designated as "intruder operations." Using the Cologne, Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Berlin frequencies of the German Home Service, Sykewar transmitters broke into German medium-wave programs with Allied commentators broadcasting false news reports in German. The official claim is probably accurate that this

"made it very difficult, if not impossible, for the German listener to sift the true from the false."

Less clearly verified is the claim that "Aspidistra" broadcasts, particularly those which announced the approach of the Allies and the false evacuation orders, "not infrequently created chaos in the German transport system." Finally, this writer is aware of no evidence to support the unqualified assertion that this operation "played havoc with the German people's morale in the last months of the war, and just about finished off their endurance . . ."

3. *Covert Operations: "Gray" and "Black"*

The covert operations, it was believed by many at Sykewar, were on a wholly different footing from "white" operations. The policy, intelligence, themes, techniques, media, and even the personnel of covert operations were kept separate from those of overt operations. "Black" operations, particularly, were regarded as a unique mode of making propaganda. The usefulness of such procedures is a problem on which comment should be reserved until the story of covert operations in World War II has been told in detail. It is clear that the strategy of "black" operations was in some ways markedly different from that of overt Sykewar. However, the covert themes, techniques, and media would seem to have been mainly variations of the "white" mode.

One distinction which has been mentioned is that "white" output explicitly acknowledged its source. That is, a "white" broadcast began with such an announcement as: "You are about to hear an important voice—the voice of a member of the staff of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force." [14] A "white" leaflet or newspaper made its origin equally clear. For example, every issue of *Frontpost* bore the legend "Nachrichten für deutsche Soldaten. Herausgeber: die amerikanischen Truppen in West Europa"—with a further credit line to the 12th AG, on the front page.[15]

"Gray" output did not indicate its source. That is, no source at all was given.[16] "Black" output deliberately attempted to masquerade under a false source, explicitly claiming to be something other than what it was. It is clear that, theoretically at least, a covert operation, with no responsibility to its own iden-

tity (since that identity is either concealed or falsified), should be free to play all sorts of tricks not available to "white" operations. What this meant in practice, however, was quite another thing.

The main "gray" operation, for example, was the daily newspaper *Nachrichten für die Truppe*. The fact that *Nachrichten* did not explicitly reveal its source was of little consequence, however. The German readers knew whose aircraft dropped *Nachrichten* over them, and Sykewar knew they knew it. Recall the observation of the 12th AG historian:

> The German soldier knew quite well that it came from the Allies, but its writers took every trouble to avoid reminding him of the fact.[17]

What made *Nachrichten* "gray," then, was less its concealed identity (which everybody knew) than its habit of mixing deliberate falsities with accurate news reports. The idea was "to carry uncheckable, irrefutable, and highly subversive home news on the shoulders of checkable and topical front news." [18] Such a notion of "mixing in the fast punches with the slow ones" would seem to make sense on the surface. Closer examination reveals, however, several reasons for doubt.

In the first place, a considerable expenditure of time, money, and personnel went into establishing accuracy in every issue of *Nachrichten,* and it was probably as reliable as any German-language newspaper on the Continent, outside of Switzerland. Clearly, no blatant or even subtle falsification of important events could appear in such a publication without destroying the value of prior efforts directed toward securing credibility. A statement that Cologne had fallen, when Allied troops were still fighting for Aachen, would not have been believed, obviously, and would have destroyed the reputation for which *Nachrichten* aimed. Its editorial staff was reduced to little lies of unspecified reference—which brings us to a second important consideration about this "gray" operation.

It is clear, from careful inspection, that *Nachrichten* told few more "little lies of unspecified reference" than the ordinary leaflet-newspaper output of Sykewar, officially classified as "white." The kind of "highly subversive home news" which *Nachrichten* carried was composed of items dealing with:

> the scandals of reserved occupations, the overworking of women, conditions in children's evacuation camps, "black-marketing" in high quarters, and insincere and bombastic appeals for sacrifice by bosses and by wire-pullers hundreds of miles behind the front.[19]

However, every item in this inventory of subversive themes was used, as well, in Sykewar output regarded as "white." Possibly the only advantage achieved by the planting of these items in a "gray" rather than in a "white" newspaper was that the skeptical German could, if he were very precise, say only "more American lies" instead of "more American lies signed by General Eisenhower." There is even reason to believe that if *Nachrichten* had carried some such legend as "Herausgeber: die amerikanische Streitkräfte," its efforts toward "subversion" might have been more impressive. By trying, unsuccessfully, to conceal its identity, *Nachrichten* made its intentions suspect before it was even read. One reason for this belief is the evidence produced by PWI interrogation of German POW's. Since PWI interrogators were not permitted to question prisoners directly about covert operations, lest they expose these operations as sponsored by the Allies, the data on these points are fragmentary. This writer, who shared the task of making sense out of these fragments, was impressed by the relatively small number of prisoners who were deceived by *Nachrichten's* concealment, and the relatively high number who were irritated or merely amused by it.

"Black" operations were initiated on a different basis. Here the attempt was not merely to conceal one's proper identity, but to present one's output under an assumed identity, considered appropriate to the purpose of the operation. "Black" was, in this sense, a "strategy of the big lie." Very little information about "black" propaganda operations has been made public. Most such operations were conducted by PID-OSS, and both these organizations have sealed their files against postwar public scrutiny. Those few "black" operations conducted mainly under the British have also been kept highly classified under the Official Secrets Act. Only about the very few "black" operations conducted mainly by the Americans has there been a regular "leak" of information (one might almost say a "flood"). But these were not the most skillful, successful, and characteristic

"black" activities, and it would be misleading to treat them here as representative.

This brief account must be based, therefore, wholly upon the inadequate data published to date, and can aim only at some bare indications of how "black" worked. The final leaflet report contributes the following bit of information concerning the dissemination of "black" leaflets:

> These leaflets, which purported to originate from enemy sources, were the joint responsibility of PID and OSS. This was a special secret operation and cannot be discussed in detail in this report. Substantial quantities of this material were distributed by packing approximately five percent of them into the leaflet bombs along with *Nachrichten,* and it is believed to have been a very effective form of propaganda.[20]

In its discussion of leaflet policy, the same report gives the following information:

> Purporting to come from enemy sources, these [black] leaflets attempted to accomplish their aims by subtlety and indirection. They covered a multitude of themes, and in general were designed to weaken the enemy's morale by undermining the soldiers' confidence in the Nazi Party and the High Command. There were also special leaflets, such as forged German food and clothing coupons, travel orders, etc., which were intended to add to the enemy's administrative difficulties and provide additional work for the SS and the Gestapo. (p. 168)

The official historian has added the following remarks about the general aims of "black" output, in both the broadcast and the printed media:

> Both before and after D-Day the main tone of black propaganda was to concentrate the attention of the German soldier on the enemy within his own ranks, i.e., Nazi Party authorities, rather than on the enemy without.
>
> In the strictly military field, it was endeavored to keep before the mind of the soldier in the West the military disasters on the Eastern Front, the weaknesses of German war production under the stress of Allied bombing, the impotence of the Luftwaffe, and the breakdown of German police authority.
>
> Prisoners of war captured during operations on the Continent stated that the Calais transmissions [gray rather than black.—D. L.] were heard by them regularly and most of the contents believed. Special success was achieved by the campaign

representing the Generals' conspiracy on Hitler's life as a powerful movement to save Germany from military disaster. (p. 52)

The student of the total Sykewar operation is struck by the remarkable resemblance of "black" objectives (and the themes used to support them) to the objectives and themes of overt Sykewar. It is clear, from inspection of the theme-counts presented in Chapter 7, that every "black" theme mentioned in the passages quoted above occurred regularly in overt output. The main differences were in the "black" treatment of these themes and the context provided them by the false identity of the "black" medium.

"Black" treatment availed itself of certain supplementary techniques, which may be distinguished as the three categories of trinkets, gadgets, and rumors.[21] The distinction between trinkets and gadgets is designed only to separate those devices which could be used for specific purposes of disruption (gadgets) from those devices which could not (trinkets). Such gadgets as false ration cards, incendiary "matches," and other instruments for sabotage, which were used in drops similar to those for "Braddock II," clearly served specific activities which were intended to disrupt German food distribution and war production, as well as German transport and security organization. No such specific purposes were served by trinkets, of which OWI Bern was a prolific producer. Among these trinkets were simulated German postage stamps, on which Hitler's head was made to look like a gruesome skull and the words "Deutsches Reich" were made to read "Futsches Reich." Other such trinkets included wall stickers, bearing various subversive slogans, and even one isolated specimen of pornography—Goebbels, with a seminude aspirant to film stardom on his lap. Sykewar's covert operations made little use of such trinkets, whose objective was to support the broad Sykewar themes by assertions—in many variations which would catch the fancy of Germans—that the Nazis or Generals or *Bonzen* were no good.

The incidence of rumor is of considerable importance in any propaganda operation.[22] Rumor can do the propagandist's work for him by multiplying his audience beyond the limited number which actually hears his broadcasts and reads his leaflets. An illustration of how rumors served Sykewar purposes is provided by incidents which followed the dropping of the gadgets

mentioned above in connection with "Braddock II." These gadgets, particularly the forged ration cards and the sabotage devices, had caused some consternation among German officials. This alarm was carried over to the Sykewar barometric release device which was used on Monroe Bombs to scatter leaflets at the proper altitude. These objects resembled shoe-polish cans, but with a "military look," and their first appearance disturbed Germans already jittery about subversive objects dropped from Allied planes. Rumors about them spread quickly, assisted by official announcements that civilians were not to tamper with these and other "strange objects." These rumors would seem to have aided Sykewar, by giving an "unearned increment" to its objective of straining the German security system.[23]

To prevent the unwitting dissemination of rumors "planted" by the enemy, among other reasons, all countries at war conduct intensive "security" campaigns. The campaign conducted in America during World War II under such slogans as "Button Your Lip" was paralleled by the German campaign under the slogan "Feind hoert mit" (The Enemy Hears Too). Among mass armies, which are cut off from most of their normal sources of information, the incidence of rumor is extremely high. In World War II, the GI's "Latrin-o-gram" was neatly paralleled by the *Landser's* "Latrinenparolen." One anti-Nazi German writer observed the same process at work even in the concentration camps: "Die unglaublichsten Gerüchte werden auf der Latrine fabriziert." [24]

Sykewar took advantage of this tendency among German soldiers by rumor mongering in all its covert media. Particularly interesting, in this connection, was the use of agents to spread rumors. The methods employed have been described as follows:

> The work of these agents, once they had infiltrated enemy lines, was comparatively simple. They distributed leaflets, put them in mail boxes, slipped them under doors, left them in railroad cars, in beer halls, railroad stations. By word of mouth they spread rumors of impending military events.[25]

Despite its importance, rumor as a technique is difficult to assess, because it is difficult to control. Many rumors said to be based upon Sykewar broadcasts, for example, bore little relation to either the content or the intention of the broadcasts from which they derived. An extended field trip over Allied-

held areas of western Germany, in the month preceding surrender, led one PWI investigator to observe that rumor mongering sometimes had unpredictable consequences: "Often enough, the news spread by this method bore only a casual resemblance to the news actually announced over Allied transmitters." [26] The incidence of rumors in Germany based on such word-of-mouth dissemination of Sykewar output was very high, and was studied regularly by PWI.

The distinctive feature of the "black" use of rumors was that a specific core of rumor was aimed at, and techniques were selected which seemed best calculated to cause its spread. An illustration of this method was provided above in the description of operation "Huguenot." The official claim is that some rumors connected with this operation achieved considerable success:

> For example, the rumor was successfully spread that German airmen wishing to desert to Allied airfields would not be fired upon by ground defenses if certain signals were given. Such signals were, in fact, never officially approved on the Allied side, but German pilots followed the instructions and landed safely none the less. (p. 165)

4. *Effectiveness of Covert Operations*

Any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of Sykewar's covert propaganda and special operations does well to begin by acknowledging that the evidence now available is limited. On the basis of such evidence, however, there seems to be a large measure of agreement among qualified Sykewarriors. Probably the most successful achievement was the "gray" broadcasting operation to the Wehrmacht known as "Soldatensender Calais" and "Kurzwellensender Atlantik." Little has been officially disclosed about this operation, beyond its existence and the fact that it broadcast daily "a combined program of news and music." [27] For illustration of how a "black" radio operation works, we may consider the less skillful but more highly publicized "Operation Annie." [28]

The following statement about the mode and techniques used by "Annie" has been made by one of the participants in this operation:

Operation Annie, known familiarly, affectionately and sometimes bitterly as "Annie," was the code name given to a "black," or secret, radio station in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg near the German border. Using the title "1212," it purported to be a German station operated within German territory by a small group of Rhinelanders loyal to the German cause, but believing that both soldiers and civilians in the Reich deserved to hear more truth about the war than they were getting from the Nazis. Actually, the station was run within the Allied lines by the Psychological Warfare Branch of the U. S. 12th Army Group.[29]

The characteristic content of "Annie" broadcasts was as follows:

The program structure of the Annie broadcasts went through the normal process of chop and change. In its final form, an hour's listening gave the Germans something like this: First, there was a general introduction to the station by our chief speaker. This man had a warm, rich, slightly husky, middle-aged Rhinelander's voice. His voice and manner invoked confidence. He was obviously a man of substance and respectability. Next came news from all sectors of the west and east fronts. Then the air news. The particular feature of this section was an eyewitness account of an Allied air raid, seen from the ground, not from the air, as was the practice in "white" or official broadcasting. Home news followed. This included items about rationing, campaigns such as the one to gather winter clothing for the troops, party news, market prices and, on Sunday night, the football scores for the benefit of the troops. The important games were played on Sunday, but the results were never announced by German radio stations until they had been published in the Monday newspapers. This gave us a tidy little scoop each week.

Two specific campaigns undertaken by "Annie" may be mentioned. In the first, an attempt was made to "start a revolution" in Germany, after the area from which "Annie" was supposed to be operating had been taken by the Allied armies: [30]

Annie was to escape from her hide-out, set up business beyond the Rhine and start a German revolution against the Nazis. At two-thirty on Wednesday morning, April 4th [1945], warnings to threatened German areas were being broadcast by Annie. The speaker was interrupted by a special announcement: "To New Germany groups in the cities of Osnabruch, Hannover, Goslar, Erfurt, Halle [and some twenty others]. It

> is urgently requested that all group members listen to a broadcast from this station during the night from Thursday to Friday next. This announcement is not confined to monitoring personnel, but concerns all, repeat, all, members."

The second campaign was along the line which has been publicized as "Annie's" most distinctive claim to fame: direct participation in Allied attainment of specific tactical objectives. This was done, it is claimed, by misleading the German troops involved in a given tactical situation to take false steps based on false information broadcast, at the critical moment, by "Annie":

> In theory, the technique of deception was quite simple. Annie gave the same sort of detailed battle news that she had been broadcasting with proved accuracy for months. But when the 7th Army started to make sharp progress through the Siegfried Line, Annie reported the American forces as being repulsed or held without gain. When the truth had to be admitted, Annie blamed misguided informants who endeavored to conceal the truth. As the 3rd Army drove south, Annie deliberately sold them short. Annie would report the 37th Tank Battalion was bearing down on the town Schwarz, which was twenty miles farther south. When other elements of the 4th Armored Division found two undamaged bridges across the Nahe River, after a thirty-mile dash, Annie had them in a brisk battle much farther north and east. We didn't want to frighten the Germans into running for the Rhine; we wanted them to mill around aimlessly until the pocket was tight. This kind of deception wasn't expected to fool anyone for an extended period. But when events are moving rapidly, small delays often develop into large disasters, and the critical period of the Saar pocket lasted only five or six days.

In assessing the specific results achieved by "Annie," it is clear that the campaign to "start a revolution" as such was a failure. There was no revolution in Germany, nor any audible rumblings of revolution. The achievements of the second campaign are more difficult to evaluate, but it is clear that the participants in "Annie" have been moved by partisan affection for their work, rather than by the canons of logical inference. Their claims of specific "tactical successes" are, in every case, an elementary *post hoc propter hoc*. The available evidence simply is not adequate for judgments on whether these tactical objec-

tives were achieved because of, or in spite of, "Annie's" participation.

Claims for the success of "Annie" have been made on a more general level. The 12th AG account closes with these remarks:

> "Operation Annie" was on the air for one hundred and twenty seven nights. Before she outlived her usefulness, she went off the air, in a way most plausible to her audience and in keeping with her past. She had accomplished her mission. She had deceived and confused the enemy, she had set German against German, Wehrmacht against Party, and civilian against military. She had breached the fortress Germany from within.[31]

Since this official account is intended as sober history, and not as free advertising for the industrious and able men who worked on "Operation Annie," such assertions as the above must be carefully weighed by any student seriously interested in the role of "black" operations in psychological warfare. To this writer, these claims are highly dubious.

Expressions of a wholly different evaluation of covert operations, including those of the superior "Soldatensender Calais," have been written by former Sykewarriors who are qualified to make such evaluations. The first of the following passages was written by the former deputy chief of PWD in charge of operations, the second by PWD's chief leaflet editor, and the third by a British participant in "black" operations: [32]

(1) *R. H. S. Crossman:*

> I am very dubious whether black propaganda, despite its brilliance in radio work, had any marked effect on the course of the war. It had to be so entertaining that it probably maintained morale!

(2) *Martin F. Herz:*

> Attempts to artfully compound material favorable to us with admissions of failure were probably unsuccessful in the case of enemy targets. Also "black" propaganda addressed to enemy population—but only because of the ineptitude of techniques involved, which usually made its origin obvious, thereby undercutting belief in our essential honesty and forthrightness. Since "black" propaganda lends itself particularly well to fraudulent practices, not only in its production and dissemination, but also in the evaluation of its results, extreme skepticism is in order in evaluating it, particularly since its deleterious

effects (anger and increased determination of enemies who discern its origin) are usually not subject to analysis.

(3) *Norman Cameron:*

Early in the war I worked on "black" German leaflets and radio. The former operation was, I suspect, a mere farce, and the latter I regard as having been a waste of effort and talent. Any German who thought about the subject at all could realize that no "black" transmitter could be operated for more than a few minutes in Germany without detection. Our "black" stations that purported, as at least two of them did, to represent underground movements in Germany were therefore blatant fakes, and tended to discredit the Allied cause. There is evidence that quite a number of Germans did listen to these stations—especially the pornographic and scatological "Gustav Siegfried Eins"—but all they got from them, I think, was entertainment. The German Socialist "black" station was more sensible, since it did not purport to be in Germany and it did give a certain amount of aid and comfort to German Socialists in Germany. But the fact that the Germans, who could locate a transmitter within a few square miles by "Peil" methods, never took the trouble, even when they had something like air supremacy over England, to send some aircraft to find out exactly where the transmitter was, and to bomb it, shows that they attached little importance to our "black" broadcasts even though they continued to do "black" broadcasting themselves.

5. *Siege of the City*

Among the Special Operations conducted by Sykewar, the propaganda attack on besieged cities is particularly noteworthy. The attack of armed men against a fortress-city has excited interest and wonder throughout history. Folklore current today still tells in tones of awe and triumph the Old Testament story that Joshua circled Jericho seven times, sounding the trumpet, and "the walls came tumbling down." The Greeks and Romans, too, developed sykewar methods of subverting enemy cities. The "Trojan Horse," for example, by means of which the Greeks infiltrated and undermined a mighty fortress-city of antiquity, has lately been revived among us and hardly requires detailed explanation here. In besieging a city, the Roman armies also developed special techniques: e.g., the ritual of *evocatio,* which historians have traced back to the Hittites and further, designed to induce the protective gods of the enemy city to pass over into

the camp of the Romans. Some versions of this evocation (literally, calling out) of the enemy gods tried to bribe them with promises of more sumptuous temples, viz.:

> [*L'evocatio* est] une invitation, voire une sommation, adressée aux dieux tutélaires de la ville ennemie, d'abandonner leurs résidences dans cette ville et de "transmigrer" à Rome. Cette invitation s'accompagne d'une promesse solennelle; on leur promet des temples. . . . On supposait que les dieux ne pouvaient pas résister à une telle prière.[33]

Machiavelli, in the Renaissance era of Italian city-states, naturally was fascinated by the problems of besieged cities and came to the conclusion that the Roman method of psychological warfare was probably more effective than that used against them by their enemies, viz.:

> It is an error to take advantage of the internal dissensions of a city, and to attempt to take possession of it whilst in that condition. The dissensions between the people and the nobility in the Roman republic were so great that the Veienti, together with the Tuscans, thought the opportunity favorable for crushing out the name of Rome entirely; and having formed an army and made incursions into the Roman territory, the Senate sent Ch. Manlius and M. Fabius against them; and when they had moved their army near to that of the Veienti, these began with insults and attacks to abuse and offend the Romans, with such a degree of temerity and insolence that it caused the Romans to forget their dissensions and to become united; so that when it came to a regular battle between them and the Veienti and Tuscans, the Romans completely defeated and routed them.[34]

In the contemporary epoch of industrialized and mass-populated cities, Archibald MacLeish sensed the new drama of the besieged city during the Spanish prelude to World War II. His radio play, *Fall of the City,* returns sykewar to the techniques of Joshua in a modern version. Neither the ritual prayer of the Romans nor the subversive abuse of the Veienti and Tuscans figures prominently here. The planes circle the city, sound their frightening trumpets as they dive downward—and drop their bombs.

Threats, promises, subversion, destruction: these are the historic techniques for the siege of the city. Sykewar tried to "co-

ordinate" all of them. It used more virtuous terms, however, to designate its operations. Instead of threats, Sykewar issued warnings; instead of promises, it offered alternatives; instead of subversion, it showed compassion for the oppressed people; instead of terror bombing, it engaged in strategic bombing. The objective of these operations, nevertheless, remained the same: to capture the besieged city.

The first important operation on the Continent was against the city of Cherbourg. From the Cotentin peninsula, through the prolonged sieges of Brest and Lorient, to the battles against German cities from Aachen to Munich, Sykewar developed techniques to cope with the ancient psychological and military problems of the fortress city.[35] A detailed account of these operations would contribute a dramatic and illuminating chapter to the history of World War II. All that can be attempted here is to illustrate the Sykewar techniques employed and to summarize the Sykewar lessons learned. Some of these are made clear by the account of the propaganda attack on a small town, Willingen, which appeared in PWI's *Weekly Intelligence Summary:*

THE CAPTURE OF WILLINGEN [36]

An opportunity to observe the battle conditions under which propaganda appeals for group surrender are able to succeed was presented by a loudspeaker address to the German troops defending the town of Willingen, situated six miles south of Trier on the Saar River. This Sykewar mission was able to issue precise instructions, completely coordinated with artillery and infantry fire, so as to convert the defeatist predispositions of most of the garrison into a successful group surrender.

Willingen is situated in a valley of the Saar River and is traversed by a north-south railroad. A U. S. Infantry battalion was approaching the town from the south as part of the coordinated attack northward toward Trier. Armored elements had already outflanked Willingen on the southeast and were well on their way to penetrating into Trier. Earlier in the morning of the attack, elements of a tank destroyer battalion, located across the river on the high ground of the valley's western slope, had been engaged in reducing pillboxes lining the river and the railroad in preparation for the infantry assault. The German garrison was composed of a Security Battalion, which had been stationed in the town for about three months, as well as elements of a German infantry division which had been retiring

northward toward Trier under American pressure. These troops were in a hopeless tactical situation, but still in a position to delay the American drive. It was therefore decided to issue a loudspeaker appeal to these troops before launching the infantry assault.

The loudspeaker apparatus was installed on the high ground of the west slope of the valley, near the American tank destroyers. The tank destroyer fire against the pillboxes was interrupted and instructions in English were issued over the loudspeaker to the American infantry unit. They were told to hold their fire for a period of 5 minutes since an appeal to surrender was about to be issued to the German force in the village. The lull in the firing was necessary to enable enemy troops to hear the message and to ensure them an opportunity to surrender.

The broadcast to the German troops was simple and largely in the form of an *order* to surrender or be destroyed. They were informed that their position was hopeless due to their encirclement by American armored units, supported by artillery and infantry units on the other edges of the town. They were given five minutes in which to throw away their weapons, leave their positions and move southward along the railroad track toward the American infantry positions. After each minute the directions to leave the town or be destroyed were repeated. At the end of the third minute, a white flag appeared over one of the main bunkers and a small group of men left their positions and walked southward. Soon other units within the town began to do likewise. Some soldiers, perhaps confused, began to leave the town in a northward direction, that is, toward the main German positions. The surrender instructions were again repeated by the loudspeaker, addressed particularly to those soldiers moving northward. This second message caused nearly all of them to change their direction as instructed. However, two men intent on escaping from the town continued northward. Artillery fire from a tank destroyer eliminated these two, who had not been impressed by Psychological Warfare. This incident provided copy for an additional loudspeaker broadcast, which was made immediately, pointing out the uselessness of further resistance. An immediate response was additional surrenders from positions along the hillside outside the town and in a second, smaller village further to the east, which was still completely in the enemy's hands.

Thereupon the American infantry commander, using the loudspeaker, ordered his troops in the valley to move in and

take over the town, which was surrendering. It also became necessary to issue directions to the remnants of the town's civilian population who, as could be seen from the hillside, were becoming alarmed and were attempting either to show their neutrality by waving white flags or to surrender with German soldiers. Since the American commander did not wish to be encumbered by civilian movements along the road, an order was issued to the population to assemble in the town's main church. The order was scrupulously obeyed and the civilian population remained there until the MG officer arrived later in the day. When he arrived, he found them still conveniently assembled and was able to issue curfew regulations and other instructions to them.

The basis for success of the mission was the perfect coordination between fire and appeal. Interrogation of many POW's captured during the operation indicated that their defeatism was pronounced. An overwhelming majority had seen our leaflets pointing out the strategical hopelessness of Germany's military position. Most had been demoralised by the Allied pressure during the last few days, which had forced them into the town. A further sense of hopelessness developed early that morning, according to some POW's, when most of their commissioned officers withdrew.

Despite such a level of defeatism and even loosening of command, mass surrender was physically impossible as long as pressure was being placed on the town. Interrogations revealed that the Security Battalion stationed in the town had frequently discussed their plans to surrender once the American troops arrived at the outskirts of the town. But when the troops actually came on the scene, no one seemed willing, or knew how, to face the physical dangers of bringing about such a surrender. As soon as an opportunity to surrender, and direct instructions on how to do so, were presented, the overwhelming majority of troops complied. Others in the town seemed to be swept along with the tide.

A key Sykewar operation against a besieged garrison was at Aachen, the famous old "Kaiserstadt," which became the first German city along the Allied route of march from northwest Europe through the Rhineland and into Germany. Here, loudspeaker efforts were doubled, with two talking "half-tracks" performing 3-5 missions daily under heavy fire from mortars and small arms. Their message was repeated in leaflets delivered both by artillery and aircraft, and in broadcasts by Radio Lux,

but to no avail. The "lesson of Aachen," which became a great Sykewar theme in subsequent output to the enemy, provided useful instruction to Sykewarriors as well. The failure to facilitate its capture by propaganda—for Aachen was finally taken only after bitter street-to-street fighting—was largely due to the inexperience of American tactical commanders and local Sykewar units with the use of propaganda against an enemy garrisoned *on his home soil.*

Aachen surrendered on 21 October 1944.[37] About six weeks earlier, on 13 September, a rumor spread through the city that the Americans were about to march in. The civilian population either hid in the bunkers, the cavernous bombproof shelters, or evacuated eastward. The Nazi Party leaders, government officials, and police departed with the evacuees. Aachen was left in the hands of the Wehrmacht, under General Schwerin, who prepared to surrender the city without resistance.[38]

"Something" went wrong. The German troops, instead of surrendering, turned loose on the town. They looted the deserted homes and shops, cleaned out such large wine shops as "Nagel und Hofbauer" and "Altes Kurhaus," and, according to some reports, multiplied *Walpurgisnacht* by four. On 17 September, the Nazi Party, reinforced by the SS and the Gestapo, returned to Aachen and took control. General Schwerin was removed and Colonel Wilck was installed. The new German order was to resist "to the end" and, for five weeks, half-deserted Aachen, besieged in a hopeless position, held out against the American attack. When the city finally capitulated, Sykewar unloosed vast quantities of printed and broadcast words upon Germans deeper within the Reich—all designed to make vivid the futility of resistance by besieged cities and the wisdom (or morality) of rapid capitulation. At the same time that they tried to exploit the "lesson of Aachen" in strategic output, however, PWD policymakers used the tactical failure of Sykewar at Aachen as an occasion to review its operations against besieged cities, in order to learn what the "something" was that had gone wrong at Aachen.

The results of this analysis emerged in the form of a memorandum entitled "Psychological Warfare Operations Against German Army Commanders to Induce Surrenders." The organizational purpose of this memo, to enlighten and secure the cooperation of field commanders, can be perceived from its

subtitle: "Recommendations to G-3 [the general staff section in charge of operations] from PWD relative to development of techniques based on experience to date—November 3, 1944." This document, which is reproduced as Appendix C, was designed largely to correct the erroneous conceptions owing to which two blunders had been committed at Aachen: first, that the delivery of an ultimatum to the commander of a besieged enemy city is *ipso facto* a wise move; second, that the more publicity given to the delivery of such an ultimatum, the better.

To make these points, the PWD memo began with the essential distinction between "commander in person" and "main body of troops." It was then noted that the aims of Sykewar to these two audiences "often conflict with each other." The dangers and uses of such a conflict were then elaborated briefly:

> Psychological Warfare leaflets and special radio broadcasts directed against the troops and designed to induce surrender or desertion invariably come to the attention of, and influence, the German commander and his staff officers. Any conciliatory action by the German commander which appears to be the direct result of propaganda pressure places him in an impossible position with his own staff. If it is remembered that only the commander himself can effect the surrender of the German force as a whole, it is also obvious that a leaflet which, for example, discloses to his troops confidential discussions of the commander with Allied representatives may well infuriate the former into ordering continuing resistance, although it may simultaneously have an excellent effect in undermining the morale of the troops and accelerating desertions. (Section 3.)[39]

Since the commander's must be the decisive voice on any surrender of "the German force as a whole," this memo urged that no Allied action be taken which makes his power to do this more difficult, or impossible, to exercise. The usual considerations "affecting the German Commander's will to resist" were taken to be the following "calculable factors" (Section 5):

(1) *Directive from his superiors.* Every besieged German commander ordered to resist had, with one exception, in a special case (Elster, south of the Loire in France), obeyed "at least the letter, if not always the spirit, of the order."

(2) *Presence of Allied military pressure.* An Allied show of force, even if only token pressure, was essential to provide the

German commander, even in a hopeless situation, with a rationale for surrender.

(3) *Attitude of his staff officers.* A commander's staff, which usually provides powerful reinforcement to his superego, will often decide the issue of capitulation or resistance. "In at least one instance, surrender was decided upon after a round-table discussion."

(4) *Nazi threats against his family.* This factor had, by November 1944, become increasingly important. "Colonel Wilck (commander at Aachen), prompted by fear of reprisals against his family, inserted in the surrender document a clause to the effect that the food and ammunition of his command were exhausted, in order to help justify his surrender."

(5) *The tactical situation, per se.* The Sykewar objective in relation to which all these factors were to be considered was clarified as follows:

> It is essential that Psychological Warfare against the German commander and his troops be conducted in such a way that an early surrender will appear "honorable" to his troops, the home public and the home leadership. Thus, it is important that contact be made as soon as possible through parliamentaries with the commander, under conditions of secrecy and privacy, and especially without publicity, before the propaganda operation has gathered momentum. The object of the first discussion should not necessarily be to induce an immediate surrender, which in any event is unlikely, but to ascertain the degree of resistance which the commander intends to put up, and the extent to which he can be influenced by token actions of the Allies and by "a good press." The Agreements reached with Admiral SCHIRLITZ at LA PALLICE (La Rochelle) relative to nondestruction of the port, provided there was no Allied air action, are a good example of a successful parley. (Section 7)

A sequence of procedures, designed to minimize other blunders and maximize the opportunities outlined above, was then worked into the memo. It outlined the following four steps:

(1) Every effort should be made at the earliest moment to establish and maintain some sort of contact, via parlementaires or agents, with the enemy commander, and utmost secrecy maintained.
(2) Firmness, determination, correctness, and lack of compromise must be shown in all dealings with the commander.

But, to carry determination to the extent of issuing an ultimatum without an attempt at a parley is clearly unprofitable, and it is especially unprofitable to publicize its rejection, as this serves only to commit the commander to an uncompromising position. The fact that arbitrary ultimata are undesirable was clearly brought out in the BREST operation. The successful operations against LE HAVRE and BOULOGNE were conducted without ultimata. The AACHEN ultimatum was a long-range propaganda asset, but tactically unproductive. The German commander who is in a position to accept an ultimatum is more likely to arrange his surrender at a parley.

(3) It is likewise unprofitable to vilify the enemy commander, or even to give him special mention in propaganda. Experience with Colonel AULOCH (who commanded ST. MALO and was extensively interrogated later) showed that the publicity he received was a factor in prolonging his resistance; in fact, this commander believed that decorations, and his promotion to Major General, were the direct outcome of Allied publicity.

(4) Propaganda should not take the line that previous commanders surrendered after first proclaiming their will to resist to the end. This creates the impression that they surrendered earlier than necessary and so may deter future surrenders, since:

(a) Neither the German commander nor his troops are willing to believe this. RAMCKE, AULOCH, etc. have very high prestige.

(b) It creates a competing situation in which each commander tries to hold out longer than another.

(c) It attaches a negative note to surrender, implying that we despise the Germans for surrendering after first proclaiming they would not. (Section 9)

To emphasize its operational character, the memo requested that G-3, if it approved, should inform its subordinate echelons "of the decision and method of future implementation" (Section 11). When the Allied armies again broke loose against German cities, in the final push which began in March 1945 and carried them across Germany into Austria and Czechoslovakia within two months, the fighting forces moved too fast to require any elaborate Sykewar operations against besieged cities. The lessons learned earlier in the campaign, however, and particularly the summary of them in the memorandum discussed above,

were among the most fruitful instructions acquired by Sykewar. In any attempt to evaluate the Sykewar operation, the learning of these lessons should not be overlooked.

Chapter 10. Notes

1. "One shoots at the enemy not with public opinion but with powder and lead." Quoted in *Der Krieg und die öffentliche Meinung* (Tübingen, 1915), p. 46, Wilhelm Bauer.

2. This tradition of "strong-man" talk is particularly notable among German rulers and leaders. Friedrich Wilhelm I is credited with an utterance of this type which has been repeated many times by his descendants: "Gegen Demokraten helfen nur Soldaten!" A variant of this theme is the remark attributed to Stalin during World War II, when the distribution of power in postwar Europe was under discussion: "The Pope? How many divisions does the Pope have?"

3. H. D. Lasswell, "Psychological Structure of the Postwar World," in *Approaches to World Peace,* p. 260, L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver, (eds).

4. Elmer Davis, *War Information* (Washington, 1943), p. 10.

5. *History: PWD,* p. 23.

6. *History: 2nd MRB,* p. 55.

7. Major General Alden H. Waitt, Introduction to G. J. B. Fisher, *Incendiary Warfare* (New York, 1946), p. ix.

8. The Germans used the same techniques, of course. The historian of one Sykewar field unit recalls that: "[Normandy] marked our first contact with the enemy's psychological tricks such as the regular nightly visit of 'bed-check Charlie,' a lone plane that cruised over the area waking everyone up at about midnight." *History: 2nd MRB,* p. 33.

9. American Psychiatric Association, *Psychiatric Aspects of Civilian Morale,* p. 45.

10. *Ibid.,* p. 50.

11. See *History: PWD,* Chapter 11, which provided many of the details contained in the following account of specific "special operations." All unattributed quotations which follow are from this source.

12. German monitoring of Allied broadcasts was regular and exhaustive. The *Sonderdienst Seehaus,* a special monitoring intelligence unit with headquarters in Berlin-Wannsee, produced a daily report similar to the BBC's *Daily Digest of Foreign Broadcasts.* This report went to an increasingly restricted list of German officials sufficiently high in the hierarchy to be exempt from the Nazi ban on Allied broadcasts. Some eight tons of these reports were collected in Berlin by this writer during the winter of 1946-47, and shipped to the Library of Congress. They are now in The Hoover Library.

13. It is possible, without introducing a nasty *ad hominem,* to suggest that an additional reason for the utter failure of "Nest Egg" may have

been the arrogant incompetence of the Canadian officer in charge of the operation.

14. See the "Voice of SHAEF" broadcasts reproduced in Appendix E.

15. See the specimen copy of *Frontpost* reproduced in Appendix D.

16. See the specimen copy of *Nachrichten für die Truppe* reproduced in Appendix D.

17. *History: PWD,* p. 166.

18. *Ibid.,* p. 165.

19. *Ibid.,* p. 165.

20. *Ibid.,* p. 164. The pages on which further quotations from this source occur are given in parentheses.

21. Any medium of communication can be used for propaganda purposes, in the broad sense. Useful studies have been made of the propaganda use of such "media" as the medieval fool, choral singing, fairy tales, circus clowns, and commemorative medals. See the Lasswell-Casey-Smith bibliographies of propaganda cited in "Bibliography and Sources."

22. Extremely useful data on rumor, of particular value to social psychologists, is contained in the five series of "captured German documents" collected by PWI. These documents, with an index and abstracts prepared by this writer, are in The Hoover Library.

A sage observation on the potency of rumors, particularly when they can be made to contradict each other, was made by Francis Bacon: "Truth comes out of error more easily than out of confusion." A brief recent statement is "A Psychology of Rumor," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 1:22-37 (Spring, 1944), R. H. Knapp. A more detailed account is *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York, 1947), G. W. Allport and Leo Postman.

23. An account of this episode was given in the London *Evening Standard* of 28 April 1944. This and similar materials are in the scrapbooks kindly made available to this writer by Mr. Richard F. Hanser.

24. "The most incredible rumors are fabricated in the latrine." Wolfgang Langhoff, *Die Moorsoldaten,* p. 247. The historian of the 2nd MRB has told a candid and illuminating story of how one rumor affected an American company of green noncombat troops in the combat zone:

> Eating a steady diet of 10-in-1 rations and sleeping in constant fear of enemy air attacks, members of the company were hardly living comfortably during the early weeks. But by far the most unforgettable night was spent on about the twentieth of July, when a false gas alert sent everyone scurrying for his mask and protective equipment. For several days our interrogators had been relaying enemy rumors that a large-scale offensive was in the offing, and this was enough to make everyone slightly jittery. But the stage was really set for the episode when a chemical-agent container stored at a dump on the road to Cherbourg sprang a leak, forcing all who passed in that direction to don their masks. That night, a jumpy guard, certain that he detected gas, fired the customary three shots signifying the gas alarm. The word spread quickly and for miles around the warning was taken up by others who imagined the presence of a chemical agent. Finally, when it was realized that a mistake had been made, First Army requested that one of the company's loudspeaker trucks go through

the area announcing that there was no gas. But even then there were some who heard only the word "gas" and were more frightened than before. *History: 2nd MRB,* p. 37.

25. *History: P & PW,* p. 194.

26. For the source of the quotation, see note 53 to Chapter 6. Analysis of German rumors current during the war was presented regularly in the *Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare.*

27. *History: PWD,* p. 52. More lines of type, but no additional facts, were published in "Station Atlantik," *The New Yorker* 21:20-22 (13 October 1945).

28. Two of the most useful accounts of "Operation Annie" have been published by former participants: Hans H. Burger, in the *New York Times Magazine* (17 February 1946); and Brewster Morgan, in the *Saturday Evening Post* (9 March 1946). As participants, both these writers make claims for the effectiveness of "Annie" which seem to this writer to go far beyond the evidence. The most complete account of 12th AG's "black" operations, including "Operation Skorpion," is given in section 5 of the *History: P & PW,* pp. 193-203.

29. This quotation and the one immediately following are taken from the article by Brewster Morgan, cited above in note 28, whose remarks should be compared at every point with those given by the official version in *History: P & PW,* section 5.

30. The complete text of the broadcast by which this German "revolution" was initiated is given in Morgan's article (see note 28).

31. *History: P & PW,* p. 200.

32. All these passages are from letters, responding to a questionnaire from this writer, which are on file in The Hoover Library. Compare these views with Howard Becker, "Nature and Consequences of Black Propaganda," *American Sociological Review* (April 1949).

33. V. Basanoff, *Evocatio. Étude d'un Rituel Militaire Romain* (Paris, 1947), p. 2. The quotation above is attributed to Alfred Pernice. Compare the view of Basanoff himself on pp. 195, ff.

34. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Discourses,* Chap. 25 (New York, 1940), p. 371.

35. Some details on the Cherbourg operation are given in the official histories already cited; for Lorient details see David Hertz, "The Radio Siege of Lorient," *loc. cit.* The capture of Aachen led to one of the great PWI reports of the war by S. K. Padover, P. R. Sweet, and L. F. Gittler (condensed in Padover's *Experiment in Germany).* The dramatic events preceding the capture of Munich were sketched in Noel F. Newsome's Sykewar report entitled "Freiheitsaktion Bayern." Sykewar operations on besieged cities were regularly reviewed in the *Weekly Intelligence Summary.* See, especially, Summary No. 31.

36. This account of the capture of Willingen, originally written by Dr. Morris Janowitz for PWI's *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 24 (10 March 1945), has been edited slightly by this writer in the interest of clarity to readers at this later date.

37. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *op. cit.,* p. 312. The *History: 2nd MRB,* p.

64, erroneously gives the date of Aachen's surrender as 10 October. The estimate, in that publication, of Sykewar effectiveness at Aachen is also very erroneous.

38. These details on the presurrender activities in Aachen were given in PWI reports of interrogations made at a later date. See S. K. Padover, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-54.

39. The full text of this PWD document is reproduced as Appendix C. Further quotations in the text are followed by parenthetical reference to the section of the basic paper from which they are taken.

Chapter 11

EFFECTIVENESS OF SYKEWAR

OF THE NUMEROUS tributes to the power of propaganda which have been uttered in recent times, the two most appropriate to this study would seem to be those of the American "supreme commanders" in the two main theaters of World War II. The first of these tributes, at the beginning of the Pacific war, was a statement by General MacArthur at his first press conference in Australia (23 March 1942):

> There has been nothing more astonishing in the progress of war, which is really the application of the mechanics of force to human nature, than the position that public opinion occupies. One cannot wage war under present conditions without the support of public opinion, which is tremendously molded by the press and other forms of propaganda.[1]

The second of these utterances, at the end of the war in Europe, was a tribute by General Eisenhower to the organization which has been studied in this book. Speaking specifically of Sykewar, Eisenhower wrote:

> In this war, which was Total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of psychological warfare as a specific and effective weapon.
>
> From the early and humble beginnings before the landings in North Africa, through the trial-and-error period of operations in North Africa, Northern France and Germany, Allied psychological warfare grew from infancy to vigorous maturity.
>
> The exact contribution of psychological warfare toward the final victory cannot, of course, be measured in terms of towns destroyed or barriers passed. However, I am convinced that the expenditure of men and money in wielding the spoken and written word was an important contributing factor in undermining the enemy's will to resist and supporting the fighting morale of our potential Allies in the occupied countries.

> The Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, may well be proud of the part it played in combating the enemy, in aiding in securing the essential lines of communication behind the fighting forces, and, finally, in beginning the vital task of re-educating the misguided people of Germany through control of the various media of public expression.
>
> Without doubt, psychological warfare has proved its right to a place of dignity in our military arsenal.[2]

It is important to notice these tributes to the power of propaganda from ranking American generals. They indicate a new increment to the thinking of important military figures. As soon as one probes a bit deeper into the matter, however, it becomes clear that, in any scientific sense, we know comparatively little about actual effectiveness—either of propaganda in general or of the Sykewar operation in particular.

1. *Limitations of the Evidence*

No serious study of the overall effectiveness of Sykewar operations has been made. Several general estimates, some of them very sagacious, have been ventured by individuals competent to judge. But these estimates are, with a few limited exceptions, mainly shrewd guesses. These are valuable, but they do not constitute an adequate substitute for a detailed study using the methods, and subject to the criteria of evidence, of the social sciences. In short, no attempt was made to study the overall effects of Sykewar in a manner comparable to the study made of the overall effects of strategic bombing. In the circumstances which governed the rapid conversion of Psychological Warfare (PWD/SHAEF) to Information Control (ICD/OMGUS), all PWI personnel went directly into occupation duties with pressing problems of current intelligence. Despite the recognition of General McClure, Colonel Gurfein, and others that a systematic study of overall propaganda effectiveness, comparable to the morale studies of the effectiveness of Allied strategic bombing, would be indispensable to any empirical evaluation of the Sykewar operation, no such project was undertaken.[3]

This was a serious omission. What Sykewar badly lacked in World War II was an adequate conceptual frame of reference, which could have provided a unifying context for the diverse

operations it conducted. This point has been stressed by W. Phillips Davison, formerly a member of Sykewar's PWI and planning sections (now editor of *Public Opinion Quarterly*), who writes that the execution of Sykewar's primary mission "was hampered by the fact that no adequate theory of opinion existed upon which a scientific program could be built." Concerning his own work as a planner, Mr. Davison writes:

> This function was only indifferently carried out, largely because of the divorcement of planning from operations, the muddied post-war aims of the Allies, and again the lack of a theory of opinion.[4]

The development of a conceptual framework after the war could have been facilitated by a detailed chronicle of Sykewar operations, published with other relevant data in a form available to the scrutiny of social scientists concerned with matters of propaganda and opinion. That no such data are now available must be attributed to the haste with which American participation in the war was organized and then disorganized. Makeshift often had to do instead of planning. A bare beginning toward the assembling and publication of data was made in the official histories, and in the final leaflet and radio engineering reports, which have been cited in this study. But these are not readily available to most interested students, and do not provide an adequate basis for evaluating overall effectiveness. In view of the kinds of data required and the importance of the time factor in data about effectiveness, it is unlikely that any such overall study of Sykewar can ever be made.[5]

The nature of the Sykewar operation, which was designed to support the combat forces for the achievement of common purposes, inevitably would have complicated the problem of overall evaluation. No specific tactical victory could be attributed to Sykewar, in the naive way G-2 of the 2nd Armored credited a talking tank with the taking of 7000 POW's, as though the effect of its operations could be distinguished from the effects of the other variables conditioning the outcome of any engagement. Indeed, the better Sykewar coordinated its output with tactical operations, the more difficult it was to allocate degrees of effectiveness. Professor Lasswell has made the general point clear:

> Propaganda is only one of the principal methods of controlling collective responses. Successful social and political management often depends upon a proper coordination of propaganda with coercion (including bribery); diplomatic negotiation; and other techniques.[6]

Sykewar Intelligence (PWI) continuously scrutinized its data to determine the effectiveness with which propaganda was "controlling collective responses" of the German audiences. PWI thus acted upon, if it did not articulate, Lasswell's view that:

> Responses are significant because they are interpersonal; they are part of the interaction of members of society. The most fundamental way to examine any response is in terms of values —does it modify or conserve values? By a "value" we mean an object of desire. . . . The act of turning off a radio broadcast is to deny something to those responsible for the program.[7]

For reasons discussed in the chapter on Sykewar Intelligence, PWI's response analyses provided considerable information on specific points, but these could not be added up at the end of the war to make an overall evaluation. This has not prevented a number of facile judgments from being expressed, but the reasons for skepticism of such judgments have been indicated by Professor Speier:

> In the absence of response analyses there will always be a tendency, as there was after the first world war, to judge the effect of propaganda on the basis of its content or volume, of sweeping opinions by well known persons (including enemy leaders), and of events preceded by certain propaganda activities.[8]

The evidence which *is* available deals mainly with specific and limited aspects of Sykewar operations: the effectiveness of a single theme, or of a single operation, or of a single campaign. Several PWI studies dealt with the trends of German, and especially Wehrmacht, opinion on specific subjects, but usually without establishing satisfactory correlations between these opinions and the state of German morale, the pattern of German behavior, or the activities of Sykewar. Despite their limitations, and partly because of them, these studies were extremely valuable when used properly. The specific conclusions they reached have been cited throughout the text. They were very numerous. Indeed, it would require another volume of this

size to examine in detail the data contained in them, and no inevitable conclusions concerning the overall effectiveness of Sykewar would emerge from such an examination of these partial studies. The intention of the next section, therefore, is merely to describe the types of evidence concerning effectiveness produced by Sykewar, with some indication of the sources, uses, and limitations of each type.

2. *Types of Sykewar Evidence*

The evidence which bears on the effectiveness of Sykewar consists of three main kinds of response data, which may be classified in order of their remoteness from the Sykewar stimulus.[9] Unfortunately, the evidence seems to have grown in quantity as its remoteness from the stimulus increased. The first kind of evidence comes from *responsive action* to given Sykewar stimuli; the second is based on *participant reports* of their own responses by the persons stimulated; the third consists of *observer commentaries* about the effectiveness of these stimuli on other people, by presumably competent observers. Supplementary data were provided by the analysis of German propaganda. The Sykewar use of these sources can be reviewed in turn.

(1) *Responsive Action.* Evidence about effectiveness from the responsive action of German audiences was the most satisfactory, when available in adequate measure and used carefully, because it enabled the analyst to establish a 1:1 ratio between Sykewar stimulus and observable response. Such evidence was comparatively rare, and was useful only in the hands of analysts who were trained to avoid the pitfall of assuming *(post hoc propter hoc)* that any given act which conformed to a Sykewar stimulus was a *result,* simply because it happened *after* the stimulus.

Occasionally, however, the correlation of variables was such that an inference of probable Sykewar effectiveness could be made from specific acts. The surrender of German troops, after a loudspeaker broadcast addressed to them, provided evidence of this type. In other cases, the inference of effectiveness had to cross a wider gap between Sykewar stimulus and German response, but the crossing could nevertheless be made with confidence. For example, Radio Lux broadcasts and PWD leaflets directed the citizens of Frankfurt to hang white flags out of

their windows before the arrival of American troops, and the troops arrived to find many such flags flying from windows in Frankfurt. Since the "flags" corresponded in detail with Sykewar instructions (e.g., towels, tablecloths, bedsheets), and since no such instructions had been issued by any other source, it could be inferred that the hanging of flags in Frankfurt at that time was a direct response-in-action to the Sykewar stimuli.[10]

Evidence of this kind, however, was slight and sporadic. In large part, this was due to the nature of the Sykewar strategy, which aimed not at immediate responsiveness, but rather at a gradual "attrition" in its targets. The historian of PWD has recorded the official view:

> Leaflets discharged at the enemy by artillery shell cannot be regarded as so many paper bullets calculated to produce the immediate effect of persuading enemy soldiers to desert.[11]

The historian of 12th AG has made the same point about combat loudspeaker operations:

> It is perhaps unfortunate that the success of a loudspeaker mission is frequently judged by the number of prisoners it brings in immediately. The chief mission of the loudspeaker is to lower morale and resistance.[12]

More than any other Sykewar channel, the loudspeaker established a direct relationship with the audience and demanded immediate responsive action. If the evidence here was inadequate, clearly it was far less adequate on the more general levels of effectiveness. The Sykewar mission, on D-Day, was to destroy the enemy's will-to-resist. By VE-Day, his will-to-resist had been destroyed. In what degree was the situation on VE-Day a result of the propaganda emitted by Sykewar media since D-Day? To ask this unanswered and, in these most general terms, unanswerable question is to indicate the limitations of the evidence based on responsive action.

(2) *Participant Reports.* Verbal reports on their own responses to Sykewar stimuli by the persons stimulated constitute a more remote and, ideally, less reliable kind of evidence than responsive action. Such an action as the hanging of white flags, as indicated above, is the hardest sort of "hard intelligence" and is sought by all military intelligence officers. No verbal report on one's own private responses can be quite as conclusive as

observable action in the public domain. Verbal reports, however, were plentiful at Sykewar and, since Sykewar was a military operation rather than an experimental project in social science methods, they became the main kind of evidence on which estimates of effectiveness were based.

The main source of such verbal reports was the German prisoners. Chapter 5 discussed in some detail the admirable features of this source: POW's were available at all times, were always ready to talk, and could be questioned repeatedly on the same or on different subjects.[13] As a result, PWI was able to elicit from this source evidence of effectiveness which was particularly useful on the level of specific Wehrmacht reactions to specific Sykewar stimuli. Interrogation of POW's provided, for example, the basis for the five successive revisions of the *Passierschein* leaflet, which eventually turned out to be the most successful leaflet produced by Sykewar.[14] On a more general level, this source of evidence produced the data from which could be derived analyses of trends in German opinions on selected questions. The results of one such trend-study are reproduced in Chart 5, page 114. Both the strength and the limitations of analyses based on verbal reports are evident in this study.

The chart has been entitled "Trends in Wehrmacht Morale." However, it is clear that the chart measures trends *not* in "morale," but in prisoner responses to certain questions selected, more or less arbitrarily, as criteria of morale. It is true that this selection was less, rather than more, arbitrary, because supplementary evidence showed these questions to be good "indices" to morale. But in this type of analysis, any degree of arbitrariness which is not made explicit is sure to be misleading. "Indices to morale," in short, are not identical with "morale." To form any estimate of Sykewar effectiveness in undermining Wehrmacht morale from this type of data, an inference (or a series of inferences) had to be drawn. It was in the drawing of such inferences about effectiveness that Sykewarriors sometimes misused the intelligence presented to them by PWI.

To use the data on this chart properly, it was essential to recognize that the precise relationship between a trend in the responses to any question and a fluctuation in Wehrmacht morale was variable. The relationship varied, for example, with respect to the personality-structure of any respondent or the group-situation of the whole sample of respondents. This was

understood by PWI personnel, but not always by the Sykewarriors who used their data to judge effectiveness. The presentation of PWI evidence in tabular form, despite the careful qualifications regarding interpretation which PWI invariably made explicit, sometimes obscured rather than clarified the distinction between data and inference among Sykewarriors less familiar with intelligence methods. Interpretation was complicated, too, by the fact that Sykewarriors shared no common master-concept of "morale." It makes an enormous difference to the evaluation of the responses quantified in Chart V, for example, whether one defines morale as will-to-*win* or will-to-*resist*. Yet, as we have seen, many Sykewarriors used these concepts alternately, without clarifying the analytical consequences of either. An illustration of this misuse of PWI data by enthusiastic Sykewarriors is provided in Chart XI, below. This was based upon PWI data, but was presented in a manner which PWI would not have tolerated, i.e., as evidence of Sykewar effectiveness.[15]

CHART XI. "EFFECTIVENESS" OF SYKEWAR LEAFLETS

Date	*Combat Area*	*Percent who saw leaflets*	*Percent influenced (of those who saw leaflets)*
1944			
26/6-28/6	Cherbourg	77	—
1/7-17/7	Carentan-St. Lo	69	—
26/7-27/7	St. Lo	84	76
1/8-10/8	St. Malo–Le Mans	24	37
September	Western Front	30	45
15/10-19/10	Aachen	64	37
November	1st US Army	80	—
15/12-31/12	1st, 3rd, 9th US Army	66	78
1945			
1/1-31/1	1st, 3rd, 9th US Army	69	75
1/2-28/2	1st, 3rd, 9th US Army	87	72
1/3-15/3	1st, 3rd, 9th US Army	90	79

Here the consequences of lack of clarity about basic concepts of effectiveness are evident in the utter confusion of the final, and critical, column giving the "Percent influenced (of those who saw leaflets)." It is impossible, on the basis of these data, to make a single relevant, reliable, and important statement

about the *influence* of combat leaflets upon Wehrmacht morale, or even upon the morale of those Wehrmacht personnel who saw the leaflets. Yet, some Sykewarriors thought that propaganda influence was established by this chart.

It is important to stress the fact that Sykewar made no systematic estimates of its effects on German morale. Some hardy individuals have ventured to make estimates, and, in the main, these are no more misleading than estimates on many other aspects of the campaign in Europe. However, they are not to be confused with scientific evaluation based on comprehensive observation. Such an undertaking was hardly feasible when, for purposes of exact analysis, the second term was ambiguous and its relationship with the first term undefined. It was hardly feasible, too, without an adequate allocation of personnel to permit PWI to undertake the job. Thus, both the conceptual framework and the operating personnel indispensable for systematic study were lacking, and we are compelled to rely upon limited and fragmentary data.

(3) *Observer Commentaries.* This type of evidence, the least reliable and the most difficult to evaluate, was naturally the most abundant. It consisted of comments on Sykewar effectiveness made by uninvolved but interested parties. These parties were often responsible German officials, themselves not directly involved in the stimulus-response situation, and others whose task it was (or who conceived it to be their task) to observe the state of German morale. Sykewar and other intelligence analysts, for example, carefully studied the contents of German press, radio, and captured documents for evidence that Sykewar shafts were reaching their mark. Such evidence on German responses was the most remote, because it was based on the comments of third parties whose competence as witnesses varied considerably. The stock illustration of the difficulties inherent in this sort of testimony is the case of the six witnesses to an automobile accident who, when asked to report what they had seen, gave six different versions of the event.

The value of such evidence for Sykewar depended, in large measure, upon the form in which it appeared. Among the captured German documents, for example, there were thousands of letters and diaries written by German soldiers. The state of morale was a favorite topic in these writings, with fairly fre-

quent estimates about the effectiveness of Sykewar attempts to undermine morale. When these estimates dealt with the German writer himself, or his small circle of friends, they often were based on direct observation, and therefore contained testimony of considerable value.[16] Nevertheless, they had to be scrutinized with an eye to the reasons why the writer may have wanted to convey a certain impression to the particular reader he addressed: for example, the desire of the soldier son to reassure his mother, or the converse desire to emphasize the toughness of his own outfit to a fellow soldier in another outfit. German censorship of the mails was another factor which conditioned the content of correspondence. When these letters and diaries delivered more general estimates of German morale or Sykewar effectiveness, whose scope clearly exceeded the writer's own range of observation, their value was usually very limited, with only a few rare exceptions in the case of writers who combined extraordinarily sensitive faculties of observation with a good position from which to observe.[17]

Other forms in which such estimates emerged from the captured documents included morale reports from German agents and military orders dealing with morale. Occasionally the military orders were based on the estimates provided by the morale reports. The value of the reports varied sharply. Those made by the Nazi Party apparatus, usually riddled by the writer's attempts to inject evidence of his own admirable political views, were generally much inferior to those made by the SD (*Sicherheitsdienst*), the intelligence apparatus of the SS. At their best, however, these reports were still estimates by third parties to the stimulus-response situation, and had to be evaluated with considerable reserve at Sykewar. PWI obtained very interesting and useful insights by comparing NSDAP reports with the SD's *Stimmungsberichte* (Morale Reports). The differences between these reports can be illustrated by comparing representative extracts from each on the same subject. For example, an SD agent began his report on Luxembourg, as early as 30 December 1943, with the following selection of unfavorable estimates, characteristic of the "tough-minded" SD. (It should be remembered that, just possibly, this SD tough-mindedness had an ulterior political purpose, i.e., the embarrassment of Goebbels and others):

* Die Stimmung im Gebiet Luxemburg ist zur Zeit eine ganz miserable. Besonders in den Industriegebieten lässt die Stimmung sich von nichts überbieten, und es kann schon von einer Gefährdung des Aufbaues im Gebiet Luxemburg gesprochen werden. Alle unterirdischen Kräfte sind zur Zeit am Werk, die dreijährige Aufbauarbeit zu unterminieren. Es ist an der Zeit, *gewaltig auf der Hut zu sein!* Möge man an höherer Stelle darüber denken, wie man will, so ist es doch Tatsache, dass höchste Gefahr im Verzuge ist!—

Als Hauptursachen, die diese Gefahr heraufbeschwören, möchte ich Folgende anführen:

(1) Die feindlichen Sender.
(2) Die illegale Organisation LPL.
(3) Das Gros der Bevölkerung als solches.
(4) Die zwischen dem Altreich und Luxemburg hin und herpendelnden fliegerbeschädigten reichsdeutschen Personen.
(5) Das zu lasche Vorgehen gegen die Familien der luxbg. Deserteure.
(6) Die Luxemburger, die im Altreich beschäftigt sind.
(7) Das Ausbleiben der Vergeltung.

By contrast, the Nazi Party report, as late as 17 July 1944 (after the D-Day landings, and seven months after the SD report cited above), was still reporting the morale of Luxembourg officials to be full of fight. This indulgent sort of inaccuracy, deriving from either blind faith or political sycophancy, is evident in most of these Party morale reports:

† Die Stimmung unter den Amtsträgern der VDB und den politischen Leitern ist ernst und hart. Als verantwortungsvolle

* Morale in Luxembourg is quite terrible at the moment. Nothing is improving morale, especially in the industrial districts, and one can say that the consolidation of Luxembourg Territory is endangered. At the present time all underground elements are busily undermining the constructive work of three years. It's high time *to come down hard!* Regardless of what anyone may think higher up, the fact remains that there is danger of the utmost gravity!

I wish to suggest as major causes contributing to the perilous situation the following:

(1) Enemy broadcasts.
(2) Illegal organization LPL.
(3) The [hostility of the] bulk of the population.
(4) The shuttling between the Old Reich and Luxembourg of Reich German air raid casualties.
(5) Too lax measures again the families of Luxembourg deserters.
(6) Luxembourgers working in the Old Reich.
(7) Absence of retaliatory measures.

† Morale among officials of the VDB and the political control is sober and firm. As responsible persons they see the magnitude of the threat and recognize

> Männer sehen sie die Grösse der Gefahr und erkennen die Härte des Kampfes. Sie wissen dass nur durch Kampf und Standhaftigkeit die Gefahr gebannt werden kann.[18]

Naturally, high Nazis preferred the Party reports over the SD reports. Consider the view of intelligence reporting implicit in the following critique, entered in his diary for 17 April 1943, by Goebbels:

> The SD report is full of mischief . . . The leaders of the Reich certainly don't have to know about someone in a little hick town unburdening his anguished heart. Just as the Führer need not know if somewhere in some company people complain about the way the war is run, just so the political leaders don't have to know if here or there someone damns the war, or curses it, or vents his spleen. The make-up of the SD report must be quickly changed. I ordered Berndt to effect collaboration between the SD and the Reich propaganda offices. If the material of the SD, which in itself is good, is sifted politically and brought into line with the political views of the Gauleiters and the Reich propaganda offices, it can develop into a good source of information.[19]

In evaluating this remarkable statement by the Nazi official most directly responsible for German opinion "in a little hick town" and "in some company" and "here or there," two considerations should be recalled: (1) Goebbels was engaged in a bitter fight with Himmler, and the SD reports gave the latter ammunition to show that Goebbels was not controlling opinion adequately by propaganda techniques, and that the job could be done better by Himmler's own techniques and organization. The intelligence was thus regarded as a pawn in the internal political battle. (2) The authenticity of these diaries has not yet been clearly established.[20] On this point, however, collateral evidence indicates that the particular passage here attributed to Goebbels is characteristic of his view.[21]

Additional evidence of Sykewar effectiveness, classifiable as "observer commentaries," came from captured military orders. However, these required even greater caution in evaluation, since they often were the work of a fourth party to the Sykewar-audience situation. The military commander who signed an

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the severity of the struggle. They know that danger can be averted only by militancy and tenacity.

order dealing with the morale of his command, and the aide who prepared the text of this order, often based their instructions on nothing more than a morale report or directive from higher headquarters, which, in turn, was based only on another morale report. We have already seen that the German reporting system was no model of efficiency, and that intelligence sometimes was manipulated for ulterior purposes. As Himmler extended his power in the Wehrmacht, PWI became increasingly aware that, in any given German report, the general estimate of Sykewar influence upon troop morale might be inaccurate, or even deliberately misleading. For example, a typical German Army order based on intelligence of this sort would forbid soldiers to read Sykewar leaflets, on pain of certain stated or implied punitive measures. The natural temptation of analysts at PWI was to take such an order as evidence that recent Sykewar leaflets to these troops had exerted a strong influence upon their morale.[22] Such an evaluation, however, would have rested upon a chain of untenable inferences.

The original German report may genuinely have mistaken Sykewar leaflets as the cause of bad morale among the troops, when the real cause was something quite different. Or, considering the heavy reliance of Nazis upon the "scapegoating" device, the German reporter may deliberately have misplaced his emphasis upon Sykewar leaflets in order to avoid acknowledging that the real reason for low morale was, for example, a loss of confidence, among the troops, in their commander. Or, the reporter's estimate that troop morale was low (or more frequently that it was high) may have been erroneous simply because it was based upon inadequate criteria or evidence for evaluating morale. Or, to conclude with only the most obvious alternatives, the order may have derived from no report at all, but only from the desire of the military commander (or NSFO, the Nazi commissar attached by the Party to supervise matters of morale in Wehrmacht units) to show his superiors that he was "on the ball." For example, there are occasional references in the captured letters of German soldiers which indicate that the presence of the NSFO was itself a morale-depressor. Naturally, none but the most hardy NSFO would include this fact in his reports.

All these possibilities indicate that captured documents usually were subject to important biases. The strictures outlined

above had to be taken into account by Sykewar analysts wherever captured documents were used as a source of evidence concerning effectiveness. Information gleaned from captured documents became useful mainly when analyzed with reference to data from all other sources—particularly the oral expressions of opinion found in the POW interrogations.

(4) *Propaganda Analysis.* As indicated earlier, German press and radio output provided an extremely useful supplementary source of fragmentary evidence concerning Sykewar effectiveness.[23] Data from this source took three main forms: indirect efforts to counteract Sykewar output; direct attacks upon Sykewar output; and punishment of Germans who exposed themselves to the potential influence of Sykewar output (i.e., the "radio criminals").

Indirect efforts to counteract Sykewar output usually came as announcements—either as quotations from a high official source, or as a statement by a prominent German on his own authority—contradicting something which had previously been asserted by Sykewar to its German audience. These efforts were "indirect," in that they did not acknowledge and repeat, for the purpose of denying, the original Sykewar assertion. (Such direct contradiction may spread the original enemy assertion to audiences which previously were not aware it had been made, and therefore usually is avoided by propagandists.)

The technique of indirect counteraction was used frequently by Nazi propagandists. According to several Allied analysts, even certain German military operations illustrated this technique. The German strategy board always kept some important new weapon in reserve, these analysts asserted, to counteract any surprise move or important success by the Allies. The V-weapons are supposed to illustrate this technique. V-1 was not released until after D-Day, to counteract the effects of the successful landings at Normandy. V-2 was held in reserve for a considerable period after tests showed it to be ready for use over Britain. The OKW (German High Command) reasoned, it is claimed, that premature launching of V-2, without itself proving a decisive factor in the war, would force the Allied command to speed up the attack, and they therefore kept V-2 in reserve until the invasion had successfully completed its initial phase. They then launched V-2 as a counteractive to the Allied military and morale successes. While such an analysis

is interesting, and not inherently implausible, no supporting evidence has been published.

On the other hand, the published evidence is plentiful that German propagandists devoted a considerable amount of their energy to counteracting indirectly the output of Sykewar. The final leaflet report alone cites a dozen examples of such efforts by the Germans. The question here is not one of evidence, which is abundant, but rather one of evaluation. What can be inferred about Sykewar effectiveness from German efforts to counteract its output? Two inferences would seem to be justified: (1) that German propaganda strategists paid considerable attention to Sykewar output; (2) that they considered it worthwhile to take counteractive measures.

It is the further attempt to deduce from these inferences that Sykewar output was causing German morale to deteriorate which can not be allowed. The German decision to take counteractive measures by indirection, avoiding overt acknowledgment of Sykewar efforts, may have signified mainly an intention to forestall any potential Sykewar influence. German propagandists, who tended in general to exaggerate the influence of propaganda, may very well have exaggerated the potential or actual influence of Sykewar. That is, their estimate in any specific case may have been either accurate or inaccurate, but PWI had no systematic way of assessing the probabilities. Given the generally dubious quality of German propagandists' estimates of their own influence upon morale, there was no reason to assume they would be better able to judge Sykewar influence. To illustrate: Prevention of potential Sykewar effectiveness, rather than cure of effects achieved, was explicitly the intention of an order addressed by the High Command to the Officers' Corps, which followed an unusually lucid analysis of Sykewar techniques:

> 1. The enemy is using this type of propaganda more frequently; it is assumed that there will be more of it and we must, therefore, be on our guard. 2. On the whole, it can be assumed that the order to destroy enemy leaflets or hand them in is carried out well. 3. In spite of this, however, this order must be stressed again and again every time the troops go into action.[24]

The problem of evaluation also complicated Sykewar use of the other forms of evidence derived from German press and radio sources. For example, direct German attacks upon points made by Sykewar occurred frequently, but these could not be taken as evidence of Sykewar effectiveness. It was more likely, in fact, that German propagandists undertook the direct attack only in cases where they judged that the effectiveness of their counteraction was likely to be greater than the risk of spreading the Sykewar view.[25]

The third form of evidence—punishment and threats of punishment for listening to Allied broadcasts—was also plentiful.[26] But careful study of these threats and punishments led several PWI analysts to conclude that these acts were probably more reliable evidence of the nervousness of certain German leaders in a bad military situation than of the Sykewar influence upon popular morale. One of the most competent analysts associated with PWI, Professor Edward A. Shils, has written:

> The Nazis occasionally became extremely excited about our leaflets, and from time to time chopped off the heads of people who were thought to be especially prone to accepting and diffusing the ideas contained therein. But I attribute this more to the hypersensitivity of the Nazis, who themselves greatly overemphasized the importance of propaganda, than to the actual responsiveness of the miserable Germans to whom they were addressed.[27]

A similar view was expressed by the Morale Division of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which indicated some possible consequences of profound import:

> German officials at or near the Ministerial level were not always realistic in their assessment of Nazi propaganda. This was true in two senses. To a considerable degree they were taken in by it themselves, and most of them exaggerated the degree to which it was popularly accepted. . . . There is considerable evidence that the degree of personal identification with the Nazi Party or Nazi doctrines is highly correlated both with personal belief in the claims of Nazi propaganda and with assumption of its widespread acceptance by others. Top officials, of course, were mainly selected for Nazi "reliability," and the inevitable price of this policy was that many of the officials in positions requiring cool, unbiased judgment were in fact least capable of such judgment. Thus was Nazi propaganda ensnared in its own toils.[28]

The purpose of this chapter, thus far, has been to describe the kinds of evidence upon which estimates of the effectiveness of Sykewar were formed, and to indicate the limitations of this evidence. It is important to recognize that the evidence is not adequate to permit a general assessment on any scientific grounds. It is equally important to recognize that "not adequate" means precisely what it says, and not something else: i.e., that inadequate evidence does not prove that Sykewar was *ineffective* any more than it proves that Sykewar was effective. The merit of the scientific method does not consist in diffusing the elementary fallacy that what can not be proved to be true is therefore necessarily false. On scientific grounds, all that can be said is that the evidence is inadequate to support either evaluation in summary form. Finally, it is important to recognize that, in the absence of decisive evidence by scientific canons, one need not dismiss the matter; one does the best possible with what is available. These points provide a context for the next section of this study, in which are summarized the opinions about Sykewar effectiveness of some of the people qualified to judge.

3. *Sykewar Effectiveness: Some Expert Opinions*

The data presented in this section were obtained in the following manner. This writer compiled a list of some 65 persons who, in his opinion, had held "key" jobs in the Sykewar organization. The "key" jobs selected were those which provided an opportunity for continuous observation of the intelligence-policy-output sequence in any major Sykewar operation. Of this list, 15 persons could not be located, and information was sought from the remaining 50 persons. To each of these persons the writer sent an identical set of seven questions bearing on the effectiveness of Sykewar. Each questionnaire was accompanied by a personal letter to the former Sykewarriors, with most of whom the writer has good personal relations, which explained the purpose for which their responses would be used in this study.

In response to the 50 questionnaires, 35 replies were received which were usable in whole or in part. There were 5 replies asking for more time to think out the answers; 5 replies explained why no answers at all could be given—2 of these on

grounds of business pressure, 3 on grounds of military security. (Of the latter, two were British, and subject to greater security restriction than exists in this country.) Finally, 3 questionnaires could not be delivered by the post office, and 2 have not yet been acknowledged.

The 35 usable replies came from the following persons, to whom the writer gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness: [29]

Michael Balfour
Gunnar Beckman
Cedric Belfrage
Morris Bishop
Norman Cameron
Gordon H. Cole
Richard H. S. Crossman
W. Phillips Davison
Guy della-Cioppa
Henry V. Dicks
Lewis F. Gittler
Patrick C. Gordon-Walker
Marius Goring
Hugh C. Greene
Murray I. Gurfein
William H. Hale
Richard F. Hanser
Martin F. Herz
Richard Hollander
Charles D. Jackson
Morris Janowitz
Konrad Kellen
Ernest G. Kingsley
Daniel Lerner
Donald V. McGranahan
John S. Minary
Adrian Murphy
Saul K. Padover
George K. Schueller
Edward A. Shils
Paul R. Sweet
Charles A. H. Thomson
Douglas Waples
Charles Weston
Duncan Wilson

The attention of these respondents was directed to the questionnaire reproduced below:

CHART XII. QUESTIONNAIRE ON SYKEWAR

1. How would you describe the mission of Psychological Warfare in Europe during World War II?
2. Do you think this mission, as a whole, was successfully executed? Why?
3. Which parts of the Psychological Warfare operations do you regard as outstanding successes and/or failures? Why?
4. How could the Psychological Warfare operations, as a whole, have been improved?
5. What was the function of your own job, and what was its relation to the Psychological Warfare operations as a whole?
6. Do you think these functions were successfully carried out? How could they have been improved?

7. Which specific incidents or operations can you recall that illustrate important points about the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of our Psychological Warfare?

Questions 2, 3, 4, and 6 were regarded as the main "substantive" items, in that these questions sought direct evaluation of Sykewar effectiveness. Questions 1, 5, and 7 were "control" questions, designed to elicit the respondent's definition of the phenomena he was evaluating. The answers to these three "control" questions contained, of course, much information of substantive value. The form of the questionnaire does not lend itself readily to elaborate quantification. This form was chosen deliberately, as the opinions expressed by such a small, special group are particularly valuable for their detailed individual content. For this reason, statements made by the respondents have been quoted verbatim throughout the text of this study.

The following presentation of the responses in numerical form must be regarded as a highly oversimplified version of views expressed in the letters. A certain degree of oversimplification is probably inherent in the tabulation of any qualitative data, and is certainly the case when the respondents are all specialists with an unusually high factor of Sykewar experience and critical intelligence. No attempt has been made to convert the numerical data into percentages, since such a conversion probably would distort rather than clarify. The respondents are not a "sample" of any determinate group, and therefore can not be considered as "representative" of any larger body of opinion. Nor are they a census of all Sykewar personnel in good observational positions. It seems sufficiently useful to regard these merely as the considered opinions of participants in the Sykewar operation who were in a position to form judgments of its effectiveness.

Chart XIII, which follows, breaks down the occupations of the 35 respondents, according to the Sykewar functions which they performed and the echelons on which they worked. The administrative, liaison, and special operations sections are not represented at all. Operations, plans, and directives have been classified together. Respondents who worked with different sections at different times are classified in the function to which their own responses mainly refer:

CHART XIII. DISTRIBUTION OF SYKEWAR FUNCTIONS

Question 5: What was the function of your own job? (35 respondents)

	PWD	*P&PW*	*BBC*	*Total*
(1) Plans and directives (operations)..	4	1	–	5
(2) Long-term planning (occupation).	3	–	–	3
(3) Intelligence	9	6	–	15
(4) Printed Media	3	1	–	4
(5) Broadcast Media	3	2	3	8
Totals.....	22	10	3	35

The preponderance of Intelligence personnel among the respondents is due largely to the nature of their work, which compelled them to seek and evaluate data on effectiveness from many sources. The next chart (Chart XIV) presents the opinions of the respondents, again classified by Sykewar functions, about the effectiveness of their own jobs. Here the echelon (PWD, P & PW, BBC) is omitted, as no significant divergence of opinions on this basis was discernible:

CHART XIV. EFFECTIVENESS OF SYKEWAR FUNCTIONS

Question 6: Do you think these functions [of your own job] were successfully carried out? (35 respondents)

	Generally Successful	*Generally Unsuccessful*	*No Answer*	*Total*
(1) Plans and directives (operations)....	4	1	1	6
(2) Long-term planning (occupation)...	–	2	1	3
(3) Intelligence	11	1	2	14
(4) Printed Media.....	4	–	–	4
(5) Broadcast Media	7	–	1	8
Totals.....	26	4	5	35

Chart XIV indicates that most of the respondents considered the functions in which they participated "generally successful." A large number of responses in this category made more or less serious reservations, but emerged with the view that their particular function, although it might have been performed better under improved conditions, was nevertheless performed "as

well as could be expected" under the conditions that actually existed. Its relationship to the total Sykewar operations was held to have been more, rather than less, successfully fulfilled. This makes an interesting comparison with Chart XV, below, which indicates the views of the respondents about the effectiveness of functions other than their own. All respondents were asked to mention those functions of Sykewar which they considered most or least successful. These "mentions" are not analyzed in terms of the respondent's own function, for in only 3 of the total of 87 mentions was self-gratification discernible. The number of mentions (87) far exceeds the number of responses (30), because most respondents mentioned more than one item.

The highest number of mentions referred to the failure of covert operations (especially "black") to achieve their objectives. However, several respondents took pains to concede that some of these operations were brilliantly executed, particularly in the broadcast media. General McClure has made the following precautionary comment, in conversation with this writer, designed to qualify present severe estimates of "black" ineffectiveness:

> It is obvious that *successful* black propaganda has not been published and should not be. Therefore, conclusions drawn without first-hand knowledge are probably based on "gray" propaganda, concerning which a considerable amount has been written.

Highest tribute for any single operation was given the BBC. Some of the mentions given to general "Radio handling of news" probably should be added to the credit of BBC as well. In the distinctions between tactical and strategic output, the preponderance of opinion chose tactical as the more effective, e.g., 7 mentions for tactical, as compared with 2 mentions for strategic, leaflets. Practically all the specific leaflets and broadcasts mentioned as "outstanding successes" were tactical. The reasons for this have been set forth in the chapters discussing the policies that Sykewar implemented and the audiences that it addressed. Allied war aims limited the uses which Sykewar could make of strategic propaganda. The political composition of the German target, and the character of the Nazi police state, made it expedient for Sykewar to concentrate on tactical output.

CHART XV. OUTSTANDING SYKEWAR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

Question 3: Which parts of the Sykewar operations do you regard as outstanding successes and/or failures? Why? (30 respondents)

	Successes	*Failures*	*Total*
(1) Covert operations	4	10	14
Black .... 2 successes 8 failures			
Gray ..... 2 successes 1 failure			
Special ... 1 failure			
(2) BBC	9	–	9
(3) Leaflets	9	–	9
Tactical .. 7 successes			
Strategic .. 2 successes			
(4) Radio handling of news	7	–	7
(5) Dissemination of leaflets	7	–	7
Special artillery shell..... 3 successes			
Monroe air bomb..... 2 successes			
Bombers (medium & light) 1 success			
Unspecified..... 1 success			
(6) Intelligence	6*	–	6
(7) Combat loudspeaker (tankmounted) ..	5	–	5
(8) Mobile radio transmitters	–	3	3
(9) German emigrés as broadcasters	–	2	2
(10) Specific leaflets	13	1	14
Passierschein ..... 8 successes			
SHAEF instructions..... 2 successes			
Eine Minute..... 1 success			
The Six Points..... 1 success			
Nachrichten für die Truppe 1 success			
Einheits Pass ..... 1 failure			
(11) Specific broadcasts	8	3	11
Voice of SHAEF..... 3 successes			
Foreign-workers program... 3 successes			
1 failure			
Letters that never arrived.. 1 success			
Voice of Military Govt..... 1 success			
Shortwave from USA..... 2 failures			
Total Mentions	68	19	87

* The comparatively low number of mentions for Sykewar intelligence is due mainly to faulty wording of this question. The word "operations" at Sykewar was confined to the output sections, and several respondents understood the term in this sense, in the above question. A very large number of tributes to PWI occurred in other parts of the lettters.

High rating was given also to the purely mechanical instruments for leaflet dissemination: One such statement praised these instruments generally; 2 specified the Monroe leaflet bomb for aerial dissemination; and 3 specified the artillery leaflet shell. The tankmounted loudspeaker was judged to be an outstanding success, with 5 mentions and no dissents. These mechanisms would probably have received even a higher rate of favorable mention if the respondents had included more Sykewarriors who had been concerned with the dissemination phase of the operation.

The number of specific leaflets named was high, the *Passierschein* quite naturally receiving more favorable mentions than any other single item of Sykewar output, without a single unfavorable mention. The Unit Surrender Pass, on the contrary, was mentioned only once, and then as an outstanding failure. Other mentions of specific output were scattered. Radio Lux broadcasts to foreign workers received little attention, considering that they were among the last major operations of Sykewar; of the categorical opinions expressed, 3 were favorable and one unfavorable. (It should be noted that rival broadcasters were responsible for two of these judgments.) Shortwave broadcasting from the United States was generally regarded as a dismal failure, although only two respondents mentioned this operation specifically in response to this question.

Chart XVI, below, summarizes the opinions of the respondents about what Sykewar was trying to do. This is an indispensable preliminary to an assessment of Sykewar effectiveness, for an opinion on how successful Sykewar was in attaining its objectives can be meaningful only with reference to some definition of those objectives.

The categories numbered (5)–(13) in Chart XVI include supplementary definitions of the Sykewar mission. All but 5 respondents stated the primary mission in terms of the first 4 categories. Several then went on to define special phases, aspects, or supplements of the primary mission. (This explains why there were 56 mentions by only 29 respondents on this point.) The spread of these supplementary definitions over 9 distinct categories, each of which contains internal variants, is an interesting outcome of the tabulation.

Categories (5) and (6) clearly complement each other, the latter being a more general version of the former. That is, in-

CHART XVI. THE SYKEWAR MISSION

Question 1: How would you describe the mission of Sykewar in Europe during World War II? (29 respondents)

(1) To *weaken* enemy will-to-resist	13
(2) To *undermine* enemy will-to-resist	6
(3) To *destroy* enemy will-to-resist	4
(4) To destroy enemy *will-to-win*	1
(5) To induce surrenders	8
(6) To shorten the war	6
(7) To encourage resistance in enemy-occupied areas	6
(8) To lay foundations of a "good peace"	3
(9) To undermine prestige of Nazi government	2
(10) To present clearly Allied aims and ideals	2
(11) To make enemy easier to handle after surrender	2
(12) To support the military mission	2
(13) To control populations of enemy-occupied areas	1
Total Mentions	56

ducing surrenders was a specific way in which Sykewar could serve the general Allied objective of shortening the war. Category (13), on the other hand, is a contrary version of category (7). The objectives of encouraging resistance and preparing control are, as we have seen earlier, incompatible on some issues of propaganda policy. The one man who specified the function of Sykewar with respect to enemy-occupied populations to be "control," rather than "encouraging resistance," was the Sykewarrior who probably was most directly concerned with this problem. Clearly, too, he was thinking of the post-hostilities rather than the pre-attack phase, to which the six respondents who mentioned "encouraging resistance" probably referred.

Categories (8) and (11) can be considered together as versions of Sykewar's long-term objectives, i.e., the peace to follow the war. The fact that these objectives ("peace aims" rather than "war aims") were ignored by Sykewarriors and emphasized by BBC respondents indicates an important difference in the characteristic thinking of key BBC and Sykewar personnel—the BBC focusing on the postwar organization of peace, and the Sykewarriors mainly on military victory. It is significant, too, that the third mention received in category (8) contains the *only* use of the word "democracy" in all the responses to describe the

Sykewar mission. (*REPEAT:* Among 29 active propagandists of Allied policy in World War II, only *one* used the word "democracy" in connection with the objectives of Allied propaganda.)

The definitions grouped in categories (1) to (4) constitute a delightful problem in applied semantics. Of the 29 respondents, 23 defined the mission of Sykewar as an operation against the "enemy will-to-resist." The scope of the operation, however, was variously described, by those who used this phrase, as "to weaken" (13 mentions), "to undermine" (6 mentions), and "to destroy" (4 mentions). Two of the respondents who said the objective was "to undermine" supplemented their first choice of what was to be undermined by adding the phrase "will-to-fight." Important policy concepts, and propaganda consequences, are denoted by these alternate phrases. In most instances, their choices reveal semantic clarity, rather than confusion, among the respondents. All respondents were quite familiar with the phrase "will-to-resist" in the standard description of the Sykewar mission. Those who omitted it did so deliberately, and chose phrases intended to describe more precisely their conception of the Sykewar mission. One respondent, for example, substituted the phrase "will-to-win."

Lt. Col. C. A. H. Thomson made a sharp distinction between the general mission of psychological warfare in the ETO and the particular mission of PWD. Lt. Col. Murray I. Gurfein, in his definition of psychological warfare, demonstrated the keen legal mind, skilled in making distinctions, which contributed to his excellent direction of Sykewar Intelligence:

> The mission of Psychological Warfare was to subvert the morale of the enemy troops and population, with two ends in view: (1) to cause temporary and critical defections in effort and optimism, and (2) to prepare for an ultimate breakdown of morale which would induce a surrender at an earlier time than could be effected without psychological warfare.

It is against this framework of definition that the tabulation presented in Chart XVII, below, must be considered. Here the respondents made their estimates of the overall effectiveness of Sykewar operations. The tabulation presents each man's estimate in terms of his main definition of the Sykewar mission—his choice of "weakening" or "undermining" or "destroying" the enemy's will-to-resist.

CHART XVII. OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF SYKEWAR

Question 2: Do you think the Sykewar mission, as a whole, was successfully executed? (32 respondents)

	Generally Successful	*Partially Successful*	*Generally Unsuccessful*	*Total Mentions*
(1) To *weaken* will-to-resist.....	8	3	2	13
(2) To *undermine* will-to-resist..	2	4	–	6
(3) To *destroy* will-to-resist.....	1	2	1	4
(4) To destroy will-to-win.....	–	1	–	1
(5) Miscellaneous definitions	1	3	–	4
(6) No definition	1	2	1	4
Total Mentions	13	15	4	32

None of the respondents considered that Sykewar was wholly successful in the execution of its mission, however defined. On the other hand, no respondent called Sykewar wholly unsuccessful. In every case the estimate was qualified. As a rule, the more limited the definition of the Sykewar objective, the more favorable was the estimate of Sykewar success.

Those who chose the category "Generally Unsuccessful" held that Sykewar successes were merely limited and local, and suggested that no overall success could have been achieved without a basic revision of the operation. One respondent in this group went on to say that no short-run propaganda operation can be successful against the resiliency of the human organism. He expressed the view that only a propaganda operation which *changes attitudes* to conform with its desires can be judged an "overall success." From this point of view, no propaganda operation which is mainly tactical, like Sykewar, can be judged in terms of overall effectiveness, because it supports no purposes which can appropriately be designated as overall objectives.

Those using the category "Generally Successful" estimated that Sykewar had achieved its objectives in the main, that its failures were local, and that they could have been eliminated by certain minor revisions in the operation. Some of these respondents made it clear that Sykewar success must be judged, not in terms of objectives which it did not seek, but only with respect to its avowed aims. R. H. S. Crossman writes:

> Within the narrow limits I have laid down [see his "Supplementary Essay," which follows this chapter], the answer is Yes.

Once we realized that propaganda could not achieve victories on its own and had to be closely coordinated on the one hand with policy, which it had truthfully to reflect, and on the other hand with strategy, which it had never to embarrass, we did quite a useful job of work. Strategic propaganda is like economic warfare. It works on the enemy by a slow process of attrition, and it builds up the spirit of friends by an equally slow process. Whenever we tried for short-term successes by clever tactical devices, such as was often attempted in black propaganda, the results were extremely dubious. Curiously enough, truth paid in the last war, and the art of propaganda depended on selection of the truth, with frequent tactical omissions, but not on perverting it beyond this point.

Those who classified operations as "Partially Successful" judged that Sykewar achieved certain of its objectives, but failed to achieve certain other objectives. Some respondents consider that these failures were basic and could have been improved only by fairly drastic policy revision of the Sykewar operation. Others merely suggest certain objectives which Sykewar did not achieve. W. H. Hale writes:

I know of no way of determining whether or not PW actually hastened enemy surrender. Certainly it produced no result as spectacular as that of President Wilson, the leading propagandist of his era, when he induced a still formidable enemy to capitulate under the impact of a verbal formula. But neither did it indulge in the reckless exaggerations and untenable promises which caused Allied propaganda of World War I soon to rebound upon its makers. Abundant evidence exists that it implanted in many enemy minds facts and arguments that speeded individual disaffection or surrender. Pitted against a German propaganda effort that was far more skillful and determined than that made by the Kaiser's government, it was limited initially to the primary role of counterpropaganda—to which, however, it gave the radical turn of answering falsehood and intimidation with plain truth and reasonable demonstration, thereby forging a verbal weapon of unprecedented credibility. It told no deliberate lies (except, of course, in "black" or deception propaganda designed for tactical ends). It held out no false hopes. To the extent that it brought home to the enemy the image of American or Allied vigor, moral force, authority and sincerity, it succeeded in a mission that was designed not only for the moment, but also for the period of consolidation and reform that was to follow victory.

All judgments about Sykewar's overall effectiveness were, as indicated, qualified by an awareness of failures. The specific reasons for these failures emerge, obliquely, from the responses tabulated in Chart XVIII, below, which contain estimates of how the operations could have been improved. Since most respondents mentioned more than one item of improvement, the number of mentions (63) considerably exceeds the number of respondents (33).

CHART XVIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SYKEWAR IMPROVEMENTS

Question 4: How could the Sykewar operations, as a whole, have been improved? (33 respondents)

(1)	Better high-policy coordination		18
(2)	Better personnel and training		14
(3)	Better coordination with military		9
(4)	Better Sykewar organization		6
	Better coordination of operations	3	
	A single Sykewar agency	3	
(5)	Better understanding of Sykewar by military		5
(6)	Better advance planning		4
(7)	Greater clarity of war aims		3
(8)	Expanded intelligence operations (PWI)		2
(9)	Improved Sykewar weapons		1
(10)	More money		1
	Total Mentions		63

The significance of these recommendations, which derive from estimates of what Sykewar should have aimed to do and how it should have been done, is quite plain: In general, the recommendation is for "more of the same, done better."

One problem does not enter into these considerations, however, and this is perhaps the most profound problem posed by the existence of such a form of human activity as psychological warfare. At bottom, this probably must be regarded as a problem in ethics, for its invokes human values as arbiter of the uses of power. The question is posed by the great potential for good and evil which is inherent in propaganda and may be phrased simply: How should propaganda be used, so as to minimize its harmful, and maximize its beneficial, effects upon both its users and its "targets"? That Sykewar in World War II was not with-

out effects, as yet but dimly discernible, upon its users seems clear. One type of influence has been suggested by a perceptive Sykewarrior, Konrad Kellen, who belongs in the classic tradition which makes wit a form of philosophy:

> I prefer not to dwell on the incomparably stronger effect Sykewar has had on those who conducted it than on those who were subjected to it. Those who conducted it—exposed as they were to the most gruelling type of self-suggestion—have never been the same afterward. For them, their job was a psychological Hiroshima.

The problem of how to use propaganda in an age of mass societies and crisis politics can be discussed fruitfully in terms of policy. It is perhaps fitting to conclude this study with a brief glance at the problem as it appears in the current world situation.

4. *Toward a Policy Conception of Propaganda*

This study began by asserting that propaganda is one of the major instruments used in world politics today, and that it operates in the service of the directive function (policy). Propaganda we regarded as a flow of symbols designed to persuade a given audience to behave in ways compatible with policy aims. With these conceptions in mind, we described the Sykewar operation against Germany, seeking answers to the question: *Who said what to whom, how, why, and with what effects?*

Along the way, and incidental to the description of what was done, some indications were given of how it might have been done better. Many of these suggestions, related to specific components of the propaganda process, came from former Sykewarriors. On the whole, these men were conscientious, hard-working, and highly intelligent. They learned much from their experience during the Sykewar years, and from their reflections on this experience during the postwar years. They constitute a group which comes as close to a "corps of experts" on propaganda as we have in this country. This fact makes all the more striking a point which is emphasized, in one form or another, by nearly all of them—that American policymakers during World War II neither understood nor used the full power of the propaganda weapon.

All these Sykewarriors have demonstrated, during and since

the war, an active conviction that propaganda is important. As earlier, somewhat exaggerated, notions of what propaganda might be able to accomplish were tempered by experience, curiously enough this conviction seems to have deepened. One indication of this is their remarkable response to the questionnaire sent out by this writer. Of 50 very busy men, 35 responded —most of them at length and in detail considerably "beyond the call of duty." The content of these responses reveals more explicitly their unanimous conviction that propaganda is important. Finally, many of them are devoting time, which they could use for making and spending money, to making propaganda for propaganda. In the United States, this is surely an important token of profound conviction.

Why, the question may be asked, in the face of this unanimous conviction among the experts, did high American leadership in World War II display such striking indifference to sykewar? Evidence was adduced earlier in the study to show that Roosevelt and Hull knew little, and cared less, about the weapon Sykewarriors considered so important. Wallace Carroll concluded, from his discussion of sykewar with the President, that "Roosevelt did not understand the systematic use of propaganda in total war." [30]

This assertion may be accurate, and yet be inadequate to explain the minimizing of sykewar by the Allied leadership. Carroll himself obviously considers Roosevelt an intelligent and responsible leader who was interested in every phase of the total war which he regarded as important. One reason for Roosevelt's indifference, and consequent failure to "understand," may have been a conviction that sykewar was in fact *not* an important phase of World War II. By any index of importance one can devise—amount of money spent, number of personnel engaged, influence in the decision-making apparatus, etc.—such an inference seems justified. But why did Roosevelt (and Hull, Marshall, and other top American leaders) consider sykewar as *not* important? Any answer to this question is on speculative ground, and we shall make only two brief suggestions here.

The first is that American leadership believed that the war, as they conceived it, could and should be won by military means alone. America's mastery of the instruments of coercion was so superior that recourse to the media and techniques of persua-

sion did not present itself to their attention as an important consideration. Hans Speier has stated this point very concisely:

> The offensive against the "morale" of the enemy was waged primarily by bombs, both in Germany and Japan. The material superiority of the Allies made it unnecessary to examine exhaustively what support political warfare might be able to give the military effort.[31]

Our second suggestion is that Roosevelt, whom Carroll acknowledges to have been "in his own right . . . a great propagandist," understood with a clarity unavailable to Sykewarriors that his conception of the war *did not lend itself* to "the systematic use of propaganda." Roosevelt's clarity on this point was unavailable to Sykewarriors, because his understanding of his own basic war policy was not available to them.

America's war policy was to "win the war." Every postwar memoir of statesman and soldier which has been published underscores the point that the United States conceived World War II mainly as a military rather than a political (ideological) problem. Even Churchill, who has been *accused* by Americans of having had "political" motives in urging various strategic moves, publicized the non-ideological character of Allied policy. Before D-Day he told the House of Commons (and the world): "As this war has progressed, it has become less ideological in its character . . ." [32]

Unconditional Surrender itself was evidence that, for American and British leadership, World War II was a military problem and required no policy beyond victory. The Allied leaders considered their means of coercion adequate, and a strategy of persuasion superfluous, for execution of this policy. I do not speak here of tactical Sykewar—whose objective of greasing the channels for surrender and desertion by German soldiers obviously served the policy of victory, was recognized as important by all leaders concerned with victory on this level, and was actually performed with considerable success. All that such propaganda needs to offer is comfort and safety—e.g., the "better 'ole," the "six points," and all the Sykewar themes described earlier which told the German soldier he could insure his chances of surviving the war and getting home afterward if he came over to our side. A policy of "victory" is served by such offers and underwrites them.

However, such a use of sykewar techniques does not add up to a strategy of persuasion on the level of high policy. The objective of sykewar designated as strategic must, in the last analysis, and in some measure, be subversion.[33] Sykewar caused no subversion, and the use of the term "strategic" to designate most of its output to German civilians indicates an important misconception which goes much deeper than terminology. It was actually tactical output adapted to the living conditions of civilians in wartime. That is, since civilians could not be offered the exit of POW camps, other channels had to be designated through which civilian disaffection could be expressed in action. As in its output to the soldiers, Sykewar did not *cause* the subversion of morale; it merely indicated the channels of action available to the disaffected, and facilitated the use of these channels by pointing out that they offered greater comfort and safety. Careful scrutiny of the "limited-action" themes directed at civilians reveals their precise correspondence with tactical output to soldiers, e.g., "hide in the woods" instead of "surrender to us." The "strategic" job of subverting morale in World War II was done, as indicated above, by "strategic bombing" and by overwhelming victories on the ground. In other words, the job was done, as President Roosevelt expected, by the military techniques of coercion rather than by the sykewar techniques of persuasion.

Another question thereupon arises: Why did Allied leaders focus their attention upon violence, and dismiss the less deadly and expensive techniques of persuasion?[34] Here we come upon the nub of the policy-sykewar relationship in World War II.

To subvert German morale by bombing and defeat in combat, the Allies had to offer the Germans only the prospect of more bombing within the context of further and final defeat. So long as we had the military means, this method—although expensive—assured the Allies of success in either subverting the Germans or destroying them. Both alternatives were compatible with a policy of victory-without-conditions (i.e., unconditional surrender).

To subvert the Germans by strategic sykewar, the Allies would have had to offer them alternatives more attractive than the hope of winning the war. A policy based mainly on persuasion, rather than coercion, would have had to offer more than a "better 'ole." It would have had to include offers of a

"better life" for Germans than the prospects offered by a German victory. Such offers would have been incompatible with the policy of Unconditional Surrender.

It is suggested that the virtual disregard of "strategic" sykewar was a deliberate policy choice by the top Allied leadership.[35] Further, that this choice derived, in part at least, from recognition that a victory based on military effort alone would involve no offers, whereas an attempt to gain victory by propaganda means would have involved making offers to the Germans which Allied leaders were not prepared to implement. We were not prepared to make any offer to the only German group powerful enough to attempt a coup d'état, i.e., the military. At the same time, we were ideologically unable to appeal to the German people, who alone could have made a mass revolution to overthrow the Nazis. This was due in part to the character of German political life under the Nazi police state. In large measure, however, this limitation derived from the defensive character of the Allied coalition in the world political arena, and the conservative character of Anglo-American society. Given these conditions, possibly the only Sykewar promises which might have revolutionized Germany would have involved also some "revolutionizing" at home. Past experience had taught the folly of making offers which would not, or could not, be carried out. Therefore, on the basis of the Wilsonian failure, the decision was to make no such offers and win the war by military means alone.

This decision, expressed in the formula Unconditional Surrender, indicates a continuing limitation of American policy in world affairs which is of key importance today. The ideas which America has been offering in the world political market have found fewer and fewer takers during the past thirty years. To an increasing number of people around the world we seem to be offering old and damaged goods, which have little sales appeal. During World War II, the competition for world power was fought out by the weapons of violence. American supremacy in these weapons vindicated the decision by American leaders to concentrate on the military mechanism, and to disregard propaganda, by presenting them with an unencumbered victory (i.e., the Unconditional Surrender of Germany and Japan).

What is possible in wartime national policy, however, is not always possible in peace. That is, during the present postwar

period, the United States may find itself compelled to "instrument" its policies by means other than its first choice. In its "cold war" with the Soviet Union, as during World War II, American leadership again has chosen its strongest weapons: economic and technological. The USSR is offering a "better world," an ideological formula with a ready-made system of organizing it, which appeals to many people in the present epoch of crisis politics. The United States is offering mainly dollars, with a ready-made system of know-how for using them to produce more "good things of life." Since the United States has lots of dollars and know-how, the choice of economic warfare puts us on safer ground than ideological warfare, just as our military means exceeded our ideological means during World War II.

Should we find that this economic strategy "wins the decision" for the United States, we shall have as limited use for professional propagandists in the near future as we have had in the recent past. However, in this competition for loyalties around the world, a predominantly economic strategy may not be adequate against a predominantly ideological strategy. Should it turn out that the United States is losing ground, that the "good things" we offer are not adequate competition against the "better world" offered by the Soviets, we shall need some new policy decisions. We shall need decisions as to whether we want to make better offers around the world; whether these offers shall include new ideas; how we shall offer these articles with which, as a nation, we are less familiar. Here we shall need to consult the intelligence specialist (the social scientist) and the communication specialist (the propagandist)—rather than, or in addition to, the diplomat, the economist, and the soldier.

These are issues which demand a "policy conception of propaganda" among our political leaders and their advisers. Political leaders usually respond not on the basis of systematic analysis of long-term probabilities, but on the basis of felt needs. Now, therefore, is the time for policy scientists to grapple with these problems of policy and propaganda, in order to clarify issues and specify needs before they begin to be felt by politicians.[36] History moves at an accelerated pace in our epoch.[37] Even if political leadership is not particularly insensitive, needs may be *felt* too late.[38]

Chapter 11. Notes

1. Quoted in R. E. Summers, *Wartime Censorship of Press and Radio,* p. 41.

2. Letter from General Eisenhower to General McClure, reproduced in facsimile as frontispiece to the *History: PWD.*

3. Reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey have been published by the Government Printing Office. See especially those by the Morale Division, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale,* 2 Vols. (Washington, 1947).

4. These passages are from a letter responding to a questionnaire from this writer. All such letters cited in this chapter have been deposited in The Hoover Library.

5. Disagreement with this view has been expressed by E. G. Kingsley, former Chief of PWI Documents Subsection, in response to this writer's questionnaire: "I don't think the effectiveness of Sykewar can be studied with an open mind by making the rounds of former PWD characters. The real answer to that question lies in Germany . . . but as a documents man I must of course blow my own disillusioned trumpet. A thorough study of documents could and should provide the perfect answer to effectiveness at the time of impact, as well as longer term value in all its shades and grades."

6. B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, R. D. Casey, *Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion,* p. 133.

7. *Ibid.,* p. 81.

8. Hans Speier, "The Future of Psychological Warfare," *loc. cit.,* p. 6.

9. The simple vocabulary of stimulus-response which is used in the above discussion is not intended to obscure the complexity of the problem of propaganda "influence." An indication of alternate, and more exact, terms in which this problem may be discussed is given by Professor Lasswell: "We may classify audience response as follows: (1) attention; (2) comprehension; (3) enjoyment; (4) evaluation; (5) action." See "Describing the Contents of Communications," B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, R. D. Casey, *op. cit.,* p. 80.

10. This writer was in Frankfurt on the day after its capitulation and reported the presence of large numbers of white flags, in his PWI Report "Notes on a Trip through Occupied Germany" (18 April 1945). Reports on similar situations in the Frankfurt area were made by Lieutenant Rosenberg's PWI team composed of Akselrad, Biberfeld, Kimental, and Samson.

11. *History: PWD,* p. 21.

12. *History: P & PW,* p. 182.

13. See the discussion of these points in Chapter 5. See also Jean Cazeneuve, *La Psychologie du Prisonnier de Guerre* (Paris, 1944); and Institute of World Polity, *Prisoners of War* (Washington, 1948).

14. The same use of POW data was made to improve broadcasting effectiveness: "Every man who surrendered was given a detailed questionnaire to fill out concerning his opinions of previous broadcasts and of the gen-

eral programming procedure, so that immediate improvements could be made." David Hertz, "The Radio Siege of Lorient," *loc. cit.*

15. This chart is taken from the final report on "Leaflet Operations in the Western European Theater," as reproduced in the *History: PWD,* p. 175. Compare it with the conclusions of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, viz., "Black listening constitutes a pretty good index of dissatisfaction with official German news sources. At least half of all German adults listened, as indicated in answers given by civilians to the question: Did you ever listen to Allied broadcasts? If so, when did you begin to listen?

Table 76. Extent of Black Listening

	Percent
Began in 1939 or before	17
Began as the war progressed	30
Time unspecified	4
No radio, hence no listening	11
Did not listen (no reason given)	38
Total	100"

Op. Cit., Vol. 1, p. 77. Unfortunately, no figures are given to indicate the size and composition of this sample. Cf. Table 33, p. 27. For an indication of the complexity of intervariability problems in estimating the effectiveness of any given problem on morale, see especially Table 16, Vol. 2, p. 13.

16. In World War I, for illustration, the German High Command, in order to study the degree to which the home front was undermined, made a simple content analysis of intercepted letters between soldiers at the front and their families. One indicator of the infectiousness of Allied propaganda was the increasing tendency to use German expressions in the special sense given to them in the Allied propaganda leaflets and whispering campaigns. It was found that the term "Junker" was increasingly employed in the year 1918 in a tendentious sense.

H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique In the World War,* p. 101. Detailed analysis of this study by the German High Command is given in *Weltkrieg ohne Waffen* (Stuttgart, 1932), Hans Thimme.

17. One such exception was the diary of a priest in Monschau, the tiny town near the German border which was used as the jumping-off point of von Rundstedt's counteroffensive in the Ardennes. Because of his status, the priest was permitted unusual freedom of movement and inquiry among the inhabitants of this unexpectedly important town. His keen faculties of observation enabled him to make the most of his opportunities. A barely legible photostat of this valuable document is in The Hoover Library.

18. These reports are included among the files of *Stimmungsberichte,* from both Party and SD agents, available under this heading in The Hoover Library.

19. *The Goebbels Diaries,* pp. 333-4, Louis P. Lochner (ed.).

20. On this point see the careful review of *The Goebbels Diaries* by Hans Speier, *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall, 1948), pp. 500-505.

21. Valuable insights into Goebbels' manipulation of intelligence for his own political purposes are given in *Goebbels: The Man Next to Hitler,*

Rudolf Semmler. See also the Introduction to this book by a former Sykewarrior, Donald McLachlan.

22. Large numbers of Wehrmacht morale orders are among the six series of captured German documents in The Hoover Library: A, DE, S, SM, SR, PID.

23. "Enemy communications are continually used for the purpose of estimating the state of morale among enemy peoples. This is the study of content as a basis of inference about the changing state of attitude toward war, and especially the intensity of the determination to carry on to victory." H. D. Lasswell, "Describing the Contents of Communications," *loc. cit.*, p. 80.

24. *History: PWD,* p. 174. The extremely perspicacious analysis which precedes this quotation should be read as an indication of how carefully the Germans watched Sykewar output and analyzed its techniques.

25. An interesting case history of one such controversy, using the method of direct attack, is documented in the scrapbooks of Richard F. Hanser. Central to the controversy was a leaflet written by Mr. Hanser (USG-26), captioned "Wenn Friede einkehrt—" on one side and "Wie kann Deutschland noch gerettet werden?" on the other. Mr. Hanser comments as follows:

> This is the full leaflet which *Das Schwarze Korps* (23 March 1944) is replying to. It interests me that in this leaflet I violated practically all the rules that were given to us on leaflet writing: we were not to repeat the enemy's arguments, not argue with the enemy, keep text to a minimum, use pictures, etc. In this leaflet I argued with the enemy, used nothing but solid text, no pictures. Yet this item stirred up more reaction than any other leaflet I know of (although there were a lot of leaflets I did not know about, of course). In following pages of the scrapbook there are other German references to this leaflet, including a veiled one by Goebbels.

26. See E. T. Lean, *Voices in the Darkness, passim.* Mr. Lean collects the data on punishment which was published regularly in the PID *News Digest.*

27. Letter to this writer from Edward A. Shils, deposited in The Hoover Library.

28. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *op. cit.,* Vol. I, p. 79.

29. The full texts of all replies received, together with an index and abridgment, are on file in The Hoover Library.

30. Wallace Carroll, *Persuade or Perish,* p. 7.

31. Hans Speier, "The Future of Psychological Warfare," *loc. cit.*

32. "A World Survey," speech before the House of Commons, 24 May 1944.

33. Hans Speier, *loc. cit.,* pp. 13-16. Dr. Speier elaborates the distinction between tactical and strategic sykewar into several lucid and very usable categories.

34. A characteristic piece of propaganda for propaganda by propagandists, even to its title, is "Words Are Cheaper than Blood," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall, 1945), p. 283, John A. Pollard.

35. For an interesting brief discussion of this point by a former Sykewarrior, see Donald V. McGranahan, "U.S. Psychological Warfare Policy" (letter), *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall, 1946), p. 446.

36. On the problems involved in the relationship of policy scientists to policy makers see: Alexander H. Leighton, *Human Relations in a Changing World* and *The Governing of Men* (Princeton, 1945).

37. On the process of "acceleration" in history, see Daniel Halévy, *Essai sur l'Accelération de l'Histoire* (Paris, 1947).

38. On the service which policy science can render, see the works of Harold D. Lasswell, especially *The Analysis of Political Behaviour.*

SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY

By Richard H. S. Crossman, M.P.

1. *Propaganda and Democracy*

In America and Britain, propaganda in peacetime has been an affair for political parties, pressure groups, and economic interests; and the democrat's demand of the State has been that it should safeguard his right to persuade other people, by a self-denying ordinance that it itself should not seek to persuade him. Only in wartime do we relax this principle, and permit the central authority to interfere in our controversies by censorship (negative psychological warfare), and by campaigns to raise the morale of our friends and to destroy that of our enemies (positive psychological warfare). Then, but only then, may the techniques employed previously in a democracy for selling goods and winning votes be used as an instrument of national self-assertion.

This liberal theory of propaganda survived to a remarkable degree in the period between the first and second world wars. Despite the rise, first, of Communist Russia—with its ideology of world revolution and its apparatus of psychological warfare against external capitalism and internal sabotage—and, later, of Nazi Germany, which took over and vastly refined the Bolshevik techniques of mass persuasion, the democracies remained psychologically disarmed. The first German broadcast from London, for instance, took place a few days before Munich. It occurred to someone that it might be a good idea to let Germans hear the text of Mr. Chamberlain's broadcast to his fellow countrymen. A friend of mine, interrupted at dinner, was hastily summoned to Broadcasting House to translate Mr. Chamberlain's message and read it over the air. This was the beginning of the European Service of the BBC, which by 1945 had grown to be the most important psychological warfare instrument of the Anglo-American war effort. But in the autumn of 1938, neither Britain nor America felt any need to counter the Nazi and Communist psychological warfare by a government-con-

trolled propaganda. "Truth will prevail" was our motto, though most of us knew from our experience in commerce, journalism, or politics that truth rarely prevails when it can not be heard.

It would be easy, now, amid the turmoil of ideological warfare, to dismiss the liberalism of earlier days as idealistic nonsense, and to repudiate the democratic opposition to state-controlled propaganda, along with President Wilson's dream of "open covenants, openly arrived at." But that would be throwing the baby out with the bath water. During the war, we discovered that truth is the best propaganda. Those who lose their integrity destroy themselves, if for no other reason than because they come to believe their own inventions; and that, as the Nazis found out too late, is the beginning of the end.

I write this as one who served as a propagandist for five long years, first as director of political warfare against the enemy in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, and then as a member of the joint Anglo-American Psychological Warfare Section of General Eisenhower's Staff. Many of us were journalists or academics by profession, and at first we found the unrestricted use of the techniques of persuasion against an unseen enemy a fascinating and absorbing task. Freed from the limitations imposed by democracy, we were able to experiment with any and every black magic in the use of words which might help to "save lives"; and we were provided—at least, toward the end of the war—with funds, staff, and material far beyond the means of any newspaper, advertising agency or political party. Here was a unique chance for what seemed to be a supremely interesting scientific experiment. We were equipped, so far as technical facilities went, to out-Goebbels Goebbels. As the campaign of 1944 progressed, and the Nazi Reich grew smaller and smaller, our radio transmitters, which in 1940 could scarcely whisper among the roar of the Nazi-controlled ether, shouted the ailing *Reichsrundfunk* down; and our specialized leaflet-carrying Fortresses, with their specialized leaflet-bombs, could pinpoint their propaganda targets virtually without hindrance. We were masters of the enemy mind—to do with it as Roosevelt and Churchill willed. Why should we pull our punches, or be squeamish about our methods? This was total war. Our job was to demoralize the enemy, so that the Allied statesmen could pastoralize him at leisure.

Yet, remarkably enough, we did pull our punches and we

remained squeamish. Indeed, the longer we stayed on the job, and the more professional we became, the greater our squeamishness. It was the occasional V.I.P. from Whitehall or the Pentagon, blowing in to give us a bright idea for winning the war by a single propaganda stunt, who succumbed to Satan.

I will only give two examples, which stick obstinately in my memory. The first occurred during the stalemate winter of 1944. We had been preparing the German mind for the Allied advance into Germany. Since high policy forbade any modification of "unconditional surrender," we had decided to build up the personality of the Supreme Commander, and step by step to persuade both the German civilian and the German soldier to accept his orders instead of those of Himmler and Hitler. Day in, day out, by radio and leaflet, German soldiers had been informed that "the way back home lies through the prisoner-of-war camp," and had been shown in photographic detail the comfort and security which really was being given to prisoners of war. Simultaneously, the civilian was being instructed in the Military Government regulations under which he should live when our armies reached the area of his home. If the soldier surrendered precisely according to the instructions which we gave him, and if the civilian obeyed the orders of Military Government, General Eisenhower would see to it that no evil would come to them. Better, therefore, when the great advance began, to "stay put" than to do as the Nazi radio advised and withdraw into the center of Germany, where the final Armageddon would take place.

It was a good campaign for several reasons. In the first place, we were telling, as is very rarely possible in wartime, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Our instructions on how to surrender with the minimum of personal risk were accurate; our description of Military Government regulations precise; our build-up of the Supreme Commander not exaggerated. Equally important, this campaign served a very important military purpose—to keep the civilians off the roads, where they would block the advancing armies, and to preserve German manpower to work in the coal mines, the factories, and the fields, and so reduce the problems of occupation.

During one of the smaller initial offensives on the west of the Rhine, a very important person visited SHAEF, and read in the *Stars and Stripes* of the instructions being issued by radio

to the German civilians that they should keep off the roads. "What nonsense!" he said to the Supreme Commander. "Why be soft to the Germans? Your job is to stimulate disorder and to block the retreat of the German armies by the methods they used against the French in 1940."

That night we received the order to reverse our whole propaganda campaign. I shall never forget the blackness of our despair. We realized that, if we carried out the Very Important Person's "stunt," we should be breaking what had become a solemn pledge by the Supreme Commander to the German people, and so undermining his authority with them. We also realized, I think, that militarily such a step would be of doubtful value, since our soldiers, unlike the Germans in France, would not shoot down helpless civilians, and the crowding of the roads would therefore obstruct our armies more than those of the enemy. Finally, we could not help remembering the indignations expressed in the name of democracy when the Nazis used these techniques four years previously.

The Chief of Staff, General Bedell Smith, was called in, as he always was in a real crisis. "Do something—one single thing—to satisfy the Old Man," he said, "and use your brains to insure that it doesn't contradict or undermine our main campaign."

How we got out of the difficulty is not relevant here. What is important to observe is that the professional propagandists had discovered by the spring of 1945 that stunts do not pay. The infantile Machiavellianism was proposed by a politician, who treated psychological warfare as a "war game," and not as what it really was—the imposition of the Allied will on the German mind.

My second example comes not from the campaign of which Dr. Lerner writes, but from the Mediterranean. I give it here because it illustrates so aptly the moral which I wish to draw. For six weeks, during the summer of 1943, the Italian armistice negotiations had been dragging on while the Sicilian campaign was wound up. As each day passed, the German strength in Italy increased. When Mussolini fell, at the end of July, there were only two or three divisions in the northern plains; we could have landed anywhere without resistance if we had had the landing barges. But by the end of August, when operation "Avalanche" was only a few days off, fourteen divisions had streamed in, and Kesselring, by a simple calculation of the

range of our fighters, could guess that our landing would have to be near Salerno. When Field Marshal Alexander talked to the propagandists in his Headquarters in Sicily, he said tersely, "I have never faced a worse situation, militarily: I have to rely on you."

Unless the Germans could be prevented from throwing all their available divisions in to defeat the landing, its failure seemed certain. Only one thing could stop them—a situation throughout Italy so serious that some of their troops would have to be used during the crucial days after September 6th for guarding the lines of communication. This is why the armistice became a matter of first-rate strategic importance. Its announcement was timed for 6:30 p.m. on the evening before the Salerno landing. This was to be the signal for an American paratroop division to take off from Sicily for airfields near Rome, where they would be met by Italian transport and employed, with four Italian divisions, to split the German Army in half. At 6 o'clock on the next morning, the disembarkations on the beaches would begin.

Our special problem was how to "authenticate" the armistice announcement. If it were simply put out over the Algiers Radio and picked up by London and Washington, it might be considered a fake, in which case the Italian Army would immediately be available to throw us off the beaches at Salerno. What was required, to convince both the Italians and the Germans that Italy had really changed sides, was a speech delivered by Badoglio over the Rome Radio. Such a speech might, for a few days at least, produce the confusion necessary to secure a firm lodgment.

It was on this basis that the final arrangements were made with the Italian General Castellano in a secret conference in a Sicilian olive yard. We took the precaution of requesting that the text of Badoglio's speech should be sent to us in good time; but otherwise we relied completely on the Italians to carry out their side of the bargain.

The morning of the 6th in Algiers was, as usual, clammy with a cloudy heat. Owing to the need for secrecy, no advance texts of the armistice announcements could be sent to London and Washington. They would have to take their cue from Algiers, where our Anglo-American propaganda team would have its first real test. Apart from General McClure, only two

of us, C. D. Jackson and I, with our two secretaries, were in on the secret. The rest of the staff were to be briefed at 5:15 p.m. At midday, the General sent for Jackson and me and informed us that a message had been received from Rome: Everything was off; the airborne division could not land; Badoglio could not broadcast. The Chief of Staff wanted to know immediately our recommendations for action.

We had only a few minutes to prepare our minds for the conference. General Eisenhower was at Tunis; communications with London and Washington took so long that it was impossible to obtain advice from there. The decision had to be made in Algiers by those who happened to be there.

One of the soldiers began by asking whether Badoglio's voice could be simulated. The reply was, "Probably yes. It would be most unlikely, since reception was so bad, that anyone would notice, except, of course, Badoglio himself." Then the advice of the psychological warfare staff was asked. One of us said, "What we have to do is to put ourselves in Badoglio's skin and forget that he's a 'yellow Iti.' If we fake his broadcast, he will have precisely the justification for cowardice which he wants. We must treat him as a gentleman and shame him into changing his mind." "What do you mean?" asked the General. "We must go on the air at 6:30 and give just sufficient details about the negotiations to implicate him and his staff. Then we must say that it had been foreseen that the Germans might prevent him from putting out an announcement from Rome, and that it had therefore been agreed between the Italians and ourselves that, if this occurred, Badoglio's message should be read aloud over the Algiers Radio. That is our only chance of persuading him to broadcast it." One of the soldiers observed that there would be no harm in letting the propagandists have a try, and the conference broke up.

For the next three hours we frantically redrafted the announcements. We knew that we were bluffing, since the Italians had actually called the whole armistice off. At 6:30 we went on the air, first with Eisenhower's message, then with our lengthy explanation of the circumstances of the negotiations, and then with Badoglio's message, read by an announcer. An hour later, while we were sitting at dinner, a monitor came in and stated that Badoglio was on the air, reading his message over the Rome Radio. So we had shamed him into it, after all.

These two stories, in their different ways, illustrate the basic principles of psychological warfare, as it was practiced by the Anglo-American armies throughout the Normandy campaign: (a) Honesty is overwhelmingly the best policy; and (b) if you want to achieve results, you must get inside the other fellow's skin, feel his feelings and think his thoughts. In so far as our psychological warfare was successful, this was because it successfully combined these two basic principles. When it failed, it was because we disregarded them and tried short-cuts.

2. *Did "unconditional surrender" prevent an effective psychological warfare?*

A people subjected exclusively to one totalitarian propaganda machine is mentally numb, whereas, when two propaganda machines are fighting it out, the controversy between them automatically releases at least a minority from the enslavement of the mind. Just as controversy is the lifeblood of democracy, so it is the poison of dictatorship, and it was the controversy between the Goebbels and the Anglo-American propaganda machines which kept occupied Europe intellectually alive from 1940 to 1944. We had won half our propaganda battle long before D-Day in Normandy, by the simple fact that we had compelled Goebbels to conduct a day-and-night battle with us in the hearing of his slaves. Having broken his monopoly, the next task was to win the confidence of Europe.

Between 1940 and 1942, we had tried every device of Nazi and Communist propaganda and a good many others which the totalitarians had never thought of; but we returned, in the end, to the conclusion that, even by the strictest standards of military expediency, the most effective weapons for demoralizing a totalitarian enemy are truthfulness and integrity. If, in a leaflet or a broadcast, the propagandist deliberately deceives a soldier, it will be discovered sooner or later, and then that soldier will not trust the armies enough to surrender when the moment comes. If a civilian in enemy country catches the BBC suppressing the truth over the air, he will have that much less confidence in the Military Government officials when they arrive. Terror propaganda may have its short-term uses in achieving tactical success against half-demoralized peoples, like the French in 1940 or the Italians in 1942, but the long-term

problems which tactical terror propaganda presents to the occupying forces easily outweigh its short-term advantages; and, in the case at least of British and Germans, even the short-term terror propaganda—and for that matter terror bombing—did not produce collapse, but actually stiffened resistance. Whether by intent or no, the propagandist builds up a picture of the nation or group of nations for whom he speaks. He creates behind the enemy lines either good will or bad will for the fighting soldiers who will ultimately decide the issue.

The austere objectivity of our psychological warfare not only was due to considerations of military expediency—it was also a direct consequence of Allied policy to Germany. In the first world war, propaganda had been constructive; its purpose had been the overthrow of the Kaiser's regime by a democratic revolution. In the second world war, psychological warfare had no such positive program. There were no Fourteen Points, and no promises, explicit or implicit, of any benefits which the Germans would enjoy if they transformed their country into a democracy. The policy of "unconditional surrender" ruled out any attempt to divide the enemy and to rally "good Germans" against the regime. No overt encouragement could be given to opposition groups. The German Officers' Corps, for instance, from which was drawn the nucleus of the conspiracy of July 20th, was explicitly named as jointly responsible for Hitlerism and, despite constant and urgent requests from the conspirators, this identification of Nazism and militarism was never modified.

On two occasions—the first in April, and the second in August, 1944—General Eisenhower, on the advice both of his psychological warfare and political staffs, sought to persuade the President and the Prime Minister to modify the harshness of "unconditional surrender." On the first occasion, a few weeks before D-Day, the case was set out at length in a staff study. This argued that German resistance in Normandy could be considerably weakened if, at an early date, the Supreme Commander were permitted, speaking as soldier to soldier, to inform the German armies of the steps which commanding officers could and should take to avoid a continuance of the useless slaughter. It was assumed that, on the high political level, "unconditional surrender" would remain the Allied policy; but it was urged that, since no surrender could actually take place unconditionally, common sense demanded the military defini-

tion of the terms of surrender. The Secretary of State, Mr. Stettinius, was in London at the time, and agreed to put the SHAEF point of view to the President. On April 17th, the reply was received that the President wished that the subject should be given no further consideration without his approval. A second attempt was made toward the end of August, but once again it was vetoed by the President.

How strictly the policy of "unconditional surrender" was enforced in Psychological Warfare is illustrated by an incident which occurred in October 1944. At that time an offensive against the Saar was being planned, and SHAEF regarded it as vitally necessary to persuade the miners to remain at work after the withdrawal of the German armies. PWD was called in to assist and, after discussion with those responsible for Military Government, we drafted an official announcement that all those miners who "stayed put" would continue to receive existing rates of pay and be permitted to organize Trade Unions. This announcement contained nothing more than the Military Government regulations which would be enforced immediately after the area was occupied. State Department and Foreign Office representatives, however, were so nervous about violating "unconditional surrender" that they raised the objection that this draft announcement contained a promise to a section of the German people and so transgressed the bounds of high policy. When the issue could not be settled inside SHAEF, it was referred to Washington. The objection was sustained by Washington and the matter dropped.

Whether "unconditional surrender" was or was not a wise policy is a question which falls outside my theme. The job of psychological warfare is not to make policy, but to work within its limitations. Surprisingly enough, we found more room for maneuver than might have been expected. The Germans had been deeply impregnated with skepticism about Anglo-Saxon promises, and Goebbels almost daily reminded them of the turpitude of the failure to fulfill the pledges implicit in President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Long before the Normandy campaign, we had discovered, while trying to "sell" the Atlantic Charter, how effective this German counterpropaganda had been. It is by no means certain, therefore, that our appeal to the German people would have been greatly strengthened if

we had been able to make use of precise promises about the treatment to be accorded to Germany if Nazism were overthrown. On the other hand, the refusal to permit the Supreme Commander to state the terms and methods of military surrender certainly decreased the readiness of German commanders in the field to surrender, and so quite needlessly prolonged the war.

Because Psychological Warfare could promise nothing, it was compelled to rely exclusively on two themes: (a) the inevitability of Allied victory, and (b) the integrity and decency of the democratic world, in contrast with the corruption and untrustworthiness of the Nazi leaders. The Germans were presented with the alternatives of unconditional surrender to Anglo-Saxon mercy and justice, or continued resistance. Partly because no promises were made, this contrast gained in persuasiveness, once it became clear that a German victory was impossible. A Germany impregnated with Nazism, paradoxically enough, was more inclined to trust an enemy who promised nothing, and told the stark truth with a soldierly objectivity, than "a Greek bearing gifts." To this extent, the limitations imposed by high policy became a positive advantage.

But when we entered Germany, we found that, though Psychological Warfare had scrupulously fulfilled its policy directive, it had nevertheless committed the Allies in one important respect. By telling the objective truth, and building an impression in the German mind of Anglo-Saxon honesty and integrity, it had brought the enemy to expect a standard of behavior on the part of troops and officials which in practice it was very difficult to maintain. Millions of Germans had learnt to know intimately the personalities who had spoken to them day by day over the radio, and the isolation of black listening had made the contact between the remote radio voice and the German audience extremely intimate. The promise of fair treatment and democratic decency had been implicit in all our propaganda output, though on no occasion had any explicit promise been made; and the contrast between the unseen personalities of the BBC and the real behavior of the occupying forces made many friendly Germans believe that a pledge had been actually broken. This belief would have been far *more* widespread and justifiable if "unconditional surrender" had been modified.

3. *Democratic and Nazi Propaganda Techniques*

It is often naively assumed that, whereas Goebbels lied, we spoke the truth, and that this constituted a real difference in technique. Such an assumption is an oversimplification. It is, of course, of vital importance to a propagandist that he expose the enemy as a liar, so as to reduce confidence in his word. By selecting and repeating *ad nauseam* German boasts which had not come true, and German promises which had not been fulfilled, we succeeded in achieving this object. Throughout the campaign, a very large part of our radio and leaflet output was devoted to discrediting the Nazi leadership by making it clear that the leaders were propagandists, whereas we were just telling the truth as we saw it. We were greatly assisted in this by Goebbels' assumption of the title of Minister of Propaganda as far back as 1933, and by his ingenuous taste for displaying his talents in public. The propagandist who asserts that he "can play on the public mind as on a piano" is a conceited amateur. If he *can* do so, it is his prime object to conceal his skill from the public and to appear always as a simple man, telling the simple truth.

It is not my impression that German propaganda was guilty of many deliberate lies. In wartime, mistakes about matters of fact are inevitable in any news service, and the enemy always exposes them as lies. During 1940 and 1941, R.A.F. communiques about bomb damage in Germany were often fantastically inaccurate, claiming, for instance, that a town had been heavily damaged, when the bombs had fallen many miles away. I have no doubt that the German propagandists were sincere enough in accusing us of lying when we published those communiques. But, in reality, we just didn't know the truth. In the same way, most of the German lies, which we successfully "nailed," were probably sheer mistakes, just as most of the German promises which, as we daily reminded the listeners, had failed to come true, were due to the ineptness of politicians. Goering was not knavish but foolish when he once stated in a speech that not a bomb would fall on the Ruhr, and so was Hitler, in October, 1941, when he announced the final collapse of the Bolshevists. But they provided us with the material we required for proving that the Nazis lied; and we used these broken promises, year in, year out, till every German knew them by heart. There is every

likelihood that Goebbels, the arch propagandist, was furious when such statements were made. He was far too able a man to make silly propaganda "commitments" or to perpetuate small lies deliberately. He understood that, if you want to put over a big lie, the way to do it is to be as scrupulously accurate as possible about the small facts.

Where the Germans differed from us was not in their means, but in their ends. The Nazis really believed that the Germans were a *Herrenvolk,* with the right to dominate the world; that democracy was an expression of decaying capitalism, and civil liberty a relic of a decadent bourgeois civilization; that the Soviet Union was simply a Mongolian despotism, and Communism a disease; that the Slavs were natural slaves and the Jews vermin, fit only for extirpation. The real lie of which Goebbels was guilty was the attempt to conceal from the rest of Europe the implications of the *Herrenvolk* idea. This led him into a maze of contradictions in his psychological warfare. Though he believed, for instance, that the French were decadent, he had to pretend, for a time, that France was a center of civilization. To a lesser extent, we suffered a similar embarrassment. The directive that we should treat Communists as fellow democrats laid us open to a line of attack which Goebbels was able to exploit to the full, particularly in relation to such countries as Yugoslavia and Poland.

Indeed, one of the most remarkable features of wartime propaganda was the inability displayed, both on our side and on the enemy's, to cover up deeply felt convictions for reasons of tactical expediency. Truth will out. The Nazi who desired to appear respectable, merely disclosed a hypocritical shiftiness. The democrat, by the very vociferousness of his pro-Russian sentiments, revealed the inner conflict between East and West. In so far as propaganda was used in an attempt to conceal real intentions, it usually exposed them. Cleverness defeated itself. We were fortunate because we began our psychological warfare in 1940, when we had nothing to lose by telling the truth and revealing our innermost convictions. Goebbels became a first-rate propagandist only in the last twelve months of the war. When Germany was faced with destruction, he advocated "blood, tears, and sweat," underlining the bad news in red ink and rallying his supporters with a fanatical self-revelation. But by then it was too late.

Once the distinction between means and ends is clear, the fact that the techniques of psychological warfare did not vary from country to country appears almost self-evident. In this respect, psychological warfare does not differ from other forms of warfare. The use of verbal missiles, just as much as artillery or aircraft, is governed by general rules which apply to all participants in total war, irrespective of the ultimate political object for which they are employed.

4. *Truth and Credibility*

Psychological warfare is only one part of propaganda. It is not concerned with home morale, or with public relations with friendly countries, but exclusively with enemy and enemy-occupied countries. It is therefore intrinsically aggressive in character, and can be fully effective only when combined with a military offensive. From 1940 until the landings in Sicily, we had tried to use it defensively. During this period it had a negligible effect in Germany, and was valuable only in keeping alive resistance groups in occupied Europe. But even here it would have been quite ineffective without an assurance that sooner or later the Army of Liberation was coming; and premature "successes" like the "Colonel Britton" campaign were highly embarrassing to the Chiefs of Staff, because they raised hopes of an early landing in France, which could not possibly be fulfilled.

The real justification for psychological warfare in this period was that the staffs engaged were learning both the techniques and the nature of the organization required. By the time of the Normandy landings, we had made most of the mistakes it was possible to make; and, largely as the result of our experiences in North Africa, we had constructed a machine expressly designed to make mistakes unlikely. In the second place, we had, during this period, established a reputation for objectivity and integrity by a calculated policy of admitting defeats—if possible before the Germans announced them—and we had learned to tone down or even suppress news, even if we believed it to be true, which would sound incredible to people living under Nazi rule.

This latter point is of considerable importance. Propaganda,

to be effective, must be not only factually true, but credible. In enemy-occupied territory we had two audiences, motivated by precisely opposite emotions—our friends, whose hopes made them intensely credulous of good news; and our enemies, ready to dismiss as *"Feindpropaganda"* even the most sober statement of an Allied success. Whether on the radio or in leaflet form, the same news had to be selected and presented so as to appear objective to both these audiences, the credulous friend and the skeptical enemy. This demanded a tremendous effort of *empathy,* not merely feeling *with* the listener, but feeling *into* his emotions, so as to avoid statements and forms of presentations which would create hostility and suspicion.

There is no doubt that in this respect Anglo-American propaganda outclassed all its rivals. The totalitarian State, by its very nature, is unable to understand its opponents. It believes them to be the caricature which they appear in its propaganda. In a democracy, so long as objectivity is not regarded as subversive, the enemy can be understood as he really is. A very large section of our Psychological Warfare staff was devoted to "consumer research," a scrupulously scientific attempt to "get inside the enemy's skin" or, alternatively, to get inside the skin of a friend living under conditions remote from our own. Our propaganda staffs, by their training, became far more objective in their estimate of enemy morale than the politicians and civil servants who laid down policy; and one important by-product of Psychological Warfare, both in the State Department and in the Foreign Office, was the supply of "psychological warfare intelligence," which attempted to correct the "propaganda picture" of the enemy current in London and Washington.

This stress on *empathy* meant that output became more and more specialized in the various language sections. A Churchill speech or a Roosevelt fireside chat would be cut and arranged quite differently for a German, French, or Norwegian audience, because it was felt that the truth would not seem truthful to different audiences unless it were presented to each in the way best calculated to make its message intelligible.

It very soon became apparent that this specializing of appeal had its dangers. It is a short step from *empathy* to appeasement, from persuasive presentation to unconscious misrepresentation. This could be avoided only by a constant and most fruitful con-

flict between the various sections of the psychological warfare machine, stretching all the way from Washington and London to the combat loudspeakers in the front line. The executants, who were charged with actually putting the propaganda out, were concerned with achieving results within their narrow field, to produce, for instance, in this particular German division in the Ardennes, a state of mind conducive to surrender. The policymakers, far away in the rear, were struggling to preserve at all costs conformity with high policy and a minimum uniformity of outlook. It was one of the accidental advantages of our complex and unwieldy psychological warfare machine that in this controversy no one had the final word. The BBC, for instance, always remained independent of the PID of the Foreign Office. OSS was at loggerheads with OWI. The SHAEF staff, who ran Radio Luxembourg in almost open rivalry with the BBC, exploited to the full the delicate balance of power between 12th Army Group, in whose area they operated, SHAEF in Paris, and the far away policymakers of Washington and London. The leaflet teams, forward with the combat troops, were each responsible to an Army Hq, itself responsible to an Army Group, which in turn was bound by a SHAEF directive derived from an OWI-PID overall directive, ground out at the highest policy level and in the most generalized terms. At each level, a considerable degree of independence was retained, which permitted friction, harassing at the time, but fruitful in its effect on the output. Our propaganda was constantly in danger of disintegrating into a chaos of conflicting specialized appeals for special purposes—sometimes, indeed, it did so—but this danger was far preferable to the dreary uniformity and lifelessness which the Russians so successfully imposed on their propaganda machine. Theoretically, this lack of system and individualism was utterly intolerable; apart from its other defects, it caused a most wasteful overstaffing at all levels. But the product, in the peculiar conditions of Anglo-American teamwork, was remarkably successful. Our psychological warfare was credible because it was *not* uniform. If the State Department and the Foreign Office had had their way, they would have caused us to be dismissed, by friend and foe alike, as blatant propagandists, and so destroyed our reputation for truthfulness and objectivity.

5. *Propaganda "directives" and "timing"*

The problem was how to combine extreme diversity in the methods of expression with adherence to an overall line which faithfully expressed Allied policy. We soon found that this could not be achieved by the mere issuing of directives. A propaganda directive is either so general as to be valueless, or so detailed that it is invalidated by events before it has been distributed. Directives were, of course, issued regularly. But, from the point of view of the active executant, their chief function was to provide a cover from interference by the policymakers. The higher the official, the more he likes a directive, and the less he peers below it to study the actual output. But every now and then there is a complaint. The high official demands to see the full text—in an English translation!—of the offending leaflet or broadcast. It is then that the directive becomes invaluable. If skilfully drafted, it provides a justification for the man on the job, which prevents interference by the policymakers, whose excessive caution on some occasions and wild stunting on others are inevitably a menace to serious and continuous work.

The speeches of Roosevelt and Churchill were by far the best directives we got. To a very great extent our work consisted of the selection and repetition of passages from their speeches, and of weaving variations on the themes which these two voices introduced from time to time. A speech, however important, is soon forgotten unless its central theme and its key sentences are endlessly repeated in every medium of propaganda.

But obviously we could not rely on the Prime Minister or the President to make a statement on each of the multitude of secondary problems which arose in the course of the campaign in the West. To deal with them, we invented "The Voice of SHAEF." The "Colonel Britton" campaign in 1941 had been an early experiment in this medium of propaganda. But Colonel Britton's messages to the resistance movement in Europe had been "pure propaganda." They were not geared to any strategic plan. "The Voice of SHAEF," on the other hand, was a deliberate and most carefully prepared projection of General Eisenhower's strategy. Before D-Day, a whole series of "Instructions to Resistance Movements" was issued by radio and leaflet. Despite their name and appearance, they were not designed as orders to the active leaders of resistance—such orders were, of course, trans-

mitted by other means. The purpose of these "instructions" was to indoctrinate the populations of enemy-occupied countries, who were *not* under the discipline of the resistance movements, and in particular to restrain them from unorganized sabotage, which might disastrously obstruct military operations. "The Voice of SHAEF" was sometimes misleadingly described as "operational propaganda." As a matter of fact, operational instructions were never given over the radio or in leaflets, except in code. The purpose of "The Voice of SHAEF" was entirely psychological—to create the state of mind among civilians in occupied countries required for the various stages of the campaign.

When the invasion of Germany began, "The Voice of SHAEF" was directed more and more to the Germans. A series of instructions was issued to German civilians, to German soldiers, and to displaced persons. The aim was twofold: (1) if possible, to ensure that the instructions were carried out, at least by a minority of those who received them; (2) to create among the less friendly elements of the population the impression that such instructions were being carried out by others, and so to demoralize them.

In developing this strategic propaganda, we discovered the importance of accurate timing. A propaganda stunt, however brilliant, can have a disastrous effect if it is launched prematurely. In this work, the "psychological moment" was not a trite phrase but a precise description of what we had to aim at. One ineffective or badly timed piece of propaganda cancels out the effect of months of patient, successful work. It was soon discovered that correct timing demands advance knowledge by the psychological warfare staff of the full details of military operations, and the closest liaison with all the various Staff sections involved. This is one reason why, during the campaign in the West, the day-to-day direction of Psychological Warfare gradually shifted from London and Washington to SHAEF, which became the central point from which military requirements were transmitted upward to London and Washington, and policy requirements were transmitted downward to the Army Groups and Armies.

Two examples of successful timing will illustrate the methods developed in the campaign in the West. A few hours after the German offensive in the Ardennes began, the first confer-

ences took place to prepare the leaflets which would accompany the Allied counteroffensive. A series of four leaflets was composed and twenty million copies printed while the Germans were still advancing, each leaflet to be dropped at a set phase of our counteroffensive. This work was done by the SHAEF staff, working in the closest collaboration with both 12th and 21st Army Groups. To prepare such a series of leaflets was possible only owing to the very precise advance knowledge provided to the SHAEF staff. This could not possibly have been disclosed to those directing policy in London or Washington.

Another interesting example of advanced planning was the SHAEF instruction "To German Units out of Contact with a Higher Command." This "Voice of SHAEF," ultimately used in radio and leaflet form, bluntly ordered German units, which could no longer obtain orders from their own side, to maintain their cohesion, and told them how to make an organized unit surrender. It was drafted, along with other instructions, during the stalemate winter of 1944, and millions of copies were printed and distributed to all our Psychological Warfare units. Then we waited for the psychological moment. Used too early —that is, before the demoralization of the German Army had reached a point where such an instruction would no longer seem to be a bluff—the effect would have been disastrous. On the other hand, if we had waited until the demoralization was complete, the propaganda would have been nugatory. By keeping a curve of the morale of freshly taken prisoners on various sections of the front, it was possible to avoid these two mistakes of "too soon" and "too late." The instruction was used with success some weeks before the German surrender.

The one propaganda weapon which needed no timing was the *Passierschein* (see Appendix D), a leaflet promising safety to any German who showed it to an Allied soldier. Very early in the war, crude "safe-conduct passes" were used by both sides. By 1944, the *Passierschein* had become almost a work of art. A great deal of detailed market research was done to perfect it. It was found that a particular shade of green was the most persuasive color (possibly because a green *Passierschein* had the authenticity of a "greenback"); that the text should not be printed only in German, but in parallel German, English, and French columns; and, most important of all, that it must have the signature of the Supreme Commander. The test of its effi-

cacy was not how many Germans actually waved a *Passierschein* when they surrendered, but how many kept a *Passierschein* because it might come in useful. The mere fact that a German soldier hid a *Passierschein* in his pocket was a tiny but important psychological concession to Allied victory.

6. *Media*

Radio is infinitely the most effective form of strategic propaganda, if we use "strategic" in the same sense as in the phrase "strategic bombing." Its peculiar power is its intimacy. By making "black listening" a crime, the Germans had already given to us an enormous advantage. Any German, Nazi or anti-Nazi, with a natural curiosity to hear both sides, was branded as a criminal, and so forced into a form of private conspiracy with the enemy. Soon a sense of dependence on the Anglo-American radio was created, not only in the occupied countries but in Germany itself; and this often grew into a devotion to the BBC and the personalities who spoke on it, all the stronger for its forbidden intimacy. Through this medium, once securely established, it was possible to impose the Allied will on the enemy mind. Even though only a small minority might have listened regularly, that minority, feeling itself "in the know," spread the news to all the rest.

The leaflet had a far more restricted use. Even after the invention of the leaflet bomb and the formation of special leaflet squadrons, it remained a relatively ineffective instrument of strategic propaganda. Its proper use was for soldiers with no access to radio and often starved of reading matter, in the front line. We found that the "Leaflet Fortresses" based on Britain could efficiently reinforce the forward teams in precision work on small sectors of the front. Printing facilities back in Britain were far better, and greater quantities could be dropped by the Fortress squadrons. The earlier division between strategic and tactical leaflet-bombing therefore tended to disappear. Once we had developed an organization through which the requirements of an Army could be passed via SHAEF to PID-OWI units in London, efficient staff work made it possible to lay on a tactical leaflet raid at forty-eight hours' notice on a single German division by the British-based Fortresses. So too, the daily leaflet newspaper for the German troops could be specially slanted to

suit the requirements of one sector of the front and dropped exclusively upon it. Such refinements of tactical propaganda are obviously impossible on the radio, which is heard by everyone.

Whether in a leaflet or on the radio, we found that *news should always take priority over views.* The more hostile the audience, the more rigorously must this Golden Rule of psychological warfare be enforced. A very friendly listener in an enemy-occupied country may tolerate a certain amount of the direct exhortation which most politicians assume to be the natural form of propaganda, but "uplift" soon palls, especially under the nervous conditions of "black listening." As Camus has reminded us, in his brilliant study of the psychology of an occupied country, *The Plague,* it is almost impossible for a writer or broadcaster to "tune in" to the mood of the "black listener." A direct emotional appeal may offend even the staunchest ally, while an enemy audience reacts against it as obvious propaganda.

By the end of the war, even the Russians had begun to realize that impersonal and unemotional news must be the main vehicle of psychological warfare, and that news selection is the discipline in which the propagandist must be trained, including the "layout" of a leaflet and the ordering of the items in a newscast.

In this respect, the technique of propaganda is the same as that of popular journalism, with the difference that the public addressed is considerably more skeptical and critical in its attitude. Paradoxically, the propagandist must achieve a considerably higher standard of objectivity and conform more strictly to the canons of "straight news" than the journalist in a democracy. There is little doubt, for instance, that throughout the war our German newscasts were more objective and sober in their treatment of news than any British or American newspaper. They had to be, since the listener was comparing them day by day with the German version, eager to catch us in attempts to deceive him.

Emotional appeals, therefore, and exhortations had to be introduced indirectly by apparently accidental juxtaposition of contrasting news items, and by the systematic *weighting* of newscasts and news sheets with items illustrating certain themes. "News creation" was an important part of our task. This did

not, of course, involve the invention of news items, but the collection of facts to sustain certain themes and the rewriting of them so that they sounded or read like "hot news." The art of the news editor was to build his bulletin or lay out his news sheet so that these "propaganda nuggets" merged into the neutral items. Day by day he had to judge his public, and in particular its ability to digest propaganda without ill effects. The more hostile the audience, the smaller the dose and the more carefully he had to administer it. His art was to conceal the fact that any artifice had been employed.

Once "objectivity" has been established by the predominance of "straight" news, a certain amount of "views" can be added. Here we found that comment and exhortation became more palatable, the more personally they were presented. The BBC built up a carefully balanced team of named "personality" speakers in all its language services. In the German service, to avoid the hostility attaching to emigrés, they all had strong British or American accents, and gave individual comments on the news from varying political standpoints. Naturally, disagreements were calculated, not accidental. The inhabitant of a totalitarian state craves for individualism as well as objectivity, and this craving was met to some extent by the "personality" commentator.

Our most difficult task was to insure that the BBC as such, or the leaflet newspaper as a newspaper, did not appear to be addressing or cajoling its public. Even the speeches of Roosevelt and Churchill and the "Voice of SHAEF" were presented as impersonally as possible, as "news of views," rather than as direct appeals to the listener. In this way he was given the feeling that he was being allowed to make up his own mind and feel his own emotions.

Another cover for propaganda is, of course, entertainment. But here the dangers of "black listening" and "black reading" must be borne in mind. The public in a totalitarian country listens through heavy jamming and with a constant sense of insecurity. This is strong even in the case of reading a leaflet. Any waste of words is infuriating, therefore, to anyone living in such conditions. But, with this proviso, entertainment is a valuable narcotic for dulling the sensibilities of a propaganda-conscious mind. A subversive thought can be instilled even into a Nazi mind, under the cover of laughter; and a news sheet

which features the legs of a film star will be kept even by an SS man; sooner or later he may read some of the letterpress.

We found also, particularly in the case of soldiers on the Atlantic Wall, that radio programs chiefly devoted to light music were not switched off when the bulletin began, so long as the first items did not sound like enemy propaganda. Even if the soldier tried not to listen, he often took in some of the information and retailed it next day, without remembering the source.

But such tricks were merely the embellishments of our craft; and there was always the danger that the craftsman's delight in virtuosity would divert him from his main function—to "exdoctrinate" the peoples of the enemy and enemy-occupied countries. That purpose was achieved by the provision, day in, day out, of a news and information service so authoritative and candid that the listener or reader learned to rely on it and pass it on to his friends. By so doing, he committed an act of spiritual desertion, or confirmed his earlier apostasy from Totalitarianism. And that was the one enduring aim of Allied Psychological Warfare.

7. *Conclusions*

(1) The secret of success in propaganda against a totalitarian State is to achieve objectivity, in two senses of that word. In the first place, the output must appear objective, not to someone sitting in London and Washington, but to someone reading it or hearing it inside the enemy state. This demands the second sort of objectivity, the understanding of the ever-changing emotions of the audience to be addressed. Such an understanding is impossible without a large and well organized research staff, trained to think and feel itself into the enemy, or enemy-occupied, mind. The combination of integrity (that is, faithfully stating the Allied case) with empathy (that is, stating it in terms the audience can understand) is an ideal which must constantly be aimed at, but with the knowledge that perfection is impossible.

(2) Psychological warfare is an aggressive weapon, which can achieve positive results only when combined with a military or diplomatic offensive. The one fatal mistake is to attempt to use it as a substitute for military or diplomatic success, or in

order to cover up military or diplomatic embarrassment. When used defensively in this way, it destroys good will and advertises weakness and divisions.

In a defensive period, therefore, or in a period of stalemate, psychological warfare must be strictly limited to the objective of building up good will by the truthful reporting even of embarrassing events and defeats. If such misfortunes are reported objectively—preferably before the enemy reports them—a rich fruit will be reaped later on. If they are concealed in a period of adversity, then the offensive use of psychological warfare in a later period of victory will be undermined.

(3) Psychological warfare must never be directed in a way to satisfy the home public. If it is to be effective inside enemy territory, its tone and manner of presentation will constantly appear "soft" or "appeasing" to a home public, which has a "propaganda picture" of the enemy very far from reality. It may not be wise to do as the British Government did during the war and treat leaflets distributed in enemy territory as secret documents. But the purpose behind this decision was sound enough —to insure that an ill-informed public opinion shall not maul and mutilate the weapon of psychological warfare. This is the most powerful reason for making the department which supervises psychological warfare a secret department, whose output is not subject to detailed scrutiny by elected representatives.

In the second world war, British psychological warfare was organized as an auxiliary division of the Foreign Office and as a secret department. In America, it was divided, very unfortunately, between two independent and rival agencies. All experience suggests that it would best be placed under the Chiefs of Staff or the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with, of course, the closest liaison with the Foreign Office and the State Department. In view of the fact that psychological warriors, by their very nature, tend to be prima donnas, they can be more easily disciplined if they are put into uniform and a severe military hierarchy is established. Moreover, by and large. whereas trained diplomats have an instinctive aversion to psychological warfare, Service officers find it far easier to treat it objectively as a weapon of war. Lastly, once the campaign begins, the most important psychological warfare activities have to be conducted, or at least directed, from Supreme Headquarters in the various areas of operations.

(4) Psychological warfare can be used fully and effectively only when it has become clear to the enemy that outright victory is impossible. From then on, it will become progressively more important as the weapon for imposing the Allied will on the mind of the enemy and of the peoples in enemy-occupied countries. In the course of a campaign, the main objective will be to insure the strictest coordination between psychological warfare strategy and the strategy of military commanders. To avoid "stunting" and to insure correct timing will be the main tasks of those in command. It is at this stage that the "market research" into the enemy mind, built up in the earlier defensive period, will fully justify itself.

(5) The strict subordination of psychological warfare to high policy is a relatively easy business. To make certain that this conformity does not degenerate into a lifeless uniformity of output is far more difficult. For this purpose, overcentralization should be carefully avoided. An apparently untidy organization —with executive units operating at Army, Army Group and Supreme Headquarters levels, as well as far back in the civilian rear—is preferable to one so tidy that it defeats its object, which is always to guarantee that the enemy feels he is listening, not to propaganda, but to honest men honestly and simply telling him the truth.

APPENDIX A: THE SYKEWAR CHARTER

SHAEF OPERATION MEMORANDUM NO. 8

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

OPERATION MEMORANDUM, NUMBER 8

11 MARCH, 1944

Psychological Warfare

1. OBJECT
The object of this memorandum is to define the responsibilities for the control, coordination, and operation of Psychological Warfare within the Allied Expeditionary Force.

2. DEFINITION
Psychological Warfare is the dissemination of propaganda designed to undermine the enemy's will to resist, demoralize his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters.

3. CLASSES OF PROPAGANDA
1. Propaganda can be broadly divided into three interdependent and closely related classes, as follows:—
a. Strategic Propaganda directed on enemy and enemy-occupied countries. Such propaganda has the double task of undermining the enemy's will to resist and sustaining the morale of our supporters.
b. Combat (or Tactical) Propaganda conducted against the enemy forces in the forward areas and towards the population immediately behind the enemy lines.
c. Consolidation Propaganda conducted towards the civil population in the rear areas, with a view to ensuring friendly cooperation, particularly in restoring essential services, and to creating opinion favourable to the war and post-war aims of the United Nations.

4. STRATEGIC PROPAGANDA
a. Strategic Propaganda is carried out by the U.S. Office of War Information (O.W.I.), the BRITISH Political Warfare Executive (P.W.E.), the BRITISH Ministry of Information (M.O.I.), and the Morale Operation (M.O.) Branch of the U.S. Office of

Strategic Services (O.S.S.). These agencies operate under joint O.W.I.-P.W.E. directives approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and in emergency under temporary directives issued by the LONDON Propaganda Co-ordinating Committee (L.P.C.).

b. The Psychological Warfare Branch of G-6 (P & PW) Division, at Supreme Headquarters, ensures that these directives are in keeping with the plans of the Supreme Commander and co-ordinates the activities of the various agencies insofar as they affect that part of the EUROPEAN sphere for which the Supreme Commander is responsible.

c. Strategic Propaganda activities include:
   (1) Radio broadcasts
   (2) Leaflets
   (3) Agents
   (4) Rumors

5. COMBAT PROPAGANDA

a. Combat propaganda includes the following activities:
   (1) Political Survey (Intelligence) and other methods of collecting Psychological Warfare information
   (2) Mobile broadcasting units
   (3) Monitoring Service
   (4) Mobile public-address system
   (5) Tactical leaflets
   (6) Field Printing

b. Combat Propaganda will be confined within the terms of directives issued by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to Army Groups and, as necessary, to Allied Naval Expeditionary Force and Allied Expeditionary Air Force.

c. In order to execute Psychological Warfare Plans prepared under these directives, Army Groups will raise, administer and operate Psychological Warfare Field Operational Units capable of carrying out the activities listed in pargr. 5a above.

6. CONSOLIDATION PROPAGANDA

a. Consolidation Propaganda will normally be carried out by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. When desirable and practicable, tasks will be decentralized to Army Groups under special directives.

b. Consolidation Propaganda includes the following activities:
   (1) Political Survey (Intelligence) and other methods of collecting Psychological Warfare Intelligence
   (2) Operation or control and servicing of local press
   (3) Operation or control and servicing of broadcasting stations

(4) Operation or control and servicing of cinemas
(5) Distribution of propaganda literature and displays
(6) Liaison on Psychological Warfare matters

7. CONTROL

a. The successful outcome of Psychological Warfare demands centralized control and coordination of propaganda themes and aims. Any departure from this principle can only lead to ineffective or disastrous results.

b. Whenever a specific use of propaganda is desired by a subordinate commander, the Psychological Warfare Branch at the appropriate headquarters will be consulted as to the type or line of propaganda to be used.

c. Any departure required by Commanders-in-Chief (Commanding Generals) Army Groups or subordinate commanders from the terms of directives issued to them will be referred to and receive the prior concurrence of Supreme Headquarters.

d. Army Groups will ensure that all possible assistance is given to the execution of approved Psychological Warfare Plans. Requests for air assistance will be made by Army Groups and Armies to their associated Air Forces. Requests for naval assistance will be made through Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to Allied Naval Expeditionary Force.

OFFICIAL:
H. R. BULL,
Major General G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

By command of General Eisenhower:
W. B. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

APPENDIX B: THE SYKEWAR POLICIES

STANDING DIRECTIVE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

June 1944

SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THIS DIRECTIVE

1. This Standing Directive lays down the general lines to be followed in all forms of white propaganda directed to German armed forces in the West. It is intended as a Standing Directive, valid both before and after D-Day. It will be supplemented from time to time by special directives, as well as by the weekly Central Directive prepared by PWE/OWI in collaboration with PWD/SHAEF. Unless expressly stated, however, these directives should be regarded as supplementary to, and not as cancelling, the present Standing Directive, which has the approval of PWE/OWI.

2. The Moscow Declaration laid down the principle that the individual would be held responsible for his war crimes. This applies equally to the soldier and to the civilian; a uniform neither aggravates nor mitigates the guilt of the individual; thus the Declaration ruled out the suggestion of mass reprisals.

3. But it has also been made clear by our Governments that they are determined to destroy not only the Nazi system, but the concept of the Wehrmacht, which has been both the initiator and the willing instrument of recurring German attempts to dominate other peoples. Nothing in the implementation of this directive must compromise that issue.

4. It is recognized that in the execution of Psychological Warfare it is a fundamental principle not to antagonize the audience. Direct denunciation or direct offence against known susceptibilities will therefore be avoided in all Psychological Warfare against the enemy armed forces. On the other hand, nothing will be done to encourage or condone the concept of German militarism and the attitudes of mind behind it, both of which we are pledged to destroy.

5. Psychological Warfare is not a magic substitute for physical battle, but an auxiliary to it. By attacking the fighting morale of the enemy, it aims at: (a) reducing the cost of the physical battle, and (b) rendering the enemy easier to handle after surrender.

6. The conduct of Psychological Warfare therefore forms part of the conduct of military operations, and must be co-ordinated with that of other arms of war. It is the task of Psychological Warfare to assist the Supreme Commander in fulfilling his mission against the enemy with the most economical use of troops and equipment.

7. The use of Psychological Warfare in military operations must however be strictly subordinated to the long-term policy of our Governments, in the sense that nothing must be done with the object of undermining fighting morale during operations which would prejudice Government policy to Germany after the war. To this end, this Standing Directive for Psychological Warfare during operations is preceded by a summary of standing high-policy directives.

8. These high-policy directives define not the strategy of the campaign which Psychological Warfare will conduct against German fighting morale, but the limits within which it must, for policy reasons, be confined.

STANDING HIGH-POLICY DIRECTIVES

9. No specific promises will be made concerning the treatment of Germany after the war, other than those expressly made by Government spokesmen. In particular there must be no suggestion that the Atlantic Charter applies to Germany by right.

10. On no account must there be any suggestion or implication:—

(a) that we recognize any claim of the German Army to be absolved from its full share of responsibility for German aggression on the grounds that its part is merely professional and nonpolitical and that it does no more than obey orders;

(b) that we recognize the possibility of divorcing the "fighting war" from the atrocities which the German soldier has committed or condoned, e.g., the taking and shooting of hostages and the murder of prisoners;

(c) that we would be prepared to allow German militarism to survive in any form.

11. The following are the points on which our Governments have committed themselves:

(a) Demilitarization of Germany.
(b) Punishment of war criminals.
(c) Liberation of territories overrun by Nazi Germany, including Austria.
(d) Occupation of Germany.
(e) Destruction of Nazism and German Militarism.

(f) Prevention of such economic distress in Germany as will be detrimental to the rest of the world.

(g) Ultimate restoration of Germany to a place "in the world family of democratic nations."

The key quotations on these points are given in Annexe I. Note that (d), (f) and (g) are only general commitments, and may not be elaborated in Psychological Warfare unless and until specific Government statements are forthcoming on these points.

APPRECIATION OF STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF GERMAN FIGHTING MORALE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Note: Except where specifically stated, the following generalizations apply to the Germany Army, not to the Air Force or Navy.

12. *Strong Points*

(I) *The Habit of Discipline.* The habit of uncritical obedience to authority, rather than any ruthless enforcement of discipline from above, remains the strongest factor in German morale today. This factor may not decrease sharply until the German Army as a whole is broken on the battlefield, since the retreats and defensive battles to which the Wehrmacht is now committed automatically place greater reliance on higher authority than offensive campaigns of the 1940 type.

(II) *Comradeship.* The ideal of comradeship has been keenly cultivated in the German Army, particularly since 1933. The German NCO forms a transitional stage between soldier status and officer status, a fact which strengthens this sense of comradeship. It has furthermore been immensely deepened by the Russian campaign.

(III) *Professional Pride.* The average German's conviction that the best life is the soldier's life, plus the social fact that the highest calling in Germany is the soldier's calling, constitutes a great source of strength.

Added to this the German soldier, and often the non-German soldier serving in the Wehrmacht, is convinced:—

(a) that he is privileged to be serving in the finest army in the world, permeated with a code of soldierly honor which rules him and his officers alike;

(b) that the Wehrmacht is the embodiment of the highest physical and spiritual attainments of German culture;
(c) that the Wehrmacht is therefore the *nonpolitical* guardian of the future of the German race;
(d) that, as a fighting machine, German "quality" can *probably* succeed in throwing back both Anglo-American and Russian "quantity."

(IV) *Material Interests.* The German Army represents, for the reasons stated in subparagr. (III) above, an honored career with considerable material benefits. (Pay allowances and especially food are good compared with civilian standards in Germany.) Thousands of officers (especially those of junior and field rank) and tens of thousands of NCO's (particularly in specialist trades) have signed on not simply for the duration, but for periods varying from 7-14 years, or longer, and are fighting not only to preserve the German Army as a war machine, but as a means of livelihood.

(V) *The Bolshevik Bogey.* The guilty fear of Russian vengeance, linked with the Teuton dislike of the Slav and general fear of Bolshevism, has convinced the average German soldier that "anything is better than defeat in the East."

German propaganda has deliberately enlarged and intensified this fear, in the following ways:—

(a) It has largely succeeded in persuading the soldier that the Anglo-Americans are so dominated by the Bolshevik Colossus that they would be powerless to save Germany.
(b) It has filled the gap created by the absence of specific United Nations policy to Germany with atrocity stories of forced labor in Russia, castration, deportation, etc.

(VI) *The Rewards of Victory in the West.* Learning from Mr. Churchill in 1940, the High Command has deliberately capitalized the threat of invasion from the West. It has:—

(a) argued that, if the Anglo-American threat can be frustrated or confined, the German Armies can be switched to the East. This argument has been used to justify the retreats in the East.

(b) argued that a defensive victory in the West will form the basis for the speedy conclusion of a "compromise peace" either with the West or with the East, which would in fact be a German victory.

(c) exploited the bombing of Germany to persuade the soldier that his only hope of regaining what he has lost lies in a German victory in the West.

(d) succeeded in convincing the German soldier that for these reasons one last tremendous effort must and can be made.

(VII) *Summary*

(a) Taken by and large, it must be accepted that the German High Command has rendered the Army largely immune to the two Psychological Warfare campaigns which proved effective in 1918, i.e., Bolshevist propaganda, leading to soldiers' and workers' councils; and democratic propaganda, leading to a revolt of the civilian under arms against the professional soldier.

We should assume that the German Army in the West will, like von Arnim's Army in Tunisia, fight on *as a whole* until it collapses *as a whole*. Indeed defeatism is more widespread at the top than at the bottom.

(b) The High Command has succeeded in actually raising fighting morale during the winter.

(c) For the reason outlined in subparagr. (I) above, no propaganda directed at the frontline German soldier is likely to be effective unless it sounds and looks more positive and authoritative than his own Army Order forbidding him to listen to it.

(d) For the reasons outlined in subparagrs. (II) and (III) above, there is little prospect of dividing the German Army *internally*—i.e., setting men against officers. Furthermore, no propaganda aiming at inducing the surrender of German troops is likely to succeed unless it meets the fundamental objection that by surrender the individual is letting down his comrades.

13. *Weak Points*

(I) *The Shaken Myth of Invincibility.* The long series of defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht in the Mediterranean and in Russia have shaken—but by no means shattered—

the German soldier's faith in the mystic invincibility of German arms which carried his fighting morale up to a high tide of fanaticism in June 1940. Within this general uneasiness are other specific doubts:

(a) *Doubt about the Führer.* Allied propaganda that disasters such as Stalingrad, Tunisia, the Ukraine battle, and the Crimea were largely due to the prestige policy of hanging on too long to too much, has gone home. Many German soldiers today feel that military operations are being dictated by political and often party considerations. The permeation of the OKW, and of the General Staff with party generals (Notably the C. of S. Zeitzler) is largely blamed for this.

Note: At present, the average soldier, despite an awareness that he has made serious mistakes, is not inclined to blame Hitler, as the generals and other informed persons already do. Hitler is still his lucky talisman. Göring is also to some extent shielded. Of the German leaders, Himmler, Goebbels, and Ley are the most unpopular. Generally speaking, "The System" or the "Party bosses" are the commonest scapegoat.

(b) *Doubts about Equipment.* German Army Equipment is good, and the German soldier knows it. But his battle experience since 1941 has given him painful proof that, in some respects at least, Allied equipment is not only more plentiful, but better. (Allied MT in Africa, Russian PAK, Russian medium tanks in the East and Allied fighter planes on all fronts are examples.)

The present *"Wunderwaffe"* vogue is in part a wishful thinking reaction to this.

(c) *Doubts about the News.* Despite intense efforts by the High Command, it has not succeeded in making the German soldier accept unquestioningly its interpretation of events. Most German soldiers, when they get the opportunity, read or listen to Anglo-American propaganda and try to find a truth halfway between their own communiques and ours. They assume that "everything is propaganda" and that they, as intelligent people, can read between the lines. Without knowing it, they are of course steeped in Nazi propaganda. They regard as "propaganda lies" such facts as that Germany invaded Poland, or that England has some highly developed

social services. They have the useful faculty of forgetting any facts inconvenient to their superiors, and believing they were invented by Anglo-American propaganda. Their outlook is formed, however, not by the direct output of the Propaganda Ministry, but by the educational and propaganda activities of the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless they are open to any propaganda which does not sound or read like "propaganda," and does not offend their sense of "soldierly honor." Unconsciously still, but actively, the German soldier craves for an excuse to stop the useless slaughter which leaves his honor as a German soldier unscathed, and puts the blame on someone or something outside the Wehrmacht. He needs, in brief: (I) facts, which seem to him to be objective, showing that, despite the courage of the Wehrmacht, someone at home has lost the war for Germany; (II) a picture of the future which portrays death and destruction for "the betrayers of Germany" and survival for the German people.

Evidence for the above analysis is provided by the growing success of: (a) Free German Committee broadcasts from Moscow, headed by General Seydlitz, and (b) Radio Calais. Both these transmissions seem to assume an analysis of German fighting morale similar to that above.

(d) *Doubts about the Luftwaffe.* Moreover, the *Air War* brings with it a cause of friction between the Air Force and the Army. German soldiers are beginning to talk like many British soldiers in 1940. This friction, and the resulting blame on "the authorities" is a real if minor chink in German fighting morale.

All these factors are important, in that they provide the soldier with scapegoats for his decline in fortune, and when things go wrong the German's natural reaction is: "I have been betrayed."

(II) *Manpower.* This is perhaps the main *operational* worry of the German soldier. He is disturbed by the enormous losses in men and material which he knows the battles in Russia have cost the Wehrmacht. This uneasiness is heightened by the Allied propaganda barrage on this theme, contrasted with the silence of his own authorities, a silence all the more significant when it

persists even under the new OKW policy of simulating complete frankness on operational matters. This general manpower worry breaks down into other specific ones:

(a) The worry that, because of manpower troubles, the ranks of the Wehrmacht are being increasingly filled with foreigners of some twenty nationalities, and that the quality of the army is therefore in danger of "pollution."

(b) The worry that, with almost every one of its field divisions committed already to actual or potential battle-fields, the German Army has no effective central reserve to sustain it.

Both (a) and (b) above apply with particular force to the target of this paper—the German forces in the West. These troops have in their own formations large numbers of foreigners; and most of these divisions have had proof, by their own experience of being switched from West to East and back, that no uncommitted central reserve exists. The great volume of German counter-propaganda on this point is further evidence of its importance.

(III) *A War Gone Wrong.* In building up the picture of the chivalrous Wehrmacht in deadly battle against Bolshevism, the High Command inevitably raises in the German soldier's mind the question why Germany is fighting Britain and America, especially since Hitler denounced in *Mein Kampf* the fatal mistake of the two-front war. The High Command seeks to answer this question by denouncing Anglo-American impotence and arguing that the Jews of Wall Street and the City of London are in conspiracy with the Kremlin. But this argument does not quell a deep uneasiness.

There is also a feeling in the German soldier's mind that the defensive battles which he is now forced to fight are not the battles for which he was trained, nor the battles for which his equipment was designed. There is evidence that the OKW had great trouble, during 1943, in converting officers and men to the technique of the defensive battle which their previous training had largely neglected.

The fear of isolation, a feature of what the Germans used to ridicule as "Maginot-mindedness," is likely to be at its strongest among coastal formations in the

West. They are particularly liable to the anxiety lest they be sacrificed as "human landmines."

(IV) *Loss of Honor.* An increasing number of soldiers are aware of, and uncomfortable about:—

(a) atrocities, especially in Russia. They naturally want to push the blame onto the SS., or simply "those in authority."

(b) the hostility of the occupied territories, including "Nordic" countries like Norway. The German wants to be liked, and the German soldier is puzzled why, despite the correctness of the Wehrmacht, he is so coldly received. He wants to have an explanation which blames someone outside the Army for this failure of the "New Order."

(V) *Respect for Western Powers.* The German has a sense of inferiority to both Britain and America. Many Nazis, for instance, regard National Socialism as the method of making Germany a ruling race "like the British." The German feelings for Britain are a confused mixture of envy, respect and contempt for the old-fashioned. Their feeling for America is different, since they do not feel toward it a racial unity like Britain or Germany, and are suspicious of its "capitalist imperialism." They profoundly respect its riches, production capacity and "smartness," and regard it as the continent of unlimited possibilities.

Intensive propaganda has failed to modify these traditional feelings. *In particular, nearly all German soldiers are confident that they will be treated well as prisoners of war and hope for (if they do not expect) an Anglo-American occupation if the worst comes to the worst.* Furthermore, they are feverishly anxious for Anglo-American appreciation of "the chivalry" of the Wehrmacht.

(VI) *The Shadow of the Two-Front War.* It is improbable that German fighting morale in the West will be seriously undermined before a successful Anglo-American landing, provided there is no great German disaster in the East. But the moment we can announce a decisive breakthrough will be a moment of profound psychological crisis, greater even than the shock of Mussolini's collapse last year.

Meanwhile, the advance of the Russian troops *into*

Europe must reduce the persuasiveness of the argument that Hitler is deliberately yielding space in the East to ensure victory in the West. Gradually the German soldier begins to ask whether Hitler's strategy is not precisely what United Nations strategy desires, and whether the Second Front is not having its effects even before it starts.

THE STRATEGY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

14. The foregoing analysis suggests that, provided there is no catastrophe in the East, the weak points in German morale, enumerated above, will begin to counteract the strong points only when the Anglo-American forces have demonstrated that they can use their quantitative superiority.

15. It is impossible to predict at what phase of the operations this change in German morale will come. On this point Psychological Warfare will be guided by G-2. Already, however, it is possible to lay down two phases in the psychological warfare campaign:

(a) The phase before and after D-Day, up to change in German morale (referred to as *Phase* A).
(b) The phase after the change (referred to as *Phase* B). The present Directive deals with *Phase* A.

16. In Phase A all psychological warfare against German troops must be regarded as *preparatory*. This must be a period *not of direct assault* or of open appeals for surrender, but of steady repetition of the facts, full recognition of which will bear sudden fruit in Phase B.

Even after D-Day this unemphatic reiteration of facts should be continued until evidence from G-2 indicates that it is time to move into Phase B.

17. During this phase psychological warfare will concentrate on the following tasks:

(I) *Long-term tasks*

(a) Maintenance and increase of belief in the reliability of the Anglo-American word, and in unity between the Russians and ourselves.
(b) Creation of an atmosphere in which the German soldier gradually comes to feel that, since defeat is certain, he has fulfilled his soldierly duty and can now follow the example of the German Army in Tunisia.

(II) *Short-term tasks, pre D-Day*

(a) Stimulation of defeatism through a sense of Anglo-American superiority in men and materials; combating the fear of Bolshevism by a cautious build-up of Anglo-American strength.

(b) Exploitation of German confidence in the good treatment of prisoners of war, so as to decrease German fighting spirit and undermine German fear of defeat. Simultaneously, familiarization of the German soldier with official Allied statements on the place of Germany in post-war Europe.

(c) Exploitation of the Russian offensive as exemplifying the certainty of a German defeat in a two-front war.

(d) Exploitation of the German fear of sabotage and resistance by occupied peoples, including foreign workers.

(e) Exploitation of a sense of isolation through the Allied threat to German communications.

(f) Exploitation of the air offensive to stimulate distrust between the air force and the army and to undermine confidence in the possibility of successful resistance.

(III) *Short-term tasks, post D-Day.* After D-Day the following tasks should be added to those in (II) above:

(a) Stimulation of distrust of foreigners in the German Army by open incitement of these foreigners.

(b) Special attacks on the morale of troops on the flanks of the fighting. Since these troops will not be actually engaged, they will probably form the best target for propaganda. In this campaign, emphasize the failure of the Luftwaffe and the German Navy to prevent the landings.

METHODS TO BE EMPLOYED IN CARRYING OUT THE ABOVE CAMPAIGN

18. *Long-term tasks*

(I) *Maintenance and increase of belief in the reliability of the Anglo-American word and in unity between the Russians and ourselves.*

(a) Throughout this phase all psychological warfare in all media, whether tactical or strategic, will remain

factual and objective, avoiding terms, phrases, or pictures which the German soldier will dismiss as "propaganda." In particular, all boasting and sneering will be scrupulously avoided; there will be no direct appeals to the soldier's self-interest. There will be no attempts at a chummy or intimate style. All psychological warfare will give the impression of Anglo-American reliability, reticence, soldierly dignity and decency.

(b) Use every opportunity to demonstrate practical collaboration between ourselves and the Russians. This is preferable to ideological dissertations on United Nations Unity.

(II) *Creation of an atmosphere in which the German soldier gradually comes to feel that, since defeat is certain, he has fulfilled his soldierly duty and can now follow the example of the German Army in Tunisia.*

Do not assume that the German soldier is yet convinced that defeat is certain. He is keyed up and may maintain a relatively high morale for some time after D-Day.

Concentrate, therefore, on those facts which the German soldier can accept as facts, illustrating the inevitability of ultimate defeat.

Make no open appeals for deserting. Similarly, make no open appeals to fear, e.g., of the air offensive. Treat the German soldier as a man who, if openly incited by the enemy to cowardice, will do the opposite.

Show the increasing isolation of Germany's position in the world and the gradual weakening and disintegration of the satellites, the increasing restrictions being imposed on Germany by the neutrals, and the defeats suffered by her Japanese allies.

19. *Short-term tasks, pre-D-Day*

(I) *Stimulation of defeatism through a sense of Anglo-American superiority in men and materials; combating the fear of Bolshevism by a cautious build-up of Anglo-American strength.*

Do not try to heighten the tension by a deliberate war-of-nerves campaign. The German will see through this and dismiss it as propaganda. But provide all material available, especially technical material, on the leadership, organization, equipment and training of the Anglo-American armies.

Continue to provide facts showing the failure of the U-boats.

Show that the Mediterranean fronts are draining away German reserves needed for the two essential fronts.

(II) *Exploitation of German confidence in the good treatment of prisoners of war so as to decrease German fighting spirit and undermine German fear of defeat. Simultaneously, familiarization of the German soldier with official Allied statements on the place of Germany in post-war Europe.*

Continue and increase the campaign illustrating the treatment of German prisoners of war. But avoid, especially in leaflets, a "display" which looks like commercial publicity. In radio propaganda, increase as far as possible broadcasts about, and by, German prisoners of war.

It is probable that many German soldiers are not familiar with even a few statements available on United Nations intentions with regard to post-war Germany. These statements should now be plugged in leaflets and radio. Equally, the fact should be emphasized that the Nazis are deliberately concealing from the German soldier the real intentions of the United Nations.

(III) *Exploitation of the Russian offensive as exemplifying the certainty of a German defeat in a two-front war.*

Destroy the illusion that the German retreat in the East is deliberately planned, by showing the intimate connection between Russian and Anglo-American strategy. Hitler is no longer the master of his own strategy. It is dictated to him by the two-front strategy of the United Nations.

Treat the Mediterranean as a theater in which we have compelled the Germans to fritter away first-class manpower and reserves vitally needed for the decisive battles on the two major fronts.

(IV) *Exploitation of the German fear of sabotage and resistance by occupied peoples, including foreign workers.*

Never appeal directly to German fear of sabotage and resistance. Confine yourself to plain facts. Do not spoil these facts by headlines such as "Martyrs of Gestapo Terror."

Build up the impression that resistance in occupied

Europe, and to a lesser extent in Germany, is an organized part of the Anglo-American strategy.

Stress, where possible, facts indicating the decline of effective police control in Germany and German-occupied Europe. Here again, do not interpret these facts to the Germans, but let them speak for themselves. *Make no references before D-Day to foreigners serving in the German Armies in the West.*

(V) *Exploitation of a sense of isolation through the Allied threat to German communications.*

Make the German soldier (especially in the coastal divisions) feel he is a "human land mine," by stressing the significance of attacks on German communications.

Stress that the Atlantic Wall is 1000 miles long, and that the German High Command can meet a threat at only one point by stripping reserves from other points. The German assumes that there will be several landings: so should we.

(VI) *Exploitation of the air offensive to stimulate distrust between the air force and the army and to undermine confidence in the possibility of successful resistance.*

"Fear propaganda" designed to intensify the effect of bombs has been rendered unnecessary by the bombs themselves. In treating the air offensive, concentrate on its strictly military significance as an essential part of our invasion strategy. Avoid giving any impression that we are trying to break German morale. Seek indirectly to arouse resentment against the fact that air power, which the Nazis claimed as their invention, has now been turned against Germany. Give the impression that the efforts of the Luftwaffe cannot make up for Anglo-American production superiority and for the mistakes of the German leadership.

Remember that production figures—unrelated to battle figures—no longer impress the German soldier. Not the number of aircraft produced, but the effects of air superiority, impress him. This applies also to all forms of manpower and material superiority.

20. *Short-term tasks, post D-Day*

(I) *Stimulation of distrust of foreigners in the German Army by open incitement of these foreigners.*

On and after D-Day a special campaign will be launched of direct incitement to desertion, addressed to

foreigners in the German Army of the West. It will have two objects: (a) to influence the foreigners, (b) indirectly to influence the German troops. A special directive will be issued on this subject.

(II) *Special attacks on the morale of troops on the flanks of the fighting.*

During the actual fighting we cannot expect that the German troops engaged will be receptive to anything but combat propaganda.

Strategic radio and leaflets should in this period be directed chiefly to the German troops on the flanks, as well as to foreigners throughout the German Army. The treatment should remain formal and objective and avoid boasting or creating an atmosphere of undue excitement. Every effort should be made to obtain "hot" statements from prisoners of war for use by radio and leaflet.

Every effort should be made to demonstrate to these troops the influence of sea power on the operation. In particular the following themes should be used:

(a) Allied command of the sea, and of the air over it, gives us the power to launch attacks with the maximum of surprise over a very wide range.

(b) Allied command of the sea excludes the free use of sea communications along the Atlantic Wall, communications which would be invaluable if land communications were destroyed or hampered.

(c) The German Navy cannot cope both with the assault and its follow up, and with the trans-Atlantic traffic bringing more and more men, weapons and supplies.

(d) To the troops on the flanks of the breach in the Atlantic Wall, emphasize the power and effectiveness of naval bombardment.

(e) Complete Allied control of the Mediterranean offers freedom of action for further attacks on the Continent.

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This first full analysis and description of psychological warfare conducted by the United States and British armies against Germany was published in 1949 and has since become a standard reference on World War II propaganda. Its appearance in paperback provides an opportunity for a clear appraisal of this unique campaign and of how it defined the ancient and recurrent problems of psychological warfare to suit the needs of the moment. There are chapters on policy, personnel, media, methods of operation, and effectiveness, as well as reproductions of typical propaganda leaflets, charts, and newspapers used against the Germans. For those who still debate the effects of the Allied "unconditional surrender" policy on the German people, Dr. Lerner offers discussion from a propagandist's point of view. The book also contains an essay from the British side by Richard H. S. Crossman.

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While preparing the book, Dr. Lerner had the assistance and cooperation of many who were actively engaged in psychological warfare operations at all levels, as well as psychologists, social scientists, and other related specialists. At the time he was chief editor in the Intelligence Branch of the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF) and was able to make firsthand observations of propaganda activities.

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